Levy Institute Publications

On November 5, 2024, American voters sent Donald Trump back to the White House. In 2020, he lost his bid for reelection to Joe Biden, after winning in 2016 against Hillary Clinton (but only thanks to the electoral college). This time, however, Trump won the popular vote. All the new energy that surrounded the Harris-Walz campaign was outmatched by the turnout from Trump supporters.
 
All polls—whatever one’s feelings about their reliability—kept pointing to the same defining issue in this (as in every other) election: the economy. Critical issues of democracy, abortion, and immigration filled the airwaves and political speeches, but the economy remained once again more powerful than any one of them.
 
Economists uniformly failed to grasp what these “concerns with the economy” were all about. They kept celebrating the decline in inflation and kept pointing to the fastest recovery in postwar history. The labor market—almost everyone declared—was now at full employment (a few of us strongly disagreed). Real wages, especially at the bottom, had finally risen for the first time in many decades. Fiscal policy had returned, juicing up economic growth with mega-contracts to firms and generous credits for renewable energy: all developments we hadn’t seen in decades.
 
This was an economy that most economists hadn’t seen in their professional lives. For 50 years, wages had been stagnating, jobless recoveries were the norm, labor force participation rates were falling. This time was different: the fastest recovery from any postwar recession, growth rates America hadn’t experienced in decades, prime-age employment at its historical peak, record peacetime government spending, and wage increases at the bottom of the income distribution. This time the recovery felt different. But despite the post-COVID splurge to salvage and repaint the old American economic engine, for many families it was the same old clunker under the hood.
 
And this is exactly what the various ballot measures on election night seemed to tell us. When presented with questions about the economy and their standard of living, voters expressed their displeasure with how things were going and they voted in support of pro-worker measures—especially in red states.
 
Here are some of the ways in which state ballot measures played out.
 
Paid Sick Leave
Three states had introduced measures requiring employers to provide paid sick leave to workers (Alaska, Missouri, Nebraska). In all three states, these measures passed. All three states voted for Trump.
 
The United States is the only advanced country without a federally mandated paid leave policy.
 
Minimum Wages 
When it came to wages, Alaska and Missouri passed measures to increase their minimum wage to $15/hour (in 2027 and 2026, respectively) and adjust them with the cost-of-living thereafter (a similar measure had already passed in Nebraska in 2022). A fourth state (Arizona) rejected a proposed measure to reduce wages of tipped workers.1 Arizona, too, voted for Trump.
 
In California, a minimum wage ballot measure (Prop 32), which would have raised the minimum wage to $18/hour, was rejected. It is unclear why, but CA voters had already passed a law in 2023 to raise the minimum wage to $16/hour in 2024.2 Massachusetts had proposed an unusual and generous increase in the wages of tipped workers (to reach 100 percent of the MA minimum wage by 2029—while continuing to earn tips), but that ballot measure was also rejected. While none of the existing or proposed minimum wages are living wages, it seems some red states are catching up to increases that have been happening in blue states.
 
Infrastructure, Climate, Health
In California,3 two infrastructure investment measures passed. Prop 2 authorizes a bond issue to go forward for public school and community college facilities, while Prop 4 is another bond issue for the support of water infrastructure, wildfire protection, and addressing climate risks.
CA also passed a measure regulating how federal money from drug reduction programs would be spent (Prop 34). Voters wanted 98 percent of such funds to go directly to patient care.
 
Housing and Prison Labor
What CA voters also wanted is to retain oversight over such bond issues, and therefore they defeated Prop 5, which reduced the votes needed to approve bond issues for housing and other public infrastructure from the current two-thirds majority to 55 percent. CA also rejected a measure to expand rent control (Prop 33) and a measure (Prop 6) that would have banned forced servitude (i.e., using prison labor as punishment). Prop 6 would have made prison labor voluntary and would have prioritized rehabilitation.
 
