In the Media

  • In the Media | November 2021

    New US Consumption Gauge To Include Unpaid Work, Housing


    By Jean Yung
    New US Consumption Gauge To Include Unpaid Work, Housing

    The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics will incorporate estimates of the value of unpaid household work and home ownership into a new measure of consumption, aiming for a more comprehensive view of living standards at a time when policymakers are increasingly concerned with addressing inequality.

    Read more at: https://marketnews.com/homepage/mni-us-bls-to-develop-novel-consumption-measure
  • In the Media | March 2019

    For Overspending Governments, an Alternative View on Borrowing Versus Raising Taxes


    By Katia Dmitrieva
    Bloomberg Quick Take with the Washington Post, March 13, 2019. All rights reserved.

    Outlining the basics of Modern Monetary Theory, Bloomberg's Katia Dmitrieva cites the work of Levy Research Associate Pavlina Tcherneva as a leading voice in the field.

    Read more: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/for-overspending-governments-an-alternative-view-on-borrowing-versus-raising-taxes/2019/03/12/13945b5a-44dc-11e9-94ab-d2dda3c0df52_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ee3a91c52dc5
  • In the Media | July 2018

    Is a Job Guarantee Possible in America?


    By Bianca Facchinei
    Newsy, July 6, 2018. All Rights Reserved.

    With recent polling showing nearly half of American support a job guarantee program, Levy Research Associate Pavlina Tcherneva speaks with Newsy’s Bianca Facchinei about the costs and benefits of guaranteed employment.

    Read more: https://www.newsy.com/stories/job-guarantee-bill-can-the-u-s-ensure-jobs-for-all/
  • In the Media | July 2018

    What Is A Federal Jobs Guarantee?


    by Laura Paddison
    Huffington Post, July 6, 2018. All Rights Reserved.

    Though official unemployment numbers are currently low, there are still many who feel they have been left behind. Levy Research Scholar Stephanie Kelton and the coauthors of the Levy Institute research project report “Public Service Employment: A Path to Full Employment” think the answer lies in a federally funded job guarantee that will “eliminate involuntary unemployment by creating living-wage, [and] socially beneficial jobs for the millions of Americans who want and need work ― essentially making employment a fundamental right.” 

    Read more: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/federal-job-guarantee-explained_us_5b363f4ae4b007aa2f7f59fc
  • In the Media | May 2018

    Stephanie Kelton has the biggest idea in Washington


    By Zach Carter
    Huffington Post, May 20, 2018. All Rights Reserved.

    Highlighting the recent Public Service Employment program proposal by Stephanie Kelton, L. Randall Wray, Pavlina Tcherneva, Scott Fullwiler, and Mathew Forstater, Huffington Post's Zach Carter offers a profile of Levy Research Associate Stephanie Kelton's work in academia and Washington.

    Read more: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/stephanie-kelton-economy-washington_us_5afee5eae4b0463cdba15121
  • In the Media | May 2017

    Greek Economy to Grow Over 2 Percent in 2017, Papadimitriou Says


    By Georgios Georgiou
    Bloomberg, May 11, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece is confident that the country’s economic output will exceed 2 percent in 2017 boosted by investments, privatizations and exports, Economy and Development Minister Dimitri Papadimitriou said.

    Read more: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-11/greek-economy-to-grow-over-2-percent-in-2017-papadimitriou-says
  • In the Media | May 2017

    EBRD Sees "Enormous Opportunities" in Greece


    By Axel Reiserer
    EBRD, May 11, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The EBRD has reiterated its support for Greece and sees “enormous opportunities” in the country. Alain Pilloux, the Bank’s Vice President, Banking, told a well-attended panel on the investment outlook for Greece: “We will continue to ramp up operations in Greece so that our contribution to economic recovery is maximised during our temporary mandate in the country.” . . .

    Read more: http://www.ebrd.com/news/2017/ebrd-sees-enormous-opportunities-in-greece.html
  • In the Media | May 2017

    The Rock-Star Appeal of Modern Monetary Theory


    By Atossa Araxia Abrahamian
    The Nation, May 22–28, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    In early 2013, Congress entered a death
 struggle—or a debt struggle, if you will—over the future of the US economy. A spate of old tax cuts and spending programs were due to expire almost simultaneously, and Congress couldn’t agree on a budget, nor on how much the government could borrow to keep its engines running. Cue the predictable partisan chaos: House Republicans were staunchly opposed to raising the debt ceiling without corresponding cuts to spending, and Democrats, while plenty weary of running up debt, too, wouldn’t sign on to the Republicans’ proposed austerity....

     Read more: https://www.thenation.com/article/the-rock-star-appeal-of-modern-monetary-theory/
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Remember Quantitative Easing? It Could Make a Comeback, Says Boston Fed President


    By Deirdre Fernandes
    The Boston Globe, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The next recession will likely force the Federal Reserve to once again buy up large amounts of assets to boost the supply of money and stimulate the economy, a move that nearly a decade ago was considered drastic and unconventional, according to Boston Federal Reserve President Eric Rosengren....

    Read more: https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/04/19/remember-quantative-easing-could-make-comeback-says-boston-fed-president/FjNnoluxXb2WPXHJzjgQxO/story.html
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Fed’s Rosengren Wants to Shrink Balance Sheet So Slowly that Rate Hikes Can Continue at Same Time


    MarketWatch, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The Federal Reserve should start shrinking its balance sheet relatively soon but do it so slowly that it doesn’t disturb the central bank’s plans to continue to gradually raise short-term interest rates, said Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren on Wednesday....

    Read more: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/feds-rosengren-wants-to-shrink-balance-sheet-so-slowly-that-rate-hikes-can-continue-2017-04-19
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Rosengren: Balance Sheet Will Be Policy Tool Going Forward


    Bu Gary Siegel
    The Bond Buyer, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The Federal Reserve's balance sheet will probably continue to be used as a monetary policy tool in the future, since interest rates remain low, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President and CEO Eric S. Rosengren said Wednesday....

    Read more: https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/rosengren-balance-sheet-will-be-policy-tool-going-forward
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Fed Should Shed Bonds Soon, Keep Hiking Rates: Rosengren


    CNBC, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The U.S. Federal Reserve should begin shedding its bond holdings soon but do so in a very gradual way that has little effect on its planned interest rate hikes, Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren said on Wednesday....

    Read more: http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/19/fed-should-shed-bonds-soon-keep-hiking-rates-rosengren.html
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Fed’s Rosengren: Balance-sheet Reduction Can Start "Relatively Soon"


    By Jessica Dye
    Financial Times, April 19, 2018. All Rights Reserved.

    Eric Rosengren, president of the Boston Fed, has added his voice to the chorus of policymakers who say they are prepared to start the process of unwinding the central bank’s massive balance sheet....

    Read more: https://www.ft.com/content/14e638f2-b0d8-347b-9eb5-5eff9d83d497
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Fed's Rosengren Calls For Trimming Balance Sheet Soon but Slowly


    By Christopher Condon
    Bloomberg, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President Eric Rosengren said the central bank should shrink its out-sized balance sheet slowly enough that officials don’t need to alter the path of interest-rate increases....

    Read more: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-19/fed-s-rosengren-calls-for-trimming-balance-sheet-soon-but-slowly
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Fed Should Shed Bonds Soon, Keep Hiking Rates: Rosengren


    By Jonathan Spicer
    Reuters, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The U.S. Federal Reserve should begin shedding its bond holdings soon but do so in a very gradual way that has little effect on its planned interest rate hikes, Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren said on Wednesday....

    Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-rosengren-idUSKBN17L276
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Boston Fed President Rosengren: Balance Sheet Reduction Should Begin 'Soon'


    By Giovanni Bruno
    The Street, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren today said that he is prepared to begin the process of reducing the Federal Reserve's vast balance sheet, according to the Financial Times

    "In my view that process could begin relatively soon, and should not significantly alter the (Federal Open Market Committee's) continuing gradual normalization of short-term interest rates," Rosengren said today at the Hyman P Minsky Conference at Bard College....

    Read more: https://www.thestreet.com/story/14093318/1/boston-fed-president-rosengren-balance-sheet-reduction-should-begin-soon.html
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Stocks Mostly Higher, but Dow Dragged Down by IBM


    By Wallace Witkowski
    Fox Business, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Economic news: Boston Federal Reserve President Eric Rosengren said at Bard College's Levy Economics Institute that he would like the Fed to start shrinking the balance sheet but at such a gradual rate (http://www.marketwatch.com/story/feds-rosengren-wants-to-shrink-balance-sheet-so-slowly-that-rate-hikes-can-continue-2017-04-19) that it doesn't disrupt the central bank's raising of interest rates.

    Read more: http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/04/19/market-snapshot-stocks-mostly-higher-but-dow-dragged-down-by-ibm.html
  • In the Media | April 2017

    FDIC's Hoenig Warns Against Scrapping a US Bankruptcy Reform


    Reuters, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    A top U.S. financial regulator on Wednesday warned against scrapping, as some American lawmakers urge, the "Title II" part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank legislation that created an alternative insolvency process for large firms, saying further reforms would be needed to protect the economy....

    Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-banks-hoenig-idUSKBN17L1TO
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Fed's George Says 2017 Rate Hikes Depend on Economy


    Bloomberg Markets, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Esther George discusses monetary policy and the state of the U.S. economy. She speaks with Bloomberg's Michael McKee on "Bloomberg Markets."

    Video: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-04-18/fed-s-george-says-2017-rate-hikes-depend-on-economy-video
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Fed's George Says Continuing with Rate Rises Is "Necessary"


    By Michael S. Derby
    The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Esther George said on Tuesday the U.S. central bank needs to press forward with rate rises, adding it should also begin reducing its massive balance sheet later in the year.

    Read more: https://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-george-says-continuing-with-rate-rises-is-necessary-1492520723
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Federal Official Backs Bond Paring This Year


    CNBC, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Another Federal Reserve policymaker on Tuesday backed an emerging U.S. central bank plan to begin trimming its bond holdings later this year, as Kansas City Fed President Esther George warned against waiting too long in order to "overheat" labor markets....

    Read more: http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/18/fed-official-backs-bond-pairing-this-year.html
  • In the Media | April 2017

    George Calls For Fed's Balance Sheet to Shrink on "Autopilot"


    By Steve Matthews and Matthew Boesler
    Bloomberg Markets, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Esther George urged the Federal Open Market Committee to start shrinking its $4.5 trillion balance sheet this year, making reductions automatic and not subject to a quick reversal....

    Read more: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-18/george-calls-for-fed-s-balance-sheet-to-shrink-on-autopilot
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Another Fed Official Backs Paring Bond Holdings This Year


    By Jonathan Spicer
    Reuters, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Another Federal Reserve policymaker on Tuesday backed an emerging U.S. central bank plan to begin trimming its bond holdings later this year, as Kansas City Fed President Esther George warned against waiting too long in order to "overheat" labor markets....

    Read more: http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN17K1J9
  • In the Media | April 2017

    Another Fed Official Backs Paring Bond Holdings This Year


    Nasdaq, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Another Federal Reserve policymaker on Tuesday backed an emerging U.S. central bank plan to begin trimming its bond holdings later this year, as Kansas City Fed President Esther George warned against waiting too long in order to "overheat" labor markets....

    Read more: http://m.nasdaq.com/article/another-fed-official-backs-paring-bond-holdings-this-year-20170418-00756
  • In the Media | March 2017

    Greece Needs a New Technologically Upgraded and Extrovert Growth Model, Says Econ Min Papadimitriou


    Athens-Macedonian News Agency, March 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The country's development plan focuses on the attraction of investments to dynamic and innovative businesses, stated Economy Minister Dimitris Papadimitriou in a statement to the Sunday edition of Ethnos newspaper....

    Read more: http://www.amna.gr/english/article/17744/Greece-needs-a-new-technologically-upgraded-and-extrovert-growth-model--says-Econ-Min-Papadimitriou  
  • In the Media | February 2017

    Greece’s Economy Minister Confident of Reaching Deal With Creditors


    By Nektaria Stamouli

    The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    ATHENS—Greece’s economy minister said he is optimistic the country can resolve its deadlock with its international creditors this month over how to fulfill its bailout program, allowing Greece to bring down its borrowing costs and return to bond markets late this year....

    Read more: https://www.wsj.com/articles/greeces-economy-minister-confident-of-reaching-deal-with-creditors-1486651074

  • In the Media | February 2017

    Alt Labour Minister Antonopoulou Highlights Potential of "Social Economy" in Greece


    Athens-Macedonian News Agency, February 6, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Developing the social economy in Greece could help stem the emigration of young Greek scientists and professionals abroad, putting the brakes on the so-called "brain drain," Alternate Labour Minister for fighting unemployment Rania Antonopoulou said in an interview with the Athens-Macedonian New Agency (ANA) released on Sunday.

    Read more: http://www.amna.gr/english/article/17055/Alt-Labour-Minister-Antonopoulou-highlights-potential-of-social-economy-in-Greece  
  • In the Media | January 2017

    Why a Universal Basic Income Is a Poor Substitute for a Guaranteed Job


    By Claire Connelly
    ABC News, January 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Creating a universal basic income as a means of addressing unemployment and productivity problems has become the topic du-jour as workers become increasingly separated from the means of production, with even modest salaries failing to cover the cost of living. 

    Consequently, Australian taxpayers have had to take on a greater burden of debt to support themselves....

    Read more: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-19/universal-basic-income-vs-job-guarantee/8187688  
  • In the Media | January 2017

    "Wildcard" Trump Could Affect Markets, Economic Outlook in 2017


    CBC News, January 2, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Donald Trump, who will be inaugurated as the next U.S president on Jan. 20, brings with him a high level of uncertainty for 2017, investment managers and economists say.

    Following the election of Trump on Nov. 8, U.S. stocks took off, with key indices hitting multiple records highs. The Dow Jones industrial average — the benchmark index of blue chip companies — came tantalizingly close to topping the 20,000-point plateau for the first time before the rally petered out in the last trading days of 2016....

    Read more: http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/markets-economy-2017-lookahead-1.3916631  
  • In the Media | December 2016

    Assessing Demonetisation: Minsky Provides the Link That Traditional Economics Misses


    By Vidhu Shekhar
    Swarajya, December 30, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    With the end of demonetisation in sight, and partial remonetisation underway, it may be a good time to reassess the much-maligned economics of demonetisation.

    Over this 50-day period, several economists have denounced demonetisation as poor economics, so much so that reading them has made us feel like we were experiencing mass famine. This, despite the fact that even the hard, early days were nearly-incident-free in spite of the enormity of the scale of operations....

    Read more: http://swarajyamag.com/economy/assessing-demonetisation-minsk-provides-the-link-that-traditional-economics-misses  
  • In the Media | December 2016

    Greek Minister Sees Progress Despite Latest Debt Drama


    By David R. Sands
    The Washington Times, December 16, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    It was a chain of events which neatly captured the grinding economic crisis that plagues Greece: Just as a light appeared at the end of the tunnel, the train broke down once again.

    In an interview last week, new Greek Economy and Development Minister Dimitri Papadimitriou said he was “very optimistic” the country had “turned the corner” addressing a crushing six-year public debt crisis that has left it wrangling with its fellow European Union members and the International Monetary Fund over bailouts, austerity and the best way to jump-start the economy....

    Read more: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/16/greek-minister-sees-progress-despite-debt-drama/
  • In the Media | December 2016

    Papadimitriou: Goal for Greece to Participate in QE


    Bloomberg Radio, December 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou, Greece’s new minister of economy and development, talks to Pimm Fox and Lisa Abramowicz about the outlook for the Greek economy, the IMF, and the EU. The minister spoke at Capital Link’s 18th Annual Invest in Greece Forum in NYC.

    Listen to the podcast here: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2016-12-13/papadimitriou-goal-for-greece-to-participate-in-qe  
  • In the Media | December 2016

    Papadimitriou on Greek Economy, 2017 Budget


    Bloomberg News, December 12, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Institute and Minister of Economy and Development for Greece, talks to Bloomberg's Mike McKee about the country's 2017 budget plan, GDP growth forecast, and expectations for concluding its second bailout review later this month.

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2016-12-12/papadimitriou-on-greek-economy-2017-budget 
  • In the Media | December 2016

    Give Greece Credit, Even Just for Treading Water


    By Mark Gilbert
    Bloomberg, December 6, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Here are two things I'll bet most people don't know about Greece. The country's just-appointed minister of economy and development, Dimitri Papadimitriou, was lured away from his position as head of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in America. He's not a member of the ruling Syriza party. And the man appointed secretary general for public revenue in January is Giorgos Pitsillis, a professional tax lawyer. He's not a party member either....

    Read more: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-06/greece-deserves-credit-for-its-reform-efforts
  • In the Media | November 2016

    IMF Indecision on Bailout Faulted by Greek Economy Minister


    By Marcus Bensasson
    Bloomberg, November 28, 2016. All Rights Reserved.
     
    The time has come for the International Monetary Fund to make up its mind on Greece, according to the country’s economy minister.

    The path to recovery runs sequentially through completion of Greece’s bailout review, debt relief and then admission to the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing program, said Dimitri Papadimitriou, an economist who joined the government this month after a career championing alternatives to the macroeconomics espoused by the IMF. Now, the Washington-based fund must decide whether the Greek recovery will happen with or without it, he said in an interview.

    Read more: http://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/2016/11/27/imf-indecision-on-bailout-criticized-by-greek-economy-minister
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Bard Professor Appointed Greece’s Minister of Economy and Development


    Daily Freeman, November 6, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Economist Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and executive vice president and Jerome Levy Professor of Economics at Bard College, was appointed Greece’s minister of economy and development....

    Read more: http://www.dailyfreeman.com/general-news/20161106/bard-professor-appointed-greeces-minister-of-economy-and-development
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Prime Minister Reshuffles Cabinet to Boost Bailout Reforms


    The Guardian, November 6, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    The Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, has reshuffled his government to boost bailout reforms in the hope of getting the EU to agree to critical debt relief by the end of the year....

    Read more: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/06/greek-prime-minister-tsipras-reshuffles-cabinet-to-boost-bailout-reforms
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves Key Ministers in Place


    New Delhi Times, November 5, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said....

    Read more: http://www.newdelhitimes.com/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place123/
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Tsipras Chases Political Revival with Greek Cabinet Reshuffle


    By Marcus Bensasson, Nikos Chrysoloras, and Eleni Chrepa
    Chicago Tribune, November 5, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece's president swore in a new Cabinet after Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras sought to turn around his political fortunes and work toward better terms from creditors by naming new ministers.

    Tsipras appointed George Stathakis as energy minister late Friday, replacing Panos Skourletis, who repeatedly clashed with the country's creditors and investors such as mining company Eldorado Gold Corp. Skourletis was moved to the interior ministry, while Stathakis' replacement as economy minister was Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in New York. President Prokopis Pavlopoulos inaugurated the new cabinet in Athens on Saturday....

    Read more: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-greece-16ea3e96-a362-11e6-8864-6f892cad0865-20161105-story.html
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek PM Tsipras Reshapes Cabinet in Bid to Speed Up Reform


    By Renee Maltezou and Lefteris Papadimas
    Reuters, November 5, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras promised "brighter days" on Saturday after a cabinet reshuffle aimed at speeding up reforms Athens has agreed to implement under its latest international bailout deal and to shore up his government's popularity....

    Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-reshuffle-idUSKBN12Z2NE
     
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Tsipras Chases Political Revival with Greek Cabinet Reshuffle


    By Marcus Bensasson, Nikos Chrysoloras, and Eleni Chrepa
    Bloomberg, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece’s president swore in a new cabinet after Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras sought to turn around his political fortunes and work toward better terms from creditors by naming new ministers.

    Tsipras appointed George Stathakis as energy minister late Friday, replacing Panos Skourletis, who repeatedly clashed with the country’s creditors and investors such as mining company Eldorado Gold Corp. Skourletis was moved to the interior ministry, while Stathakis’s replacement as economy minister was Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in New York. President Prokopis Pavlopoulos inaugurated the new cabinet in Athens on Saturday....

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-04/tsipras-shakes-up-greek-cabinet-to-boost-support-ahead-of-review
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves Key Ministers in Place


    Newsday, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.newsday.com/news/world/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place-1.12562414
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves Key Ministers in Place


    U.S. News & World Report, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-11-04/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves Key Ministers in Place


    Miami Herald, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article112603703.html
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves Key Ministers in Place


    San Francisco Chronicle, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-10594178.php
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves Key Ministers in Place


    ABC News, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-place-43312887
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves Key Ministers in Place


    The Washington Post, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place/2016/11/04/78b2bef8-a2ce-11e6-8864-6f892cad0865_story.html
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves Key Ministers in Place


    The New York Times, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/11/04/world/europe/ap-eu-greece-cabinet-reshuffle.html?_r=0
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves Key Ministers in Place


    Salon, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.salon.com/2016/11/04/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place/

  • In the Media | November 2016

    PM Removes Some Who Opposed Reforms, Brings In New Faces


    Kathimerini, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras proceeded on Friday with a long-awaited government reshuffle, moving out some ministers who have opposed bailout reforms and bringing some new blood into the administration.

    Read more: http://www.ekathimerini.com/213441/article/ekathimerini/news/pm-removes-some-who-opposed-reforms-brings-in-new-faces
  • In the Media | November 2016

    Greek Prime Minister Reorders Cabinet


    By Nektaria Stamouli
    The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras reshuffled his cabinet late Friday to speed up talks with Greece’s creditors and revive the morale of his ruling left-wing Syriza party after heavy setbacks....

    Read more: http://www.wsj.com/articles/greek-prime-minister-reorders-cabinet-1478295602
  • In the Media | September 2016

    Tsipras Defeat in Attica Battle Bolsters Bank of Greece Governor


    By Marcus Bensasson
    Bloomberg, September 21, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Advantage Yannis Stournaras.

    In the battle of wits between Greece’s central bank governor and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, the former seems to have won the latest round, giving him a leg up should he harbor any ambitions of a return to politics....

    Read more:
    http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-21/tsipras-defeat-in-attica-battle-bolsters-bank-of-greece-governor  
  • In the Media | August 2016

    Imagining Economics in an Age of Stein, Clinton, Trump, or Johnson


    Manhattan Neighborhood Network, August 25, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    "Radical Imagination" host Jim Vrettos talks to Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray about what the US economy might look like under a Stein, Clinton, Trump, or Johnson administration.

    Full video of the interview is available here.
  • In the Media | August 2016

    Hillary Clinton's Economic Dream Team


    By Jeff Spross
    The Week, August 22, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    The election isn't here yet, but it's looking more and more likely Hillary Clinton will trounce Donald Trump in November. Speculation over who she might appoint as advisors and agency heads has already commenced. And like anyone else, I have got my own opinions about who Clinton should pick, particularly when it comes to the economics positions….

    Read more: http://theweek.com/articles/643874/hillary-clintons-economic-dream-team
     
  • In the Media | August 2016

    Tcherneva on Job Guarantee over a Basic Income


    RT America, August 20, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    In this interview on "Boom Bust" Research Associate Pavlina R. Tcherneva advocates in favor of a public job guarantee program over universal basic income as a means of alleviating poverty and stabilizing the business cycle. (Interview begins at 15:00.) 

    Watch here:
    https://www.rt.com/shows/boom-bust/356572-louisiana-crisis-turkey-economy/ 
  • In the Media | August 2016

    Time for a US Job Guarantee?


    RT America TV, August 9, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Research Associate Pavlina R. Tcherneva appears on "Boom Bust" to discuss sluggish growth, labor markets, and her proposal for a job guarantee. 

    Watch here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GvFliCk1osE#t=13m15s  
  • In the Media | July 2016

    Minsky's Moment


    The Economist, July 28, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    From the start of his academic career in the 1950s until 1996, when he died, Hyman Minsky laboured in relative obscurity. His research about financial crises and their causes attracted a few devoted admirers but little mainstream attention: this newspaper cited him only once while he was alive, and it was but a brief mention. So it remained until 2007, when the subprime-mortgage crisis erupted in America. Suddenly, it seemed that everyone was turning to his writings as they tried to make sense of the mayhem....

    Read more: http://www.economist.com/news/economics-brief/21702740-second-article-our-series-seminal-economic-ideas-looks-hyman-minskys />
  • In the Media | July 2016

    Connecting the Dots: Debt, Savings and the Need for a Fiscal Growth Policy


    Andrea Terzi
    Public Debt Project, July 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Twice in the second half of the twentieth century, in the midst of a robust economy, economists optimistically talked about the taming and even “the death of the business cycle” based on the belief that advances in macroeconomics had reached a point of perfection. Yet, both times, the economy underwent serious turbulence and the policies that seemed to have “solved the problem” proved inadequate to the challenges presented by unexpected realities. In the 1970s, the “neo-classical synthesis,” with its faith in forecasting and macroeconomic “fine tuning,” succumbed to stagflation and a new theory, the Monetarist paradigm, came to prominence....

    Read more: http://privatedebtproject.org/view-articles.php?Connecting-the-Dots-Debt-Savings-and-the-Need-for-a-Fiscal-Growth-Policy-21
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
  • In the Media | July 2016

    Keep Unemployment From Mushrooming With Preventative Policies


    Pavlina R. Tcherneva
    The New York Times, July 11, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Though job growth surged in June, by and large, this recovery has been the slowest in postwar history and 7.8 million people continue to look, unsuccessfully, for work.

    There is nothing inevitable or natural about jobless recoveries....

    Read more:
    http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/11/are-we-ready-for-the-next-recession/keep-unemployment-from-mushrooming-with-preventative-policies
     
  • In the Media | June 2016

    The Argument Against Basic Income


    Bloomberg, June 7, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Research Associate Pavlina R. Tcherneva argues against a universal basic income policy and in favor of a job guarantee in this interview with Bloomberg’s Joe Weisenthal. Click here for the video.
  • In the Media | May 2016

    Glut: Storing Oil at a Loss, Greece in Need of Money


    Boom Bust (RT), May 25, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Anti-austerity protests take hold in Belgium as tens of thousands take to the streets in opposition. And the Eurogroup meets to discuss the Greek bailout as tension builds between creditors. Ameera David reports....

    After the break, Ameera is joined by Levy Economics Institute research associate Marshall Auerback to discuss the situation concerning Greece’s Troika debt and austerity program.... Full video of the interview is available here (15:52).
  • In the Media | May 2016

    Can the US "Print Money" to Pay Down the National Debt?


    Bloomberg, May 12, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray discusses the US national debt and inflation with Bloomberg’s Joe Weisenthal on “What’d You Miss?” 

    Full video of the interview is available here.
  • In the Media | May 2016

    Trump Is Now Running to the Left of Sanders on Federal Debt


    By Michelle Jamrisko
    Bloomberg, May 11, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Donald Trump’s about-face on the relevance of a ballooning U.S. debt continues his campaign’s hallmark of zigging and zagging on policy issues, landing him now on economic proposals favored by economists to the left of Bernie Sanders.

    The billionaire businessman has advocated for the federal government to take advantage of cheap interest rates by boosting spending on initiatives such as rebuilding infrastructure -- a position shared by traditional Keynesian economists and skewered by budget hawks who say his numbers won’t add up. Now, Trump’s post-Keynesian approach is throwing out budget balancing, and declaring American immunity to a default....

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-05-11/trump-is-now-running-to-the-left-of-sanders-on-federal-debt  
  • In the Media | May 2016

    Book Review: Why Minsky Matters


    Reviewed by William J. Bernstein
    Seeking Alpha, May 5, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    A few decades ago, Paul Samuelson wrote a letter to Robert Shiller and John Campbell, in which he discussed the notion that while the stock market was “micro efficient,” it was also “macro inefficient,” by which he meant that although profitable security choices were swiftly arbitraged away, the stock market as a whole irrationally swung between extremes of valuation.

    Hyman Minsky would have made a similar point about the economy: While it is highly efficient, it is also unstable….

    Read more: http://seekingalpha.com/article/3971589-book-review-minsky-matters 
  • In the Media | May 2016

    Levy Economics: 90% of Americans Worse Off Today Than in 1970s


    By Gary D. Halbert
    ValueWalk, May 3, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Today we will focus on a recent study from the Levy Economics Institute which found that 90% of Americans were worse off financially in 2015 than at any time since the early 1970s. Furthermore, for the vast majority of Americans, the nation’s economy is in a prolonged period of stagnation, worse even than that of Japan.

    So are we really worse off today than Japan? This latest study concludes that the answer isYES, when it comes to real income – that is, income adjusted for inflation. According to their findings, 90% of Americans earn roughly the same real income today as the average American earned back in the early 1970s. It’s an eye-opening look at how the vast majority of Americans are struggling to make ends meet....

    Read more: http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/05/americans-worse-off/
     
  • In the Media | April 2016

    Trump Says American Dream Is Dead; Is He Right?


    By Dora Mekouar
    Voice of America, April 25, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Donald Trump has famously declared that the American Dream is dead, but the majority of middle class Americans seem to disagree with the Republican presidential frontrunner.

    Sixty-three percent of people surveyed earlier this year believe they are living the American Dream. That finding suggests American optimism hasn’t been a casualty of the recession, despite a report that says 90 percent of Americans are worse off today than they were in the 1970s....

    Read more: http://blogs.voanews.com/all-about-america/2016/04/25/trump-says-american-dream-is-dead-is-he-right/ 
  • In the Media | April 2016

    How Regulators Mess With Bankers’ Minds, and Why That’s Good


    By Peter Eavis
    The New York Times, April 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Bank regulators on Wednesday sent a message that big banks are still too big and too complex. They rejected special plans, called living wills, that the banks have to submit to show they can go through an orderly bankruptcy.

