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What Would a Grexit Look Like?
by Michael Stephens
Slate‘s Matt Yglesias nicely captures the gap between the reactions of opinion-makers to the Greek election results and the reactions of markets (Sunday’s electoral results point to a coalition government centered around New Democracy and Pasok): “Markets were supposed to be reassured. Instead they’re freaking out. European stock markets are declining, and Spanish bond yields are back into the 7 percent danger zone. What went wrong? Perhaps the better question to ask is how it ever got to be conventional wisdom that maintaining the Greek status quo was the reassuring option?” A Greek exit from the eurozone is still very much a live possibility. And given that the election results represent a continuation of the status quo, you might say a Grexit is even more likely. If you believe the status quo is unsustainable, and that only something like a Greek New Deal would bring the growth necessary to pull Greece out of its depression, then there is little room for optimism. So what would a Greek exit actually look like? C. J. Polychroniou tackles this question in a new policy note. Polychroniou argues that it was a mistake not to allow Greece to proceed with an orderly default two years ago. While Greece is in for some economic pain whether it stays on the euro or returns to the… Read More
What This Election Isn’t About
by Michael Stephens
This received little attention, but President Obama recently sat down for an interview with Mark Halperin of Time magazine. The interview didn’t generate anything you might call “newsworthy,” littered as it was with tired exchanges like this one: Q: “Why not in the first year, if you’re [re-]elected — why not in 2013, go all the way and propose the kind of budget with spending restraints that you’d like to see after four years in office? Why not do it more quickly?” A: “Well because, if you take a trillion dollars for instance, out of the first year of the federal budget, that would shrink GDP over 5%. That is by definition throwing us into recession or depression. So I’m not going to do that, of course.” No, of course not. There isn’t anything surprising about this response, with the President mechanically delivering the Keynesian line. But it does reinforce something about this election: that it’s shaping up to be a battle between contrasting visions, Keynesian vs. Austerian, and a referendum on the President’s implementation of his preferred Keynesian approach. That’s what will make this election so satisfying for anyone interested in economic policy and what makes it a rare occasion for the public to deliver their verdict on the last few years’ worth of Keynesian management, and to decide if… Read More
Some Views on the “Cliff”
by Greg Hannsgen
On the topic of public policy, this Works Progress Administration (WPA) poster from the 1930s seems particularly relevant this year. You may have heard of the “fiscal cliff” that the federal budget will fall off in January, under existing law. It will be quite a fiscal contraction, if it happens as scheduled: about 4 percent of last year’s GDP, to use these numbers from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). This total includes both tax increases and spending cuts, but not the offsetting effects of “automatic stabilizers,” such as lower income taxes for people whose incomes are adversely affected by the cliff itself. The CBO report projects that this set of changes would lead to a recession early next year. (Briefly, the changes that make up the cliff are (1) the expiration of the “Bush tax cuts,” the 2 percent payroll-tax holiday, and some other tax cuts; (2) the across-the-board spending cuts broadly agreed to by President Obama and Congress as part of last summer’s deal to raise the debt limit; (3) the end of new emergency extended unemployment benefits; (4) reduced Medicare doctor payment rates; and (5) tax increases included in the “Obamacare” health act passed by Congress in 2010.) I chose the image at the top of this post out of many available free-of-charge at the Library of Congress’s… Read More
Austerity Wars: A New (False) Hope
by Michael Stephens
The intensity of the debate over whether the Baltic economies (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) should serve as models for the rest of the eurozone periphery has been raised a couple notches. Last week, Paul Krugman noted that the Estonian recovery, while positive, has not been as remarkable as austerity supporters tend to imply. This prompted a vigorous reaction from Estonia’s head of state (unless there’s someone impersonating Toomas Hendrik Ilves on Twitter). But let’s bracket for the moment this question of how impressive the Baltic recoveries have been. They are growing again, and that’s at least something. Last week, Rainer Kattel and Ringa Raudla put out a policy note that focused on a different aspect of the problem: whatever you think of the results, to what extent is the Baltic experience replicable? If the rest of the eurozone periphery can’t reproduce the conditions that led to Baltic growth, then this isn’t a terribly useful model. The argument is supposed to be that austerity and internal devaluation (that’s basically trying to get your real wages to fall in order to regain competitiveness) should be credited for the recoveries in the Baltics (incomplete though they may be). As C. J. Polychroniou has been pointing out, the latest attempts at internal devaluation don’t appear to be working terribly well in the rest of the… Read More
Help Is Not on the Way
by Michael Stephens
An update on the distressing state of fiscal and monetary policy in the United States and Europe: Chairman of the Federal Reserve to Congress: “I’d be much more comfortable, in fact, if Congress would take some of this burden from us ….” Congress to Bernanke: No thanks. And while we’re on the subject, we would be much more comfortable, in fact, if you’d just stop carrying the load entirely. Kindly leave the economy in the ditch right there. Or as Binyamin Appelbaum put it in his NYTimes report: Republicans on the committee pressed repeatedly for Mr. Bernanke to make a clear commitment that the Fed would take no further action to stimulate growth. “I wish you would look the markets in the eye and say that the Fed has done too much,” Representative Kevin Brady of Texas told Mr. Bernanke. Democrats, by contrast, inquired politely after the Fed’s plans and showed surprisingly little interest in urging the Fed to expand its efforts. Perhaps the private sector can muddle through on its own? Here’s a graph from the Levy Institute’s Strategic Analysis showing employment and unemployment rates going back to 2000: To fill the gap in the employment rate represented by that orange area, according to the macro team “the nation needs to find jobs for about 6 percent of the… Read More
Lessons of the JPMorgan Chase Affair: What Is All This Risk For?