School Choice
Three states introduced a measure to amend the state constitutions and allow state money to go to private schools. In all three states, the measure failed (KY, CO, NE). Considering that school choice is a signature Republican policy, it is notable that two out of the three states that defeated this measure voted for Trump.
 
Reproductive Rights
Repealing Roe v. Wade was bad politics. Voters overwhelmingly supported measures to protect reproductive rights and the right to an abortion. Such measures passed in six states (AZ, CO, MD, MO, MT, NV). In some states, the right to an abortion is now a state constitutional right (CO, NV). Other state laws protected that right up to the point of fetal viability (AZ). New York passed a measure (Prop 1), which adds an anti-discrimination provision to the state’s constitution. NY reproductive rights activists argue that the right to an abortion is now subsumed under a wide range of other protections against unequal treatment.
 
Nebraska had two ballot measures. In the first one, NE voters rejected establishing the right to an abortion until fetal viability, while in the second ballot measure, they voted to enshrine in the constitution the current law prohibiting abortions after the first trimester, unless it is required due to medical emergencies, sexual assault, or incest. In South Dakota and Florida, the proposed constitutional right to an abortion also failed.
 
Right to Vote 
Anti-immigrant rhetoric dominated this election cycle, leading to uniform support for “citizenship requirement to vote” measures wherever they were introduced (IA, ID, KY, MO, NC, OK, SC, WI). In Nevada, voters approved a proposal to amend the state constitution to require voter identification for in-person and by-mail voting. To become law, this measure will need to be approved a second time during the 2026 election.
 
Economic Signals
While the sample of ballot measures that dealt with economic issues in this election cycle is small, it still makes clear where the electorate’s anxieties lie. Red states voted to protect workers, supporting minimum wage increases and mandated paid sick leave. Voters in CA and MA didn’t go for another round of measures, perhaps because they had supported similar increases in recent history. Still, CA voters supported measures to strengthen healthcare, schools, and public infrastructure.
 
For those who remember the politics of school vouchers from the Betsy DeVos area, it is notable that red states rejected using public funds for private school vouchers.
 
While Democrats rightfully singled out abortion and democracy as core issues in this election, and zeroed in on housing affordability and childcare support, they said very little about uniformly popular policies like raising the minimum wage and mandating paid family leave.
 
We should note that none of the minimum wage increases (in blue or red states) will deliver the living incomes that Americans are calling for. The MIT living wage calculator4 is a quick check for how much one must earn to make ends meet. There is no corner of the country where minimum wages come close. Still, these ballot measures are saying that working families can’t keep up.
 
When people say that inflation is their top concern, they are also saying that their jobs and paychecks aren’t allowing them to stay afloat. They are telling us that they need a break; they want paid leave, they want government funding to directly support their immediate needs: patient care, public schools, clean water. They don’t want the public’s money to go to already-thriving private schools.
 
Left Behind
The US saw the fastest recovery in postwar history and an unprecedented level of government spending, but for working families the economy has pretty much returned to its pre-COVID status quo. And that wasn’t pretty. But for a brief moment during the COVID crisis, Americans realized what was possible: they got universal healthcare, no questions asked. They could get student loan relief and a break from other debt and rent payment. Parents received a universal child allowance. All of it was possible and all of it disappeared. Still, Americans wanted and needed more.
 
Today we know that the job market is softening even as the unemployment level remains around its pre-COVID lows. Part-time-employment for economic reasons has been on the rise. Job-related anxieties have been clear in sentiment surveys for a while,5 but the problems are deeper and structural. American families’ standard of living has been slipping for a long time: housing, education, and healthcare have been consistently out of reach. The high grocery bill that American families get to see every day has only added insult to injury, even as official measures of inflation have fallen.
 
Failure
In 2008, the Queen of the United Kingdom asked how professional economists could fail to foresee the 2008 crisis. Well, not everyone failed—for one, we at the Levy Institute saw it—but the mainstream establishment didn’t. Today, we can say that most economists uniformly failed again. They failed in the US, in Europe, and everywhere authoritarianism is on the rise; failed to understand that patching up the economy after each crisis is not enough.
 