    The thinking behind the regulators’ call for living wills is that if a large bank crash is orderly, there will be no need to save it and no need for taxpayer bailouts....

    Read more:
    http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/upshot/how-regulators-mess-with-bankers-minds-and-why-thats-good.html  
  • In the Media | April 2016

    EZB/Constancio: Instrument der Negativzinsen hat Grenzen


    Von Tom Fairless
    Finanz Nachrichten, 14 April 2016. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

    Für das Instrument der negativen Zinsen gibt es nach Aussage des EZB-Vizepräsidenten Vitor Constancio "klare Grenzen". Die Schwelle, an der die Leute anfangen, Geld abzuziehen, um die Negativzinsen zu umgehen, scheine aber noch weit weg zu sein, sagte Constancio in einer Rede beim Bard College in New York....

    Weiterlesen: http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2016-04/37060417-ezb-constancio-instrument-der-negativzinsen-hat-grenzen-015.htm
  • In the Media | April 2016

    Speech Vítor Constâncio: International Headwinds and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy


    Foreign Affairs, April 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Speech by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, at the 25th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Blithewood, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York, 13 April 2016 

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    I want to start by thanking the Levy Institute for inviting me again to address this important conference honouring Hyman Minsky, the economist that the Great Recession justifiably brought into the limelight. His work provides crucial insights not only identifying the key mechanisms by which periods of financial calm sow the seeds for ensuing crises, but also the specific challenges that economies face in recovering from such crises....

    Read more: http://foreignaffairs.co.nz/2016/04/14/speech-vitor-constancio-international-headwinds-and-the-effectiveness-of-monetary-policy/
  • In the Media | April 2016

    ECB's Constancio Says Negative-Rate Policy Has "Clear Limits"


    By Alessandro Speciale and Matthew Boesler
    The Washington Post, April 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    European Central Bank Vice President Vitor Constancio on Wednesday said there was only so much that negative interest rates can do to boost the economy and defended the central bank’s strategy as positive for the euro area as a whole.

    It is “important to recall that there are clear limits to the use of negative deposit facility rates as a policy instrument,” he said in a speech at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in New York state. “Tier systems that simply pass direct costs at the margin can mitigate this concern but cannot dispel it altogether.” ...

    Read more: http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-O5LE8T6TTDS101-597LUN1M75BN1J81FK32I14G7R
  • In the Media | April 2016

    Negative Rates Not Needed in US for Now—ECB's Constancio


    By Richard Leong
    Reuters, April 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Negative deposit rates are not required as a monetary fix for the United States at the moment, in contrast with the euro zone, which is struggling with deflation risk, a top European Central Bank official said on Wednesday.

    The U.S. economy, while far from robust, has been growing at a steady pace, and has seen some improvement in price growth since hitting a post-crisis low earlier this year.

    Read more: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ecb-policy-constancio-negativerates-idUKKCN0XA2Q4
  • In the Media | April 2016

    AMB/Constancio: Negatif faiz politikasının limitleri var


    Bloomberg, 14 Nisan 2016. Her Hakkı Saklıdır.

    Avrupa Merkez Bankası (AMB) Başkan Yardımcısı Vitor Constancio Çarşamba günü yaptığı açıklamada, negatif faiz oranının ekonomiyi destekleme konusunda yapabileceklerinin sınırlı olduğunu söyleyerek AMB'nin stratejisinin euro bölgesinin tamamı için olumlu olduğunu söyledi.

    Constancio, New York eyaletinde Bard College'de Levy Economics Institute'de yaptığı konuşmada, "Negatif mevduat faiz oranını bir politika aracı olarak kullanmanın açık sınıları olduğunu hatırlamak önemli, kademeli faiz sistemi bu endişeyi azaltabilir ama tamamen yok edemez" dedi....

    Daha fazla oku: http://www.bloomberght.com/haberler/haber/1872569-ambconstancio-negatif-faiz-politikasinin-limitleri-var
  • In the Media | April 2016

    Negative Rates Not Needed in US for Now—ECB's Constancio


    By Richard Leong
    Yahoo! Finance, April 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Negative deposit rates are not required as a monetary fix for the United States at the moment, in contrast with the euro zone, which is struggling with deflation risk, a top European Central Bank official said on Wednesday.

    Read more: http://finance.yahoo.com/news/negative-rates-not-needed-u-225239865.html
  • In the Media | April 2016

    Update 1—Negative Rates Not Needed in US for Now—ECB's Constancio


    By Richard Leong
    Reuters, April 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Negative deposit rates are not required as a monetary fix for the United States at the moment, in contrast with the euro zone, which is struggling with deflation risk, a top European Central Bank official said on Wednesday.

    The U.S. economy, while far from robust, has been growing at a steady pace, and has seen some improvement in price growth since hitting a post-crisis low earlier this year....

    Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/ecb-policy-constancio-negativerates-idUSL2N17G2GK
  • In the Media | April 2016

    EZB-Vizepräsident: Negativzinsen sind kein Allheilmittel!


    Finanzen 100, 13 April 2016. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

    Die vielumstrittenen Negativzinsen der EZB haben klare Grenzen der Wirksamkeit. Obwohl der EZB-Vizepräsident Vítor Constâncio die Strategie der Notenbank am Mittwochabend als positiv für die Eurozone verteidigt hat, gab er zu, dass negative Zinsen die Konjunktur nur beschränkt ankurbeln können....

    Weiterlesen: http://www.finanzen100.de/finanznachrichten/wirtschaft/geldpolitik-ezb-vizepraesident-negativzinsen-sind-kein-allheilmittel_H609679858_263944/
  • In the Media | April 2016

    ECB's Constancio Says Negative-Rate Policy Has "Clear Limits"


    By Alessandro Speciale and Matthew Boesler
    Bloomberg, April 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    European Central Bank Vice President Vitor Constancio on Wednesday said there was only so much that negative interest rates can do to boost the economy and defended the central bank’s strategy as positive for the euro area as a whole.

    It is “important to recall that there are clear limits to the use of negative deposit facility rates as a policy instrument,” he said in a speech at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in New York state. “Tier systems that simply pass direct costs at the margin can mitigate this concern but cannot dispel it altogether.” ...

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-13/ecb-s-constancio-says-negative-rate-policy-has-clear-limits
  • In the Media | April 2016

    Negative Rates Not Needed in US for Now: ECB's Constancio


    By Richard Leong
    The Fiscal Times, April 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Negative deposit rates are not required as a monetary fix for the United States at the moment, in contrast with the euro zone, which is struggling with deflation risk, a top European Central Bank official said on Wednesday....

    Read more: http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/latestnews/2016/04/13/Negative-rates-not-needed-US-now-ECBs-Constancio
  • In the Media | March 2016

    Ignored for Years, a Radical Economic Theory Is Gaining Converts


    In an American election season that’s turned into a bonfire of the orthodoxies, one taboo survives pretty much intact: Budget deficits are dangerous.

    A school of dissident economists wants to toss that one onto the flames, too....

    Read more:
    http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-13/ignored-for-years-a-radical-economic-theory-is-gaining-converts
     
  • In the Media | February 2016

    European Disunion: EU Negotiates UK on #Brexitb


    Reuters, February 19, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    All eyes are on Brussels as European leaders converge for meetings that could ultimately redefine the region, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has lowered its global economic forecast. Ameera David weighs in and then sits down with Marshall Auerback—research associate at the Levy Economics Institute—to continue the discussion on Europe….

    Interview begins at 4:45: https://www.rt.com/shows/boom-bust/332954-european-disunion-eu-negotiations/

  • In the Media | January 2016

    The Fed Puts Rates on Ice


    By Sheyna Steiner
    Federal Reserve Blog, January 27, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    After raising interest rates in December for the first time since the financial crisis and Great Recession, the Federal Reserve has gone into a January freeze. The central bank on Wednesday announced no change in interest rates, meaning the target for the Fed's benchmark federal funds rate will remain between 0.25% and 0.50%, the range set last month.

    For consumers, the outcome of this week's meeting means more of the same. Savers will continue to suffer low interest rates on savings while debtors continue to enjoy extremely low borrowing costs....

    Read more: http://www.bankrate.com/financing/federal-reserve/the-fed-puts-rates-on-ice/
  • In the Media | January 2016

    Why Minsky Matters: An Introduction to the Work of a Maverick Economist (a Review)


    By William J. Bernstein
    CFA Institute, January 20, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    A few decades ago, Paul Samuelson wrote a letter to Robert Shiller and John Campbell in which he discussed the notion that while the stock market was “micro efficient,” it was also “macro inefficient,” by which he meant that although profitable security choices were swiftly arbitraged away, the stock market as a whole irrationally swung between extremes of valuation.

    Hyman Minsky would have made a similar point about the economy: While it is highly efficient, it is also unstable....

    Read more: http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/full/10.2469/br.v11.n1.2
  • In the Media | December 2015

    The Enduring Relevance of “Manias, Panics, and Crashes”


    By Joseph P. Joyce
    EconoMonitor, December 14, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The seventh edition of Manias, Panics, and Crashes has recently been published by Palgrave Macmillan. Charles Kindleberger of MIT wrote the first edition, which appeared in 1978, and followed it with three more editions. Robert Aliber of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago took over the editing and rewriting of the fifth edition, which came out in 2005. (Aliber is also the author of another well-known book on international finance, The New International Money Game.) The continuing popularity of Manias, Panics and Crashes shows that financial crises continue to be a matter of widespread concern.

    Kindleberger built upon the work of Hyman Minsky, a faculty member at Washington University in St. Louis. Minsky was a proponent of what he called the “financial instability hypothesis,” which posited that financial markets are inherently unstable. Periods of financial booms are followed by busts, and governmental intervention can delay but not eliminate crises. Minsky’s work received a great deal of attention during the global financial crisis (see here and here; for a summary of Minsky’s work, see Why Minsky Matters by L. Randall Wray of the University of Missouri-Kansas City and the Levy Economics Institute)….

    Read more: http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2015/12/the-enduring-relevance-of-manias-panics-and-crashes/
  • In the Media | December 2015

    Auerback on ISIS Funding and ECB Negative Rates


    RT, December 4, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Edward Harrison sits down with Research Associate Marshall Auerback to talk about Europe in this broadcast interview (04:17): https://www.rt.com/shows/boom-bust/324713-auerback-isis-funding-turkey/
  • In the Media | November 2015

    Review: Another "Minsky Moment" May Be on the Way


    By Edward Chancellor
    Reuters, November 27, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Forget the living canon of great economists – Paul Krugman, Joe Stiglitz, Larry Summers and the rest. Hyman Minsky was the only contemporary thinker to have predicted with uncanny precision the global financial crisis. This is no small achievement since Minsky died more than a decade before Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Minsky’s unorthodox vision of capitalism, with its emphasis on the central role of finance and the system’s inherent tendency to crash, was vindicated by the subprime crisis.

    In a new book, “Why Minsky Matters: An Introduction to the Work of a Maverick Economist,” L. Randall Wray suggests that he would have approved of policymakers’ initial response to the crisis precipitated by Lehman’s collapse in the fall of 2008. However, by now, Minsky would be fretting that another “Minsky moment” is not far away and pondering what lies ahead....

    Read more: http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2015/11/27/review-another-minsky-moment-may-be-on-the-way/ 
  • In the Media | November 2015

    Want More—and Better—Jobs? Put Women in Charge


    By Tamar Khitarishvili
    Voices from Eurasia, November 24, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    I was recently in Tbilisi to participate in a conference that took stock of what we know about the challenges of job creation in the South Caucasus and Western CIS. While researching gender inequalities in labour markets of these countries, I searched for evidence on how the challenge of job creation can be overcome without perpetuating gender inequalities in the region, and preferably, by reducing them....

    Read more: http://europeandcis.undp.org/blog/2015/11/24/want-more-and-better-jobs-put-women-in-charge/
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
  • In the Media | November 2015

    Greek Banks Ask Investors to Take Uncertain Leap of Faith


    By Nikos Chrysoloras and Christos Ziotis
    Bloomberg, November 13, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The National Bank of Greece SA and Eurobank Ergasias SA joined Piraeus Bank SA and Alpha Bank AE on Thursday in starting book-building processes as they seek to fill part of 14.4 billion-euro ($15.5 billion) hole in their accounts identified by the European Central Bank. The state-owned Hellenic Financial Stability Fund will contribute the rest from loans from Greece’s latest bailout, but not before imposing mandatory losses or "burden sharing” on shareholders and creditors of the banks....

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-13/greek-banks-ask-investors-to-take-leap-of-faith-amid-uncertainty
  • In the Media | November 2015

    Recapitalization of Battered Greek Banks Entering Critical Phase, New Levy Economics Institute Report Says


    Investorideas.com, November 12, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The battered Greek banks will soon face yet another round of recapitalization this November and December. For the banks to have any prospect of returning to their precrisis role as liquidity providers to the Greek economy, it is imperative that the country’s EU creditors and supervisors avoid the pitfalls of previous recapitalizations, argues a new report from the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. In their Policy Note What Should Be Done with Greek Banks to Help the Country Return to a Path of Growth? Emilios Avgouleas, professor and chair of international banking law and finance at the University of Edinburgh School of Law, and Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou stress that the recapitalization of Greek banks—perhaps the central issue for the Greek state today—has entered its most critical stage.... 

    Read more: http://www.investorideas.com/news/2015/main/11123.asp
  • In the Media | October 2015

    2015’s Most & Least Recession-Recovered Cities


    By Richie Bernardo
    WalletHub, October 12, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    For many Americans today, the Great Recession is nothing more than the distant shadow of a troubled economic past. The longest downturn since the Great Depression officially ended six years ago. Cities coast to coast have completely bounced back — some even surpassing their pre-recession economic levels, thanks to lucrative industries that helped them rebuild or stay afloat through the crisis.

    Yet the effects of the recession still reverberate in various parts of the U.S., falling deeper into debt and leaving millions of Americans wondering whether the recession has indeed blown over. ...

    Read more: https://wallethub.com/edu/most-least-recession-recovered-cities/5219/#pavlina-r-tcherneva 
  • In the Media | September 2015

    Is It Time for a New New Deal?


    By James M. Larkin and Zach Goldhammer
    The Nation, September 30, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    To close out our series on work, produced in partnership with Open Source with Christopher Lydon and The Nation, we’re looking ahead to the big proposals and spiritual realignments that might spell a major change for working- and middle-class people who feel as though the recession never ended.

    For proof of the problems we face, look no further than this chart, produced by one of our big thinkers this week, the Bulgarian-American economist Pavlina Tcherneva….

    Read more: http://www.thenation.com/article/is-it-time-for-a-new-new-deal/
  • In the Media | September 2015

    Kregel: "Do nothing about vulture funds; let the case sit there"


    By Fermin Koop
    Buenos Aires Herald, September 27, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Jan Kregel, one of the world’s most eminent Post-Keynesian economists specialized in financial crises and structural problems of developing economies, has written several papers on Argentina’s economy after the 2001–2002 economic meltdown. The director of research at the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in upstate New York, Kregel served as rapporteur of the president of the UN General Assembly’s Commission on Reform of the International Financial System.

    In Buenos Aires for a conference, Kregel met with the Herald and discussed the country’s economy, highlighting that the currency is in desperate need of a devaluation. At the same time, he said the country shouldn’t take action regarding the “vulture” funds, which he linked to late special AMIA prosecutor Alberto Nisman....

    Read more: http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/199670/kregel-‘do-nothing-about-vulture-funds-let-the-case-sit-there’
  • In the Media | September 2015

    Jan Kregel: “Lo importante es generar empleo”


    Página|12, 26 Septiembre 2015. Reservados todos los derechos.

    “No se puede mirar el crecimiento económico sin empleo. Si se va a desarrollar la economía, no importa la tasa de inversión o de crecimiento si no se genera empleo”, destacó el prestigioso economista estadounidense Jan Kregel, durante su intervención en el Congreso sobre Pensamiento Económico Latinoamericano. El investigador poskeynesiano compartió el panel junto con el especialista francés Pascal Petit, quien advirtió que hacia fin de año habrá 19 millones de desempleados en la Eurozona, unos siete millones más que durante 2008....

    Lee más: http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-282499-2015-09-26.html
  • In the Media | September 2015

    Alexis Tsipras and Greece Are Still Trapped


    By John Cassidy
    The New Yorker, September 21, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    How long will the smile on the face of Alexis Tsipras last? On Monday night, Tsipras was sworn in as the head of a new Greek government that looks very similar to the previous one. The left-wing Syriza party is again forming a coalition with a small nationalist party, Independent Greeks; together, the two parties will have a small majority in parliament….

    Read more: http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/alexis-tsipras-and-greece-are-still-trapped
  • In the Media | August 2015

    Papadimitriou on Latest from Greece


    Bloomberg Radio, August 20, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou talks to Bloomberg's Michael McKee and Kathleen Hays about the resignation of Greek PM Alex Tsipras, public reaction to the latest bailout package, and the forthcoming snap elections. 

    Podcast: http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/v8Dhep9k7w6o.mp3
  • In the Media | July 2015

    Nine People Who Saw the Greek Crisis Coming Years Before Everyone Else Did


    By Julie Verhage and Alex Balogh
    Bloomberg Business, July 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Although the problems in Greece didn't begin making big headlines until 2009, a number of economists, politicians and professors spotted cracks in the European currency union as early as the 1990s. Among the nine listed here? Levy Institute scholars Wynne Godley, L. Randall Wray, Stephanie A. Kelton, and Mathew Forstater. 

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-15/nine-people-who-saw-the-greek-crisis-coming-years-before-everyone-else-did
  • In the Media | July 2015

    Episode 75: Your Greece Bailout Explainer and the Coming Healthcare Revolution


    The American Prospect, July 14, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Good evening, podcast listeners! We’ve got a great episode for you this week as Richard Aldous speaks with his Bard colleague Pavlina Tcherneva about the recently announced deal with Greece before discussing the promise of disruptive new healthcare technologies with Philip Auerswald....

    Full audio of the interview is available here.

     


  • In the Media | July 2015

    Antonopoulos: Greece “Back in Serious Recession” despite Rescue


    By Robert Peston
    BBC News, July 13, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece's economy will contract a further 3%, Athens minister Rania Antonopoulos has told me in a BBC interview.

    The alternate minister for combating unemployment, who was a professional economist, said that the combination of the closure of the banks and austerity measures being forced on the country by eurozone and IMF creditors will tip Greece back into serious recession.... 

    Full video of the interview is available here.
  • In the Media | July 2015

    Greece Is Committed to Staying in Euro Zone: Antonopoulos


    Bloomberg Business, July 10, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Ahead of Greek PM Alex Tsipras's meeting with eurozone finance ministers on July 11, Syriza MP and Levy Institute economist Rania Antonopoulos expressed confidence that a "mutually beneficial" agreement between Greece and its creditors would be put in place within the week, and stated that the government's commitment to remaining in the eurozone "is as strong as ever."

    Full video of the interview is available here.
  • In the Media | July 2015

    Levy's Papadimitriou on Narrowing Options for Greece


    Bloomberg Radio, July 8, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou talks to Kathleen Hays about anti-left sentiment in the eurozone, the possibility of a Grexit, and Greece's strategic value, as the deadline for submitting a new reform proposal to its creditors approaches.

    Full audio of the interview is available here.
  • In the Media | July 2015

    Negotiations between the Greek and European Finance Ministers Go Nowhere


    Background Briefing with Ian Masters, July 7, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    From Athens, Greece, Levy President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou provides an update on emergency negotiations between the new Greek finance minister and his European counterparts, amid warnings by German Chancellor Angela Merkel that “it is no longer about weeks, but a matter of days” before time runs out on striking a deal.

    Listen to the complete interview here: 
    http://ianmasters.com/sites/default/files/bbriefing_2015_07_07c_dimitri%20papadimitrou.mp3  
  • In the Media | July 2015

    Greece Defaults on IMF


    RT, July 2, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Research Associate Pavlina R. Tcherneva outlines the conditions that would encourage Greece to accept a bailout offer and provides her take on the government’s debt reconstruction deal.

    Video of the interview is available here (3:35):  http://rt.com/shows/boom-bust/271168-greece-defaults-imf-creditors/  
  • In the Media | June 2015

    Bard’s Papadimitriou on Outcomes of Greece Debt Crisis


    Bloomberg Radio, June 29, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Papadimitriou provides a picture of what it’s like on the ground in Athens, where the prevailing mood is defined by “negotiation fatigue” and anxiety about the end of the bailout agreement on June 30. Greece is being asked to do the impossible, says Papadimitriou: to impose extra austerity measures to maintain a primary surplus—a prescription even the IMF concedes just doesn’t work. The solution, he says, is to roll over Greek debt and put austerity policies aside. “We’re talking about simple economics here, not ideology.”

    The full interview is available here (01:25): http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/Markets/Analyst_Calls/vXNvCeDOi46M.mp3
  • In the Media | June 2015

    La crisi negli USA: Il punto di vista di Jan Kregel


    Economia, June 23, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    All'interno del quadro economico internazionale, Jan Kregel, direttore del programma “Politica Monetaria” presso il Levy Economic Institute negli USA, analizza qual è stato il ruolo degli Stati Uniti all'interno della crisi economica. Uno degli elementi che viene messo maggiormente in evidenza, è l' importanza data al settore finanziario, rispetto all'economia reale: ciò ha portando ad una minore attenzione a problemi come la disoccupazione, che rappresenta ancora una delle questioni irrisolte dell'Europa, ma soprattutto dell'Italia. 

    Una volta che la crisi economica è scoppiata negli Usa, si è diffusa a macchia d'olio specie nel continente europeo, dove la forbice presente tra europa meridionale e settentrionale, si è notevolmente ampliata.   A tale ritratto, Kregel, aggiunge anche un'attenta le politiche economiche messe in atto da Cina e Giappone e dalle loro ripercussioni sul sistema economico mondiale.

    intervista videoregistrata:
    http://www.economia.rai.it/articoli/la-crisi-negli-usa-il-punto-di-vista-di-jan-kregel/30575/default.aspx
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
  • In the Media | June 2015

    What Is Reform? The Strange Case of Greece and Europe


    By James K. Galbraith
    The American Prospect, June 12, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    On our way back from Berlin on Tuesday, Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis remarked to me that current usage of the word “reform” has its origins in the middle period of the Soviet Union, notably under Khrushchev, when modernizing academics sought to introduce elements of decentralization and market process into a sclerotic planning system. In those years when the American struggle was for rights and some young Europeans still dreamed of revolution, “reform” was not much used in the West. Today, in an odd twist of convergence, it has become the watchword of the ruling class....

    Read more: http://prospect.org/article/what-reform-strange-case-greece-and-europe
  • In the Media | June 2015

    Idealogues Are Crippling Recovery and Undermining an Otherwise Healthy Economy


    Background Briefing, June 11, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Levy President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Ian Masters discuss the Institute’s latest Strategic Analysis of the US economy, and how destructive political ideology is crippling recovery and undermining an otherwise healthy economy. Full audio of the interview is available here.
  • In the Media | June 2015

    Time to End Europe’s Disgrace of Holding Greek People Hostage


    Jörg Bibow
    The Conversation, June 10, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    It was never going to be easy. That much was known from the outset.

    Greece’s newly elected government and the country’s creditors started from too far apart to quickly settle on anything that would be easily sellable to their respective constituencies....

    Read more: https://theconversation.com/time-to-end-europes-disgrace-of-holding-greek-people-hostage-42939
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
  • In the Media | June 2015

    Papadimitriou: "Los fondos buitre deben ser abolidos del sistema"


    Genaro Grasso
    Tiempo, 07 de Junio de 2015. Todos los derechos reservados.

    El economista griego señala que los especuladores deberían estar regulados de la misma manera que las entidades financieras, tanto en forma global como a nivel país.

    Apunta contra los efectos de la globalización en tanto ha sido el canal de difusión de una nueva ola de determinismo neoliberal, en los países en desarrollo y también en los desarrollados....

    Leer más:
    http://tiempo.infonews.com/nota/154525/los-fondos-buitre-deben-ser-abolidos-del-sistema
  • In the Media | May 2015

    Railing Against Bailing


    Congress Launches New Attacks on America's Central Bank
    The Economist, May 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    During a financial panic, said Walter Bagehot, a former editor of The Economist, a central bank should help the deserving and let the reckless go under. Bagehot reckoned that the monetary guardians should follow fourrules: lend freely, but only to solvent firms, against good collateral and at high rates. Many American politicians complain that the Federal Reserve is all too happy to lend, but that it ignores Bagehot's other dictums. On May 13th two senators of very different hues—Elizabeth Warren, a darling of the left, and David Vitter, a southern conservative—joined forces to introduce a bill that would restrict the Fed's ability to lend during the next financial panic. Does that make sense?

    Emergency lending under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act was one of the most controversial policy responses to the financial crisis. In a letter to Janet Yellen, the chair of the Fed, Ms Warren and Mr Vitter say that from 2007 to 2009 the Fed provided over $13 trillion to support financial institutions. The loans were cheap. A study from 2013 by the Levy Institute, a nonpartisan think-tank, found that many of them were "below or at the market rates" (sometimes less than 1%). Many of the banks that benefited were insolvent at the time. And much of the $13 trillion went to just three banks (Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley), leading many to suspect that the Fed was indulging favoured firms.

    Critics focus on details but miss the big picture, counters the Fed. Elizabeth Duke, a former governor, says that the Fed targeted its lending programmes at the right markets, such that it helped to stop the crisis from getting even worse. Jerome Powell, a current governor, points out that "every single loan we made was repaid in full,on time, with interest."

    But whether the Fed should be able to offert his kind of financial support at all is a different question. Choosing certain firms or markets to receive credit over others is inherently problematic, says a recent paper from the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. The prospect of easy money encourages firms to take excessive risks. And according to a paper by Alexander Mehra, then of Harvard Law School, the Fed "exceeded the bounds of its statutory authority" when it bought privately issued securities as well as making loans.

    The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in 2010, was supposed to ensure that the Fed never again made such large, open-ended commitments. Congress told the Fed's board to ensure that emergency lending propped up the financial system as a whole, not individual firms. However, say Ms Warren and Mr Vitter, the Fed has not implemented the new rules in the spirit of the law. The new bill proposes a number of Bagehot-like changes: to toughen up the definition of insolvency, such that the Fed lends only to viable firms; to offer any lending programme to many different institutions; and to ensure that when the Fed does lend, it charges punitive rates.

    This battle is not the only one the Fed faces. On May 12th Richard Shelby, a Republican senator and chair of the Senate Banking Committee, introduced his own bill, which he hopes will rein in the Fed's powers in different ways. It would increase the threshold at which a financial institution became "systemically important" (and thus subject to tougher regulatory scrutiny) from assets of $50 billion to $500 billion. Mr Shelby also wants to shake up the structure of the Federal Reserve System, including changing how the president of the New York Fed, which oversees big banks, is appointed. They may have different complaints, but lots of America's lawmakers agree that the Fed must change.

    From the print edition: Finance and economics
  • In the Media | May 2015

    Will Greece Get Through This Coming Week's Crisis?


    Background Briefing, May 10, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    From Athens, Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou updates Ian Masters on the financial crisis as Greece teeters on the brink of default, with an $840 million payment to the IMF looming and fears that there is no credible plan to reach an agreement with the country’s eurozone creditors.

    Full audio of the interview is available here.
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Wall Street Watchdogs Should Prevent Crises, Not Build Buffers


    By Pedro Nicolaci da Costa
    The Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The effort by financial regulators to ensure big banks and other financial institutions have adequate levels of capital is misguided since that will only help lessen the impact of a crisis, not prevent one.

    That’s the conclusion of Eric Tymoigne, an economist at Lewis & Clark Collegein a presentation last week at the Levy Economics Institute‘s 24th Minsky Conference.

    Read more:
    http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/04/22/wall-street-watchdogs-should-prevent-crises-not-build-buffers/  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Elizabeth Warren: “The Unfinished Business of Financial Reform”


    Moyers & Company, April 18, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Last Wednesday, Senator Elizabeth Warren delivered this speech at a conference at the Levy Institute in Washington which lays out the banking reform she believes still needs to happen.  The Nation’s George Zornick called it “a blueprint for how Warren thinks Democrats should attack continued financial reform.”

    Read more: http://billmoyers.com/2015/04/18/elizabeth-warren-speech/
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Paul Tucker Warns of Global Financial Risk


    By Robert Feinberg
    NewsMax, April 17, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Perhaps the highlight of the 24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies was a speech by Paul Tucker, senior fellow at both the Kennedy School and the Business School at Harvard, who served as deputy governor of the Bank of England (BOE) from 2009 to 2013.... 

    Read more: http://www.newsmax.com/finance/robertfeinberg/tucker-financial-dodd-frank-bank/2015/04/17/id/639147/
  • In the Media | April 2015

    ‘Game of Thrones’ and the darkness that awaits us


    By Jim Tankersley
    The Washington Post, April 17, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    It still isn’t winter in Westeros, at least not on television, although there is no shortage of reminders that it is coming. The seasons in George R.R. Martin’s “Game of Thrones” aren’t regular or celestial. Summer can last a few minutes or many years. At this point in the show, the start of the fifth season, it has gone on for a decade, the longest in the realm’s recorded history. The balmy weather is about to give way to snows and famine, and astoundingly, no one in the land seems prepared....

    Read more: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/17/game-of-thrones-and-the-economic-darkness-that-awaits-us/
  • In the Media | April 2015

    What Elizabeth Warren Has That Hillary Clinton Needs


    By David Dayen
    The Fiscal Times, April 17, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    “Rules are not the enemy of markets,” Sen. Elizabeth Warren told me yesterday, on the heels of her major address on the unfinished business of financial reform at the Levy Institute’s Hyman Minsky Conference. “Rules promote innovation and competition. Rules prevent markets from blowing up. We learned that in 1929 and we should have learned it again in 2008.” 