by Michael Stephens
After the news broke of his firm’s (now $3 billion) loss on a hedge gone awry, Jamie Dimon quipped: “just because we’re stupid doesn’t mean everybody else was.” Stupidity, however, is beside the point. Jan Kregel has pointed out how a lot of the discussion surrounding this episode is designed to give the impression that this was just a matter of personal folly and bad judgment. Get rid of a few people, tweak a model, and everything should be fine. But there’s far more to this story, says Kregel in a new policy note. First, the fact that management appeared not to recognize what was going on in a unit that reported directly to them suggests that JPMorgan was too big to manage. And if it’s too big to manage, it’s too big for regulators to supervise effectively. But simply making banks smaller won’t solve the problem either, according to Kregel—not if they’re allowed to engage in the same kinds of trades on the same kinds of assets. Here he captures the “heads they win, tails we lose” dynamic of the post-Gramm-Leach-Bliley banking world: [S]ince the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, the major activity of banks is to profit from changes in the prices of the assets held in its trading portfolio—and for JPMorgan Chase, in its hedging… Read More
Try Out a New Macro Model and a New Technology
by Greg Hannsgen
You wonder what will happen when markets finally start working. How about, for example, a market that changes prices and wages quickly in response to fluctuations in demand? In a mixed economy with a government that tries to provide fiscal stimulus as needed, will it be of help to move toward such fast-adjusting markets? The two interactive diagrams in this post are based on figures 9a, 9b, 10a, and 10b in a Levy Institute working paper of mine called “Fiscal Policy, Unemployment Insurance, and Financial Crises in a Model of Growth and Distribution,” which was issued just this month and posted on the Institute’s site (math content somewhat crucial). Each of the two figures shows one pathway followed by an imaginary economy. The pathways are computed by simulating a heterodox model, using a set of parameters as well as a starting point for each of the following variables: capacity utilization, public (government) production, the markup on labor costs used by businesses to calculate their prices, and the size of the labor force. As I explain in the paper, my parameter choices are not based on econometric estimates, but rather on a rough sense of what might be reasonable for a developed economy. In a moment, a new technology will give you a chance to see the impact of varying one… Read More
The Wrong Narratives
by Michael Stephens
News sections are littered with shortcuts for explaining what’s going on in the eurozone, often featuring easy, morally sodden narratives. But the real problem here is not that narratives and other shortcuts are being employed—after all, sometimes the data need a little help. The real problem is that they’re using the wrong narratives. We’re told more often than not that the reason peripheral countries like Spain are in trouble is that their governments engaged in an irresponsible spending binge and are now reaping the consequences. But in 2007 Spain’s debt-to-GDP ratio was low—a quaint 27 percent of GDP—and had been falling for some time. Likewise, by contrast with the Aesop-flavored conventional wisdom, German ants work 690 fewer hours per year compared to their Greek grasshopper counterparts. But this doesn’t mean morality has no place in an assessment of Europe’s economic woes. Today, for instance, the imposition of austerity and the waste of human potential this is generating—even as austerity fails to summon the “confidence” and growth that was promised and fails to make a significant dent in debt-to-GDP ratios—begs for moral judgement. And while a technical analysis of the basic setup of the EU and all the imbalances it has generated can get you most of the way toward explaining what’s going on (take a look at the private debt… Read More
No More Fiscal Policy Bank Shots
by Michael Stephens
A little while back the Wall Street Journal observed that if there were as many people employed by government today as there were in the last month of George W. Bush’s tenure, the unemployment rate would be around 7.1 percent. Job creation policy, in other words, can sometimes be quite simple. Step One: stop firing so many people. Reuters’ Edward Hadas picks up Pavlina Tcherneva’s research on the reorientation of fiscal policy and points us in the direction of a Step Two: offer a job to anyone who wants to work but can’t find paid employment. Tcherneva’s research reveals that the standard way of doing fiscal stimulus, trying to boost economic growth with traditional pump-priming and hoping that the jobs follow, has it backwards. Instead of the traditional “trickle-down Keynesian” approach, Tcherneva suggests that targeting the unemployed with direct job creation policies that run throughout the business cycle would be far more efficient. Tcherneva envisions a direct job creation program that would function as a more effective automatic stabilizer, expanding in recessions and contracting in booms. She argues that this “bottom up” approach is not only closer to what Keynes actually advocated, but that it is also more likely to bring us back to full employment—while being less inflationary and more equitable. Although expanding government payrolls for projects fulfilling various… Read More