Economists fed this complacency with talk about a booming economy and “full employment” (which it was not), celebrating the increase in real wages at the bottom of the distribution, without sounding the alarm that it is not enough to keep up. They urged us to celebrate this once-in-a lifetime postwar growth, glossing over the clear sense among the electorate that the economy is profoundly broken and folks are fed up with the status quo.
 
Growth is not enough. This much should have been obvious long ago. Structural economic issues and insecurity still shape voters’ lives and continue to shape every dimension of politics. For those of us reading the economic tea leaves pointing to economic insecurity, the ballot measures corroborated the anxieties voters feel about their standard of living.
 
As one friend put it to me:
 We are two parents with three Master’s degrees between us and three kids. I make $15-23/hour teaching and have a second job. My husband has a full-time job with benefits but he just survived a first round of layoffs and we don’t know what’s next. Groceries are not affordable, childcare is not affordable, our property taxes continue to rise but we can’t even afford basic house maintenance. Our car repairs put us over the edge, while our kids are growing and their financial needs are expanding. Sending them to college is extremely expensive and our own student loans are impossible to pay. Health insurance has been a help but each year we pay more and more out-of-pocket expenses uncovered by Obamacare. Most jobs require advanced degrees but pay miserable wages. The list goes on and on. We live paycheck to paycheck and cannot afford entertainment or “wants” like we used to. 
That’s it. That’s the story of downward mobility for a middle-class American working family, with a clear punch list for policy makers. The same punch list we’ve known about for decades.
 
 
Notes

1. The Arizona measure (Prop 138) was particularly convoluted but it would have made it more difficult for tipped worker wages to keep up with increases in the state minimum wage. Currently, employers can only pay $3 below the state minimum wage: a gap that will be shrinking as a percentage of the minimum wage as the latter increases. The new proposal would have fixed that gap at 25 percent less than the state minimum wage.
2. https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2023/2023-66.html
3. https://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/index.htm
4. https://livingwage.mit.edu/
5. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/05/29/us-workers-are-less-satisfied-with-nearly-every-aspect-of-their-jobs-survey-finds.html

On the eve of the 2024 US presidential election, the authors share their latest macroeconomic projections using the Levy Institute’s tailored stock-flow consistent model and evaluate two alternative policy scenarios, depending upon the next occupant of the White House: (1) a significant increase in import tariffs and decrease in the marginal tax rate, and (2) a substantial increase in government expenditure paired with an increase in the marginal tax rate.

Edward Lane surveys some of the main potential contributors to the recent period of elevated inflation rates in the US economy—focusing on supply disruptions, inflation-adjusted consumer spending, and consumer spending attributable to price markups—­and outlines prominent proposals being made by the 2024 presidential candidates that may have an impact on inflation.

In a New York Times editorial, David Leonhardt recounts Aesop’s apocryphal story about the boy and the wolf, warning that while deficit hawks have so far been wrong, the growing government debt will eventually bite. He reports the economic plans of both presidential candidates would add to the debt that will soon exceed GDP and grow to 130 percent of annual output under a President Harris, or 140 percent with a Trump presidency.

The story of the boy and the wolf was a fable, although it was within the realm of possibility. The fable of the debt wolf is not. While there are real world wolves—Leonhardt mentions climate catastrophe and autocratic leaders, and the authors would add rising inequality and the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of billionaires—authors Yeva Nersisyan and L. Randall Wray assert, federal debt is not one of them.