    Read more:
     http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2015/04/17/What-Elizabeth-Warren-Has-Hillary-Clinton-Needs
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Free Lunch: Finance and the Rule of Law


    By Martin Sandbu
    Financial Times, April 17, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Elizabeth Warren may not be running for president but she does not relent in gunning for Wall Street. On Wednesday she gave a speech arguing powerfully that the task of taming finance is far from finished. It is an important speech that deserves to be widely read. The location she chose to give it was, incidentally, as apt as can be. The Levy Institute has covered itself in more glory than the economics profession at large, with research less marred by the blind spots that once distracted so many economists from the looming crisis. (It was Hyman Minsky's home institution.)

    Read more:
     http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a37b9244-e386-11e4-9a82-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Xfu2l4dm
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Fed's Bullard, FDIC's Hoenig and Sen. Warren Talk Financial Policy


    By Robert Feinberg
    NewsMax, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    On the first day of the Levy Institute's two-day annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference, held at the National Press Club in Washington, high-powered speakers held forth on the most prominent issues in the financial world that will affect the economy as Congress begins to try to legislate during the two years that the Republican Congress has to make its mark as the Obama administration winds down. 

    Read more:
     http://www.newsmax.com/finance/robertfeinberg/bullard-hoenig-warren-financial/2015/04/16/id/638861/
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Elizabeth Warren Just Laid Out All the Financial Reforms She Wants to Push Through


    By Portia Crowe
    Business Insider Australia, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Elizabeth Warren made a speech at the Levy Institute’s Minsky Conference on Wednesday and laid out some major financial reforms she wants to push through.

    “The culture of cheating on Wall Street didn’t stop with the 2008 crash,” the populist Massachusetts Senator said.

    Read more:
     http://www.businessinsider.com.au/elizabeth-warren-new-reforms-2015-4  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Warren: It’s Time to Break Up Too-Big-to-Fail Banks


    MPA Magazine, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren has called on lawmakers to break up too-big-to-fail by capping the size of the largest financial institutions and separating commercial and investment banking. She also proposed limiting emergency lending by the Federal Reserve to troubled institutions by the Federal Reserve.

    Speaking at the Levy Institute’s 24thannual Hyman Minsky conference, Warren said the fact that the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. say 11 banks threaten the entire U.S. economy means they are too big.

    Read more:
     http://www.mpamag.com/mortgage-originator/warren-its-time-to-break-up-toobigtofail-banks-22121.aspx
  • In the Media | April 2015

    If Elizabeth Warren Were Running for President, This Would Be Her Agenda


    By George Zornick
    The Nation, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    If Elizabeth Warren ran for president, a key part of her campaign—if not the centerpiece—would likely involve how to restructure the financial sector in a less dangerous and more productive way. Dodd-Frank was by many accounts a good start, but it’s clear the economy is still over-financialized and too-big-to-fail banks continue to pose an existential threat.

    Warren isn’t running for president, but she unveiled that exact agenda in a sweeping speech Wednesday in a conference at the Levy Institute in Washington. It advocated an array of specific, often ambitious policy proposals, many of which have circulated in Washington for years and that Warren, at various times, has already called for.

    Read more:
     http://www.thenation.com/blog/204433/big-elizabeth-warren-speech-how-finish-financial-reform#  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    ECB Monetary Policy to Be Accommodative in the Foreseeable Future—Constancio


    By Jan Strupczewski
    Reuters, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The European Central Bank's monetary policy will be accommodative in the foreseeable future, the bank's Vice President Vitor Constancio said on Thursday.

    "... Monetary policy needs to be accommodative, as I expect to be the case for the foreseeable future in the euro area," Constancio told a seminar at the Levy Economics Institute. 
       
  • In the Media | April 2015

    ECB Constancio: Eurozone Monetary Policy Needs to Stay Accommodative


    By Harriet Torry
    The Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Vitor Constancio, vice president of the European Central Bank, said Thursday that economic recovery in Europe remains “gradual and moderate,” underscoring the need for loose monetary policy in the eurozone for the foreseeable future.

    “Monetary policy has to remain accommodative with low interest rates,” Mr. Constancio said, adding that “getting Europe growing again is one of the most important challenges we face at present.”

    But Mr. Constancio also highlighted the importance of being aware of the limitations of monetary policy, in remarks at a conference hosted by the Levy Institute.

    Read more:
     http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/04/16/ecb-constancio-eurozone-monetary-policy-needs-to-stay-accommodative/
  • In the Media | April 2015

    The Senator Professor Drops By the Shebeen


    By Charles Pierce
    Esquire, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    It's been an interesting week for Senator Professor Elizabeth Warren. First, in Time Magazine's annual 100 Groovy Folks list, she gets a rapturous shout-out from none other than Hillary Rodham Clinton, currently touring the silos of Iowa and the clam shacks of New Hampshire....

    Read more:
     http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a34418/a-visit-from-senator-professor-warren/
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Warren Lays Out Detailed Plan to Take on Wall Street


    By Victoria Finkle
    American Banker, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON — Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., delivered a sweeping speech Wednesday aimed at what she's calling "the unfinished business of financial reform."

    Warren laid out a number of broad policy goals for the banking industry, arguing that while the Dodd-Frank Act "made some real progress," more needs to be done to resurrect a safe financial system.

    Read more:
     http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/warren-lays-out-detailed-plan-to-take-on-wall-street-1073764-1.html  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Elizabeth Warren Has a Game-changing Idea That Doesn’t Require Congress


    By Matthew Yglesias
    Vox, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Elizabeth Warren isn't running for president. But she does have an agenda for reining in the big banks that would go well beyond the Obama administration's (underrated) bank regulation moves and substantially alter the role of Wall Street in American life.

    In a speech delivered on April 15 at the Levy Institute's 24th annual Hyman Minsky conference, Warren laid out the most comprehensive and ambitious version of her agenda yet.

    Read more:
     http://www.vox.com/2015/4/15/8420789/elizabeth-warren-prosecutions  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Warren Calls for Breaking Up the Banks


    By Holly LeFon
    US News & World Report, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., called Wednesday for breaking up big banks through structural reforms that would bring a decisive end to “too big to fail.”

    Warren told a Levy Economics Institute conference she has worked with other lawmakers to advance a bill that would build a wall between commercial banking and investment banking.

    Read more:
     http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/15/warren-calls-for-breaking-up-the-banks  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Anti-Wall Street Senator Lambasts Bank Non-prosecution Deals


    By Barney Jopson and Gina Chon
    Financial Times, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Elizabeth Warren, the anti-Wall Street senator, has lashed out at US regulators for being soft on misbehaving banks, describing settlements that extracted billion dollar fines as a “slap on the wrist” and demanding that banks be put on trial.

    The remarks by Ms Warren, who has emerged as a standard bearer of the Democratic left, are designed to put pressure on the US authorities as they come close to concluding their investigation into the manipulation of the foreign exchange market.

    Read more:
     http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bce88134-e394-11e4-9a82-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3XQnJg6ZU  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Fed's Bullard Renews Call for Rate Hike


    By Sam Fleming
    Financial Times, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    US growth is set to remain relatively "robust" and low inflation is due largely to temporary factors, St Louis Federal Reserve president James Bullard said in a speech on Wednesday morning in Washington DC. 

    He renewed his recent calls for higher interest rates, in part because of the risks of stoking up asset bubbles by leaving them at near zero levels, reports the FT's Sam Fleming.

    Read more:
     http://www.ft.com/intl/fastft/308482/us-growth-remain-relatively-robust-feds-bullard  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    FDIC’s Thomas Hoenig: Banks Should Meet Capital Minimum to Get Regulatory Relief


    By Ryan Tracy
    The Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON—The No. 2 official at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. said banks should get “regulatory relief” if they meet minimum capital requirements and other criteria, weighing in as Congress considers measures to ease rules on smaller banks.

    FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig, who favors breaking up the largest banks and is influential with members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, said banks should only get regulatory relief if they hold foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives worth less than $3 billion, maintain an equity-to-asset ratio of at least 10%, and don’t engage in trading activity.

    Read more:
     http://www.wsj.com/articles/fdic-banks-should-meet-capital-minimum-to-get-regulatory-relief-1429107301  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Bullard Says Zero Policy Rate Risks Asset-Price Bubbles


    By Steve MatthewsChristopher Condon
    Bloomberg, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard repeated his call for beginning to normalize monetary policy and said maintaining interest rates near zero risks destructive asset-price bubbles.

    “A risk of remaining at the zero lower bound too long is that a significant asset-market bubble will develop,” Bullard said in prepared remarks in Washington on Wednesday. “If a bubble in a key asset market develops, history has shown that we have little ability to contain it,” he said, citing the housing bubble that preceded the last recession.

    Read more:
     http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-15/fed-s-bullard-says-zero-policy-rate-risks-asset-price-bubbles  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Fed's Bullard Says "No Problem" with Hiking Then Returning to Zero


    Reuters, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    (Reuters) – A top Federal Reserve official said on Wednesday that it's okay for the Fed to raise interest rates and then return to near-zero levels if the economic data shows that the central bank needs to retreat.

    "I don't think there's a problem with that," St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard said, referring to the issue of hiking rates soon and then lowering them shortly afterward if economic growth drops.

    Read more:
     http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/15/usa-fed-bullard-rates-idUSN9N0WC01O20150415  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    FDIC's Hoenig: Blanket Small Bank-Exemption from Volcker Unwise


    By Brai Odion-Esene
    MNI Deutsche Börse Group, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MNI) - The vice chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Wednesday argued against giving all small banks an exemption from the ban on proprietary trading by traditional banks, commonly known as the Volcker Rule, arguing that it does not impose any added regulatory burdens on smaller institutions.

    "A blanket exemption for smaller institutions to engage in proprietary trading and yet be exempt from the Volcker Rule is unwise," Thomas Hoenig said in remarks prepared for delivery at the Levy Institute's Hyman Minsky conference in Washington.

    Read more:
     https://mninews.marketnews.com/content/fdics-hoenigblanket-small-bank-exemption-volcker-unwise
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Warren pitches ideas for stronger Wall Street curbs


    By Annie Linskey
    The Boston Globe, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren wants to limit to just one the number of deals financial institutions accused of wrongdoing can cut with the government, a change that she believes would force corporations to follow the rules or face criminal charges.

    It’s among several new ideas that Warren unveiled in a speech at the National Press Club on Wednesday. The senator offered new initiatives that would require banks to par far higher “mandatory minimum” fines when they avoid prosecution after violating rules. She also suggested a tax incentive aimed at prodding highly leveraged banks to use capital to finance deals rather than debt.

    Read more: http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2015/04/15/elizabeth-warren-pitches-ideas-for-stronger-wall-street-curbs/4OHy5tGIOxcEhtAyEr7YYL/story.html  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Warren Says Banks Should Face Bigger Tax Burden to Balance Risks


    By Jesse Hamilton and Silla Brush
    Chicago Tribune, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Wall Street banks and their top executives should face new tax penalties to keep them from engaging in risky practices that can pose threats to the financial system, Sen. Elizabeth Warren said Wednesday.

    Warren, who has been a leading defender of the Dodd-Frank Act, called on the Republican-led Congress to relent from attacks on the 2010 law and close a tax loophole that she said encourages bank chief executive officers to seek quick gains.

    Read more: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-news-bc-warren15-20150415-story.html  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Elizabeth Warren Hammers the Endless Failures of Wall Street Regulators


    By Zach Carter
    The Huffington Post, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON -- Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) assailed the nation's top bank regulators on Wednesday for coddling Wall Street offenders and ducking the responsibilities Congress assigned them in the wake of the 2008 financial meltdown.

    At a conference hosted by the Levy Economics Institute, Warren called not only for structural change to the banking system but for a revamping of the weak enforcement culture at the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice....

    Read more:
     http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/15/elizabeth-warren-wall-street_n_7073040.html  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    How Warren's Banking Agenda Could Influence Clinton


    By Victoria Finkle
    American Banker, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON — Hillary Clinton just kicked off her presidential bid on Sunday, but progressives have already begun a campaign of their own to shape the financial policy debate ahead of the 2016 elections.

    Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., delivered a wide-ranging address on Wednesday, laying out an agenda for tending to "unfinished business" in the financial industry in the wake of the financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank Act.

    Read more:
     
    http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/cheat-sheet-how-warrens-banking-agenda-could-influence-clinton-1073782-1.html?utm_campaign=daily%20briefing-apr%2016%202015&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&ET=americanbanker%3Ae4197921%3A4562712a%3A&st=email  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Warren on the Warpath: Slams SEC, Pitches Financial Reforms


    By Joe Mont
    Compliance Week, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    If she had not already emphatically dismissed the idea of running for president, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) delivered what would have been a headline-grabbing stump speech on Wednesday.

    Speaking at Bard College’s Levy Economics Institute, Warren presented her view of what is needed for continuing financial reforms beyond the Dodd-Frank Act....

    Read more:
     https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the-filing-cabinet/warren-on-the-warpath-slams-sec-pitches-financial-reforms#.VTFJtL6itUR  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Elizabeth Warren: The Unfinished Business of Financial Reform


    Value Walk, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    In a speech at the Levy Institute’s annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference today, Senator Elizabeth Warren laid out a set of proposals to advance the process of financial reform that began with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.

    Read more:
     http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/04/elizabeth-warren-financial-reform/
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Elizabeth Warren's New Agenda for Democrats on Financial Reform


    By Eric Garcia
    National Journal, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    For Sen. Elizabeth Warren, the Dodd-Frank financial reform law was an important first step to taming financial markets. On Wednesday, she laid out a series of bold next steps for financial reform that could provide a road map for the Democratic Party in 2016.

    Speaking at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College's 24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on Wednesday, Warren gave a message that could serve as strong ammunition for Democrats in the future, saying that opponents of financial regulation often pit the argument as between being pro-market and supporting deregulation versus being anti-market and supporting more regulation.

    Read more:
     http://www.nationaljournal.com/economy/elizabeth-warren-s-new-agenda-for-democrats-on-financial-reform-20150415  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    This Unorthodox Plan May Keep Greece in the Eurozone


    By Joseph Adinolfi
    MarketWatch, April 8, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (MarketWatch) — The idea has been bandied about for years by economists who fear a Greek exit from the euro could trigger a global financial crisis. 

    To create the fiscal flexibility that Greece’s economy so sorely needs to reinvigorate economic growth, meet its debt payments and, ultimately, stay in the eurozone, the Greek government could adopt what economists at the Levy Institute call a “parallel financial system” that would allow the government to make payments without using hard currency.

    Read more:
     http://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-unorthodox-plan-may-keep-greece-in-the-eurozone-2015-04-08  
  • In the Media | April 2015

    Greece's Overtures to Russia May Not Be a Sideshow


    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Al Jazeera, April 8, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' visit to Moscow this week for talks with President Vladimir Putin has fuelled wild speculations about the real intentions of the Greek government.

    The visit is taking place while bailout talks between Greece and Europe have reached a very critical juncture.

    Read more:
     https://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/greeces-overtures-russia-may-not-sideshow-110052332--finance.html
     
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    C. J. Polychroniou
  • In the Media | March 2015

    Quantitative Easing Won't Cure Europe's Economic Woes


    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Al Jazeera, March 20, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The European Central Bank's (ECB) quantitative easing (QE) programme seems to have created a state of euphoria among global investors, but it will do very little to ameliorate Europe's economic problems.

    A close look into the state of Europe's economies reveals a much ignored fact by most professional economists and the media alike: Europe is the sick man of the global economy once again.

    Read more:
     https://uk.news.yahoo.com/quantitative-easing-wont-cure-europes-economic-woes-070940559.html#ITWWghr  
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    C. J. Polychroniou
  • In the Media | March 2015

    Forced Austerity: Nothing but a Ponzi Scheme?


    By Klaus Jurgens
    Today's Zaman, March 18, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The current escalation of disagreement between Athens and Berlin symbolizes that there may be more at stake than simply extending repayment deadlines. Could perhaps the entire monetary union project and thus the vision of political union be at stake?

    Nothing less is what a brand-new study published by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College suggests. In it Senior Scholar Jan Kregel analyzes the creation of the eurozone and how Germany is trying to deal with the recent currency problems -- actually, problems almost exclusively in a limited number of eurozone family members, notably Greece.

    Read more:
     http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/klaus-jurgens/forced-austerity-nothing-but-a-ponzi-scheme_375591.html  
  • In the Media | March 2015

    Greek Debt: Do the Right Thing


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The Huffington Post, March 18, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    "Greece's government and people have indulged in excesses and corruption; now it is time to pay the price." The argument for full repayment of Greece's debt is well known, easily understood, and widely accepted, particularly in Germany. Sacrifice, austerity and repayment are righteous, fair, and just.

    That view is coloring this and next week's coming meetings between Greece and its international lenders, and with European leaders. A revision of Greece's debt terms has not been on the agenda. 

    Read more:
     http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dimitri-b-papadimitriou/greek-debt-do-the-right-t_b_6894678.html
  • In the Media | March 2015

    Teoría monetaria moderna y trabajo garantizado


    El Salmon Contracorriente, 5 Marzo 2015. Reservados todos los derechos. 

    Randall Wray abrió el acto explicando al público una de las bases de su enfoque teórico: la apertura del discurso económico hacia una perspectiva distinta a la que se imparte en la universidad. El profesor estadounidense planteó que para criticar el actual modelo económico es necesario conocer la teoría y se desmarcó de la idea predominante al afirmar que “existen cosas primordiales que son más importantes que el déficit público”, antes de profundizar en la propuesta de Trabajo Garantizado, que calificó de “sentido común”....

    Leer más:
     http://www.elsalmoncontracorriente.es/?Teoria-monetaria-moderna-y-trabajo
  • In the Media | March 2015

    Alberto Garzón plantea un plan para crear un millón de empleos en un año


    El Correro, 4 Marzo 2015. Reservados todos los derechos.

    Izquierda Unida quiere que el trabajo esté "garantizado" en Espaã como elemento de inserción social imprescindible y, para ello, propone implantarlo de forma gradual y por etapas con la creación de un millón de empleos el primer aõ con menos del 1% del PIB....

    Leer más:
     http://www.elcorreo.com/bizkaia/politica/201503/04/alberto-garzon-plantea-plan-20150304155358-rc.html
  • In the Media | March 2015

    IU plantea un plan de 9.600 millones para crear un millón de empleos en un año


    Público, 04 de marzo 2015. Reservados todos los derechos.

    MADRID — El portavoz económico de la Izquierda Plural (IU-ICV-CHA) y próximo candidato de Izquierda Unida a la Presidencia del Gobierno, Alberto Garzón, ha presentado este miércoles una propuesta para crear un millón de empleos por una inversión neta de 9.600 millones de euros en su primer año de aplicación.   Este programa de trabajo garantizado, que será una de las piezas angulares de su programa electoral en el ámbito laboral, se inspira en la teoría monetaria moderna y en el libro del profesor L. Randall Wray sobre este asunto, que aporta un discurso alternativo a las teorías convencionales sobre cómo debe gastar e invertir el Estado para mejorar el bienestar social y garantizar el derecho al trabajo que tienen los ciudadanos.

    Leer más:
     http://m.publico.es/Pol%C3%ADtica/1903984/iu-plantea-un-plan-de-9-600-millones-para-crear-un-millon-de-empleos-en-un-ano
  • In the Media | March 2015

    Do Cryptocurrencies Such as Bitcoin Have a Future?


    By Campbell R. Harvey and Éric Tymoigne
    The Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Despite the mystery, the whiff of scandal, and general public unfamiliarity with the concept, somebody out there is buying, and selling, not just bitcoin but dozens of other cryptocurrencies as well. The total market capitalization for these unregulated electronic forms of payment was roughly $4.04 billion as of mid-February, according to coinmarketcap.com, a website that tracks trading in alternative currencies. More than 500 altcoins, as they are also known, were represented on the site recently.

    Read more:
     http://www.wsj.com/articles/do-cryptocurrencies-such-as-bitcoin-have-a-future-1425269375
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
  • In the Media | February 2015

    The Greek Debt and the German Acquiescence


    Interview with James K. Galbraith
    The Real News Network, February 27, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Initially, Germany stood firm in saying that Greece would have to sign the existing loan program in order to secure an extension, but this was always an untenable position, says Research Scholar James K. Galbraith. 

    For the complete interview: http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=13320
  • In the Media | February 2015

    Bard's Papadimitriou on Greece


    Interview with Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Bloomberg Radio, February 24, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Levy Institute President Dimitri Papadimitriou discusses the approval of Greece’s reform package and the four-month extension of the bailout agreement with its eurozone partners in this interview with Kathleen Hays.

    To listen to the podcast: http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/Economics/On_Economy/vLaWHOte5hq4.mp3 
  • In the Media | February 2015

    Tax Anticipation Notes: A Timely Alternative Financing Instrument for Greece


    By Robert W. Parenteau
    Credit Writedowns, February 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The recent election of an explicitly anti-austerity party in Greece has upset the prevailing policy consensus in the eurozone, and raised a number of issues that have remained ignored or suppressed in policy circles. Expansionary fiscal consolidations have proven largely elusive. The difficulty of achieving GDP growth while reaching primary fiscal surplus targets is very evident in Greece. Avoiding rapidly escalating government debt to GDP ratios has consequently proven very challenging. Even if the arithmetic of avoiding a debt trap can be made to work, the rise of opposition parties in the eurozone suggests there are indeed political limits to fiscal consolidation. The Ponzi like nature of requesting new loans in order to service prior debt obligations, especially while nominal incomes are falling, is a third issue that Syriza has raised, and it is one that informed their opening position of rejecting any extension of the current bailout program. 

    Read more:
     https://www.creditwritedowns.com/2015/02/tax-anticipation-notes-timely-alternative-financing-instrument-greece.html
  • In the Media | February 2015

    The Workers' Think Tank


    By Sasha Abramsky
    The Nation, February 2, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    By many measures, the American economy has recovered from the 2008 implosion. The stock market is soaring, housing values in many markets have rebounded and GDP is growing at a healthy rate of more than 4 percent. Compared to Spain and Greece, where debt, mass unemployment and hardship remain widespread following the Eurozone crisis, America looks to be on easy street.

    Yet scratch below the surface and you’ll see that the United States still has a considerable economic problem. While the official unemployment rate has fallen to 5.6 percent, the lowest since 2008, the percentage of the adult population participating in the labor market remains far lower than it was at the start of the recession. At least in part, headline unemployment numbers look respectable because millions of Americans have grown so discouraged about their prospects of finding work that they no longer try, and thus are no longer counted among the unemployed. Depending on the measures, only 59 to 63 percent of the working-age population is employed, far below recent historical norms.

    Read more:
     http://www.thenation.com/article/196721/workers-think-tank
  • In the Media | January 2015

    Syriza Is Offering a New Deal for the People of Greece


    By C. J. Polychroniou
    The New York Times, January 28, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The reason for the meteoric rise of Syriza is clear. The Greek electorate has had enough of the imposition of the harsh austerity measures that are behind the bailout loan agreements that have been in effect since May 2010 when Greece was on the brink of an official default. Undoubtedly, a Greek default would have had a catastrophic impact on Europe’s major banks and could have led to the dissolution of the eurozone, at least in its present form, so a bailout by Greece’s euro partners was inevitable.

    Read more:
     http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/01/27/can-greeces-anti-austerity-government-succeed/syriza-is-offering-a-new-deal-for-the-people-of-greece
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    C. J. Polychroniou
  • In the Media | January 2015

    Greek Voters Set Stage for Tense Austerity Negotiation


    By Ned Resnikoff
    Al Jazeera America, January 26, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece’s socialist left has won power. Now it needs to wield it.

    For Syriza, the left-wing, anti-austerity party that seized control of the government in Sunday’s snap parliamentary elections, that means following through on its number one campaign promise: to renegotiate the terms of Greece’s economic bailout with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the European Central Bank (ECB). Those three financial institutions, collectively known as the “Troika,” have made their economic assistance contingent on Greece’s willingness to pass a series of draconian austerity cuts.

    Read more:
     http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/26/greek-voters-set-stage-for-tense-austerity-negotiation.html
  • In the Media | January 2015

    Thank You Greece!


    By Maria Helena dos Santos André
    Social Europe, January 26, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    In a time when in Paris Marine Le Pen is “Ante Portas”, when xenophobic populists are marching through the streets of Dresden, when in London the UKIP sets the tone for an ever more anti-European hysteria, and when in Helsinki the Finnish government becomes the most ardent proponent of more austerity for Greece, for no other reason but the fear of a success of the “Real Finns” at the next ballot box, the Greek people have given a clear signal, voting against more austerity and for the European values of democracy, the welfare state, tolerance and inclusive societies.

    Read more:
     http://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/01/thank-greece/
  • In the Media | January 2015

    Hello 2015. Goodbye Austerity?


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The World Post, January 8, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece is facing front, looking towards the new year and the upcoming January elections. But it would be foolish not to learn from a look backwards, as well.

    At the Athens economics conference, Europe At The Crossroads, the participants were a diverse collection of policymakers, overflowing with disagreements on the very best route to growth. Nonetheless, with one notable exception (the leader of Ireland's central bank, endorsing European Central Bank policy), the overwhelming majority united on a single principle:

    The bailout and its related austerity programs have failed miserably.

    Read more: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dimitri-b-papadimitriou/hello-2015-goodbye-auster_b_6438328.html
  • In the Media | January 2015

    Markets Tank with Greece Poised to Leave the Euro: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou


    Background Briefing with Ian Masters, January 5, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Papadimitriou joins Masters to discuss the upcoming January 25 election in Greece that is likely to bring the anti-austerity left-wing Syriza party to power, sparking fears that Greece will reject the terms of the EU, ECB, and IMF bailouts and exit the euro.

    Listen to the complete interview here: http://ianmasters.com/content/january-5-markets-tank-greece-poised-leave-euro-weaponization-finance-gop-114th-congress-80-
  • In the Media | December 2014

    Despite Growth, Experts Skeptical US Recovering from Recession


    By Mustafa Caglayan
    Anadolu Agency, December 24, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    The U.S. economy on Tuesday posted its fastest expansion in more than a decade, but experts warn that there may be a dark cloud to this silver lining.

    Official figures show that the gross domestic product—the broadest measure of economic output and growth—grew at its fastest rate since 2003, surging 5 percent in the third quarter.

    Read more:
     http://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/440452--despite-growth-experts-skeptical-us-recovering-from-recession
  • In the Media | December 2014

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou: "Juncker's Stimulus Plan Is Unrealistic on Many Fronts"


    Interview with Dimitris Rapidis
    Bridging Europe, December 16, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    As part of the Bridging Dialogue Initiative, Dimitris Rapidis discusses with Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou the ECB's interest rates policy, deflation, EC President Jean-Claude Junckers's fiscal stimulus plan, debt management and the Stability Pact, the US economy, and the economic crisis in Greece. 

    Read more:
     http://www.bridgingeurope.net/interview-with-dimitri-b-papadimitriou-president-of-the-levy-economics-institute.html
  • In the Media | October 2014

    Central Banks: Where Do They Go from Here


    By Ronald Find
    Global Finance, October 29, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Governors of the world’s central banks face difficult choices as they are increasingly tasked with promoting financial stability and providing a boost to growth. Not all central bankers—or other stakeholders—believe this is, or should be, their role. What’s more, the tools at their disposal may have limited effects and unforeseen consequences, leaving the bankers between a rock and a hard place. . . .

    Read more: https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/october-2014/central-banks-where-do-they-go-here
  • In the Media | September 2014

    Smart Charts: An Economic Recovery for the 1%


    By Joshua Holland
    Moyers & Company, September 29, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Matthew Yglesias calls this chart, from Pavlina Tcherneva, an economist at the Levy Economic Institute at Bard College, “the most important chart about the American economy you’ll see this year.” It illustrates how much income gains those at the top have enjoyed during each of our post-war expansions....

    Read more:
     http://billmoyers.com/2014/09/29/smart-charts-economic-recovery-1-percent/
  • In the Media | September 2014

    This Really Depressing Graph About the Economy Is Turning Heads


    By Aaron Abbruzzese
    Mashable, September 27, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    If it seems like the rich are getting richer, well, the data might just back you up. A new graph based on data from times of growth backs up growing concern that the current economic system is disproportionately favoring those that are already wealthy....

    Read more:
     http://mashable.com/2014/09/25/this-really-depressing-graph-about-the-u-s-economy-is-turning-heads/
  • In the Media | September 2014

    The Benefits of Economic Expansions Are Increasingly Going to the Richest Americans


    By Neil Irwin
    The New York Times, September 25, 2014

    Economic expansions are supposed to be the good times, the periods in which incomes and living standards improve. And that’s still true, at least for some of us....

    Read more:
     http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/upshot/the-benefits-of-economic-expansions-are-increasingly-going-to-the-richest-americans.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=HpSum&module=second-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&abt=0002&abg=0    
  • In the Media | September 2014

    This Depressing Chart Shows that the Rich Aren't Just Grabbing a Bigger Slice of the Income Pie—They're Taking All of It


    By Christopher Ingraham
    The Washington Post, September 25, 2014

    Take a look at this chart, from Bard College economist Pavlina Tcherneva. In an August 2013 paper, she wrote:

    An examination of average income growth [in the U.S.] during every postwar expansion (from trough to peak) and its distribution between the wealthiest 10% and bottom 90% of households reveals that income growth becomes more inequitably distributed with every subsequent expansion during the entire postwar period.

    In other words, the wealthy are capturing more and more of the overall income growth during each expansion period....

