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Columbia University is hosting a seminar series on “Money and the Public Purpose.”  The seminar, open to the public, begins this week and features a number of Levy Institute scholars.  From the overview: Modern Money and Public Purpose is an eight-part, interdisciplinary seminar series held at Columbia Law School over the 2012-2013 academic year. The series aims to present new perspectives and progressive policy proposals on a range of contemporary issues facing the U.S. and global macroeconomy. Seminars will feature a mix of academics and practitioners on topics ranging from the history of debt and money and the structure of the financial system to economic human rights for the 21st century. Tomorrow’s session features Randall Wray and Michael Hudson on “The Historical Evolution of Money and Debt.” Full schedule here.  Background reading here.

Whatever the outcome of efforts to resolve severe economic difficulties in Europe and elsewhere, it is becoming increasingly clear that the next big economic crisis may not hinge on interest rates at all. One reason is that the world’s central banks, many of them following something like a Robinsonian “cheap money policy,” have managed to keep interest rates reasonably low in many countries. For example, it seems clear that yields on Spanish and Italian bonds are under control for now, after statements last month by Mario Draghi, the president of the ECB, that he was “ready to do whatever it takes,” to keep interest rates down. As made clear in this interesting and enlightening 2003 book edited by Bell and Nell (Stephanie Bell Kelton and Edward Nell), the theoretical argument for the Eurozone was badly flawed from the beginning.  (Indeed, many in the world of heterodox economics saw these  flaws from the beginning.) But, returning in this post to a key theme in Joan Robinson’s writings on the interest rate, I will offer some of the thoughts of John Maynard Keynes himself, who wrote in 1945 that: The monetary authorities can have any rate of interest they like.… They can make both the short and long-term [rate] whatever they like, or rather whatever they feel to be right. … Historically… Read More

The idea of breaking up the big banks, while seemingly growing in popularity, leaves a lot of unanswered questions.  And one of the biggest questions is probably this:  what will be the structure of the smaller institutions that remain after such a break up?  If these smaller institutions are allowed to entangle themselves in the same complex activities as before, then we will still be a long way from stabilizing the financial system. In this context (and with a recent IMF paper reconsidering the Depression-era “Chicago Plan”), Jan Kregel looks at one potential proposal for simplifying the financial structure; an alternative to Dodd-Frank’s partiality and complexity.  In his latest policy brief (“Minsky and the Narrow Banking Proposal: No Solution for Financial Reform“), Kregel looks at Hyman Minsky’s consideration of a narrow banking proposal in the mid-1990s (at the time, Minsky was looking at potential reforms for a post-Glass-Steagall financial system).  In this narrow banking proposal, commercial and investment banking functions would be separated into distinct subsidiaries of a bank holding company, with 100 percent reserves required for the deposit-taking subsidiary and a 100 percent ratio of capital to assets for the investment subsidiary. Minsky eventually turned against the proposal, and Kregel likewise concludes that narrow banking is not the answer.  Among other reasons, Kregel notes that in such a narrow… Read More

Over at The Nation, Dimitri Papadimitriou writes about the accelerating eurozone bank runs, in which euros have been flowing out of Spanish and Greek banks and into Germany at an eye-popping rate, and lays out scenarios for how this whole things ends: The migration of money into Germany is quickening. And under TARGET 2, the trillions of euros that the ECB has loaned out to finance this race will be uncollectable. How to counteract a disaster of these proportions? Unlimited deposit insurance for all euros in EMU banks, backed by the creation of a strong European federal treasury, would end the bank runs, just as deposit insurance in the United States has prevented them here ever since the Great Depression. The insurance liability would be on Europe’s central bank, which would become insolvent if Spain or Italy abandoned the euro. Since, unlike the United States, the ECB doesn’t have a unified European treasury to backstop it, Germany would presumably get the bill for a default. As Randall Wray and I predict in a new Levy Institute policy paper, “That’s a bill Germany will not accept, hence, probably no deposit insurance.” And no future for the euro. Update: Papadimitriou was also interviewed on the topic for Ian Masters’ Background Briefing radio program (listen here).