Retracing European and Chinese Monetary Thoughts on Chartalism, Nominalism, and the Origins of Monetary Systems

A monetary approach that combines Chartalism, Nominalism, and Command origins of monetary systems is often deemed to have emerged only recently, while the Aristotelian approach (Commodity, Metallism, and Market origins of monetary systems) is the only one that existed until the end of the eighteenth/early-nineteenth century. In the major studies of the history of monetary thought, the Chartalism-Nominalism-Command approach is mostly left unmentioned, or at best reduced to an incoherent banality. The paper shows that this approach has a long and rich intellectual history among European monetary thinkers. In Europe, Plato was its first exponent, albeit in a very rudimentary way, and so one may call it the “Platonic approach.” It is developed by Roman legists (such as Javolenus, Paulus, and Ulpian) and Medieval legists (such as Du Moulin, Hotman, and Butigella) who note that coins are similar to securities and that debts are serviced when nominal sums are paid rather than specific coins tendered. During the Renaissance and early modern period, a series of scholars and financial practitioners (such as Law, Dutot, Thomas Smith, and James Taylor) emphasize the financial logic behind monetary mechanics and the similarity of coins and notes. In the twentieth century, authors such as Innes, Knapp, Keynes, and Commons build onto the groundwork provided by these past scholars. In China, the Chartalism-Nominalism-Command approach develops independently and dominates from the beginning under Confucian and Legist thoughts. They emphasize the statecraft origins of monetary systems, the role of tax redemption, and the irrelevance of the material used to make monetary instruments. Clay, lead, paper, iron, copper, and tin are normal and convenient means to make monetary instruments, they are not special/emergency materials. The essence of a monetary instrument is not defined by its materiality but rather by its chartality, that is, by the promise it embeds. The Platonic approach rejects the categories and conceptualizations used by the Aristotelian approach and develops new ones, which leads to a different set of inquiries and understanding of monetary phenomena, problems, and history.

This paper looks at the relationship between government budget deficits and the growth rate of GDP. While orthodox economic theory offers several reasons to believe that growing deficits might be associated with slower growth, and would ultimately be unsustainable, Keynesians assert that deficits could stimulate growth—at least in the short run—implying the relation between deficits and growth could be positive. Modern Money Theory, adopting Godley’s sectoral balance approach, Lerner’s functional finance approach, and Minsky’s theory of financial instability takes a more nuanced approach. Historical data for a number of countries is presented, showing that there is no obvious relation between the deficit ratio and economic growth over long time periods. However, there is a predictable path of the relationship over the course of the business cycle for all countries examined.

In this report, Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Research Scholar Giuliano T. Yajima, and Senior Scholar Gennaro Zezza discuss the rapid recovery of the US economy in the post-pandemic period. They find that robust consumption and investment and a relaxation of fiscal policy were the key drivers of accelerated GDP growth—however, the signs that the same rapid rate of growth will continue are not encouraging. In the authors’ assessment, projections relying on significant increases in private sector expenditures, including residential investment, are doubtful unless the relaxation of fiscal policy continues; both the household and corporate sectors will be deleveraging instead of increasing spending; the trade balance will continue along its same path in a deficit position; and the run up in the stock market carries significant downside risks.

Recently, the neglected question of why the US government borrows, given that it can print money, has arisen in the context of discussions surrounding a new documentary, Finding the Money. As L. Randall Wray observes in this one-pager, Modern Money Theory has been providing answers to this question for some time; and, he argues, it is a topic that mainstream economists are ill-equipped to address, since very few concern themselves with the monetary operations that underlie the question of why a currency-issuing government issues debt.

This working paper contrasts the neo-Keynesian and post-Keynesian theories of monetary policy for an open economy, highlighting the irrelevance of the orthodox theory and the explanatory capacity of heterodoxy for an emerging economy such as Mexico. It focuses on the role of the central bank and the case of the Mexican currency during the economic recovery after the Great Lockout. In the first section, we criticize two proposals of the 3-Equation New-Keynesian model, concluding that, implicitly, both models reaffirm the extreme neutrality of money and the exchange rate in both the short and the long runs. In contrast, we analyze the post-Keynesian exchange rate model proposed by John T. Harvey (2009). In addition, we rely on the fundamentals of the heterodox school of thought such as the financial instability hypothesis of Hyman Minsky (1994) and the relevance of capital flows for the determination of the exchange rate and its implications for economic growth and prices by Jan Kregel (2008). Finally, the erratic behavior of the excessive appreciation of the Mexican Super Peso against the dollar after the recovery of the COVID-19 crisis and in the context of global risk is presented.