    Read more:
     http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/09/25/this-depressing-chart-shows-that-the-rich-arent-just-grabbing-a-bigger-slice-of-the-income-pie-theyre-taking-all-of-it/
  • In the Media | September 2014

    How the Rich Conquered the Economy, in One Chart


    By Jordan Weissmann
    Slate, September 25, 2014

    When you write about the economy every day for a living, you can start feeling numb toward charts about income inequality. After all, the story doesn't change much week to week, and usually neither do the visualizations. But this one, from Bard College economist Pavlina Tcherneva, somehow still feels astonishing, and has stirred up a bunch of attention today. It shows how much of U.S. income growth has been claimed by the top 10 percent of households during economic expansions, and how much was claimed by the bottom 90 percent. Guess who's gotten the lion's share in recent years?

    Read more: 
    http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/09/25/how_the_rich_conquered_the_economy_in_one_chart.html
  • In the Media | September 2014

    Will Lindsay Lohan Save Greece?


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    New Geography, September 25, 2014

    It's September, but island beaches from the Aegeans to Zante are still buzzing in Greece. Mykonos has been the summer's Go-To spot for superstars and supermodels; the mainland and cities are also seeing the British and Europeans coming back....

    Read more:
     http://www.newgeography.com/content/004533-will-lindsay-lohan-save-greece
  • In the Media | September 2014

    The Most Important Chart about the American Economy You'll See This Year


    By Matthew Yglesias
    Vox, September 25, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Pavlina Tcherneva's chart showing the distribution of income gains during periods of economic expansion is burning up the economics internet over the past 24 hours and for good reason. The trend it depicts is shocking....

    Read more:
     http://www.vox.com/xpress/2014/9/25/6843509/income-distribution-recoveries-pavlina-tcherneva
  • In the Media | September 2014

    The Rich Are Getting Richer, Part the Millionth


    By Kevin Drum
    Mother Jones, September 27, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    It's not easy finding new and interesting ways to illustrate the growth of income inequality over the past few decades. But here are a couple of related ones. The first is from "Survival of the Richest" in the current issue of Mother Jones, and it shows how much of our total national income growth gets hoovered up by the top 1 percent during economic recoveries. The super-rich got 45 percent of total income growth during the dotcom years; 65 percent during the housing bubble years; and a stunning 95 percent during the current recovery. It's good to be rich....

    Read more:
     http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/09/rich-are-getting-richer-part-millionth
  • In the Media | August 2014

    Greek Crisis and the Dark Clouds over the American Economy: An Interview with Dimitri B. Papadimitriou


    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Truthout, August 27, 2014

    Is the Greek crisis nearly over as the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the Greek government like to proclaim because of the sharp decline in Greek bond yields, the attainment of a primary surplus and an increase in foreign tourism? If so, what about the 27.2 per cent of the population that remains unemployed and the widespread poverty across the nation, the ever growing public debt ratio and the dismal state of Greek exports? And what about the United States? Is America on the way to becoming Greece as many Republicans claimed a couple of years ago? Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, executive vice president and Jerome Levy professor of economics at Bard College, and president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard, who foresees Greece emerging into a debt prison and a rather gloomy economic future for the United States, discusses these questions in an exclusive interview for Truthout with C. J. Polychroniou.

    Read the entire post here: 
    http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/25796-greek-crisis-and-the-dark-clouds-over-the-american-economy-an-interview-with-dimitri-b-papadimitriou
  • In the Media | August 2014

    COLOMBIA: 'Ingreso de Colombia a la Ocde es un gran error': Jan Kregel


    Etorno Inteligente, August 22, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Portafolio
     / Colombia comete un gran error en perseguir el objetivo de entrar a la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (Ocde), porque eso debe ser para países con un grado similar de desarrollo, dice el economista Jan Kregel, investigador del Levy Economics Institute of Board College de Estados Unidos.

    El experto, relator de la Comisión de la ONU sobre la reforma al sistema financiero internacional, participa en la Décima Semana Económica de la Universidad Central.

    Colombia ha basado su crecimiento en productos básicos. ¿Cómo mantener esa tendencia a largo plazo? 

    Lo que se puede predecir para una economía como la colombiana es una crisis externa sustantiva porque, si se mira el déficit externo, algo así como el 50 por ciento de las exportaciones de Colombia provienen del petróleo. Si hay una disminución de los precios, el primer impacto es empeorar el déficit externo y reducir los flujos financieros y habrá una presión fuerte sobre la tasa de cambio y la posición de los exportadores empeorará.

    ¿Qué debe el país hacer para reactivar la industria? 

    Hay un impacto de la enfermedad holandesa. Las exportaciones de materias primas han tenido una elevación de precios y han apreciado la tasa de cambio. Por eso, otras exportaciones son menos competitivas. Otro factor es la redistribución de las manufacturas globalmente. Si uno mira el impacto de las importaciones en la economía colombiana, hay un gran incremento de las compras a Asia.

    ¿Colombia tiene enfermedad holandesa? 

    Absolutamente sí. La enfermedad holandesa se puede clasificar de dos maneras: una es simplemente el impacto de los productos básicos, creando una mejora en los términos de comercio y un aumento de los ingresos del país. Pero el impacto de la tasa de cambio en la competitividad acaba con un incremento de los ingresos nacionales y al mismo tiempo se abaratan los bienes importados.

    El peligro real de la enfermedad holandesa no está solamente en la tasa de cambio, sino que se ve en la distribución del consumo de productos nacionales a importados.

    Una mejora en los precios de las materias primas es lo mismo que un incremento en los ingresos nacionales pero, al mismo tiempo, esto causa una apreciación en la tasa de cambio y el ingreso doméstico incrementado se va a gastar en bienes más baratos y estos son los importados. Entonces es un factor doble.

    ¿Es sano para Colombia ingresar a la Ocde? 

    Es un gran error. México y Corea cometieron el mismo error y ambos sufrieron crisis financieras sustantivas como resultado de esto. Si nos remontamos a las viejas teorías de los economistas estructuralistas, se alegó que una de las condiciones básicas para ingresar a cualquier tipo de acuerdo de esta naturaleza es que hubiese un nivel similar de desarrollo, de productividad y de competitividad.

    Colombia va a entrar a la Ocde sin preocuparnos por competir con Estados Unidos, y estamos hablando de competir con México. La pregunta es si Colombia va a ser capaz de competir en los mercados internacionales con otros países en desarrollo que ya están en la Ocde y no parece prometedor. ¿Por qué se quiere entrar a la Ocde? Es básicamente para darles confianza a los inversionistas extranjeros para que inviertan en Colombia, pero esto implica empoderar más la enfermedad holandesa.

    Pero Colombia es hoy uno de los países de Latinoamérica que más crece. 

    Es un crecimiento que desilusiona. No se puede mirar crecimiento sin empleo. Si se va a desarrollar la economía no importa qué tan alta sea la tasa de inversión ni qué tan alto sea el crecimiento si no se genera empleo. Si no se reduce el sector informal no se está generando desarrollo.

    Pero el desempleo ha bajado… 

    Ha bajado, pero no es mucho y sigue siendo sumamente alto. Hay un problema de desempleo disfrazado que debe ser de 40 por ciento. La pregunta es ¿Por qué? La explicación proviene de la enfermedad holandesa y del impacto sobre el sector de manufacturas.

    ¿HAY QUE REGULAR MERCADOS? 

    La dificultad es que nunca habrá una regulación que dé estabilidad a los mercados financieros en el mundo, porque estos siempre van adelante de los reguladores.

    La reglamentación está para reducir la rentabilidad de los bancos y estos existen solo si pueden tener utilidades sustanciales en su negocio.

    Fernando González P. Subeditor Economía y Negocios 

    −−> Colombia comete un gran error en perseguir el objetivo de entrar a la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (Ocde), porque eso debe ser para países con un grado similar de desarrollo, dice el economista Jan Kregel, investigador del Levy Economics Institute of Board College de Estados Unidos.

    El experto, relator de la Comisión de la ONU sobre la reforma al sistema financiero internacional, participa en la Décima Semana Económica de la Universidad Central.

    Colombia ha basado su crecimiento en productos básicos. ¿Cómo mantener esa tendencia a largo plazo? 

    Lo que se puede predecir para una economía como la colombiana es una crisis externa sustantiva porque, si se mira el déficit externo, algo así como el 50 por ciento de las exportaciones de Colombia provienen del petróleo. Si hay una disminución de los precios, el primer impacto es empeorar el déficit externo y reducir los flujos financieros y habrá una presión fuerte sobre la tasa de cambio y la posición de los exportadores empeorará.

    ¿Qué debe el país hacer para reactivar la industria? 

    Hay un impacto de la enfermedad holandesa. Las exportaciones de materias primas han tenido una elevación de precios y han apreciado la tasa de cambio. Por eso, otras exportaciones son menos competitivas. Otro factor es la redistribución de las manufacturas globalmente. Si uno mira el impacto de las importaciones en la economía colombiana, hay un gran incremento de las compras a Asia.

    ¿Colombia tiene enfermedad holandesa? 

    Absolutamente sí. La enfermedad holandesa se puede clasificar de dos maneras: una es simplemente el impacto de los productos básicos, creando una mejora en los términos de comercio y un aumento de los ingresos del país. Pero el impacto de la tasa de cambio en la competitividad acaba con un incremento de los ingresos nacionales y al mismo tiempo se abaratan los bienes importados.

    El peligro real de la enfermedad holandesa no está solamente en la tasa de cambio, sino que se ve en la distribución del consumo de productos nacionales a importados.

    Una mejora en los precios de las materias primas es lo mismo que un incremento en los ingresos nacionales pero, al mismo tiempo, esto causa una apreciación en la tasa de cambio y el ingreso doméstico incrementado se va a gastar en bienes más baratos y estos son los importados. Entonces es un factor doble.

    ¿Es sano para Colombia ingresar a la Ocde? 

    Es un gran error. México y Corea cometieron el mismo error y ambos sufrieron crisis financieras sustantivas como resultado de esto. Si nos remontamos a las viejas teorías de los economistas estructuralistas, se alegó que una de las condiciones básicas para ingresar a cualquier tipo de acuerdo de esta naturaleza es que hubiese un nivel similar de desarrollo, de productividad y de competitividad.

    Colombia va a entrar a la Ocde sin preocuparnos por competir con Estados Unidos, y estamos hablando de competir con México. La pregunta es si Colombia va a ser capaz de competir en los mercados internacionales con otros países en desarrollo que ya están en la Ocde y no parece prometedor. ¿Por qué se quiere entrar a la Ocde? Es básicamente para darles confianza a los inversionistas extranjeros para que inviertan en Colombia, pero esto implica empoderar más la enfermedad holandesa.

    Pero Colombia es hoy uno de los países de Latinoamérica que más crece. 

    Es un crecimiento que desilusiona. No se puede mirar crecimiento sin empleo. Si se va a desarrollar la economía no importa qué tan alta sea la tasa de inversión ni qué tan alto sea el crecimiento si no se genera empleo. Si no se reduce el sector informal no se está generando desarrollo.

    Pero el desempleo ha bajado… 

    Ha bajado, pero no es mucho y sigue siendo sumamente alto. Hay un problema de desempleo disfrazado que debe ser de 40 por ciento. La pregunta es ¿Por qué? La explicación proviene de la enfermedad holandesa y del impacto sobre el sector de manufacturas.

    ¿HAY QUE REGULAR MERCADOS? 

    La dificultad es que nunca habrá una regulación que dé estabilidad a los mercados financieros en el mundo, porque estos siempre van adelante de los reguladores.

    La reglamentación está para reducir la rentabilidad de los bancos y estos existen solo si pueden tener utilidades sustanciales en su negocio.
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
  • In the Media | August 2014

    Are EU Bankers Trying to Increase Unemployment in Greece?


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The Huffington Post, August 21, 2014

    Do European lenders want unemployment to keep rising in Greece?

    It looks that way. The commitment to economic austerity policies by the "troika"–the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund–hasn't wavered. Meanwhile, the country's unemployment rate has soared to yet another unexpected high. In a population of 9.3 million, 1.3 million are out of work....

    Read the full article here: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dimitri-b-papadimitriou/are-eu-bankers-trying-to-_b_5696270.html
  • In the Media | July 2014

    Flat? Actually Many Wages Have Been Declining


    By Jon Talton
    The Seattle Times, July 7, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    It has been well documented that wages adjusted for inflation for most workers have been stagnant since the mid-1970s. The one exception: from the late 1990s until 2002. This is a key driver of rising inequality. But researchers at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College have added a new twist.

    The labor force is aging and becoming better educated. Workers are also putting off retirement, having been hammered by the bubble collapses of 2001 and 2008. The result: real wages for many workers likely have been declining between 2002 and 2012, especially for those with less than a college degree. But a degree may not alone guarantee future results. “Going forward, as baby boomers retire, the average experience in the labor force will decline, pulling average wages down.”

    Speaking of the labor market:
     The latest JOLTS report (Job Openings and Labor Turnover) is out. May is little changed from April. Especially disconcerting is the low level of “voluntary separations,” which would indicate workers feel confident in finding a new job and demand for labor is rising. But there are 2.1 times as many job seekers as openings. This is true across every industry. Economist Heidi Shierholz of the Economic Policy Institute goes into detail here.

    And furthermore:
     Seattle-based Payscale, which surveys cash compensation for full-time, private industry employees, released its second-quarter index. Real wages in the index are down about 8 percent from 2006. “Annual U.S. wage growth was 1.8 percent last quarter, but inflation in (the second quarter) was the highest it’s been in three years,” said Katie Bardaro, lead economist at PayScale. “As a result, the high inflation essentially wiped out wage growth and consumers experienced no real wage growth in terms of their actual purchasing power.”

    Consumer prices increased 2.1 percent over the 12 months ending in May. So inflation is very subdued — too subdued to really get the recovery going. The big problem is the weak labor market, so employers can hold down wages. After all, they have choices. Many workers don’t.
  • In the Media | June 2014

    The Coming "Tsunami of Debt" and Financial Crisis in America


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    The Guardian, June 15, 2014

    The US Congressional Budget Office is projecting a continued economic recovery. So why look down the road – say, to 2017 – and worry?

    Here's why: because the debt held by American households is rising ominously. And unless our economic policies change, that debt balloon, powered by radical income inequality, is going to become the next bust....

    Read the full article here: www.theguardian.com/money/2014/jun/15/us-economy-bubble-debt-financial-crisis-corporations
     

  • In the Media | May 2014

    Jeff Koons's Popeye Is the Fifth Column


    By Martin Sosnoff
    Forbes, May 19, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    At the Sotheby’s May evening auction, Steve Wynn was the successful bidder for Jeff Koons’s life-sized Popeye sculpture, knocked down at a disappointing $28,115,000, and destined for one of Steve’s casino properties. Within this lot is some cautionary metaphor about conspicuous consumption reigning, again. The Koons piece is an immaculate, but exaggerated life sized presence in colorful, shiny sheet steel.

    When Wynn took control of the Golden Nugget Casino in Las Vegas some 40 years ago, I sold him my block of stock, a reportable position. He deserved all his successes, a great operator who made Vegas a family destination resort while competition still ran grind joints.

    I accept that there are hundreds of art buyers who easily qualify for spending $50 million or more on “name brand” work. Whether this is driven by connoisseurship, emotionality or trading savvy is another story. These big hitters are equivalent to whales at gaming casinos: Alice Walton (the Warhol Coca-Cola), Elaine Wynn (the Bacon) and corporate types like Russian oligarchs and Malaysian honchos, dealers – investors like the Mugrabi family, the jewelry purveyor Graff, even a handful of hedge fund operators.

    The economics of taste suggests, long term, elevated art prices don’t hold up, excepting masterpieces. More critical, overindulgence ultimately is divisive for the country by calling attention to how the top 0.1% conduct themselves. Eventually, a public outcry congeals. Congressmen begin to speak out on income inequality. Unions get their raucous voice back.

    Our middle-class holds minimal free capital for equity investment. A market rising 32% makes Buffett and his ilk billions richer, year-over-year. For the family with $50,000 in stocks, if that, we are talking chump change. Individual pension fund assets carry a discounted value based upon when they can be withdrawn.

    Republicans and major multinational corporations call for tax breaks on the repatriation of offshore earnings, but the facts suggest just the opposite is called for. Corporate income tax rates rest much lower than during the sixties and seventies. Wage earners gain no leverage when the unemployment rate is elevated. Take home pay rises at a measly 2% rate, unless you work for Twitter or other dot com operators and are richly vested in zero cost equity.

    Twitter’s insiders disgorged hundreds of millions of shares once their lockup ended. Employees drove Twitter down 17%, overnight. Such action is indicative of a middle class as yet capital starved. Not just machinists, even young computer code writers.

    If I were Dan Loeb, instead of coveting Sotheby’s, an overpriced piece of paper that just broke below $40, I’d be driving a Buick and seeking naming opportunities at hospitals and graduate business schools. Buffett and Bill Gates are great role models here, and as far as I know disinterested in $100 million Bacon canvases.

    The problem with conspicuous consumption is it can take decades, even centuries before it ends. Never happily. The French Revolution was preceded by bread riots but their political system for centuries exempted the nobility from taxation.

    When I compare our present Gilded Age with the past, I see major differentiation. End of 19th century, Robber Barons mainly were industrialists with controlling positions in oil (Rockefeller), steel (Carnegie), railroads (Vanderbilt), the Guggenheims (minerals), Rosenwalds and Hartfords (retailing). Yes – there was J.P. Morgan and Jules Bache and a few Russians, but no Chinese, Japanese and Malaysians throwing their money around in the art world.

    Land based wealth existed but yielded minimal returns in rents and farm income. There’s no material book value in Twitter and Facebook excepting cash and intellectual property. We have come a long way from when wealth rested in hard assets – minerals and chemicals, now in serious oversupply.

    Art world players mainly are linked to stock market wealth. They include a couple of dozen hedge fund operators. Likewise, private capital operators at KKR, Blackstone, Carlyle and Leon Black. Throw in a dozen VC’s and Internet founders. Although establishment corporate management has learned how to milk their income statements, only a handful walk away billionaires. Unconventionally designed yachts belong to Russians and headman owners like Larry Ellison at Oracle.

    If our S&P 500 Index puts together another year like 2013 in the next couple of years, the art market, surely goes through the roof. Deal proliferation would break out all over, too. Analysts would disremember how to punish tech houses with big disparity between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings.

    The stock market is capitalized currently at 16 times earnings, not 10 or 11, vulnerable to any sign of a decelerating economy. I don’t know where hedge fund capital comes out in a bearish setting. After all, most of them weren’t bullish enough last year and badly trailed the market.

    Obama doesn’t even have an inclination or the power to tax the carried interest of private capital operators at standard rates. Don’t expect any substantive tax reform that redistributes income downward to the poor and lower middle class categories. It could take decades. Infrastructure spending, what the country needs desperately to create jobs, is a stalled initiative for years to come.



    The Levy Economics Institute at Bard College rightly underscores that rising income inequality weighs down the economic setting. GDP momentum, absent positive numbers on exports, must depend on rising private borrowing. But, a high debt to income ratio is unsustainable unless the stock market shows late foot.

    The distribution of income over three decades flows to the top 1%. They control most of the assets in equities but are themselves vulnerable to a stock market bubble as denouement.

    In the sixties and seventies, from my ski chalet in Franconia, New Hampshire I’d zip out in zero degrees early mornings with my band of brown baggers. We sharpened our own skis at home, and ate tons of spaghetti together. My next door neighbor, a dermatologist who was coining money, even in New Hampshire, asked me if it was okay with the group if he bought a new Caddy.

    I told him to drop down one price point. The group might frown on such conspicuous consumption. Les did just that. Those days are gone but not forgotten.
  • In the Media | May 2014

    Income Inequality Undermines Growth


    By Barry Elias
    MoneyNews, May 8, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Future rises in income inequality will lead to a prolonged period of anemic economic growth and high unemployment.

    Income for the bottom 90 percent of households has stagnated during the past 35 years. Strong economic activity in the 1990s and 2000s was largely generated by consumption that was financed by borrowing. The resulting high levels of debt relative to income precipitated the financial and economic crisis.

    Since 2008, the bottom 90 percent of households have deleveraged, thereby reducing their debt-to-disposable-income ratio. This ratio for the top 10 percent has remained relatively stable. Should this deleveraging trend continue, by 2017, economic growth will be 1.7 percentage points lower than the post-recession period, and unemployment will rise 1.3 percentage points to 7.6 percent, according to the Levy Economics Institute.

    Future economic growth is unlikely to arise from the activities of the top 10 percent of households. Their consumption levels tend to remain relatively stable, and their investments are driven by short-term arbitrage opportunities of financial assets — not long-term direct investment in businesses that generate strong employment and income growth.

    Coupled with weak foreign demand and restrictive government fiscal policy, future economic growth may be driven by domestic deficits. This burden will fall primarily on the bottom 90 percent in the private sector and exacerbate income disparity. However, as debt-to-income levels rise, a financial and economic crisis becomes more probable.

    The only viable solution to this economic conundrum is greater income equality.
  • In the Media | May 2014

    Levy Economics Institute President Dissects the Myth of the Greek "Success Story"


    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Truthout, May 4, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    When the global financial crisis of 2008 reached Europe's shores sometime in late 2009, Greece was the first victim of the euro system's failure. Facing persistently large deficits and very high public debt levels, the country ended up being shut out of the global bond markets, raising the prospect of a sovereign bankruptcy. In light of these developments, in May 2010, the Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to provide a 110 billion euro bailout loan to Greece in exchange for severe austerity measures and strict conditions. The "rescue" plan, as has been openly admitted by now, was designed not for the purpose of reviving Greece's ailing economy but to save Europe's banks. Thus, as many economists had anticipated, the bailout plan made things worse, spreading havoc with its "economics of social disaster." Less than two years later - and with the debt-to-GDP ratio having increased substantially - a second international bailout plan went into effect for the sum of 130 billion euros. All the money lent to Greece was being used to pay off debt obligations on time while the radical budget cuts and sharp tax hikes that were adopted were meant to readjust the nation's fiscal condition, with no regard for the economic and social costs which these policies entailed.

    Four years later, Greece looks like a badly battered boxer. Its economy has shrunk by 20%; the unemployment rate has reached stratospheric levels; poverty has become widespread; the debt-to-GDP ratio has increased dramatically and Greeks are leaving the country in record numbers. However, both EU and Greek government officials are claiming that the country is moving in the right direction, hailing its recent re-emergence in international credit markets as a sign the economy is recovering. Indeed, the government now talks of the Greek "success story," hoping that this narrative will tilt the electoral balance as Greece's main opposition Radical Left Coalition party (Syriza) is expected to win the European Parliamentary and local elections in May.

    For an analysis of the latest developments in Greece, C. J. Polychroniou (a research associate and policy fellow at the Levy Economics Institute and a columnist for the Greek nationally distributed newspaper, The Sunday Eleftherotypia) interviewed Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, executive vice president and Jerome Levy Chair Professor of Economics, for Truthout. An edited and shorter version of the interview appears simultaneously in Greek on the Sunday edition of Eleftherotypia).  

    C.J. Polychroniou for Truthout: After four years as the pariah of the financial markets, in the course of which 330 billion euros was granted/guaranteed in international bailouts in order to avoid an official bankruptcy, Greece has made a successful return to the international bond markets. Why did Greece return to the bond markets now when the country's debt-to-GDP ratio is much bigger than it was back in 2010?

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou:
     The return to the bond markets was an act of pure symbolism. The government purposely made the success of the austerity program dependent on achieving a primary surplus as opposed to the return to growth in output and employment. Recall that the idea of expansionary austerity embraced by the country's international lenders was spectacularly discredited. Thus, the Troika (IMF, EU and European Central Bank ) and Greece's compliant government needed to invent a new metric of success, and it was associated with achieving a primary surplus as large as it could be so that financial markets can be impressed. However, no one else is impressed, especially the international lenders, for three main reasons: (1) The primary surplus was achieved by a one-off (non-recurring) excess revenue from the gains of Greek bonds in the portfolios of Eurozone's central banks and the European Central Bank's (ECB) holding that were returned to Greece; (2) collections of old tax revenue; and (3) non-recurring spending cuts and delayed payment of the government's debt to the private sector, whether VAT refunds or non-payments to private sector vendors.

    Finally, the return to the markets was costly to the country - the apparent low interest rate of 4.95% notwithstanding - since the interest rate of the funds borrowed from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is at a very much lower interest rate. To be sure, the hedge funds and the private sector [parties] buying the new bonds knew that there was an implicit guarantee from the ECB that would accept these bonds under its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. So the bonds were not backed by the progress of the Greek economy - it would be ludicrous to assume so, for an economy in continuing recession and increasing debt to GDP ratio, especially if its credit rating is still below investment grade. So, all in all, it was an act of desperation and a strategy to give the government extra help in the soon-to-be-held local and European Parliament elections.

    The government has hailed the return to the financial markets as a sign that the crisis is over. Yet, the unemployment rate right now stands at 28%; the education and health care systems have been decimated; 1 out of 3 Greeks live below the poverty line and, according to some estimates, the debt could grow to 190% of GDP by the end of 2015. Do these numbers spell out an economic "success story" or a national tragedy?

    All these statistics point to the failure of the harsh program of fiscal consolidation, but if you are interested in presenting a portrait of success, you need to invent a condition that will persuade the non-critical mind that things are much better. No one likes Cassandras, even though they turn out to be quite accurate in the end. As has become clear by now, the Greek mass media industry has played an inappropriate role in persuading people that economic conditions are much better than they think, that the country has reached bottom and it is just about to turn the corner. How many times have we heard that we are seeing the light at the end of the tunnel? But the tunnel is unfortunately very, very long and it will take either a decade or more for conditions to be turned around if present policy continues, with more erosion of living standards and very high structural unemployment, or a relatively quick improvement with an immediate reversal of policy. For this, the omens are very clear, but the political will is not. And one should not expect any change of policy to happen without a change in political leadership. Brussels, Berlin and Frankfurt have a lot to lose with a change of the prevailing policy, and thus they must continue to enforce it despite the destroyed lives that it leaves behind as it moves forward. So we are seeing a tragedy which I am afraid will expand unless the European Parliamentary elections give a different message either with a significant showing of the extreme right or left parties. Marine Le Pen's impressive showing in the relatively recent local [French] elections speaks to my point. It would be ironic if voters, despite the catastrophic consequences they continue to endure, give the present European leadership another message of approval. It will be self-flagellation with a vengeance.

    The feeling one gets as a result of the implementation of austerity in the case of Greece and the other fiscallytroubled countries in the Eurozone is that this is not simply a fine-tuning policy. If that is indeed the case, what is then the ultimate strategy of austerity?

    In my view, the idea of austerity was not a policy of fine-tuning. To the contrary, it was a policy of radical change to allow markets to reign supreme with no government interference. This is a doctrine first put to test by the late US President Reagan and UK Prime Minister Thatcher. They both embraced the view that government is the problem to economic ills and not the solution. But the real world has taught us time and again that government at difficult times and downturns is the only solution. We saw it to be the case in the US, Germany, China, Japan and every other economy in trouble. Why Greece and the other fiscally troubled economies should become experiments of contrarian policy whose results were predicted is something that really boggles the mind. No one would dare apply the idea of austerity to the extent it has been applied to countries such as the US or even Germany and other countries of the industrial world irrespective of how high their debt-to-GDP ratios are. Why aren't we forcing Germany and France with their mighty GDP machines to have high public surpluses so they can decrease their debt to GDP ratios to the 69% limit as required by the Maastricht Treaty? After all, Germany is a growing economy. So it is clear that member states in the Eurozone are not equal. When Germany was the sick man in Europe, it was acceptable for the government to follow the Keynesian prescription, but now that its status has changed to that of hegemon, the laissez-faire paradigm returned in vogue. There will always be many thoughtless leaders, but sooner rather than later people take steps to remove them from positions of strength and power.

    The advocates of austerity claim that this policy will improve the external fundamentals of fiscally troubled countries in the Eurozone. Has this happened in the case of Greece?

    People who are not knowledgeable about structure of economies on which they impose policies should never be surprised with contrarian results. The Greek economy cannot be improved just because policy makers impose policies that supposedly restructure labor markets - read here, suppression of wages and eliminating labor rights and standards - if import and export elasticities are different than those assumed in the policy implementation. The sum of import and export elasticities in Greece is barely above one, which makes a substantial increase in net exports the goal of a wild imagination, at least in a relevant time frame. No wonder Greece's net exports have failed to offset the public spending cuts, and thus not contributed to the growth of GDP. And those increases are primarily from oil-related products that are volatile in concert with oil price volatility. To be sure, tourism is important, but despite last year's "huge" increase in foreign tourist arrivals to Greece, net employment continued to plummet. The external fundamentals are not dependent on labor reforms, but on large investment, public partnership with the private sector, which will not be forthcoming any time soon. It won't happen with the privatization of the old Athens airport or with other similar "privatization" schemes.

    Radical structural reforms, which include labor and product markets and blanket privatizations, constitute the second component of the conditions behind Greece's bailout plans. First, is there in economic literature a direct connection between labor market flexibility, productivity growth and national economic performance?