Since eurozone governments don’t issue the currency in which their debts are denominated and can’t borrow euros directly from the European Central Bank, member-states essentially have to run budget surpluses—generating euros by taxing the private sector—if they’re going to reliably meet their debt servicing costs, according to Jan Kregel, and they have to run even bigger surpluses if they’re going to reach the debt limits set by the Stability and Growth Pact.  Kregel puts this in Minskyan terms:  “member-states should be engaged in ‘hedge’ finance, which means producing a fiscal surplus well in excess of debt service. If it cannot do this, it must issue additional debt to the private sector, since it cannot borrow from the ECB. In this case, the government would be engaging in what Minsky called ‘Ponzi’ finance: it would be borrowing to meet debt service.” But in order to maintain such budget surpluses, Kregel points out, the eurozone needs higher economic growth, and this sets up a fundamental paradox: …governments cannot produce this growth through deficit spending; it must come from either domestic or foreign demand. Lowering government expenditures or raising taxes to generate the required fiscal surplus will only reduce domestic demand. This leaves external demand as the only solution. But without the ability to improve external competitiveness through exchange rate adjustment, internal depreciation… Read More

(Updated) by Rania Antonopoulos and Michael Stephens Poverty is often measured by the ability to gain access to some level of minimum income, based on the premise that such access ensures the fulfillment of basic material needs. But this approach neglects to take into account the necessary (unpaid) household production requirements without which basic needs cannot be fulfilled. In fact, because the two are interdependent, evaluations of living standards ought to consider both dimensions; otherwise, the poverty numbers produced by statistical agencies and used by policy makers are flatly wrong. Consider, for instance, two identical households of two adults and two children whose annual household incomes are also identical.  In the first household, while the mother or father works and brings in all the income, the other spouse is a stay-at-home parent that raises the children. In the second household, both adults are employed and, as it turns out, they work long hours because their hourly wages are relatively low. Nonetheless, they pull in the same income as the first household (with only one adult working). Income-wise, the two households are identical. What differentiates them is “time”: the first household has an adult with ample amounts of time to devote to cooking, maintenance work, raising the children, etc. The second household does not: it faces a time deficit in that… Read More

For those who worry that elevated federal deficits and quantitative easing (QE) by the Fed will lead to high inflation, a word about the macroeconomics of the 1970s. The topic came up in the news recently with the passing of economist and former presidential adviser Paul McCracken. In keeping with many orthodox accounts of the era, an obituary in the New York Times cast much of the blame for the stagflation [slow growth combined with high inflation] of the 1970s on “Keynesian” macro policies, in particular large budget deficits: A wide-ranging thinker, Mr. McCracken was part of a postwar generation of economists who believed that government should play an active role in moderating business cycles, balancing inflation and unemployment, and helping the disadvantaged. His nearly three years at the White House coincided with a turbulent era marked by rising deficits, rampant inflation, the imposition of wage and price controls, and the breakdown of the system of fixed exchange rates that had governed the world’s currencies since World War II. As a result, by the early 1980s, Mr. McCracken, like other economists, questioned the Keynesian assumptions that had been dominant since the war. He concluded that high inflation had resulted from “a cumulative paralysis in our will” and called for greater fiscal discipline to limit the growth of government spending —… Read More

Randall Wray joined Suzi Weissman for radio KPFK’s Beneath the Surface to discuss monetary policy, financial fraud, and a number of other issues.  The interview kicked off with Wray explaining his skepticism of the effectiveness of monetary policy, and in particular of quantitative easing, under current conditions, touching also on the question of why this long-term bias in favor of monetary over fiscal policy has developed.  The interview turned to LIBOR and the long string of recent financial scandals and outright fraud, with Wray tying it all to a broader (and growing) financialization of the economy.  Elaborating on the dominance of the FIRE sector in our economy, he discussed the increasingly fuzzy boundaries between, say, finance and industry. Listen to the interview here.