Against the backdrop of demographic transition in India, the study highlights the necessity of integrating the elderly population as a critical factor in formula-based intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The demographic transition, characterized by an increasing elderly population, imposes unique fiscal challenges on states, necessitating a revision of transfer formulas to ensure equitable and efficient resource distribution. The paper employs a historical analysis of fiscal devolution criteria, and analyzes the impact of incorporating the elderly population into the devolution formula on the share of states in the total tax transfer to states. The findings indicate that integrating the elderly population into the tax devolution formula can significantly alter the distribution of resources among states, with states benefiting more while having a relatively larger elderly population. The study recommends considering demographic changes by incorporating the elderly to working age population ratio as a criterion used by the Sixteenth Finance Commission to promote a more equitable and efficient allocation of resources. 

In spring 2021, under the direction and encouragement of Commissioner William Beach, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) kicked off a major initiative—to produce a measure of consumption to supplement the release of consumer expenditures. The production of such a measure would fill a data gap regarding household economic well-being. For years BLS staff, with support from the public, had discussed the possibility of producing a consumption measure. However, it was the experience of COVID-19 and the role of home production for consumption that nudged the Bureau to promote the development of such a measure. To support this new initiative, the BLS sought input from the greater research community and public: first through the organization of a Consumption Symposium; and second through a Request for Information (RFI) that would result in an outside BLS contract. Consumption Symposium speakers included well-known national and international researchers who are expert in various aspects of measurement, including home production; the Symposium was held September 21–22, 2021. In parallel, the RFI was issued in May 2021 with responses received in July 2021. This was followed by Request for Quotation (RFQ) in September 2021. The Levy Institute was awarded the contract with a period of performance of twelve months beginning September 30, 2021.
 
The following report includes the Levy Institute’s findings in developing an empirical methodology and identifying data sources (including the BLS American Time Use Survey) to extend the consumer expenditure data collected by the BLS (using Consumer Expenditure Surveys) by incorporating household production (nonmarket and nongovernmental services such as do-it-yourself home repairs and childcare). The researchers—Ajit Zacharias, Fernando Rios-Avila, Nancy Folbre, and Thomas Masterson—found that an overwhelming share of home production is provided by women. Distinct from most previous research, this research extends the scope of household production to include supervisory childcare and care received by household members from people outside their household. Estimates are generated for various major components of household production, such as childcare and cooking, rather than a single category. Included are estimates by alternative methods with monetary values of household production. This research represents an extension of the work the Levy Institute has been doing in bringing the realm of household production into economic analysis, including the creation of alternative measures of economic well-being (LIMEW) and poverty (LIMTIP).
 
During fiscal year 2024, the BLS will be evaluating the methodology proposed in this report with an expectation that a BLS consumption measure that includes home production will be forthcoming in 2025.
 
The full report can be downloaded here.

Tables and figures from the report can be downloaded here.

Additional detailed information on the quality checks conducted regarding the imputations from the ATUS data can be found here.

The GitHub repository files contain detailed information on the three methods of imputation, weekday and weekend imputations, and results pertaining to each CE file (Interview, Diary, quarter, etc.). These files contain information that we used to check the quality of imputations. Users who want to use a particular method (say statistical matching) and a particular file (say third-quarter Interview sample) can check the quality of imputation for their use with the help of the information available in the repository. In assessing the quality, the users could use the strategy we provide in the report or their own criteria.

In this report, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Nikolaos Rodousakis, Giuliano T. Yajima, and Gennaro Zezza investigate the determinants of the recent performance of the Greek economy.
 
Despite geopolitical instability from the continuing Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Gaza wars and higher-than-expected inflation rates, the country has managed to register the highest growth rates among eurozone member-states in 2021 and 2022.
 