    The economic literature, as economists know, can produce conflicting results. It will not be surprising to find cases when statistics will prove that there is a positive outcome in terms of increasing productivity with flexible labor conditions, but this is always dependent on the level of technology diffusion. To be sure, German workers have the highest productivity in Europe along with those in the Netherlands, but it is not because they are paid less than other Eurozone workers but because of the high level of effective technology used. So they are about 70% more productive as compared to Greeks, Portuguese or Spaniards despite the fact that the latter work substantially many more hours during the week. Clearly, Germany's and other North European economies enjoy better economic performance, but this is not due to so-called labor flexibility only. Germany is successful because it is lucky, having an extraordinary number of idle and low-wage workers from East Germany when the unification took place. Unification gave Germany the ability to hold West German wages down. But this should not be used as an example of a successful application of a labor flexibility policy. The literature also abounds in studies showing that labor productivity is not dependent on labor flexibility. Indeed, the theory and policy of "efficiency" wages, promoted by none other than Nobel Laureate George Akerlof and current Fed Chair Janet Yellen, is part of the economic research which shows there are productivity gains and other positive outcomes to firms which pay higher than market wages. All in all, then, the argument of flexible wages does not, I am afraid, hold water.

    The international experience with privatizing electricity, gas, water, sanitation, and public health services indicates that there are anti-social effects behind privatization. So why are Greek governments so eager to privatize virtually everything in Greece?

    As has been shown in certain cases, the public sector can be inefficient, but this is not tantamount to the private sector being efficient either. There are key industries that must be in the public domain because their goods or services are considered public goods. In many advanced countries, such as in the US, the goods and services mentioned are mostly in the private sector's hands, but it does not mean that they are efficient or price competitive. To the contrary, whenever a service was privatized or became unregulated, it never gave the desired effects in being price competitive. For countries like Greece marked with high income distribution inequality, some of the services (such as health services, for example) must be the business of the public sector. Other services can be privatized, but they must be highly regulated. The privatization process in Greece is a fire sale of public property just because the international lenders have imposed it. If profitable, and in the public interest, then some of these services can be privatized, but should continue to be regulated. In the US, however, no one would dream of privatizing the national lotteries; they are the most profitable and high revenue sources of government revenue, yet in Greece it was the first public company to go on sale. There is no general rule that these services should be privatized. They need to be run efficiently either under the aegis of the government or the private sector - absent the corruption, nepotism or other ills of the up-to-now Greek clientist political system. The absence of transparency should not be the reason for privatizing them.

    You have argued in a number of publications in the recent past that what Greece needs is a European type of a Marshall Plan. Doesn't this suggestion run counter to existing political structures and economic realities in Europe?

    I am pleasantly surprised to read of late that even the government speaks of a European Marshall-type plan of aid to Greece. The existing political structure in Europe may be seeing such an aid program as anathema, but I believe it recognizes that if the European project is to be kept intact, it must begin to think along those lines. An economic and monetary union requires various types of support from the economically strong to the weak. This will eventually take place willingly or not, and the evidence shows that it not to the benefit of the weak only - but more so to the strong. The announcement of the creation of a Greek Investment Fund with the support of Germany's KfW is a step in the right direction even though the details of the plan are rather sketchy. Thus, even though I have been labeled by many the Cassandra of Greece, I want to be optimistic that such aid may not be that farfetched.

    The European Union and the International Monetary Fund have disagreed all along about the sustainability of the Greek debt load. Who is right, if any?

    There is no question in anyone's mind that the debt load is unsustainable. It was known from early on that a debt restructuring will be needed. The haircut that took place was ill-conceived and hurt the country more than it helped since it decimated the balance sheets of Greek and Cypriot banks along with public pension trust funds and middle-class Greek citizens. It occurred much too late after the German, French and Italian banks unloaded their Greek holdings to their counterparts in Greece and Cyprus. When it happened, it was a thoughtless decision despite the government celebrating it as a major accomplishment. I haven't agreed on anything with former ECB Vice President Papademos' views about the Greek economy except with his opposition to such a haircut when it happened. All in all, the IMF is, of course, correct - but Brussels, Berlin and Frankfurt are trapped, having convinced every European citizen that Greece's debt load is sustainable. The government will celebrate a new accomplishment after the European elections when the debt will be restructured by extending its maturity to perhaps 50 years and lowering the interest rate. This is in economic terms a present-value "haircut," but not a debt-load reduction. It is the proverbial kicking the can further down the road, which will subject the country to continued vigilance and restrict its sovereignty over its fiscal policy stance.

    Syriza represents itself as a viable alternative to the current economic, social and political malaise in Greece by claiming that, when it comes to power, it will put an end to austerity and will force the European Union to rethink its policies towards Greece. However, while a good percentage of Greek voters have shifted to the left, many others seem to believe that Syriza's political rhetoric rests either on naive thinking or plain opportunism. What are your own thoughts on this matter?

    I believe Syriza is the only viable alternative that Greece has at the present time if a change in policy direction is to be achieved. Its mandate to change policy would be very difficult indeed. But it can be done, although not free of risks. But risks are endemic in any policy prescription that would be implemented, and I believe the current policy being followed entails higher risks for the economic future of Greece. What I fear more is the disappearance of what used to be a middle class, let alone the immiseration of low-income, low-skilled workers. What these groups need right now is a lifeline - which, unfortunately, is not in the cards. Given the additional financing that will be needed in 2014 and 2015, more austerity will be needed which will affect even further the country's living standards, a process which will have even further adverse effects for the middle class and the low-income and low-skilled segments of the population. With conditions worsening, even more people are expected to question the prevailing policy. And if there is one political force which can offer a viable alternative to the current nightmare, it is none other than Syriza. Yes, perhaps there is an element of political naivete characterizing Syriza, but there is seriousness of purpose and the work of the gifted in its midst is very refreshing and encouraging. To be sure, political analysts talk about the importance of the incumbent candidates and this would be a very difficult problem to overcome. I want to believe, however, that despite the internal squabbling which frequently occurs among the different groups inside Syriza, the party will, at the end, prevail. At least I hope so. To those who oppose them, I can only respond by saying be careful what you wish for.

    If the economic "success story" of Greece turns out in the end to be nothing more than a politically constructed myth, and the prospects of the European integration project remain what they are today, why shouldn't Greeks opt to leave the euro?

    There is plenty of evidence that the success story is a politically constructed myth with the acquiescence of the European leadership. The question about the country remaining in the euro club is interesting and very important. I believe that Greece cannot leave the euro since the costs associated with an exit are very consequential. As I have written elsewhere, Greece has a number of options that it can follow, if the European leadership continues with its intransigence and continuing policy of the dangerous idea of austerity. If all other options fail, the introduction of a carefully designed parallel financial system is a very viable alternative in order to get a handle on both domestic financial market liquidity and employment growth and output. This is not a novel idea. The Greek government used a similar program in 2010, although very haphazardly conceived, but it was introduced nevertheless. It is not a crackpot idea and has been embraced by both conservative and liberal thinkers. This will address some of the most serious challenges the Greek economy and society face without endangering the country's membership in the euro. So, there are other alternatives available before the unthinkable becomes the only option.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    CEA's Furman Looks at "Great Moderation"


    By Robert Feinberg
    MoneyNews, April 30, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Jason Furman, the brilliant economist who chairs the Council of Economic Advisers, spoke recently at the 23rd Annual Hyman Minsky Conference, sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 

    The title of Furman's presentation was "Whatever Happened to the Great Moderation?" He argued that with the right economic policies, as advocated by the administration, this mythical Great Moderation could be restored. 

    I suspect a priori that the Great Moderation was a result of official policies that suppressed normal adjustments that should have taken place in the economy, for example, by neglecting prudential and consumer protection regulation of "too big to fail" banks, so that when the 2008 episode of the permanent financial crisis erupted, it was much more costly and disruptive than it would otherwise have been. 

    Ironically, after having written this sentence, I found that a similar suggestion had been made by a famous economist — none other than Hyman Minsky. The very informative Wikipedia entry on the Great Moderation also contains a reference to a 2003 speech by University of Chicago economist Robert Lucas as president of the American Economic Association celebrating the idea that the profession had practically solved "the central problem depression prevention." 

    Furman defined the Great Moderation as the reduction in the volatility of a wide range of economic variables, and to the associated increase in the longevity of economic expansions and reduction in the frequency and severity of economic contractions. Among the economists cited as having contributed research on this subject are former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2004) and Douglas Elmendorf (2006), currently director of the Congressional Budget Office. 

    Furman dated the beginning of the debate over the Great Moderation to the early 1990s. To his credit, Furman took time out to question, as I do, whether "there ever was a 'Great Moderation,' let alone that it has returned and rendered further policy steps unnecessary."

    Furman dismissed the idea that policy responses are not needed, because recessions serve a purpose and little can be done, on the ground that while this might be true in "normal times," these times are characterized by a large shortfall in output, and policy responses are needed. He seems not to have considered that maybe these are "normal times," and that the slow growth and shortfall in output are due to previous misguided policies. 

    Instead, he offered some new misguided policies, a lot of them, under what he calls "The Unfinished Agenda for Economic Stability." This is ironic, because it seems that Minsky himself was highly skeptical that "economic stability" could be achieved by policy. 

    It almost becomes amusing to consider the grab bag of measures Furman offers as holding out hope of averting or coping with future downturns. He claimed that Obamacare will have a counter-cyclical effect, a notion that is heatedly disputed, and he also pointed to increased progressivity in taxation. Reducing inequality is highly speculative as a counter-cyclical measure, but maybe they can start with salaries of reckless bank executives and their feckless regulators. 

    Finally, Furman pointed to implementation of Dodd-Frank and Housing and Finance Reform, which are laughable, because neither is likely to happen, and they might not produce the effects he expects even if they do. 

    As a political document, the speech represents how desperate the administration is to establish a positive legacy as President Obama's popularity declines.

    (Archived video can be found here.)
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Rep. Maloney Attacks Ryan Budget — Part I


    By Robert Feinberg
    MoneyNews, April 28, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Rep. Carolyn Maloney, D-N.Y., spoke at the 23rd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference, held in Washington at the National Press Club recently. The conference was sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, an independent group that "encourages diversity of opinion in the examination of economic policy issues while striving to transform ideological arguments into informed debate." The theme of the conference was "Stabilizing Financial Systems for Growth and Full Employment," and it was co-sponsored by the Ford Foundation. 

    The conferences celebrate the life and work of Minsky, who was an early theorist on the financial crisis and an advocate of government intervention to respond to financial crises that inevitably occur from time to time. This is the first of three articles on speeches delivered at the conference by Maloney and Jason Furman, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

    Maloney struggled to deliver the speech due to a cough, and perhaps also due to some form of the flu, she seemed medicated and perhaps to be reading the speech for the first time, although the arguments were very familiar. 

    Later that day the House was scheduled to vote on what is known as the "Ryan budget," authored by Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis., which she rightly stated represents the embodiment of the Republican platform, and she devoted the speech to two provisions related to financial reform that would be affected by the Ryan budget, namely the so-called "Orderly Liquidation" provisions contained in title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, and so-called "Housing Finance Reform" now being tentatively considered in Congress.

    In 2008, I predicted privately that there would be a bank bailout, based on a cynical recollection of the deals that were put together in 1988 during the savings and loan crisis to stretch that mess out past the November election at what was then considerable cost to taxpayers. However, this prediction was not nearly cynical enough. The George W. Bush administration, with Henry Paulson as Treasury Secretary, was so incompetent, or the needs of Paulson's former firm, Goldman Sachs, were so pressing, that the bailout could not be put off. 

    The 2008 election offered a choice between a candidate who had virtually no experience and one who had a lifetime of experience but seemed not to have learned much from it. 

    Candidate John McCain made a big show of "suspending" a campaign that voters may not have noticed even existed. McCain flew back to Washington, ostensibly to intervene in the crisis, but without any actual plan. Meanwhile, candidate Barack Obama stayed coolly on the sidelines and benefited from the contrast with the manic McCain.

    After the failure of Lehman Brothers and the bailouts of Bear Stearns and AIG, the official story line was, not surprisingly, that the reason the crisis happened was that the regulators lacked the authority to resolve nonbanks whose failure threatened the health of the financial system. Title II of Dodd-Frank gives the FDIC the authority to borrow up to $150 billion to fund the resolution of failing institutions through "debtor in possession" financing. The Ryan budget wants to repeal this authority, and Maloney is extremely exercised about this prospect.

    Given that this move has engendered such a reaction from bailout apologists like Maloney, legislators seeking to prevent yet another round of bailouts might consider attaching the repeal of title II to any legislation coming out of the Senate that looks promising.

    (Archived video can be found here.) 
  • In the Media | April 2014

    FOMC Member Evans Calls For More Aggressive Monetary Policy


    By Robert Feinberg
    MoneyNews, April 22, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Charles Evans, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and a leading dove of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), delivered a speech April 9 titled "Monetary Goals and Strategy" to the 23rd annual Hyman Minsky Conference, which is sponsored by the Levy Institute of Bard College and held at the National Press Club in Washington. 

    With the exception of me, the modest-sized audience was composed of liberals who follow economic policy very closely and believe that governmental authorities should tinker constantly with the economy in order to improve its performance and the distribution of income. 

    The conference honors Minsky as one of the earliest exponents of this view, who propagated it articulately from the earliest years of the permanent and ongoing financial crisis.

    Chicago has traditionally been a hotbed of conservative and even hard money economics, especially at the University of Chicago. However, the Chicago Fed under Evans has placed itself firmly in the dovish camp on monetary policy, and in 2015 Evans will rotate into a voting seat on the FOMC, so that he can back his sentiments with a vote. Evans has taught at the University of Chicago, University of Michigan and University of South Carolina, and he received degrees in economics from the University of Virginia and Carnegie-Mellon University, which is a stronghold of conservative monetary scholarship.

    What makes Evans' speech especially significant is that he poses a scholarly challenge to conservative advocates of a monetary rule, particularly in circumstances where the economy has performed so poorly that the federal funds rate has already dropped to the bottom, and he contends that under these conditions, even Milton Friedman would agree that the FOMC should take an aggressive stance in order to keep the economy from slipping into a zone of negative inflation that could cripple economic growth for decades. 

    The speech was divided into four parts. First, Evans reviewed the "Three Big Events in Fed History," in his order of importance: 1) The Great Depression (1929 to 1938); 2) The Great Inflation (1965 to 1980); and The Treasury Accord (1951). He defended the independence of the Fed, but accepted in a serious way, not just rhetorically, that with the independence must go accountability.

    Second, Evans laid out a three-part strategy for achieving the goals the FOMC has set out during the long term. 

    Third, he used bulls-eye charts to demonstrate that the Fed has missed both its employment and inflation targets. 

    And finally, he lamented the inability to stimulate the economy by adjusting the federal funds rate once it has reached its lower bound. 

    He concluded by advocating that the Fed adopt more aggressive policies now to stimulate growth, even at the risk of exceeding the 2 percent inflation target for some time after the employment target has been reached. 

    He criticized as "timid" the stance of most of his colleagues who argue for a slow glide path to the target so as not to risk touching off another bout of inflation.

    (Archived video can be found here. A copy of the speech can be found here.) 
  • In the Media | April 2014

    China: The Bad Way and the Good Way to Burst Asset Bubbles


    By Panos Mourdoukoutas

    Forbes, April 14, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    For years, China has been enjoying robust economic growth that has turned it into the world’s second largest economy.

    The problem is, however, that China’s growth is in part driven by over investment in construction and manufacturing sectors, fueling asset bubbles that parallel those of Japan in the late 1980s. With one major difference: China’s overinvestment is directed by the systematic efforts of local governments to preserve the old system of central planning, through massive construction and manufacturing projects for the purpose of employment creation rather than for addressing genuine consumer needs.

    Major Chinese cities are filled with growing numbers of new vacant buildings. They were built under government mandates to provide jobs for the hundreds of thousands of people leaving the countryside for a better life in the cities, rather than to house genuine business tenants.

    China’s real estate bubble is proliferating like an infectious disease from the eastern cities to the inner country. It has spread beyond real estate to other sectors of the economy, from the steel industry to electronics and toys industries.  Local governments rush and race to replicate each other’s policies, especially local governments of the inner regions, where corporate managers have no direct access to overseas markets, and end up copying the policies of their peers in the coastal areas.

    We all know how the Japanese bubble ended. What should Chinese policy makers do? How can they burst their bubble?

    There is  a bad way and a good way, according to L. Randall Wray and Xinhua Liu, writing in "Options for China in a Dollar Standard World: A Sovereign Currency Approach.” (Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No 783, January 2014).

    The bad way is to pursue European-style austerity, which reins in central government deficits.

    We all know what that means–the Chinese economy is almost certain to be placed in a downward spiral that will jeopardize employment growth. Besides, as the authors observe, China’s fiscal imbalances aren’t with central government, but with local governments. In fact, China’s main imbalance “appears to be a result of loose local government budgets and overly tight central government budgets.”

    That’s why the authors propose fiscal restructuring rather than austerity. Rein in local government spending, and expand central government spending.

    That’s the good way to burst the bubble. But is it politically feasible? Can Beijing reign over local governments?

    That remains to be seen. 

  • In the Media | April 2014

    Antídoto


    Por Alfredo Zaiat
    Fracasos Múltiples Internacionales está regresando al escenario político y económico argentino. La moción de censura y la amenaza de iniciar el camino de la expulsión del país de esa institución por la calidad de las estadísticas públicas colocó al Gobierno en una situación incómoda. La opción era romper con ese organismo internacional, convirtiéndose en el único país del mundo en quedar fuera de esa entidad multilateral, lo que hubiera derivado en la marginación del G-20, en la clausura al acceso de créditos del Banco Mundial, el BID y del mercado, y en deteriorar la reputación internacional frente a otros países, o negociar el espacio de intervención de sus técnicos. Esta última fue la elección del gobierno de CFK. Implicó una primera evaluación silenciosa del FMI sobre el sistema financiero local el año pasado y luego la cooperación técnica para la elaboración del nuevo índice de precios al consumidor y la actualización del indicador PBI. La evaluación general de la economía (el conocido artículo IV del convenio constitutivo del Fondo, en cuya sección 3 establece “la supervisión de las políticas de tipo de cambio de los países miembros”) es la única cuestión de tensión en la relación Argentina-FMI.

    Aceptar la revisión anual es una decisión política, de carácter simbólico, más que económico. En Washington, en el marco de la Asamblea Anual conjunta del FMI-BM Axel Kicillof le reiteró a David Lipton, subdirector gerente del Fondo Monetario Internacional, que el país no analiza volver a aceptar las auditorías anuales. Argentina no registra deuda con el FMI después de que el 5 de enero de 2006 cancelara el total por 9530 millones de dólares, y no está negociando ni requiere de un crédito del organismo atado a condicionalidades en la política económica. Instrumenta una estrategia heterodoxa que no es simpática al staff del Fondo, como quedó expresado en el último Perspectivas Económicas Mundiales. Estos técnicos consideran a la Argentina como un mal ejemplo por su política económica de crecimiento, inclusión social y autonomía del mercado de capitales. También es resistida por la persistente crítica a las recetas ortodoxas realizada por CFK en foros internacionales.

    Después de ocho años de esa tensa relación, para las autoridades del Fondo les resulta satisfactorio retomar el vínculo con el país, como lo dijo su director gerente, Christine Lagarde, para mostrar que todas las ovejas están en el rebaño. Mientras, para el Gobierno le resulta necesario para despejar el frente externo en un contexto de escasez de divisas, y para facilitar la negociación del default de doce años con el Club de París. Incluso sin revisión anual de la economía es una reconciliación por conveniencia mutua.

    El entusiasmo que manifiestan analistas y economistas del establishment por cada comentario de funcionarios del Fondo o del Banco Mundial, excitación exacerbada si incluye algún componente crítico, es una particularidad argentina. En general las observaciones del Fondo no son tomadas con seriedad, puesto que ya ha habido suficiente experiencia global para comprobar el fracaso de sus recomendaciones. En los hechos, el FMI es esencialmente un actor político para condicionar políticas económicas en función de garantizar el pago de la deuda a los acreedores, además de preservar los intereses económicos de las potencias (Estados Unidos y Europa).

    Sobre ese rol del Fondo, la ex presidenta del Banco Central, Mercedes Marcó del Pont, señaló que “frente a los datos que muestran una desaceleración en las economías de la región el FMI, una vez más con serios problemas de diagnóstico, recomienda medidas que profundizarían los problemas. El desafío para América latina es utilizar el espacio de política ganado en estos años para sostener los niveles de actividad y empleo, con políticas anticíclicas, fundamentalmente en el terreno fiscal, para sostener la demanda interna”. Lo afirmó el miércoles pasado en la Minsky Conference, en Washington, siendo la primera vez que habló en público desde que dejó el cargo, ratificando que es diferente a otros ex funcionarios que cuando dejaron el gobierno se dedicaron a castigar a la Argentina en foros internacionales. Marcó Del Pont destacó la solvencia de la economía argentina en el 23rd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the US and World Economics, organizado por el Levy Economics Institute. Participó del panel Financial re-regulation to support growth and employment (re-regulación financiera para impulsar el crecimiento y el empleo). Los principales conceptos de Marcó del Pont sobre la situación económica de América latina y, en particular, de Argentina, fueron los siguientes:

    - No puede ignorarse que los dos factores clave que han promovido a nivel agregado el crecimiento de la región, el denominado viento de cola (precios de los commodities y flujos de capital) han acentuado, salvo casos excepcionales como el de Argentina, la primarización de sus estructuras productivas.

    - América latina deberá lidiar con estos fenómenos en un contexto internacional que se presenta menos benévolo para nuestras naciones ya que ni las condiciones de liquidez internacional ni los términos del intercambio se proyectan tan favorables como hasta ahora.

    - El desafío pasa entonces por delinear estrategias anticíclicas que al mismo tiempo que busquen sostener los niveles de actividad y empleo, actúen también en la transformación de sus estructuras productivas, alentando la diversificación e industrialización. Para ello deben maximizar el uso del espacio de política ganado durante la década.

    - La región tiene márgenes de maniobra para encarar ese desafío. En gran medida ello quedó de manifiesto durante lo peor de la crisis de 2008-2009. Disponen, por un lado, de mercados internos dinámicos que han constituido la base de sustentación del crecimiento durante los últimos años. Y a diferencia de lo ocurrido en las décadas del ’80 y ’90 América latina no atraviesa en general por situaciones de fragilidad financiera o elevada exposición en materia de endeudamiento externo. Ambos rasgos son particularmente ciertos en el caso de Argentina.

    - Ahora bien, esta descripción no supone ignorar que en la gran mayoría de los países de la región (ciertamente no en Argentina) persiste un elevado grado de integración con los mercados financieros internacionales, lo cual potencia su exposición a los ciclos de liquidez internacional. Recordemos que la cuenta capital y financiera de América latina registra el más elevado grado de apertura de todas las economías del mundo en desarrollo.

    - El diagnóstico predominante y las recomendaciones subsecuentes que surgen del main stream no toman en cuenta estos fenómenos estructurales, complejos, que caracterizan a nuestras economías. Persiste, en cambio, una unilateral preocupación por la ausencia de “reformas estructurales” (léase mayor flexibilización del mercado de trabajo) o por la presencia de la “dominancia fiscal” (léase ajuste fiscal) como uno de los principales fenómenos explicativos de inestabilidad macroeconómica y de crisis. Se soslaya en el debate la importancia de la “dominancia de la balanza de pagos” como factor que históricamente ha truncado los procesos de desarrollo de América latina.

    - Abordar las condiciones de la re-regulación financiera para el crecimiento y el empleo requiere incorporar a la regulación de los flujos de capital dentro del instrumental permanente de política económica de los países en desarrollo. Y los bancos centrales deberían jugar un rol activo en ese terreno.

    - Esa regulación de la cuenta capital incluyó, a partir de 2011, restricciones a la compra de moneda extranjera para fines de ahorro por parte de los argentinos, la cual se había constituido en una fuente desestabilizadora del mercado de cambios y en canal de fuga del excedente económico por fuera del circuito de inversión y consumo. En efecto, el elevado bimonetarismo que todavía caracteriza a nuestra economía es un condicionante no menor para la administración del mercado de cambios.

    - Ahora bien, ¿cómo se ubica Argentina frente al ya mencionado escenario internacional menos favorable? Sin duda alguna el haber regulado el ingreso de capitales de portafolio nos torna menos vulnerables a los cambios que se presentan en el ciclo de liquidez, no sólo en términos de volúmenes sino, en un futuro no tan lejano, de tasas de interés. Frente a la aparición en los últimos años de un ligero desequilibrio externo el desafío de la política económica es garantizar las fuentes de recursos externos que nos permitan sostener los niveles de actividad y empleo, y en paralelo abordar los déficit sectoriales que impactan en las cuentas externas. Y en ese sentido el desequilibrio industrial y energético deben ubicarse en el centro de las prioridades.

    - Argentina tiene, entonces, espacio para buscar recursos externos que se orienten hacia los destinos estratégicos que remuevan los obstáculos estructurales y garanticen capacidad de repago.

    - Vale la pena insistir, el carácter virtuoso o no que asuma el acceso de Argentina, ya sea de su soberano como de sus empresas, a corrientes de inversión directa o de financiamiento depende de manera decisiva en la asignación de esos recursos y su capacidad para remover las causas estructurales del estrangulamiento externo. Dicho en otros términos en la capacidad para promover el proceso de desarrollo, esto es, de transformación productiva y una más equitativa distribución del ingreso. Este conjunto de ideas puede actuar de buen antídoto ante tanta contaminación en el debate económico, al que ahora se ha vuelto a incorporar en forma activa el FMI. 
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Tarullo Says Fed Shouldn't Rush to Avert Any Wage Pressures


    The Bond Buyer, April 11, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo said the central bank shouldn't raise interest rates "preemptively" on a belief the recession cut the supply of ready labor in the economy. "We should remain attentive to evidence that labor markets have actually tightened to the point that there is demonstrable inflationary pressure," Tarullo said today in remarks prepared for a speech in Washington. "We should not rush to act preemptively in anticipation of such pressures based on arguments about the potential increase in structural unemployment in recent years." Tarullo, the central bank's longest-serving governor, backed a March 19 statement in which the Federal Open Market Committee said it will keep the main interest rate below normal long-run levels while attempting to meet its mandate for full employment and stable prices. In a wide-ranging speech, Tarullo cited slower productivity growth, the smaller share of national income accruing to workers, rising inequality and decreasing economic mobility as "serious challenges" for the U.S. economy. Monetary policy, by focusing on the full-employment component of the dual mandate, can "provide a modest countervailing factor to income inequality trends by leading to higher wages at the bottom rungs of the wage scale," Tarullo, 61, said at the 23rd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference in Washington. The Fed governor rebuffed concerns about near-term inflation from wages, noting that even as the unemployment rate has fallen to 6.7 percent in March from 7.5 percent in the same month a year earlier, "one sees only the earliest signs of a much-needed, broader wage recovery." "Compensation increases have been running at the historically low level of just over 2 percent annual rates since the onset of the Great Recession, with concomitantly lower real wage gains," Tarullo said. The reasons for that lag in wage gains are not clear, he said. "The issue of how much structural damage has been suffered by the labor market is of less immediate concern today in shaping monetary policy than it might have been had we experienced a period of rapid growth during the recovery," Tarullo said at the event, organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y. 
  • In the Media | April 2014

    BCE: Constancio, faremo qualcosa perche' inflazione troppo bassa


    Class Editori, April 11, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    MILANO (MF-DJ)--La Banca centrale europea e' pronta a intervenire per affrontare il problema della bassa inflazione che continua a rimanere sotto il target ufficiale della Bce. Lo ha dichiarato il vice presidente della Bce Vitor Constancio, aggiungendo che i policy maker stanno ancora cercando di capire quali misure devono prendere e confermando che l'acquisto di titoli e' una possibilita'. "Faremo qualcosa perche' l'inflazione e' troppo bassa, e anche considerando solo il compito principale sulla stabilita' dei prezzi, noi chiaramente, nel medio termine, non stiamo raggiungendo il nostro target di inflazione del 2%. Quindi dobbiamo affrontare seriamente il nostro compito", ha detto Constancio in una conferenza a Washington sponsorizzata dal Levy Economics Institute. Il vice presidente ha sottolineato che neanche se il sistema bancario europeo ritornasse in piena salute si potrebbe garantire una ripresa della crescita economica. La Banca centrale ha posto grande enfasi sulla valutazione dei bilanci degli istituti europei prima di diventare supervisore unico alla fine dell'anno. Si spera che l'esercizio costringera' le banche a ripulire i bilanci e a raccogliere capitali, con l'obiettivo di renderli piu' forti in modo da concedere maggiori prestiti all'economia reale. Ma secondo Constancio questo modo di agire e' troppo semplicistico. "I bilanci delle banche sono gia' stati largamente riparati". Inoltre, ha aggiunto il membro della Bce, non e' assolutamente chiaro che "la finanza sia una condizione sufficiente per far ripartire la crescita europea". L'Eurozona deve affrontare numerosi problemi che "potenzialmente sono molto piu' seri dei danni inflitti dalla crisi finanziaria e la conseguente crisi del settore bancario". Questi problemi sono anche molto piu' difficili da affrontare", ha concluso il vice presidente. 
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Evans’s Prescription: Wage Hikes and Small Dose of Inflation


    By Denis MacShane
    The OMFIF Commentary, April 11, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    The normal duty of central bankers (especially in Europe) is to denounce inflation as the work of the devil and call for labour market flexibility as a barely disguised code for reducing wages.

    But a gathering of academic economists at the annual Minsky Conference this week in Washington heard an impassioned plea from one of America’s top central bankers that it was time to increase wages and let inflation rise again.

    Charles Evans is president of the Federal Reserve Bank in Chicago, where he has worked much of his professional life, in addition to stints as an economics professor and author of heavyweight academic articles on monetary policy.

    Evans, currently a non-voter, is among the more dovish members of the Federal Open Market Committee. In his paper at the Bard College Levy Institute’s Minsky Conference, commemorating the work of depression-fighting economist Hyman Minsky, Evans said the US economy now needed a serious boost in wages to help business demand.