In his recent commentary on the LIBOR scandal, Jan Kregel elaborates on a distinction that is crucial to understanding this story.  The scandal centers around revelations that financial institutions had been manipulating their LIBOR rate submissions to the British Bankers’ Association (BBA).  Questions have subsequently been raised as to whether regulators were aware of and condoned, or actively encouraged, these manipulations.  But as Kregel explains, there were two very different types of manipulation that were going on, and the distinction between the two is acutely relevant to evaluating attempts to pin a major share of the blame for this scandal on regulators and central bank officials.  (LIBOR is a proprietary index put out by the BBA that is supposed to represent an average of the rate at which banks are able to borrow from each other short term.  It is composed of rate submissions from banks selected for a panel who are asked to give the rate at which they have borrowed or could hypothetically borrow.  The highest and lowest 25 percent of the submissions are thrown out.  LIBOR sets the benchmark for things like mortgages, student loans, credit cards, etc.  See Kregel’s piece for a more detailed explanation.) Prior to the most recent financial crisis, LIBOR was rigged by banks in an attempt to benefit their trading positions (the… Read More

We end the week with news of only modest economic growth, but also with a set of revised data that does not seriously worsen the economic outlook. Today the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced the release of an advanced estimate of 2nd quarter GDP, as well as revised data for 2009Q1 through 2012Q1. Their press release notes that: “Real gross domestic product—the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States—increased at an annual rate of 1.5 percent in the second quarter of 2012, (that is, from the first quarter to the second quarter), according to the “advance” estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the first quarter, real GDP increased 2.0 percent.” An article from the FT  points out that consumption grew by 1.5 percent, while government spending at all levels of government fell by 1.4 percent. Leaving the drop in government spending out of the calculation would raise the overall growth rate to 1.8 percent per year, or .3 percent higher than the actual figure released today. Here is a graphical comparison of the old and new data series: As the figure shows, the new data series implies that the fall in real GDP during the 2007–09 recession was not as deep as previously believed, though this difference is rather… Read More

The cliff approaches, and politicians and pundits in Washington are pondering how to deal with it. For those who have forgotten, recent nontechnical summaries of the legislative issues and amounts of money at stake can be found here , here, and in this old post. But essentially, the term “fiscal cliff” refers to a massive group of tax increases and spending cuts due to take effect on or around January 1 of next year. President Obama and some Congressional Democrats are seeking to take a stand for distributional fairness and deficit reduction at the same time by pushing for a renewal of the Bush tax cuts, but only for those with incomes less than perhaps $250,000 for a couple. On the other hand, some long-time fiscal conservatives are seeking to cushion the blow by delaying the impact of the spending cuts and tax increases and by seeking a less indiscriminate choice of program cuts. They emphasize that in any case, draconian measures must in their view be taken eventually and committed to now. From the point of view of Keynesian macroeconomics, what the fiscal conservatives fail to understand is that the economy requires even more fiscal ease than they have been willing to contemplate so far; otherwise, like Spain and many other European nations (see the FT and the WSJ on… Read More

Martin Essex of the Wall Street Journal flags Dimitri Papadimitriou and Randall Wray’s recent Policy Note on the eurozone, “Euroland’s Original Sin.”  The Note traces the root cause of the eurozone’s struggles, including the solvency issues and bank runs in the periphery, to a fundamental design flaw in its setup:  national governments gave up currency sovereignty by adopting the euro but retained responsibility for their own fiscal policy. Essex chooses to focus on a footnote that quotes some early predictions by those associated with the Levy Institute, which is fine.  But it’s important to note a couple of things here.  First, the point is not that the euro project was predicted to run into trouble in general, but that in these quotations the problems were predicted to flow from a particular structural flaw:  the separation between fiscal policy and monetary sovereignty.  And this is important for reasons that go beyond a prescience contest.  The predictions serve as a useful guide for figuring out what needs to be done to save the euro project. Getting it right isn’t about being able to say “I told you so,” but about having the credibility to say “here’s what should happen next.”  In this case, in the context of addressing the bank runs afflicting the periphery, Papadimitriou and Wray argue for the necessity of… Read More