Yet the authors’ projections, based on 2023Q3 official statistics, show that there will be a deceleration of GDP growth in the upcoming two years. This will be driven mainly by sluggish consumption demand due to the falling trend of real wages and persistent higher imported inflation, coupled with the inability of the government to deploy NGEU funds and a significant loss of production due to climate damage from floods and fires. These dynamics will likely continue the brain drain of skilled workers, who opt to move abroad for better employment opportunities. The overreliance of the Greek economy on tourism is also questioned, given the dependency on foreign industrial inputs.

Gender budgeting is a public financial management (PFM) tool, used to ensure accountability mechanisms. The analysis of “process” indicators of gender-responsive PFM (GRPFM) reveals that India has been successful in integrating a gender lens within the budget cycle, including in the financial planning and allocation, and in effective implementation. However, a legally mandated GRPFM would be crucial for the sustained impact of gender budgeting on gender equality outcomes. The empirical analysis of the link between GRPFM and gender equality outcomes showed that flexibility of finances is crucial for a government to implement GRPFM. The unconditional fiscal transfers have relatively more impact on gender equality outcomes than conditional transfers. The plausible mechanism through which unconditional tax transfers impact gender equality outcomes lies in the flexibility of use of tax transfers by the subnational governments in prioritizing their gender-related commitments. This inference has policy implications for the 16th Finance Commission.

The article analyzes Mexico under globalization, particularly on the free mobility of capital. It argues that globalization has detrimentally impacted the productive and external sectors, causing the economy to become excessively reliant on volatile capital inflows from abroad. The Mexican government—instead of undoing the structural problems that lead to external deficits—implements policies that resolve the short-term liquidity needs and go against economic growth, as if they are promoting capital inflows. The national currency has appreciated greatly and acts only in favor of the financial sector and in detriment of the productive and the external sector.
 
The Mexican economy has fallen into a context of high external vulnerability since it rests on capital inflows. Capital inflows are highly fragile and volatile. They depend not only on internal problems, but also on the world economy and expectations. For this reason, the reliance on capital inflows to appreciate the peso is unsustainable.
 
Given the meager growth of the world economy and trade, globalization is being questioned and various countries are implementing industrial and protectionist policies. If Mexico continues to bet on outward growth through nearshoring, it will have no chance of overcoming the problems it faces.
 
Mexico cannot continue with an economic policy that does not generate endogenous conditions to growth and that has made the economy dependent on the behavior of international financial markets which generate recurrent crises.

For Matías Vernengo and Esteban Pérez Caldentey (2020), the MMT literature overemphasizes the choice of the exchange rate regime and the relevance of a flexible exchange rate regime, as well as the ultimate effect of that choice upon the policy space. In addition, they argue that the role of capital flows is underexplored, and that the relevance of the balance-of-payments constraint is often underestimated. Vernengo and Pérez’s criticism fails to consider that exchange-rate flexibility makes it possible to use flexible fiscal and monetary policies as well, to boost growth and employment, and to reduce the balance-of-payments constraint.

This paper examines the dynamics of euro-denominated (EUR) long-term interest rate swap yields. It shows that the short-term interest rate has an economically and statistically significant effect on EUR swap yields of different maturity tenors, after controlling for various key macroeconomic variables. It presents several autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) models of the dynamics of EUR swap yields. The estimated econometric models of EUR swap yields of different maturity tenors imply that the European Central Bank (ECB) exerts substantial influence on interest rate swap yields, primarily through the effect of its actions on the current short-term interest rate. Examining the case of EUR interest rate swaps, the findings of the paper lend additional credence to John Maynard Keynes’s hypothesis concerning the ability of a central bank to influence long-term market interest rates.