    Evans used moderate, cautious language. However, the message was clear: Deflation and low wages are the new dragons to be slain.

    ‘Low wage increases are symptomatic of weak income growth and low aggregate demand. Stronger wage growth would likely result in more customers walking through the doors of business establishments and leading to stronger sales, more hiring and capacity expansion,’ Evans said.

    He suggested a target wage growth figure of 3.5%, which he argued ‘is sustainable without building inflation pressures.’ This compares with the current range of 2-2.25 in compensation growth, coinciding with labour’s historically low share of national income.

    Evans is right to underscore the dramatic change in the amount of US added value that goes to employees. Until 1975, wages normally accounted for more than 50% of American GDP, but this fell to 43.5% by 2012.

    Evans said fears about inflation which have hovered over monetary policy-making since the 1970s have been exaggerated. Evans argued: ‘No one can doubt that we [the Fed] are undershooting our 2% [inflation] target. Total personal consumption expenditure (PCE) prices rose just 0.9% over the past 12 months; that is a substantial and serious miss.’

    ‘Below-target inflation’, said Evans, ‘is a worldwide phenomenon and it is difficult to be confident that all policy-makers around the world have fully taken its challenge on board. Persistent below-target inflation is very costly, especially when it is accompanied by debt overhang, substantial resource slack and weak growth.’

    'Despite current low rates, I still often hear people say that higher inflation is just around the corner. I confess that I am somewhat exasperated by these repeated warnings given our current environment of very low inflation. Many times, the strongest concerns are expressed by folks who said the same thing back in 2009 and then in 2010.’

    Denis MacShane is former UK Minister for Europe and a member of the OMFIF Advisory Board. He was a speaker on European politics at the Minksy Conference.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Real Time Economics


    The Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    ECB’s Constancio: “We Will Do Something” About Low Inflation.  The ECB is poised to take action to tackle the problem of low inflation that continues to consistently undershoot its official target, ECB Vice President Vitor Constancio said Thursday. He said policy makers are still trying to figure out which measures to take, adding that bond buying is a possibility.   “We will do something because the situation is that inflation is indeed very low, and even considering only our primary mandate of price stability we are clearly not achieving our target of having, on a medium-term basis, inflation below but close to 2%,” Mr. Constancio told a conference in Washington sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute. http://on.wsj.com/1n92J4q 

    ECB Constancio Says Healthy Bank Sector Won’t Guarantee Quick Economic Rebound. 
    http://on.wsj.com/1sHfLdz

    ECB’s Praet: Euro-Zone Economies ‘Will See Economic Slack Until 2017.’ The euro zone economy will see economic slack persist until 2017 at least, European Central Bank executive board member Peter Praet said Thursday, suggesting that the ECB will maintain its easy-money policies well into the future. Still, Mr. Praet signaled that the ECB is in no rush to provide additional stimulus through rate cuts or other measures, saying that the bank’s inflation outlook remains in place despite a string of weak reports. http://on.wsj.com/1ixBFaW  
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Obama Economic Adviser: The Great Moderation Is Over, if It Ever Existed


    By Joseph Lawler
    Washington Examiner, April 11, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    The so-called "Great Moderation" of low economic volatility between the mid-1980s and the financial crisis of 2008 was not as great as it seemed, and the future likely won't be as pleasant, according to President Obama's top economic adviser.

    Jason Furman, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, said in a speech in Washington on Thursday that “the Great Recession certainly does reveal serious limitations of the concept of a great moderation,” and that the U.S. economy shouldn't be expected to return to a pattern of relatively smooth growth now that the banking crisis is in the past.

    The "Great Moderation" was a term coined by economists James Stock, another current member of the CEA, and Mark Watson in a 20003 paper. It was meant to describe the decline in volatility in macroeconomic indicators such as gross domestic product growth and inflation since Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker brought the high inflation rates of the 1960s and '70s to an end.

    In 2004, Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor under Chairman Alan Greenspan, popularized the term in a speech that attributed the smoothing out of the business cycle to better monetary policy by the Fed -- although Bernanke also acknowledged that luck may also have played a significant role, and that luck might run out in the future.
       

    Furman, however, suggested that improvements in the private sector and in the government's management of fiscal and monetary policy may not have reduced the risks of severe recessions, but rather pushed the risks out to the tails of the risk distribution. In other words, economic shocks might be rarer, but more dangerous. While the U.S. did not suffer a deep recession in the late '80s and '90s, it was due for one eventually.

    Furman illustrated the point with two charts. Looking at deviations in one-year GDP growth from the long-term average, he noted, it appears that there was a Great Moderation, briefly interrupted by the 2007-2009 recession:
     
    But looking at the deviations in 10-year GDP growth from the average, it's a different story. Volatility in economic growth spiked and hasn't returned to normal.
    Furman concluded that it "would be foolish to be complacent and fully assume that in the deeper, lower frequency sense there ever was a genuine 'Great Moderation,' let alone that it has returned and renders further policy steps unnecessary."

    He proposed four measures for further stabilizing the economy in the future, including automatic fiscal stabilizers to even out government spending and taxing in boom times and downturns, reducing income inequality, improving coordination among countries and promoting financial stability.

    Notably, Furman drew special attention to housing finance as a component of financial stability. Although the Obama administration for the most part has left the issue of what should be done with bailed-out government-sponsored mortgage businesses Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Congress, Furman did signal support for a bill that Democratic and Republican senators on the Senate Banking Committee have introduced.

    The committee "is making promising bipartisan progress and the administration looks forward to continuing to work with Congress to forge a new private housing finance system that better serves current and future generations of Americans," he said.

    The event at which Furman was speaking, hosted by the Levy Economics Institute, was named after Hyman Minsky, an American economist whose worked focused on financial crises and their relationship to economic downturns. 
  • In the Media | April 2014

    At Least Six Months between End of QE and Rate Rise: Fed's Evans (Update)


    NDTV, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Washington (Reuters | Update)
    :

    The Federal Reserve will likely wait at least six months after ending a bond-buying program before raising interest rates, and will only act that quickly "if things really go well," a top US central banker said on Wednesday.

    "It could be six, it could be 16 months," Chicago Fed President Charles Evans told reporters on the sidelines of a Levy Economics Institute forum.

    Last month, Fed Chair Janet Yellen put the wait at "around six months" depending on the economy. Her comment undercut stocks and bonds and prompted economists to revise forecasts. Traders and Wall Street economists now expect the first rate hike to come around the middle of next year.

    "If I had my druthers, I'd want more accommodation and I'd push it into 2016," Evans said of the first rate hike, but "the actual, most likely case I think is probably late 2015."

    The Fed has kept rates near zero since the depths of the recession in late 2008, and has bought some $3 trillion in bonds to help lower US borrowing costs. It has reduced its bond-buying and expects to wind it down by the fall.

    Evans said the current pace of reducing the bond purchases, $10 billion at each Fed policy meeting, is "reasonable" and takes the Fed "into the October timeframe" for shelving the program.

    "I am confident that, depending on how the economic circumstances come out, we'll keep interest rates low for quite some period of time," he said.

    WOULD WELCOME ECB EASING Evans, a vocal policy dove, has long worried that the Fed has been too timid in its efforts to lower employment and raise inflation toward the central bank's targets.

    "We're in a very low inflation global environment," he said. "The eurozone well below 1 per cent and Japan has been very low for a long period of time, and I'm worried that there's something more afoot" than just the US or eurozone experience.

    Asked about a possible further easing of policy by the European Central Bank, he said: "Yes I think that would be quite welcome," adding he would welcome "all actions that help generate stronger world growth."

    A fellow dove at the central bank, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, has proposed lowering the interest rate the Fed pays banks on excess reserves. The aim would be to provide more accommodation and boost inflation from just above 1 per cent currently.

    Asked about this idea, Evans said he was willing to look at the possibility, but noted that the Fed's policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee has long considered it and has not acted. 
  • In the Media | April 2014

    At Least Six Months between End of QE and Rate Rise - Fed’s Evans


    By Jonathan Spicer
    Manorama Online, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The Federal Reserve will likely wait at least six months after ending a bond-buying program before raising interest rates, and will only act that quickly "if things really go well," a top U.S. central banker said on Wednesday.

    "It could be six, it could be 16 months," Chicago Fed President Charles Evans told reporters on the sidelines of a Levy Economics Institute forum.

    Last month, Fed Chair Janet Yellen put the wait at "around six months" depending on the economy. Her comment undercut stocks and bonds and prompted economists to revise forecasts. Traders and Wall Street economists now expect the first rate hike to come around the middle of next year.

    "If I had my druthers, I'd want more accommodation and I'd push it into 2016," Evans said of the first rate hike, but "the actual, most likely case I think is probably late 2015."

    The Fed has kept rates near zero since the depths of the recession in late 2008, and has bought some $3 trillion in bonds to help lower U.S. borrowing costs. It has reduced its bond-buying and expects to wind it down by the fall.

    Evans said the current pace of reducing the bond purchases, $10 billion at each Fed policy meeting, is "reasonable" and takes the Fed "into the October timeframe" for shelving the program.

    "I am confident that, depending on how the economic circumstances come out, we'll keep interest rates low for quite some period of time," he said.

    WOULD WELCOME ECB EASING
    Evans, a vocal policy dove, has long worried that the Fed has been too timid in its efforts to lower employment and raise inflation toward the central bank's targets.

    "We're in a very low inflation global environment," he said. "The eurozone well below 1 percent and Japan has been very low for a long period of time, and I'm worried that there's something more afoot" than just the U.S. or eurozone experience.

    Asked about a possible further easing of policy by the European Central Bank, he said: "Yes I think that would be quite welcome," adding he would welcome "all actions that help generate stronger world growth."

    A fellow dove at the central bank, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, has proposed lowering the interest rate the Fed pays banks on excess reserves. The aim would be to provide more accommodation and boost inflation from just above 1 percent currently.

    Asked about this idea, Evans said he was willing to look at the possibility, but noted that the Fed's policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee has long considered it and has not acted.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    ECB Constancio: Fully Healthy Bank Sector Won't Guarantee Quick Economic Rebound


    ECB VP: Euro Zone Faces Problems That Are More Profound Than Just Weakness in the Banking Sector
    By Todd Buell and Christopher Lawton

    The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.


    The euro zone faces problems that are more profound than just weakness in the banking sector and that are harder to address, European Central Bank Vice President Vitor Constancio said Thursday.

    In remarks prepared for delivery in Washington, Mr. Constancio said that even if banks in the euro zone could completely erase the damage from the financial crisis, it wouldn't be a guarantee that strong growth and low unemployment would return quickly.

    The ECB has placed great emphasis on its assessment of banks' balance sheets, which it is carrying out before becoming the single currency's banking supervisor later this year. It is hoped that the exercise, culminating in a stress test, will force banks to clean up their balance sheets, raise capital, which should put them in a stronger position to lend to the real economy.

    But Mr. Constancio said this story line is too simplistic.

    Firstly, "bank balance sheets in the euro area have to a large degree already been repaired," he said. Furthermore, he said it was "far from clear that finance is a sufficient condition for jump-starting growth in Europe."

    "Even a complete rehabilitation of the euro area's banking system…will not guarantee a quick return to high growth and low unemployment," he added. The euro zone's economy faces numerous issues, he said, that are "are potentially more serious than the damage inflicted by the financial crisis and the subsequent euro area crisis on the euro area banking sector. These issues are also far more difficult to address."

    Mr. Constancio mentioned three issues that he called the "chief obstacles" to growth in Europe: the "remarkable" slowdown in emerging markets, the "large" drop in domestic private investment in Europe since the financial crisis, and weak domestic demand.

    The last point "is often left out of the public discourse, but micro evidence suggests that it is a problem that cannot be underestimated." He added that survey data suggest that euro-zone firms face problems on the demand side that are more serious than problems coming from bank lending.

    Mr. Constancio said that while bank deleveraging "certainly plays an important role in the inadequate current levels of credit supply to the real economy, factors related to the demand side are even more important," he said.

    Lending to the private sector has been declining in annual terms for nearly two years in the euro zone and many experts have said that this is a signal of the weakness of the recovery in the currency bloc and a factor that may force the ECB to pump more money into the 18-nation currency bloc.

    Mr. Constancio, however, said that a "creditless" recovery is "far from unusual," especially after a financial crisis.

    He said that based on current trends, the euro zone faces a future over the medium term of "stable but low growth, with unemployment evolving to lower levels in 15 years as a result of a declining active population."

    "Europe has to react swiftly if it wants to avoid a whole generation being wasted and sacrificed," he said.

    Turning to monetary policy, he said that while ECB policy will continue "to provide stimulus", the central bank can't be called upon to "do everything." Indeed, "people seem to expect too much from central banks." Rather, governments must accept responsibility to promote investment, increase demand, and implement active labor market policies, he said.

    In an apparent reference to Samuel Beckett, Mr. Constancio said that commentators have been "waiting for the Godot of a new wave of technical innovations that will save the day" out of a trap of low growth and low inflation.

    "Maybe it will come," he said. "But I am sure that we also need active policies and new economic thinking to deal with the income distribution problems that the coming technology will aggravate as well as the role of finance and demand in monetary economies where it is wrong to try to reduce macroeconomics to narrow real and long-term supply-side considerations, as our present predicament so impressively demonstrates."
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Fed's Tarullo Says Economy Looking Stronger


    Morningstar Advisor, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) -- The U.S. economy, aided by the Federal Reserve's easy monetary-policy stance, is beginning to look healthier, Federal Reserve Gov. Daniel Tarullo said Wednesday. "While we've not had certainly the pace and pervasiveness of the recovery that we wanted, the unconventional monetary policy have been critical in supporting the moderate recovery we have had, which I think now is looking reasonably well-rounded going forward, and I think that is reflected in the fairly wide expectation growth is going to be picking up over the course of this year," Tarullo said at a conference organized by the Levy Institute of Bard College. Tarullo sounded in no hurry to end the Fed's easy policy stance. He said the Fed "should not rush to act preemptively" in anticipation of inflationary pressures. Tarullo's comments were noteworthy because he rarely speaks about monetary policy -- rather, most of his speeches deal with financial-stability issues given his role as the central bank's point-man on strengthening regulation in the wake of the financial crisis.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    ECB's Peter Praet Says Euro-Zone Economies "Will See Economic Slack until 2017"


    By Brian Blackstone and Christopher Lawton
    The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON—The euro zone economy will see economic slack persist until 2017 at least, European Central Bank executive board member  Peter Praet  said Thursday, suggesting that the ECB will maintain its easy-money policies well into the future.

    Still, Mr. Praet signaled that the ECB is in no rush to provide additional stimulus through rate cuts or other measures, saying that the bank's inflation outlook remains in place despite a string of weak reports.

    "The degree of slack in the economy is very high," Mr. Praet said in a speech at a conference in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute. "Whatever the measure you take of output gap, this output gap is unlikely to be closed in the euro zone before 2017."

    The output gap refers to the difference between the present level of gross domestic product with where it should typically be based on the economy's growth potential. When economies experience recession, as the euro zone did from late 2011 until early last year, this gap rises, limiting inflationary pressures and giving central banks added leeway to ease monetary policy.

    Mr. Praet, who heads the ECB's economics department, also noted that bank lending to the private sector remains weak in the euro zone, although there seems to be some substitution toward greater debt issuance in the capital markets.

    Mr. Praet is in Washington, D.C. for the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund, which brings together top central bankers and finance ministers from around the world. The IMF has in recent weeks pressed the ECB to consider more dramatic stimulus measures to keep inflation from staying too low. But outside of a small rate reduction last November, the ECB has largely resisted such steps, saying inflation should gradually accelerate toward its target of just under 2%.

    Annual euro-zone inflation was 0.5% in March, more than a four-year low.

    "We have a sequence of monthly inflation that have been weaker than what we have expected. But we are still in our base scenario," Mr. Praet. The ECB expects a gradual acceleration in annual consumer-price growth toward 1.7% by the end of 2016.

    "There is a lot of noise also in the monthly figures," he said.

    At its monthly meeting last week, the ECB held interest rates steady, but it beefed up its commitment to ease policy if needed. The ECB's rate board "is unanimous in its commitment to using also unconventional instruments within its mandate to cope effectively with risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation," the bank said in its policy statement last week.

    Mr. Praet called this signal "quite important." Still, he added that expectations of future inflation remain well anchored. The design of any future ECB stimulus program will depend on the problem the bank is trying to tackle, he said.

    In his speech, Mr. Praet said divergent economic growth and productivity continues to plague the euro zone, and urged the monetary bloc's various members to embark on reforms to narrow the gap between richer and poorer countries.

    "The first decade of Economic and Monetary Union failed to produce real convergence," Mr. Praet said.

    "What the euro area needs, in my view, is to 'rerun' the convergence process."
  • In the Media | April 2014

    ECB’s Constancio: “We Will Do Something” About Low Inflation


    By Pedro Nicolaci da Costa
    The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    The European Central Bank is poised to take action to tackle the problem of low inflation that continues to consistently undershoot its official target, ECB Vice President Vitor Constancio said Thursday.

    Mr. Constancio said policy makers are still trying to figure out which measures to take, adding that bond buying is a possibility.

    “We will do something because the situation is that inflation is indeed very low, and even considering only our primary mandate of price stability we are clearly not achieving our target of having, on a medium-term basis, inflation below but close to 2%. So we do take seriously our mandate,” Mr. Constancio told a conference in Washington sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute.

    During his prepared remarks, Mr. Constancio argued returning Europe’s banking system to full health would not be enough to ensure economic growth picks up.

    The ECB has placed great emphasis on its assessment of banks’ balance sheets, which it is carrying out before becoming the single currency’s banking supervisor later this year. It is hoped that the exercise, culminating in a stress test, will force banks to clean up their balance sheets, raise capital, which should put them in a stronger position to lend to the real economy. But Mr. Constancio suggested this story line is too simplistic.

    “Bank balance sheets in the euro area have to a large degree already been repaired,” he said. Furthermore, he said it was “far from clear that finance is a sufficient condition for jump-starting growth in Europe.”

    “Even a complete rehabilitation of the euro area’s banking system…will not guarantee a quick return to high growth and low unemployment,” he added. The euro zone’s economy faces numerous issues, he said, that are “are potentially more serious than the damage inflicted by the financial crisis and the subsequent euro area crisis on the euro area banking sector. These issues are also far more difficult to address.” 
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Dealers Shifted Rate View after Fed Meeting: NY Fed Poll


    By Ann Saphir
    Reuters, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    (Reuters) – Wall Street bond dealers began anticipating an earlier first interest-rate hike from the Federal Reserve after last month's policy meeting, according to the results of a poll by the New York Fed released on Thursday.

    That was exactly what Fed policymakers had feared would happen after the central bank published fresh forecasts on interest rates that appeared to map out a more aggressive cycle of rate hikes than previously expected, minutes of the meeting released Wednesday showed.

    Dealers who changed their expectations said they did so because of forecasts, and "several pointed to comments made by (Fed) Chair (Janet Yellen) during her press conference," according to the poll, which asked dealers about their rate hike expectations both before and after the Fed's March 18-19 meeting.

    At the policy-setting meeting, central bank officials made a widely expected reduction in their bond-buying stimulus and decided to jettison a set of numerical guideposts they were using to help the public anticipate when they would finally raise rates.

    The Fed said the change in its rate hike guidance did not point to a shift in policy intentions, but new rate forecasts from the current 16 Fed policymakers suggested the federal funds rate would end 2016 at 2.25 percent, a half percentage point above Fed officials' projections in December.

    Adding to the perception of a slightly more hawkish Fed, the Fed said it would wait a "considerable time" following the end of its bond-buying program before finally raising interest rates, a period of time that Yellen in her press conference suggested could be "around six months."

    As of March 24, dealers saw a 29 percent chance of a first rate hike in the first half of 2015, up from 24 percent before the March meeting, the poll showed.

    Both before and after polls showed dealers attached a 30 percent probability to a rate rise in the second half.

    Fed officials have since gone to great pains to point out any rate hike decisions will depend on the state of the economy.

    "It could be six, it could be 16 months," Chicago Fed President Charles Evans told reporters on the sidelines of a Levy Economics Institute forum on Wednesday.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Wednesday's Top Stories in the United States


    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    * Chicago Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Evans Wednesday accused the central bank of being "timid" in its attempts to spur faster economic growth, saying the Fed has been "less aggressive" than called for despite being nowhere its employment and inflation goals. In remarks prepared for delivery at the Levy Institute's Hyman Minsky conference, Evans warned that the tentative approach to bolstering the economic recovery could leave it susceptible to unforeseen shocks, and called instead for the Fed to keep most of its ultra-easy monetary policy in place "for some time." "Generally, the evidence points to a still weak labor market. We still have some ways to go to reach our employment mandate," said Evans, who will vote on the policymaking Federal Open Market Committee in 2015.

    * Speaking to reporters after his speech, Evans said it would be appropriate for the central bank to hold off raising interest rates until 2016, citing his concerns about the low inflation environment. However, "the actual, most likely case, I think it's probably late 2015." He said he thinks "it's important to remind everybody that we have strong accommodation in place and we need to leave in place in order to do the job that it's intended to do," he said.    
  • In the Media | April 2014

    UPDATE 1 – At Least 6 Months between End of QE and Rate Rise – Fed's Evans


    By Jonathan Spicer
    MSN Money, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON, April 9 (Reuters) – The Federal Reserve will likely wait at least six months after ending a bond-buying program before raising interest rates, and will only act that quickly "if things really go well," a top U.S. central banker said on Wednesday.

    "It could be six, it could be 16 months," Chicago Fed President Charles Evans told reporters on the sidelines of a Levy Economics Institute forum.

    Last month, Fed Chair Janet Yellen put the wait at "around six months" depending on the economy. Her comment undercut stocks and bonds and prompted economists to revise forecasts. Traders and Wall Street economists now expect the first rate hike to come around the middle of next year.

    "If I had my druthers, I'd want more accommodation and I'd push it into 2016," Evans said of the first rate hike, but "the actual, most likely case I think is probably late 2015."

    The Fed has kept rates near zero since the depths of the recession in late 2008, and has bought some $3 trillion in bonds to help lower U.S. borrowing costs. It has reduced its bond-buying and expects to wind it down by the fall.

    Evans said the current pace of reducing the bond purchases, $10 billion at each Fed policy meeting, is "reasonable" and takes the Fed "into the October timeframe" for shelving the program.

    "I am confident that, depending on how the economic circumstances come out, we'll keep interest rates low for quite some period of time," he said.

     

    Would Welcome ECB Easing
    Evans, a vocal policy dove, has long worried that the Fed has been too timid in its efforts to lower employment and raise inflation toward the central bank's targets.

    "We're in a very low inflation global environment," he said. "The eurozone well below 1 percent and Japan has been very low for a long period of time, and I'm worried that there's something more afoot" than just the U.S. or eurozone experience.

    Asked about a possible further easing of policy by the European Central Bank, he said: "Yes I think that would be quite welcome," adding he would welcome "all actions that help generate stronger world growth."

    A fellow dove at the central bank, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, has proposed lowering the interest rate the Fed pays banks on excess reserves. The aim would be to provide more accommodation and boost inflation from just above 1 percent currently.

    Asked about this idea, Evans said he was willing to look at the possibility, but noted that the Fed's policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee has long considered it and has not acted. 

  • In the Media | April 2014

    Chicago Fed's Evans: Monetary Pol Less Aggressive Than Needed


    By Brain Odion-Esene
    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MNI) -–Chicago Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Evans Wednesday accused the central bank of being "timid" in its attempts to spur faster economic growth, saying the Fed has been "less aggressive" than called for despite being nowhere its employment and inflation goals.

    In remarks prepared for delivery at the Levy Institute's Hyman Minsky conference, Evans warned that the tentative approach to bolstering the economic recovery could leave it susceptible to unforeseen shocks, and called instead for the Fed to keep most of its ultra-easy monetary policy in place "for some time."

    "Generally, the evidence points to a still weak labor market. We still have some ways to go to reach our employment mandate," said Evans, who will vote on the policymaking Federal Open Market Committee in 2015.

    As for the Fed's price stability mandate, he said he sees an economy that points to below-target inflation for several years, which underscores the need for easy policy.

    "Given today's unacceptably low inflation environment and the wealth of inflation indicators that point to continued below-target inflation, I think we need continued strongly accommodative monetary policy to get inflation back up to 2% within a reasonable time frame," he said.

    Instead, "the FOMC has been less aggressive than the policy loss function calls for," Evans said, arguing that "in the current circumstances, accountability and optimal policy mean we should be maintaining a large degree of accommodation for some time."

    "It certainly seems that the fallout from the financial crisis and persistent headwinds holding back economic activity are consistent with the equilibrium real interest rate being lower than usual today," he added.

    Evans said actions that place the FOMC "on a slow glide path" toward its targets undermine the credibility of the Fed's vow to meet its mandates in a timely fashion.

    "Timid policies would also increase the risk of progress being stymied along the way by adverse shocks that might hit before policy gaps are closed," he said. "The surest and quickest way to reach our objectives is to be aggressive."

    This also means the FOMC should be open to the idea of overshooting its targets in a manageable fashion.

    "Such risks are optimal if the outcome of our policy actions implies smaller average deviations from our targets over the medium term. We should be willing to undertake such policies and clearly communicate our willingness to do so," Evans said.

    Making his case for why the economy still needs continued, aggressive monetary policy, Evans said March's 6.7% unemployment rate is still well above the 5.25% percent rate that he considers to be the longer-run normal. As the jobless rate continues to decline, he stressed the importance of assessing a wide range of labor market data "to better gauge the overall health of the labor market."

    These would include quit rates, layoffs and a variety of wage measures, as well as broader measures of unemployment that include discouraged workers and those who would like to work more hours.

    Evans also argued that the decline in the labor participation rate in recent months cannot be ascribed solely to changing population demographics and other factors outside the Fed's control. The end of extended unemployment insurance benefits, among other things, has also likely decreased the natural rate of unemployment, meaning that "the decline in the unemployment rate likely overstates to some degree the reduction of slack in the labor market over the past year."

    On the inflation front, Evans noted that the United States is not the only country struggling with below-target inflation, and that "it is difficult to be confident that all policymakers around the world have fully taken its challenge onboard."

    "Persistent below-target inflation is very costly, especially when it is accompanied by debt overhang, substantial resource slack, and weak growth," he added.

    Given the low inflation environment, Evans said he is "somewhat exasperated" by those who constantly warn that higher inflation "is just around the corner."

    For one thing, he argued that unless there is an unexpected, and positive, shock to the global economy, commodity prices are unlikely to fuel a strong increase in inflation.

    To those worried about the inflationary risks posed by the Fed's swollen balance sheet and the massive amounts of excess bank reserves, Evans countered that banks so far have not been lending these reserves nearly enough to generate big increases in broad monetary aggregates.

    Even if lending did pick up, he added, "Dramatically higher bank lending would surely be associated with higher loan demand and a generally stronger economy. Strong growth and diminishing resource slack would be part of this story, and a rising rate environment would be a natural force diminishing the rising inflation pressures."

    The slow rate of wage growth is another cause for concern, Evans said, as it is "symptomatic of weak income growth and low aggregate demand."

    "At today's 2% to 2.25% compensation growth rates and labor's historically low share of national income, there is substantial room for stronger wage growth without inflation pressures building," he said.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Fed Gov Tarullo: Mon Pol Can Help Address Long-Term Unemplymnt


    By Brai Odion-Esene
    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MNI) – Federal Reserve Board Gov. Daniel Tarullo Wednesday night argued that monetary policy can play an important role in helping the nation's long-term unemployment, saying the Fed right now should not be overly concerned with how much of the slow pace of job creation is due to structural factors outside its control.

    "The very accommodative monetary policy of the past five years has contributed significantly to the extended, moderate recoveries of gross domestic product (GDP) and employment," Tarullo said in remarks prepared for the Levy Economics Institute's Hyman Minsky Conference.

    And to underline that he does not favor tightening monetary policy anytime soon, Tarullo said because of the modest growth in place for several years, "it seems less likely that we will experience a growth spurt in the next couple of years that would engender concerns about rapid wage pressures and changes in inflation expectations."

    Voicing his concerns about slow U.S. productivity growth, widening income inequality, and long-term unemployment, Tarullo stressed that while monetary policy "cannot be the only, or even the principal," tool in counteracting these longer-term trends, "that is not to say it is irrelevant."

    "Monetary policies directed toward achieving the statutory dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability can help reduce underemployment associated with low aggregate demand," he added, a statement that echoes Fed Chair Janet Yellen's commitment to tackling the nation's jobs crisis.

    "To the degree that monetary policy can prevent cyclical phenomena such as high unemployment and low investment from becoming entrenched, it might be able to improve somewhat the potential growth rate of the economy over the medium term," he said.

    Appointed to the Fed board by President Barack Obama in 2009, Tarullo has a permanent vote on the Fed's policymaking Federal Open Market Committee.

    Yellen said she still sees "considerable slack" in the labor market in a March 31 speech, and Tarullo said reducing labor market slack can help lay the foundation "for a more sustained, self-reinforcing cycle of stronger aggregate demand, increased production, renewed investment, and productivity gains."

    "Similarly, a stronger labor market can provide a modest countervailing factor to income inequality trends by leading to higher wages at the bottom rungs of the wage scale," he said.

    There is uncertainty among both Fed officials and economists regarding how much the high unemployment is due to cyclical factors like low demand, or more structural issues such as a skills mismatch between jobseekers and would-be employers.