Public Citizen on the Repo Ruse
by Michael Stephens
Whether or not you already know what a “repo” is, Public Citizen’s new report on repurchase agreements, which played a part in the recent financial crisis (as well as the collapse of MF Global), is well worth reading. Here’s their introduction: In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, banks depended increasingly on an unreliable method of funding their activities, called “repurchase agreements,” or repos. Repos may look like relatively safe borrowing agreements, but they can quickly create widespread instability in the financial system. The dangers of repos stem from a legal fiction: despite being the functional equivalent of secured loans, repo agreements are legally defined as sales. Dressing up repo loans as sales can lead to sloppy lending practices, followed by sudden decisions by lenders to end their risky lending agreements and market panics. Repos also permit financial institutions to cover up shortcomings on their balance sheets. The problems in the repo market were exposed as the 2008 financial crisis unfolded, yet the risks posed by repos remain largely unaddressed. Without reform, the financial system will remain susceptible to the sudden and severe shocks that repos can cause. Micah Hauptman and Taylor Lincoln have also written a blog post that runs down some of the basics. In their report, Public Citizen uses data from the Financial Stability Oversight Council… Read More
How’s That “Make People Poorer” Strategy Working Out?
by Michael Stephens
There is no shortage of viable economic solutions for the eurozone. But as Martin Wolf points out in his FT column, once you strike all of the solutions that have been declared politically unacceptable (eurobonds, a stronger EU-level fiscal authority), there aren’t too many policy levers left to pull. One possibility Wolf mentions is to encourage faster adjustment within the eurozone by allowing higher inflation in the core (Germany) than in the periphery—but Germany is unlikely to accept that either. Instead, we’re left with trying to achieve adjustment through internal devaluation (declining wages in the periphery). How’s that going? C. J. Polychroniou checks in on the progress in his latest one-pager: The “internal devaluation” policy pursued by Germany, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission can be summed up in a few words: great pain, no gain. The irony of this seems not to have escaped the attention of the Brussels bureaucrats: the Commission’s spring economic forecast, released just a few days ago, observes that “wages in the business sector have been falling in recent quarters but at a pace that was insufficient to help recover competitiveness.” Still, the report injects a note of optimism by stating that “the recent labour market measures are expected to contribute to further significant reductions in labour costs over the next two years.”… Read More
Can the Eurozone Be Saved without Treaty Changes or New Institutions?
by Michael Stephens
Yanis Varoufakis and Stuart Holland have updated their “Modest Proposal” for overcoming the eurozone crisis (they call it version 3.0). They took on the challenge of coming up with proposals for addressing the eurozone’s tripartite crisis (sovereign debt, banking, and underinvestment) in a way that avoids any treaty changes or the creation of new EU institutions. So although turning the eurozone into a “United States of Europe,” with an empowered federal (which is to say EU)-level fiscal authority and a central bank willing and ready to act as a buyer of last resort for government debt might be an ideal solution, there are serious institutional and political obstacles that stand in the way. These are the three constraints Varoufakis and Holland accepted as fixed elements of the EU’s policymaking landscape: (a) The ECB will not be allowed to monetise sovereigns directly (i.e. no ECB guarantees of debt issues by member-states, no ECB purchases of government bonds in the primary market, no ECB leveraging of the EFSF-ESM in order to buy sovereign debt either from the primary or the secondary markets) (b) Surplus countries will not consent to the issue of jointly and severally guaranteed Eurobonds, and deficit countries will not consent to the loss of sovereignty that will be demanded on them without a properly functioning Federal Europe (c) Crisis… Read More