The Guyana government, from 2015 to 2021, accumulated a large overdraft on its central bank account. It owed this overdraft to a binding debt ceiling limit and fractious political environment that prevented an increase in the ceiling, allowing for the auctioning of Treasury bills to create the liquidity reflux necessary to refill the account. This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of reflux (one-sided sales of Treasury bills) and broken or incomplete reflux (base money expansion) by focusing on domestic inflation, the foreign exchange (FX) rate, and the quantity of FX traded in the local market. The empirical results suggest that the inflation rate is largely driven by foreign price and oil shocks. Nevertheless, the broken reflux adversely affected the local FX market by increasing the demand for foreign currencies, marginally depreciating the exchange rate, and slightly increasing the inflation rate. The latter finding has important implications for the enormous post-2020 budget spending since the discovery of offshore oil. However, reflux was found to have a stabilizing effect on the demand for FX and inflation. Granger predictability tests provide strong evidence that the government spends first from its central bank account before reflux occurs. Finally, the paper discusses a few novel institutional features of Guyana which resemble the monetary circuit framework (with government) of neo-chartalists.

We argue that the US trade and industry sector has experienced several unsustainable sectoral processes, including (i) a fall in the trade balance in machinery and equipment and high-tech (HT) industries, (ii) a rise in import multipliers in machinery and equipment and HT industries, (iii) a fall in the manufacturing share of GDP in machinery and equipment and HT industries, (iv) a rise in commodities share of GDP, (v) a fall in the wage share, (vi) structural shifts in the consumption share of wages, and (vii) a fall in employment multipliers for the US, particularly in manufacturing. To address these issues, the US must shift toward a more sustainable and value-added economy with a focus on innovation and investment in high-tech industries, renewable energy, and sustainable agriculture. Additionally, policies must be put in place to address the negative impacts of resource extraction and to promote a more equitable distribution of income and wealth.

In comparison to the policy responses in the aftermath of the 2008–9 global financial crisis, the reactions of EU policymakers to the combined shocks of the COVID-19 crisis and Ukraine-Russia conflict reveal a greater willingness to deploy public finance in support of the population. Yet, while this display of renewed solidarity is commendable, policymakers have a long way to go in building a more resilient and sustainable EU. A confrontation with long-standing “business as usual” EU rules and policies is necessary, and it is in this context that the job guarantee deserves serious consideration. Acting for the common purpose of reducing and eventually eliminating long-term unemployment would send a clear message that a Social Europe is possible.

This paper econometrically models the dynamics of Swedish government bond (SGB) yields. It examines whether the short-term interest rate has a decisive influence on long-term SGB yields, after controlling for other macroeconomic and financial variables, such as consumer price inflation, the growth of industrial production, the stock price index, the exchange rate of the Swedish krona, and the balance sheet of Sweden’s central bank, Sveriges Riksbank. It applies an autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) approach using monthly data to model SGB yields across the Treasury yield curve. The results of the estimated models show that the short-term interest rate has a marked influence on the long-term SGB yield. Such findings reaffirm John Maynard Keynes’s view that the central bank’s monetary policy affects long-term government bond yields through the current short-term interest rate.  It also shows that the interest rate behavior observed in Sweden is in concordance with empirical patterns discerned in previous studies related to government bond yields in both advanced countries and emerging markets.

Analyzing the Tax Buoyancy of the Extractive Sector

Against the backdrop of fiscal transition concomitant to energy transition policies with climate change commitments, revenue from the extractive sector needs a recalibration in the subnational fiscal space. Extractive tax is the payment due to the government in exchange for the right to extract the mineral substance. Extractive tax has been fixed and paid in multiple tax regimes, sometimes on the measures of ad valorem (value-based) or profits or as the unit of the mineral extracted. Using the ARDL methodology, this paper analyzes the buoyancy of extractive revenue across the states in India, for the period 1991–92 to 2022–23 and analyzes the short- and long-run coefficients and their speed of adjustment. There are no identified structural breaks in the series predominantly because of the homogenous extractive policy regime shift to ad valorem from a unit-based regime. Our findings revealed that extractive tax is a buoyant source of own revenue, though there are distinct state-specific differentials. The policy implication of our study is crucial for a “just transition” related to climate change commitments where extractive industries’ tax buoyancy is compared to other tax buoyancy across Indian states, and can be used as the base scenario to estimate the loss of revenue when fiscal transition sets in with “just transition” policies.