    Tarullo argued that there is not "as sharp a demarcation between cyclical and structural problems as is sometimes suggested," as "by promoting maximum employment in a stable inflation environment around the FOMC target rate, monetary policy can help set the stage for a vibrant and dynamic economy."

    Still, Tarullo advised the FOMC to proceed pragmatically in crafting policy.

    "We should remain attentive to evidence that labor markets have actually tightened to the point that there is demonstrable inflationary pressure that would place at risk maintenance of the FOMC's stated inflation target (which, of course, we are currently not meeting on the downside)," he said. "But we should not rush to act preemptively in anticipation of such pressures based on arguments about the potential increase in structural unemployment in recent years."

    "In this regard, the issue of how much structural damage has been suffered by the labor market is of less immediate concern today in shaping monetary policy than it might have been had we experienced a period of rapid growth during the recovery," he said.

    Outside of actions being taken by the Fed, Tarullo also called on fiscal policymakers to also take a more forceful approach in helping the economy.
    "A pro-investment policy agenda by the government could help address some of our nation's long-term challenges by promoting investment in human capital, particularly for those who have seen their share of the economic pie shrink, and by encouraging research and development and other capital investments that increase the productive capacity of the nation," he said.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Tarullo Says Fed Shouldn’t Rush to Avert Any Wage Pressures


    By Craig Torres
    Bloomberg Businessweek, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo said the central bank shouldn’t raise interest rates “preemptively” on a belief the recession cut the supply of ready labor in the economy.

    “We should remain attentive to evidence that labor markets have actually tightened to the point that there is demonstrable inflationary pressure,” Tarullo said today in remarks prepared for a speech in Washington. “We should not rush to act preemptively in anticipation of such pressures based on arguments about the potential increase in structural unemployment in recent years.”

    Tarullo, the central bank’s longest-serving governor, backed a March 19 statement in which the Federal Open Market Committee said it will keep the main interest rate below normal long-run levels while attempting to meet its mandate for full employment and stable prices.

    In a wide-ranging speech, Tarullo cited slower productivity growth, the smaller share of national income accruing to workers, rising inequality and decreasing economic mobility as “serious challenges” for the U.S. economy.

    Monetary policy, by focusing on the full-employment component of the dual mandate, can “provide a modest countervailing factor to income inequality trends by leading to higher wages at the bottom rungs of the wage scale,” Tarullo, 61, said at the 23rd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference in Washington.

    The Fed governor rebuffed concerns about near-term inflation from wages, noting that even as the unemployment rate has fallen to 6.7 percent in March from 7.5 percent in the same month a year earlier, “one sees only the earliest signs of a much-needed, broader wage recovery.”

    Low Gains
    “Compensation increases have been running at the historically low level of just over 2 percent annual rates since the onset of the Great Recession, with concomitantly lower real wage gains,” Tarullo said. The reasons for that lag in wage gains are not clear, he said.

    “The issue of how much structural damage has been suffered by the labor market is of less immediate concern today in shaping monetary policy than it might have been had we experienced a period of rapid growth during the recovery,” Tarullo said at the event, organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    At Least Six Months between End of QE and Rate Rise: Fed's Evans


    By Jonathan Spicer
    Reuters, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    (Reuters) -–The Federal Reserve will likely wait at least six months after ending a bond-buying program before raising interest rates, and will only act that quickly "if things really go well," a top U.S. central banker said on Wednesday.

    "It could be six, it could be 16 months," Chicago Fed President Charles Evans told reporters on the sidelines of a Levy Economics Institute forum.

    Last month, Fed Chair Janet Yellen put the wait at "around six months" depending on theeconomy. Her comment undercut stocks and bonds and prompted economists to revise forecasts. Traders and Wall Street economists now expect the first rate hike to come around the middle of next year.

    "If I had my druthers, I'd want more accommodation and I'd push it into 2016," Evans said of the first rate hike, but "the actual, most likely case I think is probably late 2015."

    The Fed has kept rates near zero since the depths of the recession in late 2008, and has bought some $3 trillion in bonds to help lower U.S. borrowing costs. It has reduced its bond-buying and expects to wind it down by the fall.

    Evans said the current pace of reducing the bond purchases, $10 billion at each Fed policy meeting, is "reasonable" and takes the Fed "into the October timeframe" for shelving the program.

    "I am confident that, depending on how the economic circumstances come out, we'll keep interest rates low for quite some period of time," he said.

    Would Welcome ECB Easing
    Evans, a vocal policy dove, has long worried that the Fed has been too timid in its efforts to lower employment and raise inflation toward the central bank's targets.

    "We're in a very low inflation global environment," he said. "The euro zone well below 1 percent and Japan has been very low for a long period of time, and I'm worried that there's something more afoot" than just the U.S. or euro zone experience.

    Asked about a possible further easing of policy by the European Central Bank, he said: "Yes I think that would be quite welcome," adding he would welcome "all actions that help generate stronger world growth."

    A fellow dove at the central bank, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, has proposed lowering the interest rate the Fed pays banks on excess reserves. The aim would be to provide more accommodation and boost inflation from just above 1 percent currently.

    Asked about this idea, Evans said he was willing to look at the possibility, but noted that the Fed's policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee has long considered it and has not acted.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Fed’s Tarullo: Uncertainty Over Labor Market Slack Means Fed Must Proceed “Pragmatically”


    By Victoria MacGrane
    The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo on Wednesday said policy makers should proceed cautiously in judging when inflationary pressures are building in the economy, given uncertainty that surrounds just how much slack remains in the labor market.

    Mr. Tarullo placed himself in the camp of Fed Chairwoman Janet Yellen, saying he believes the labor market is still operating well short of its potential and associating himself with her March 31 speech explaining the reasons why.

    Given there is some debate over how to measure labor market slack, “we are well advised to proceed pragmatically,” he said in a dinnertime speech prepared for delivery at a conference organized by the Levy Institute of Bard College.

    He stressed Fed officials should await actual evidence that labor markets had tightened enough to trigger inflationary pressures that could push inflation above the Fed’s 2% inflation target. The Commerce Department’s personal consumption expenditures price index, the Fed’s favored measure of inflation, was up 0.9% in February from a year earlier. The Labor Department’s consumer price index, an alternative measure, was up 1.1%.

    “But we should not rush to act preemptively in anticipation of such pressures based on arguments about the potential increase in structural unemployment in recent years,” he said.

    There is a vigorous debate at the central bank and among economists generally over the extent of remaining slack in the labor market. Minutes from the Fed’s March 18-19 policy meeting released Wednesday showed that while officials generally agreed slack persisted, they disagreed about how much and how well the unemployment rate reflects the degree of slack.

    In her March 31 speech, Ms. Yellen pointed to several factors beyond the jobless rate that suggest the labor market is still quite weak, including the large number of long-term jobless and the seven million Americans who are working part-time but would prefer full-time jobs.

    Mr. Tarullo suggested he’s not worried economic growth will suddenly take off and leave the Fed flat-footed and fighting rising inflation. “The issue of how much structural damage has been suffered by the labor market is of less immediate concern today in shaping monetary policy than it might have been had we experienced a period of rapid growth during the recovery,” he said.

    In light of the economy’s modest performance since the end of the recession, “it seems less likely that we will experience a growth spurt in the next couple of years that would engender concerns about rapid wage pressures and changes in inflation expectations,” Mr. Tarullo said.

    Mr. Tarullo’s comments came within the context of a speech raising concerns about “troubling” long-term trends in the U.S. economy, including falling productivity growth and rising inequality.

    The Fed’s efforts to battle recession help lay the groundwork for a stronger, more dynamic economy, Mr. Tarullo said. “But there are limits to what monetary policy can do in counteracting” the longer-term trends he is worried about.

    Mr. Tarullo said the federal government could address some of the challenges through investment, especially in ways that help “those who have seen their share of the economic pie shrink.” Early childhood education, job training programs, infrastructure and research are areas that could boost the long-term prospects for the U.S. economy, said Mr. Tarullo. 
  • In the Media | April 2014

    At Least Six Months between End of QE and Rate Rise: Fed's Evans


    By Jonathan Spicer
    The Chicago Tribune, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Federal Reserve will likely wait at least six months after ending a bond-buying program before raising interest rates, and will only act that quickly "if things really go well," a top U.S. central banker said on Wednesday.

    "It could be six, it could be 16 months," Chicago Fed President Charles Evans told reporters on the sidelines of a Levy Economics Institute forum.

    Last month, Fed Chair Janet Yellen put the wait at "around six months" depending on the economy. Her comment undercut stocks and bonds and prompted economists to revise forecasts. Traders and Wall Street economists now expect the first rate hike to come around the middle of next year.

    "If I had my druthers, I'd want more accommodation and I'd push it into 2016," Evans said of the first rate hike, but "the actual, most likely case I think is probably late 2015."

    The Fed has kept rates near zero since the depths of the recession in late 2008, and has bought some $3 trillion in bonds to help lower U.S. borrowing costs. It has reduced its bond-buying and expects to wind it down by the fall.

    Evans said the current pace of reducing the bond purchases, $10 billion at each Fed policy meeting, is "reasonable" and takes the Fed "into the October timeframe" for shelving the program.   "I am confident that, depending on how the economic circumstances come out, we'll keep interest rates low for quite some period of time," he said.
      WOULD WELCOME ECB EASING Evans, a vocal policy dove, has long worried that the Fed has been too timid in its efforts to lower employment and raise inflation toward the central bank's targets.

    "We're in a very low inflation global environment," he said. "The euro zone well below 1 percent and Japan has been very low for a long period of time, and I'm worried that there's something more afoot" than just the U.S. or euro zone experience.

    Asked about a possible further easing of policy by the European Central Bank, he said: "Yes I think that would be quite welcome," adding he would welcome "all actions that help generate stronger world growth."

    A fellow dove at the central bank, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, has proposed lowering the interest rate the Fed pays banks on excess reserves. The aim would be to provide more accommodation and boost inflation from just above 1 percent currently.

    Asked about this idea, Evans said he was willing to look at the possibility, but noted that the Fed's policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee has long considered it and has not acted.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Fed's Tarullo Says Economy Looking Stronger


    By Greg Robb
    Fox Business, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON –  The U.S. economy, aided by the Federal Reserve's easy monetary-policy stance, is beginning to look healthier, Federal Reserve Gov. Daniel Tarullo said Wednesday. "While we've not had certainly the pace and pervasiveness of the recovery that we wanted, the unconventional monetary policy have been critical in supporting the moderate recovery we have had, which I think now is looking reasonably well-rounded going forward, and I think that is reflected in the fairly wide expectation growth is going to be picking up over the course of this year," Tarullo said at a conference organized by the Levy Institute of Bard College. Tarullo sounded in no hurry to end the Fed's easy policy stance. He said the Fed "should not rush to act preemptively" in anticipation of inflationary pressures. Tarullo's comments were noteworthy because he rarely speaks about monetary policy -- rather, most of his speeches deal with financial-stability issues given his role as the central bank's point-man on strengthening regulation in the wake of the financial crisis.  
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Tarullo: Fed Shouldn't Rush to Avert Any Wage Pressures


    Money News, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo said the central bank shouldn’t raise interest rates “preemptively” on a belief the recession cut the supply of ready labor in the economy.

    “We should remain attentive to evidence that labor markets have actually tightened to the point that there is demonstrable inflationary pressure,” Tarullo said Wednesday in remarks prepared for a speech in Washington. “We should not rush to act preemptively in anticipation of such pressures based on arguments about the potential increase in structural unemployment in recent years.”

    Tarullo, the central bank’s longest-serving governor, backed a March 19 statement in which the Federal Open Market Committee said it will keep the main interest rate below normal long-run levels while attempting to meet its mandate for full employment and stable prices.

    In a wide-ranging speech, Tarullo cited slower productivity growth, the smaller share of national income accruing to workers, rising inequality and decreasing economic mobility as “serious challenges” for the U.S. economy.

    Monetary policy, by focusing on the full-employment component of the dual mandate, can “provide a modest countervailing factor to income inequality trends by leading to higher wages at the bottom rungs of the wage scale,” Tarullo, 61, said at the 23rd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference in Washington.

    The Fed governor rebuffed concerns about near-term inflation from wages, noting that even as the unemployment rate has fallen to 6.7 percent in March from 7.5 percent in the same month a year earlier, “one sees only the earliest signs of a much-needed, broader wage recovery.”

    Low Gains
    “Compensation increases have been running at the historically low level of just over 2 percent annual rates since the onset of the Great Recession, with concomitantly lower real wage gains,” Tarullo said. The reasons for that lag in wage gains are not clear, he said.

    “The issue of how much structural damage has been suffered by the labor market is of less immediate concern today in shaping monetary policy than it might have been had we experienced a period of rapid growth during the recovery,” Tarullo said at the event, organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.
  • In the Media | April 2014

    Fed's Tarullo: Recovery Looking "Well-Grounded" Going Forward


    By Brai Odion-Esene
    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MNI) - Federal Reserve Board Gov. Daniel Tarullo Wednesday night sounded bullish in his outlook for the U.S. economy the rest of this year, saying the Fed's aggressive actions have continued to play a major role.

    "Unconventional monetary policies have been critical in supporting the moderate recovery that we have had, which I think now is looking reasonably well-grounded going forward," he said during a question and answer question following a speech at the Levy Economic Institute's Hyman Minsky Conference.

    This is reflected in the "fairly large" expectations that growth is going to be picking up over the course of this year," he said.

    The U.S. economy is recovering at a modest pace, Tarullo said, and he argued that the policy pursued by the Fed "has been essential to ensure that moderate pace of recovery."

    At the same time, he acknowledged that the Fed's aggressive actions have not created "the kind of recovery that everybody would have preferred."

    Tarullo said the Fed's asset purchase program and its zero interest rate policies have had "a pretty demonstrable effect" on interest rate-sensitive sectors such as auto sales and the housing market.

    "In doing what we have done to try to affect longer term rates and not just short-term rates, I think we've actually facilitated a bunch of economic activity that would not have otherwise taken place," he added.

    The level of aggregate demand continues to be inadequate, he said, a fact that is highlighted by the "relatively low rates" of capital investments by businesses.

    This is because firms have decided that "the demand they expect does not justify the additional investment in capacity," Tarullo said.
  • In the Media | March 2014

    Did Hyman Minsky Find the Secret Behind Financial Crashes?


    By Duncan Weldon
    BBC News Magazine, March 23, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    American economist Hyman Minsky, who died in 1996, grew up during the Great Depression, an event which shaped his views and set him on a crusade to explain how it happened and how a repeat could be prevented, writes Duncan Weldon.

    Minsky spent his life on the margins of economics but his ideas suddenly gained currency with the 2007-08 financial crisis. To many, it seemed to offer one of the most plausible accounts of why it had happened.

    His long out-of-print books were suddenly in high demand with copies changing hands for hundreds of dollars - not bad for densely written tomes with titles like Stabilizing an Unstable Economy.

    Senior central bankers including current US Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen and the Bank of England's Mervyn King began quoting his insights. Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman named a high profile talk about the financial crisis The Night They Re-read Minsky.

    Here are five of his ideas.

    Stability is destabilising


    Minsky's main idea is so simple that it could fit on a T-shirt, with just three words: "Stability is destabilising."

    Most macroeconomists work with what they call "equilibrium models" - the idea is that a modern market economy is fundamentally stable. That is not to say nothing ever changes but it grows in a steady way.

    To generate an economic crisis or a sudden boom some sort of external shock has to occur - whether that be a rise in oil prices, a war or the invention of the internet.

    Minsky disagreed. He thought that the system itself could generate shocks through its own internal dynamics. He believed that during periods of economic stability, banks, firms and other economic agents become complacent.

    They assume that the good times will keep on going and begin to take ever greater risks in pursuit of profit. So the seeds of the next crisis are sown in the good time.

    Three stages of debt

    Minsky had a theory, the "financial instability hypothesis", arguing that lending goes through three distinct stages. He dubbed these the Hedge, the Speculative and the Ponzi stages, after financial fraudster Charles Ponzi.

    In the first stage, soon after a crisis, banks and borrowers are cautious. Loans are made in modest amounts and the borrower can afford to repay both the initial principal and the interest.

    As confidence rises banks begin to make loans in which the borrower can only afford to pay the interest. Usually this loan is against an asset which is rising in value. Finally, when the previous crisis is a distant memory, we reach the final stage - Ponzi finance. At this point banks make loans to firms and households that can afford to pay neither the interest nor the principal. Again this is underpinned by a belief that asset prices will rise.

    The easiest way to understand is to think of a typical mortgage. Hedge finance means a normal capital repayment loan, speculative finance is more akin to an interest-only loan and then Ponzi finance is something beyond even this. It is like getting a mortgage, making no payments at all for a few years and then hoping the value of the house has gone up enough that its sale can cover the initial loan and all the missed payments. You can see that the model is a pretty good description of the kind of lending that led to the financial crisis.

    Minsky moments

    The "Minsky moment", a term coined by later economists, is the moment when the whole house of cards falls down. Ponzi finance is underpinned by rising asset prices and when asset prices eventually start to fall then borrowers and banks realise there is debt in the system that can never be paid off. People rush to sell assets causing an even larger fall in prices.

    It is like the moment that a cartoon character runs off a cliff. They keep on running for a while, still believing they're on solid ground. But then there's a moment of sudden realisation - the Minsky moment - when they look down and see nothing but thin air. Then they plummet to the ground, and that's the crisis and crash of 2008.

    Finance matters

    Until fairly recently, most macroeconomists were not very interested in the finer details of the banking and financial system. They saw it as just an intermediary which moved money from savers to borrowers.
    This is rather like the way most people are not very interested in the finer details of plumbing when they're having a shower. As long as the pipes are working and the water is flowing there is no need to understand the detailed workings.

    To Minsky, banks were not just pipes but more like a pump - not just simple intermediaries moving money through the system but profit-making institutions, with an incentive to increase lending. This is part of the mechanism that makes economies unstable.

    Preferring words to maths and models

    Since World War Two, mainstream economics has become increasingly mathematical, based on formal models of how the economy works.

    To model things you need to make assumptions, and critics of mainstream economics argue that as the models and maths became more and more complex, the assumptions underpinning them became more and more divorced from reality. The models became an end in themselves.

    Although he trained in mathematics, Minsky preferred what economists call a narrative approach - he was about ideas expressed in words. Many of the greats from Adam Smith to John Maynard Keynes to Friedrich Hayek worked like this.

    While maths is more precise, words might allow you to express and engage with complex ideas that are tricky to model - things like uncertainty, irrationality, and exuberance. Minsky's fans say this contributed to a view of the economy that was far more "realistic" than that of mainstream economics.

    Analysis: Why Minsky Matters
     is broadcast on BBC Radio 4 at 20:30 GMT, 24 March 2014 or catch up on BBC iPlayer.
  • In the Media | March 2014

    The Jobs-Currency Connection in Greece


    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Huffington Post, March 25, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Negotiations between the Greek government and its international lenders were finally resolved last week, after seven long months. In January, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras made a celebratory announcement projecting a small, 2013 primary budget surplus of 1.5 billion euros. Also recently announced: European Union co-funding for a long-delayed 7.5 billion euro road construction project in 2014.

    Sounds good. No reason to suggest that Greece needs an extreme monetary makeover right now, is there? Yes, there is. Talk of a recovery isn't just premature, it reflects a complete fantasy. For starters, at today's rate of net job creation Greece won't reach a reasonable employment level for more than a decade. That's too long.

    An alternative domestic currency could be the basis for a solution. A parallel currency that was used to finance a government employment program would provide a relatively quick restoration of a lost standard of living to a large fraction Greece's population. We reached that conclusion at the Levy Institute after modeling multiple scenarios based on the narrow range of available options.

    Here's the context that makes such a radical move rational: The failures of the current strategy have been so great that even a total abandonment of austerity programs now would provide relief only at a very slow pace. A modest increase in government spending like the infrastructure project, while the right approach, isn't nearly powerful enough to fuel a turnaround; once it's finished the economy will contract again. And the primary surplus stems from conditions unlikely to be sustained: dramatic spending cuts, higher taxes, and a one-off return of earnings by European central banks on their holdings of Greek government bonds.

    Bank lending is down (by 3.9 percent), real interest is up to its highest rate since Greece joined the European Monetary Union (8.3 percent), and price deflation has set in. Unemployment just reached a new high of 24.9 percent for men, 32.2 percent for women, and a breathtaking 61.4 percent for youths. Even the shots at reducing the debt to GDP ratio, the foremost priority of Greece's creditors, have been spectacular misfires. It has risen from 125 percent at the crisis onset to 175 percent now.

    To repair Greece's position, numerous ideas have been floated for a currency that would function alongside the euro. Proposals have been termed everything from 'government IOUs' to 'tax anticipation notes' to 'new,' 'local,' or 'fiscal' currencies; most visibly, Thomas Mayer of Deutsche Bank coined (so to speak) 'geuros.' Some plans envisioned an orderly exit out of the euro. Most shared the perspective of the troika -- the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund -- that export-led growth through increased price competitiveness and lower wages is central to solving the problem.

    Our policy synthesis fundamentally differs from those views. We see Greece remaining in the Eurozone and initiating a parallel financial system that, most importantly, restores liquidity in the domestic market.

    Why not stress exports? Price elasticity in Greece's trade sector is low, our analysis shows, which explains why there hasn't been much evidence of success in export growth. Of course exports are important, but even China, with its gigantic export-guided economy, has recognized the need to increase and stabilize domestic demand.

    That should be the focus in Greece, too. We modeled a parallel financial system that would stimulate demand by financing an employment guarantee program known as an ELR; the government serves as the Employer of Last Resort. It would hire anyone able and willing to work to produce public goods. Wage levels would be low enough to make private employment more attractive, but high enough to ensure a decent living standard. The program would be financed by a government issue of a parallel currency... call it the geuro.

    Geuros would essentially be small denomination zero-coupon bonds: transferable instruments with no interest payment, no repayment of principal, and no redemption, that would be acceptable at par for tax payments. This kind of arrangement is well-known in public finance.

    The government would use the alternative currency to pay domestic debts, unemployment benefits, and a portion of wages for public employees. And it would demand that a share of taxes and social benefits be paid in geuros.

    Foreign trade would still require euros, which would remain in circulation, and Greece's private sector would still do business in euros. The currency would be convertible only in one direction, from euro to geuro.

    In our simulation, 550,000 jobs (and many more indirect ones, via a sensible fiscal multiplier) would be created at a net cost of 3.5b geuros per year. The infusion would contribute a 7 percent GDP increase, and there would still be a sizable euro surplus. As with any fiscal stimulus, the overall deficit would increase and there would be a deterioration in the balance of payments, although a manageable one.

    Restoring domestic demand needs to be Greece's economic policy emphasis. Despite any downsides, a parallel currency that supports an employment guarantee program would be a U-turn towards rebuilding the population's purchasing power -- and rebuilding Greece's ravished economy.

    This article originally appeared on EconoMonitor on March 24, 2014, under the title "The Currency/Jobs Connection in Greece."
  • In the Media | March 2014

    How Money Matters


    The Old Lady Fails to Get an "A"
    Credit Writedowns, March 21, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    One thing’s for sure: The financial crisis has dealt a deadly blow to what was until recently considered the state-of-the-art of monetary policy. Just compare the 1992 edition of Modern Money Mechanics, published by the Federal Bank of Chicago, with the articles and videos published this month by the Bank of England (BoE).

    The former publication explains that a bank’s excess reserves can be used to make loans, that prudent bankers “will not lend more than their excess reserves,” and that there is a “deposit expansion and contraction associated with a given change in bank reserves,” a.k.a. the money multiplier. Ultimately, “the total amount of reserves is controlled by the Federal Reserve.”

    In stark contrast to what was considered common knowledge twenty years ago, the BoE now considers the multiplier a mistaken belief. For the Bank of England, a “common misconception is that the central bank determines the quantity of loans and deposits in the economy by controlling the quantity of central bank money — the so-called ‘money multiplier’ approach.” Contrary to a widespread view, “neither are reserves a binding constraint on lending, nor does the central bank fix the amount of reserves that are available.” The BoE further explains: “Loans create deposits, not the other way around”; and bank reserves do not provide incentives for banks to lend “as the money multiplier mechanism would suggest.”

    The many professionals in the banking and finance industry who often have trouble with the way academics teach and discuss money and monetary policy will find the new view much closer to their operational experience. The few economists who have long rejected the “state-of-the-art” in their models, and refused to teach it in their classrooms, will feel vindicated. Those lagging behind had better adapt quickly to a changing paradigm, re-write their lecture notes, and avoid describing the stance of monetary policy with the position of a money supply function. For example, the Khan Academy’s course in banking includes several lectures based on the notion of the money multiplier. To serve its users well, the Khan Academy should largely revise those lectures or at least explain that they apply to a monetary system based on gold or some other fixed-rate system.

    The views expressed in the BoE publication do not come out of the blue. Several studies have recently challenged the notion of the money multiplier. The fact that this is now stated by a central bank marks good progress in the understanding of monetary operations, especially in light of conventional wisdom having inspired a number of erroneous interpretations during the banking and financial crisis.

    It is also a blow to the “Monetarist Keynesian” approach that continues to inspire mainstream macroeconomic models. In a video that is part of a 1980 series called “Free to Choose,” Milton Friedman explains the money multiplier in a fixed-rate monetary system (the gold standard) and argues that the same principle holds in the contemporary U.S. banking system. Friedman concludes that the Great Depression was caused by the U.S. Fed doing a very poor job, forcing the money multiplier to work its way downwards and effectively destroying the money supply. A former graduate student at MIT who had studied Friedman’s view of the Great Depression—named Ben Bernanke—has seemingly dealt with the 2007-08 crisis with one idea in mind: prevent the money supply contraction that caused the Great Depression. This was the theoretical foundation of Helicopter Ben’s QEs.

    For the Bank of England, now, there are two common misconceptions about Quantitative Easing: “that QE involves giving banks ‘free money’; and that the key aim of QE is to increase bank lending by providing more reserves to the banking system, as might be described by the money multiplier theory.” The BoE also explains how the amount of central bank money (banknotes and bank reserves) is fixed by the demand of its users and not by the central bank “as it is sometimes described in some economics textbooks.”

    And yet, more progress is desirable, and I would not mark the BoE paper with an A.

    For all those economists who feel they have been ahead of the curve on this matter, the Bank of England should make an additional effort, especially on two remaining issues.

    1. Why money is valuable to its holders

    In its account of money and monetary policy, the BoE asks the question: What makes an inconvertible piece of paper valuable? The BoE explains that money is an IOU issued by a single (monopolist) supplier rather than by a variety of individuals. Although a twenty-pound note is no longer convertible into gold, it is “worth twenty pounds precisely because everybody believes it will be accepted as a means of payment both today and in the future… And for everyone to believe that, it is important that money maintains its value over time and is difficult to counterfeit. It’s the central bank’s job to ensure that that is the case.”

    Economists have always had a hard time proving how confidence alone could suffice. Money historians dealing with “token money” (not redeemable in gold or silver) and those economists who are aware of the political foundation of money or who have read or heard Warren Mosler have a different answer. It is inaccurate to describe paper currency as an “unredeemable” asset whose value depends on users’ confidence. Paper money gives its holder a credit that is redeemable in a very concrete way, and it is so redeemed every time holders of money use currency to pay their liabilities to the government: taxes, sanctions, and fines. In fact, the national currency is the only means available for making such payments.

    The BoE remains silent on this point. Acknowledgement of this fact would entail accepting that the payment of taxes is made possible by government spending and not the other way around. It is tax payers, not governments, that can go broke!

    2. How powerful is monetary policy

    On this point, the BoE publication does not break much with the past, at the risk of making statements that clash with the rest of the paper.

    The BoE makes two accurate statements regarding central bank money (banknotes and bank reserves):

    1) it is not chosen or fixed by the central bank;

    2) it does not multiply up into loans and bank deposits.

    This would seem to imply that a central bank does not control the money supply. More accurately, as the ECB states on its website, “by virtue of its monopoly, a central bank is able to manage the liquidity situation in the money market and influence money market interest rates.”

    To the reader’s surprise, however, the BoE concludes that the central bank can:

    “influence the amount of money in the economy. It does so in normal times by setting monetary policy — through the interest rate that it pays on reserves held by commercial banks with the Bank of England. More recently, though, with Bank Rate constrained by the effective lower bound, the Bank of England’s asset purchase programme has sought to raise the quantity of broad money in circulation. This in turn affects the prices and quantities of a range of assets in the economy, including money.”

    For the BoE, changing interest rates is a powerful means to influence bank lending and thus the money supply and the overall economy. This view that interest rates trigger an effective “transmission mechanism” is one of the Great Faults in monetary management committed during the Great Recession.

    There are various channels through which interest rates influence demand, output, and the price level, yet none is empirically strong, and some work in different directions. Bank lending is primarily pro-cyclical, as a famous quote attributed to Mark Twain explains effectively (“A banker is a fellow who lends you his umbrella when the sun is shining, but wants it back the minute it begins to rain”), and the Global Crisis proved central banks to be powerless in trying to reverse this course. The reality is that the level of interest rates affects the economy mildly and in an ambiguous way. To state that monetary policy is powerful is an unsubstantiated claim.
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  • In the Media | January 2014

    The "Problem" of Unemployment


    Rania Antonopoulos
    Kathimerini, January 31, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    The responses to unemployment by the last three governments [in Greece] have been characterized by sloppy proposals and an insignificant amount of funds in relation to the size of the problem. Regardless of whether there were political considerations behind it (or not), the recent announcement of the Prime Minister highlights, unfortunately, a relentless continuation of lack of understanding of reality.