In recalling John Maynard Keynes’s revolutionary theory of interest, reviewing the doctrines Keynes sought to overthrow, and analyzing the structural transformations of the US economy, James K. Galbraith maintains there is no alternative to a policy of low interest rates. However, such a policy cannot be effective, he argues, without a radical restructuring of the US economy as a whole.

While the trigger for the Covid recession was unusual—a collapse of the supply side that produced a drop in demand—the inflation the US economy is now facing is not atypical, according to L. Randall Wray. In this one-pager, he explores the causes of the current inflationary environment, arguing that continuing inflation pressures come mostly from the supply side.

Wray warns that, given federal spending had already been declining substantially before the Fed started raising interest rates, rate hikes make a recession—and potentially stagflation—even more likely. A key part of our fiscal policy response should be focused on well-designed public investment addressing the substantial supply constraints still affecting the US economy—constraints that are not just due to the Covid crisis, but also decades of underinvestment in infrastructure. Such an approach, in Wray's view, would reduce inflationary pressures while supporting growth.
 

Reexamining the Economic Costs of Debt

On November 20, 2019, Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray testified before the House Committee on the Budget on the topic of reexamining the economic costs of debt:

"In recent months a new approach to national government budgets, deficits, and debts—Modern Money Theory (MMT)—has been the subject of discussion and controversy. [. . .]

In this testimony I do not want to rehash the theoretical foundations of MMT. Instead I will highlight empirical facts with the goal of explaining the causes and consequences of the intransigent federal budget deficits and the growing national government debt. I hope that developing an understanding of the dynamics involved will make the topic of deficits and debt less daunting. I will conclude by summarizing the MMT views on this topic, hoping to set the record straight."

Update 1/7/2020: In an appendix, L. Randall Wray responds to a Question for the Record submitted by Rep. Ilhan Omar

Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

Gender disparity in the division of responsibilities for unpaid care and domestic work (household production) is a central and pervasive component of inequalities between men and women and boys and girls. Reducing disparity in household production figures as one element of the goal of gender equality enshrined in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and feminist scholars and political activists have articulated that the redistribution of household production responsibilities from females to males is important for its own sake, as well as for achieving gender equality in labor market outcomes. A cursory examination of available cross-country data indicates that higher per capita GDP—the neoliberal panacea for most societal malaise—provides little bulwark against the gender inequality in household production.
 
Ajit Zacharias, Thomas Masterson, Fernando Rios-Avila, and Abena D. Oduro contribute to the literature on the intrahousehold distribution of household production by placing the question within a framework of analyzing deprivation, applying that framework to better understand the interactions between poverty and the gendered division of labor in four sub-Saharan African nations: Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania. Central to their framework is the notion that attaining a minimal standard of living requires command over an adequate basket of commodities and sufficient time to be spent on home production, where meeting those requirements produces benefits for all—including those beyond the household.
 
Their findings motivate questions regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of redistribution of household responsibilities to alleviate time deficits and their impoverishing effects. By developing a framework to assess the mechanics of redistribution among family members and applying it to gender-based redistribution, they derive the maximum extent to which redistribution—either among all family members, between sexes, or between husbands and wives—can lower the incidence of time deficits. The conclude with a discussion of alternative principles of distributing household production responsibilities among family members and examine their impact on the Levy Institute Measure of Time and Income Poverty (LIMTCP) and discuss some policy questions in light of their findings.

Heterodox Economic Policy for the 21st Century

A Great Leap Forward: Heterodox Economic Policy for the 21st Century investigates economic policy from a heterodox and progressive perspective. Author Randall Wray uses relatively short chapters arranged around several macroeconomic policy themes to present an integrated survey of progressive policy on topics of interest today that are likely to remain topics of interest for many years.

Published by: Elsevier Press