    The Prime Minister recently, on January 29, told us that unemployment is a "sneaky enemy" and proceeded to announce measures to tackle the problem. He also indicated that "we do not promise things we cannot do, and we say no to populism and fine words." The goal of the proposed measures, we heard, is to create 440,000 "work opportunities" of which 240,000 will target the unemployed 15–24 years of age, with no prior work experience. The announced measures totaling 1.4 billion Euro, will be financed by funds from the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), social funds from the EU, and are classified into three pillars.

    Specifically, the first pillar sets a target to recruit 114,000 unemployed for the private sector, an initiative that essentially subsidizes wages and social security contributions for businesses that hire unemployed who are up to 29 years old and some who are unemployed between the ages of 30 to 60 years of age. The second pillar concerns 240,000 young persons. This program will provide work experience and training for all unemployed up to 24 years old, who have no prior work experience. These unemployed, will also go to private companies for some time, or participate in vocational training centers (VTC) to improve their skills in order to find their first job, or both. The third pillar concentrates in hiring  90,000 unemployed from households who have no employed person, who will work in community service projects in the public sector and local government.

    Assuming that strict rules are in place, with dedicated control mechanisms that will guarantee nonreplacement of existing positions in the private and public sector (really, is there  a sufficient number of public sector inspectors for this task?), prima facie, it all sounds positive and leads to the conclusion that at last the Prime Minister himself has publicly accepted his responsibility towards the citizens that have been left without a job. But, appearances can be deceiving.

    Let's start with the obvious. If we divide the 1.4 billion euros with 440,000 job opportunities to be created in the next two years, we arrive at an average of 220,000, now unemployed, future employed per year, who will receive a total of 3,182 euros during one year. Namely, 265 euros per month. So these jobs offer underemployment, or starvation wages or both. Job opportunities? These interventions in reality provide employment for four to five months. Then what?

    But, also, there was nothing new proposed. The present government, on January 10, 2013 had presented us with a National Action Plan for Youth Employment.  The "Action Plan" consisted essentially of a compilation of already existing interventions, which, it should be noted, had already received miserably failing grades by ELIAMEP, through a study that they produced at the request of the National Bank of Greece. Mr. Samaras suggested the same and identical measures. If these “actions” have not worked in the past, why should we expect them to help now? This is important, because at this difficult hour it would be wise not to throw out the window EU funds. At the end, if the aim is to provide income support, let’s expand unemployment coverage, and not pretend we are creating jobs.

    But the essential problem is that the proposed action plan is based on the wrong diagnosis. First, its focus is on the young unemployed, and secondly, it mistakenly identifies the causes of youth unemployment in "employability"–namely, inthe absence of knowledge, experience, and seniority.

    Let's start with the second question first. The proposal carries a message that youth unemployment will fought through the acquisition and improvement of knowledge on the one hand (through VTC), and  practical experience in temporary jobs in private sector companies. Success should be evaluated by the ability of participants to find a permanent job after termination of participation in these programs. Do we then expect the young graduates to find a job? how many new jobs were announced in 2013? What has changed since 2008 is demand for labor due to the tremendous reduction of GDP and not the quality of the labor supply of young people. Unemployment has sky rocketed [from 7.7 to over 27%] due to austerity, lack of liquidity SMEs face, and the rapid, albeit legal, reduction of salaries and pensions. These are more or less commonly accepted facts. 2008 employees aged 15–24 included approximately 270,300 young aged workers, when in 2013 there were only 125,300 (a 145,000 reduction). Similarly, today the total number of unemployed people aged 15–24 is approximately 178,500—in 2008 there were 72,300 (an increase of 106,200). The numbers speak for themselves.

    Measures of "improving knowledge" will not do, not when our well-educated graduates migrate abroad massively.  These "solutions" are of European origin and are ineffective because the main problem we face is that the private sector has shrunk and this has produced a plummeting of demand of the existing workforce due to the depth and duration of the recession—the problem is not lack of quality and skills of the labor force.

    Let us now consider the first issue, the problem of youth unemployment. Indeed, the unemployment rate is very high among the youth and especially for 15–24 years, from 22.1% in 2008 to 57.2% today. But among the 1.3 billion unemployed (average of the first three quarter of 2013) the 1,186,000 are over 25 years old. According to the Hellenic Statistical Authority, all unemployed aged 15–24 amounted to 178,500. Recall that the second pillar consists of 240,000 unemployed young people aged up to 24 years! All the newcomers put together, among the 15–24 years of age, are less than 130.00. Even if we include new entrants ages 25–29, we reach 225,000 persons. The numbers are not consistent, at least not for the youth category of 15–24. Unless the same young person who participates one month in a training program and is then engaged in the private sector represents two “jobs.”

    The age targeted measures are ill conceived, as is the focus on employability. Most tragic of all is that long-term unemployed by now hits approximately 900,000 unemployed, of which 844,000 are not in the category of “youth.” Among them, 224,100 have been out of paid work for more than 48 months (4 years) and an additional 317.00 unemployed, for 24–47 months. For all these long-term unemployed, including those who have exhausted their resources and cannot pay even their electricity bill, for the 777, 000 unemployed who have a high school education level or lower, the announcement of Mr. Samaras highlights that there will be some lucky 200,000 young and more mature workers (440,000 minus 240, 000 people) that will be offered an “employment opportunity” for a few months out of a year in the private or public sector, receiving the meager earnings mentioned earlier.

    What must be urgently understood is that although the economy is now approaching the area of balancing the internal and external balance of payments and the pressure on further depressing the economy gradually slows down, this does not automatically lead to recovery. The economy can remain at frighteningly low production levels, high unemployment and income inequality of catastrophic dimensions. Recovery needs high and sustained private and public investment rates, and certainly gradual relief from the austerity measures. But let us remember that the decade before the crisis, with on average GDP growth about 4%, the economy created each year, on average, 55–60 thousand new jobs. Even if the growth rate returns to precrisis levels, at 4%, generating even 50–60 thousand new jobs per year, to reach the employment levels of 1998 to 2008 will be impossible in the near future; the figures for unemployment are so high, that the next decade will be 'lost', including for people sent to educational training centers.

    It is reasonable to ask, What can the poor government do when it has to deal with the Troika "requirements" of the one hand and the NSRF European Unon funds on the other, which are focused on these specific "actions"? Negotiate hard and convince their "partners" that the yardstick for introducing or maintaining conditionality measures, structural and otherwise, at this time is whether they increase unemployed or not; and  point out to other partners that these "actions" against unemployment are incompatible with the Greek reality—that the "Youth Guarantee" and the rest should be channeled to other types of interventions.

    The time has come to stop recycling the same distorted views. This crisis requires urgently a custom tailored Greek New Deal, which should last for at least the next three years. That is, the extension of a radically reorganized job guarantee program*, a community-based program of "koinofelis ergasia" not for five months but for 11 months per year, not for the 50,000–90,000 jobs for the unemployed but 440,000 real year-round jobs. As for what it will cost and where will we find the money, I reserve the right to provide relevant information next month through a study of the Levy Institute in cooperation with INE / GSEE [General Confederation of Trade Unions]. There is a solution, but it requires getting rid of current obsessions and to not follow the beaten track. Whether the political will of the current government to do so exists, is another matter.

    *The Levy Institute was instrumental in proposing a Job Guarantee policy for Greece, which was adopted by the Ministry of Labor in 2011, as a pilot program for 55,000 unemployed. It was rolled out in 2012 and was run through the NGO sector in collaboration with local and community governing bodies. For a background document that includes guidance notes on how best to design and implement such an initiative see http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=1458
  • In the Media | November 2013

    The U.S. Economy Needs an Exports-led Boost


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Reuters, November 26, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    A recent visit by President Obama to an Ohio steel mill underscored his promise to create 1 million manufacturing jobs. On the same day, Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker announced her department’s commitment to exports, saying “Trade must become a bigger part of the DNA of our economy.”

    These two impulses — to reinvigorate manufacturing and to emphasize exports — are, or should be, joined at the hip. The U.S. needs an export strategy led by research and development, and it needs it now. A serious federal commitment to R&D would help arrest the long-term decline in manufacturing, and return America to its preeminent and competitive positions in high tech. At the same time, increasing sales of these once-key exports abroad would improve our also-declining balance of trade.

    It’s the best shot the U.S. has to energize its weak economic recovery. R&D investment in products sold in foreign markets would yield a greater contribution to economic growth than any other feasible approach today. It would raise GDP, lower unemployment, and rehabilitate production operations in ways that would reverberate worldwide.

    The Obama administration is proud of the 2012 increase of 4.4 percent in overall exports over 2011. But that rise hasn’t provided a major jolt to employment and growth rates, because our net exports — that is, exports minus imports — are languishing. Significantly, the U.S. is losing ground in the job-rich arena of exported manufactured goods with high-technology content. Once the world leader, we’ve now been surpassed by Germany.

    America’s economic health won’t be strong while its trade deficit stands close to a problematically high 3 percent of GDP (and widening). Up until the Reagan administration, we ran trade surpluses. Then, manufacturing and net exports began to shrink almost in tandem.

    Our past performance proves that we have plenty of room to grow crucial manufacturing exports, and even eliminate the trade gap. The rehabilitation should begin with a national commitment to basic research, which in turn boosts private sector technology investment. The resulting rise in GDP would be an important counterbalance to a slightly higher federal deficit.

    Just-completed Levy Economics Institute simulations measured how a change in the target of government spending could influence its effectiveness. The best outcomes came about when funds were used to stoke innovation specifically in those export-oriented industries that might yield new products or cost-saving production techniques. When a relatively small stimulus was directed towards, for example, R&D at high tech manufacturing exporters, its effects multiplied. The gains were even better than the projections for a lift to badly needed infrastructure, which was also considered.

    Economists haven’t yet pinpointed a percentage figure that reflects the added value of R&D, but there’s a strong consensus that it is significant. Despite the riskiness of each research-inspired experiment, R&D overall has proven to be a safe bet. Government-supported research tends to be pure rather than applied, but, even so, when aimed to complement manufacturing advances, small doses have a good track record.

    Recognition that R&D outlays bring quantifiable returns partly explains why the federal National Income and Product Accounts have recently been altered to conform with international standards. NIPA will now treat R&D spending as a form of fixed investment. This will be a powerful tool to help reliably gauge its aftermath.

    Private sector-based innovation has also proved to be far more likely to occur when it is catalyzed by a high level of public finance. (For amazing examples, check out this just-released Science Coalition report.) Contractors spend more once government has kicked in; productivity rises and prices drop.

    The prospect of a worldwide positive-sum game is far more realistic than the “currency wars” dynamic so often raised by the media. Overseas buyers experience lower prices and the advantages of novel products. Domestic consumers, meanwhile, enjoy higher incomes and more employment, with some of the earnings spent on imports.

    An export-oriented approach faces multiple barriers. Anemic economies across the globe could spell insufficient demand. Another challenge lies in the small absolute size of the U.S. export sector.

    But the range of strategic policy options for the U.S. is limited. A rapid increase in research-based exports is the only way we see to simultaneously comply with today’s politically imposed budget restrictions and still promote strong job and GDP growth.

    Instead of stimulating tech-dependent producers, though, we’ve been allowing manufacturing to stagnate and competitiveness to erode. Public R&D spending as a percentage of GDP has dropped, and is scheduled for drastic cuts under the sequester.

    Sticking with the current plan means being caught up in weak growth and low employment for years. Jobs are being created at a snail’s pace, with falling unemployment rates largely a reflection of a shrinking workforce.

    For our R&D/export model, we posited a modest infusion of $160 billion per year — about 1 percent of GDP — until 2016. We saw unemployment fall to less than 5 percent by 2016, compared with CBO forecasts that unemployment will remain over 7 percent. Real GDP growth — instead of hovering around 3.5 percent, by CBO estimates, on the current path — gradually rose to near 5.5 percent by the end of the period.

    We need this boost. It’s urgent that we bring down joblessness and grow the economy. A change in fiscal policy biased towards R&D shows real promise as a viable way to help rescue the recovery.
  • In the Media | November 2013

    Yves Mersch: Intergenerational justice in times of sovereign debt crises


    Bank for International Settlements, November 11, 2013
    Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Minsky Conference in Greece, organised by the Levy Economics Institute, Athens, 8 November 2013.

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    The last time I gave a speech here in Athens was in early January 2008. How much the world has changed since then.
     
    Yet it has not always changed in the ways that observers predicted. I still remember clearly, in the early weeks of May 2010, the prophetic claims that Greece would leave the euro area within weeks, that other countries would follow within months, and that the collapse of the euro would be complete before the year was out.

    Those claims were wrong - and the Greek people have played an important part in proving them so.

    Since the loss of market access in early 2010, the Greek people have made extraordinary efforts to refute the naysayers and turn the economy around. They have executed a fiscal adjustment of historic proportions and embarked on the difficult road of structural reforms. The results of these actions have accrued first and foremost to Greece - but they have also accrued to the wider euro area.

    However, this turnaround is still only half complete. There is still much work to do. And what I would like to emphasise in my remarks today is that staying on the path of reform is essential not only for the citizens of today. It is also essential for those of tomorrow.

    Like all Western societies, and some rapidly ageing Eastern ones, Greece faces long-term fiscal challenges linked to high public debt levels and demographic developments. These challenges raise profound questions about intergenerational justice. And it is only through reforms that they can be answered in a fair way.

    For all ageing societies, this implies, first, ensuring sustainable public finances and, second, achieving stronger economic growth. Both are necessary because they are mutually reinforcing: fiscal sustainability creates the stability and confidence necessary for future growth; and higher growth creates the revenues and debt-to-GDP ratios necessary for fiscal sustainability.

    Let me therefore deal with each in turn, starting with what is being done to ensure fiscal sustainability in the context of intergenerational justice.

    Strengthening sustainability

    The fiscal challenges that Greece is facing today, while more severe than others, are not unique to this country. All Western societies are being confronted with difficult questions about the distribution of consolidation and spending between current and future generations.

    A first question is how the burden of high public debt levels in Western societies will be shared between generations. This question is particularly pertinent in the euro area because all countries are bound by law to start reducing their debts to below 60% of GDP - and average public debt levels in the euro area are currently in excess of 95% of GDP.

    If fiscal consolidation starts today, then the generation which has benefited most from this debt will play the largest role in reducing it. But if consolidation is delayed, then future generations will have to bear the burden of debt reduction - this would constitute a direct transfer from our children and grandchildren to ourselves.

    And it is only us who are taking the decision. Our children and grandchildren have no power to raise their objections.

    A second question with intergenerational consequences is how to spread the costs of demographic change. In the EU, it is projected that by 2060 there will be just two working-age people for every person over 65, compared with a ratio of 4:1 today. This means the weight of supporting an ageing population will rest on ever fewer shoulders.

    If current generations are proactive in reforming pension systems, they can reduce the load that the shrinking working age population will have to carry. But if they choose instead to preserve their entitlements, then they make the lives of future generations commensurately harder. They would be effectively sacrificing their descendants' quality of life for their own.

    In other words, all Western societies are facing choices about the distribution of responsibility. Do we, the current generation, take responsibility for the long-term fiscal challenges that we have played a large part in creating? Or do we delay and pass the consequences of our choices onto our children and grandchildren? I think it is fairly clear what a perspective of intergenerational justice would imply.

    This perspective is of course not new. The so-called "demographic time bomb" has been predictable for many years. Indeed, I pointed to this issue when I spoke here in Greece in early 2008. But what has changed today is the urgency for action. The crisis has meant that these difficult choices can no longer be delayed. One might say it has pressed the fast-forward button and brought the challenges of the future into the present.

    This is the broader context for the ongoing consolidation process in Greece. Certainly, it is about increasing spending control and tax collection. But it is also about putting Greece on a sustainable path for the future; limiting the load that is bequeathed to our descendants; and ensuring that those that created fiscal problems take responsibility for them.

    What Greece has achieved

    And indeed, this is what is happening in Greece today. The commitment the Greek people have shown to fiscal consolidation has been remarkable, even in international comparison.

    The primary deficit has declined by almost 10 percentage points of GDP between 2009 and 2012. Taking into account the deep and prolonged recession, the underlying fiscal adjustment has been even larger. The OECD estimates that structural adjustment was nearly 14 percentage points of GDP in this period.

    As Greece is one of the smaller euro area Member States, the scale of its efforts is not always appreciated appropriately. If the level of expenditure consolidation we have seen in Greece were applied in Germany, it would be equivalent to a permanent reduction in public spending of 174 billion euro. That is more than the total sum of social spending.

    Greece has also made important progress in addressing the long-term fiscal challenges linked to its ageing population. There is little doubt that before the crisis the Greek pension system was unsustainable. In the Commission's 2009 Ageing Report, age-related spending in Greece was projected to increase from 22% of GDP in 2007 to a staggering 38% of GDP in 2060. By contrast, the average for the euro area would be under 30% of GDP in 2060.

    But thanks to the pension reforms the authorities have introduced, the Greek system is now comparable to others. In the 2012 Ageing Report, age-related spending in Greece was projected to increase to just under 30% of GDP in 2060 - so around than 8 percentage points lower than the previous estimate. This is almost identical to the euro area average. If we take into account as well the recently legislated increase in the pension age, Greece may even be ahead of others.

    In short, the Greek people have taken vital measures to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. This will reduce the burden that will be passed to future generations. And I recognise that in doing so, current generations have made considerable sacrifices. Real earnings have fallen by over 20% between 2009 and 2012, undoing the gains made since adopting the euro. Far too many people are currently without work, with unemployment at over 27% and youth unemployment reaching 57%. For so much potential to be lying idle is a tragedy.

    What remains to be done

    Nevertheless, this is the painful cost of reversing the misguided economic policies and lack of reforms in the past. And fiscal sustainability - and hence intergenerational justice - is not yet assured. While the government appears to be on track to meet its 2013 primary balance target, Greece still has some way to go to reach the primary surplus targets of 1.5% of GDP in 2014, 3% of GDP in 2015 and 4.5% of GDP in 2016. This means that fiscal consolidation has to continue.

    Based on current projections, a fiscal gap has emerged for 2014. It comes mainly from delayed gains from the tax administration reform, shortfalls in the collection of social security contributions and the continuing underperformance of the instalment schemes for outstanding tax obligations. Measures will have to be identified to close it.

    Looking forward, failure by the authorities to proceed with tax administration reform and to accelerate the fight against tax evasion will unavoidably widen the fiscal gap - and imply the need for higher savings on the expenditure side. This simple truth should provide sufficient incentives for stepping up the pace of tax administration reform.

    To put tax collection in Greece in context, according to the most recent OECD data, the tax debt in Greece as a share of annual net tax revenue was almost 90% in 2010, compared with an OECD average of under 14%. Fighting tax evasion now is therefore key to enhancing social fairness - both on an intra-generational and an inter-generational basis.

    To this effect, the recently legislated semi-autonomous tax agency will need to become fully operational and be shielded from political interference.

    Beyond that, accelerating the implementation of public administration reform is key to the success of the wider reform agenda. Significant delays have occurred in finalising staffing plans and transferring employees to the new mobility scheme, and this is slowing down the identification of redundant positions and the necessary modernisation of the public sector.

    Of course, consolidation would be made easier by higher rates of growth. But we should not treat growth as an exogenous variable. On the contrary, it depends critically on the decisions of the Greek authorities - namely on their willingness to implement the growth-enhancing measures in the programme. The relatively closed and rigid nature of the Greek economy is both a challenge and an opportunity: it makes the process of reform harder, but it also means that the potential for reforms to raise growth is commensurately greater.

    Let me therefore turn to the subject of growth, which forms the second part of my remarks today.

    Strengthening growth

    The economic situation in Greece has started to pick up this year, with the economy stabilising and seasonally-adjusted real GDP increasing by 0.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q2 2013. Overall, GDP growth is expected to turn positive next year at 0.6%.

    But while these are welcome developments, they still represent a relatively weak recovery, especially given the depth of the recession that preceded it. In my view, to add momentum to this recovery and lay the foundations for medium-term growth, the authorities need to address three challenges. First, increasing the economy's external competitiveness; second, ensuring the banking sector can fund the recovery; and third, attracting productive foreign investment.

    Increasing external competitiveness

    As Greece is undergoing a simultaneous deleveraging in its public and private sectors, sectoral accounting tells us that its external sector must go into surplus. The key for growth is to ensure that this happens as much as possible through higher exports rather than import compression. The best way Greece can achieve this is by improving its price competitiveness.

    Price competitiveness is particularly important for Greek firms as their exports are largely concentrated in low-tech products. At the end of the last decade, high-tech or intermediate-tech products represented only 28% of total exports, compared to nearly 50% for the EU average. Yet since euro entry price competitiveness in Greece has actually been on a worsening trend. According to the Commission, the real effective exchange rate (on an HICP basis) in Greece was still rising until 2011.

    To facilitate an export-led recovery, this trend has to be corrected and there is no way this can be achieved in the short run other than by adjusting prices and costs. I know the difficulties that such adjustment creates and the criticisms that are levelled against it. But we are in a monetary union and this is how adjustment works. Sharing a currency brings considerable microeconomic benefits but it requires that relative prices can adjust to offset shocks.

    This process has already begun in Greece today. Thorough labour market reforms have reduced labour costs significantly. costs have now fallen by around by 18% since 2009, with wage adjustment being the main driver of that fall. Indeed, compensation per employee has fallen by about 20% in this period.

    But the translation of cost competitiveness gains into prices has been too slow - notwithstanding the encouraging recent trend of disinflation. This is largely because reforms in product markets have not kept pace with those in labour markets. And this not only limits the potential for the external sector to generate growth, but also lowers citizens' real incomes.

    Speeding up the pace of product market reforms is therefore a priority. The authorities have introduced several recent reforms, for example removing barriers to entry in transportation services, repealing restrictions in the retail sector and removing mandatory recourse to services for a number of regulated professions. However, as of today product market regulations are still among the most restrictive in Europe. Further reform will help remove unjustified privileges and the related excess profits, and by helping prices adjust, this will in turn strengthen social fairness.

    Funding the recovery

    While product market reforms are an essential part of building a more competitive economy, their ability to generate growth depends also on other developments - in particular, the condition of the banking sector.

    If banks do not make new loans, this impedes the entry of new players into liberalised sectors, which then reduces competitive pressures and price adjustments. And if banks do not write off loans to insolvent debtors, in particular "zombie" companies, this slows down the necessary reallocation of resources toward exports and higher-productivity sectors.

    In other words, cleaning up bank balance sheets and ensuring a well-functioning bank lending channel is an equally important part of the adjustment process. This is the second challenge for growth.

    The authorities in Greece have taken important steps to preserve the stability of the banking sector. The recapitalisation of the four core banks was completed in June 2013, while the consolidation of the banking sector has continued through the resolution of non-viable banks and the absorption of Greek subsidiaries of foreign banks. Deposit inflows have continued, in part offsetting the deposits lost between the end of 2009 and the middle of 2012.

    But despite these improvements, credit growth to the private sector remains very weak, in particular for the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that make up about 60% of business turnover in Greece. The last ECB survey on SME financing showed that 31% of SMEs had applications for bank loans rejected, well above the euro area average of 11%. Moreover, the sectoral allocation of credits has not substantially shifted towards export-oriented sectors since 2010, suggesting that banks are not facilitating internal rebalancing.

    To some extent, these developments are cyclical: the weak economic environment means banks are attaching higher credit risk to SMEs. But there is also a more structural explanation. Non-performing loans (NPLs) increased from 16% at the end of 2011 to 29% of total loans in the first quarter of 2013. This is acting as a barrier to new lending to higher- growth sectors.

    Unfortunately, this problem is in part being created by government policy. The ongoing moratorium on auctioning the properties of debtors in default has slowed down resolution of NPLs and balance sheet restructuring. Moreover, suggestions by policy-makers about horizontal debt relief for bank debtors are leading to a steep rise in strategic defaults, with banks estimating that 25% of NPLs in the mortgage and SME sectors are now strategic.

    This deterioration in the payment culture, even if it helps individuals on a micro level, is deeply damaging to the economy as a whole. If it continues, it will ultimately lead to higher costs for banks, new recapitalisation needs and further constrictions in bank lending. In my view, to restart lending to the real economy, this self-fulfilling cycle must be broken.

    I welcome the fact that the Greek authorities have established an inter-agency working group to identify ways to improve the effectiveness of debt resolution processes. Its priority should be to establish a time-bound framework to facilitate the settlement of borrower arrears using standardised protocols. This would help to remove expectations about future debt relief, and as such, remove the debilitating moral hazard this is creating.

    Otherwise, the ultimate result would be that excessively high risk premia become structural and choke off investment and job creation - thus punishing the whole of society for the actions of those in strategic default.

    Attracting productive foreign investment

    The third challenge for growth is to attract higher foreign investment. This is important to add momentum to the recovery in the short term, while also increasing the capital and knowledge base of the Greek economy over the medium term. Indeed, before the crisis, investment in knowledge-based capital in Greece was among the lowest in the euro area.

    From the available signals, there seems to be significant investor interest in Greece. While total investment in Greece has fallen by around 43% from 2008-2012, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have recently been positive, driven largely by investment in the banking sector. But anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign interest in the real economy is also growing, with several multinational companies announcing plans to increase their output at Greek units in the coming years. To maximise such investments, I see three actions as key.

    First, the authorities need to redouble their efforts to improve the business environment. Product and labour market flexibility is certainly a part of this, but there is also a wider challenge related to reducing bureaucracy, red tape and corruption. Progress has been made in these areas but Greece still ranks second to last among euro area countries on the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index.

    Second, foreign investment would naturally rise if privatisation were increased. In 2012 only 0.1 billion euro was derived from privatisation receipts, instead of the 3.6 billion euro originally forecast. Yet the example of the Port of Piraeus shows what well-targeted privatisation can achieve. Since the transfer of management of part of the port to the company COSCO in 2009, container traffic has tripled and its market share in the Mediterranean has risen from 2% to 6%.

    Third, it is crucial for foreign investors that uncertainty about Greece's medium-term outlook is dispelled. The greatest source of such uncertainty in the past was persistent questions about Greece's place in the euro area, but thanks to the joint efforts at the European and national levels, this seems to have significantly declined over the last year. The main source of uncertainty today is the continued commitment of the authorities to the programme. I therefore trust that the authorities will do everything possible to remove such doubts.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Greece has made tremendous progress in recent years to close its fiscal deficit. By any standards, what has been achieved is remarkable.

    But the process of restoring sustainability and growth in Greece is not yet complete - and neither is the progress so far secured. If the authorities fail to address the remaining challenges, they will put at risk what has already been achieved.

    In other words, Greece today stands at a crossroads.

    In the one direction lies the path of difficult choices. This is the steep and thorny way, and it requires great commitment to negotiate, but it is the one that will lead to a reformed state, a sustainable economy and justice between generations.

    In the other direction lies the path of easy answers. This path is littered with false alternatives, such as recurrent proposals for debt restructuring.

    To some, debt restructuring or larger haircuts on government bonds may seem politically attractive. But such practices can only be a last resort. They are by no means a sustainable option to ease a government's financial obligations. They would not help to promote fiscal discipline and could create higher costs in the long run. And they would do nothing to address the fundamental weaknesses in the Greek economy.

    In short, the path of easy answers leads to stagnation, decline and an over-burdening of the young and future generations.

    From what I see today, I trust that the Greek people know which path they need to take. A recent poll shows that 69% of the public supports the euro - and being part of the euro means taking tough but necessary decisions.

    Responsible choices and reliability are the preconditions for solidarity. Greece has already received support from other euro area countries equivalent to 17,000 euro per Greek citizen. And, provided that it complies with the programme, those countries are committed to supporting Greece until it regains market access.

    In short, all the conditions are present for Greece to return to prosperity - and for the sake of both current and future generations, I trust that Greece will make the most of them.

  • In the Media | November 2013

    ECB Mersch: Greece Has Taken Vital Measures, Still More to Do


    By Martin Baccardax
    MNI News, November 8, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    FRANKFURT (MNI) - European Central Bank Executive Board member Yves Mersch praised the efforts of Greece's government to tackle its structural and fiscal reforms but said there was much left to be done in order to ensure a lasting recovery for the struggling economy.

    In prepared remarks for a speech at the Minsky Conference in Athens organised by the Levy Economics Institute, Mersch urged the continued efforts of the Greek government to tackle tax evasion, attract foreign investment and increase internal competitiveness.

    "The Greek people have taken vital measures to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. This will reduce the burden that will be passed to future generations," Mersch said "And I recognise that in doing so, current generations have made considerable sacrifices."

    "Nevertheless, this is the painful cost of reversing the misguided economic policies and lack of reforms in the past. And fiscal sustainability - and hence intergenerational justice - is not yet assured," he added. "While the government appears to be on track to meet its 2013 primary balance target, Greece still has some way to go to reach the primary surplus targets of 1.5% of GDP in 2014, 3% of GDP in 2015 and 4.5% of GDP in 2016. This means that fiscal consolidation has to continue."

  • In the Media | November 2013

    Mersch: Greece Debt Restructuring, Haircuts on Govt Bonds "Only Last Resort"


    Matina Stevis
    The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    ATHENS—Further haircuts on Greek government debt should only be "the last resort" in the country's efforts at an economic turn-around, European Central Bank Executive Board member Yves Mersch said Friday.

    Speaking at a conference here in Athens, organized by the Levy Institute of Bard College, Mr. Mersch cautioned that "Greece today stands at a crossroads."

    Hard-earned reforms towards a sustainable economy is one way, "easy answers" the other, he said.

    Greece's privately-held debt was restructured in May 2012 in the biggest debt restructuring in history. Most of its debt is now held by euro-zone governments and the International Monetary Fund, which have been keeping the country afloat since 2010 through bailouts worth a total of some EUR240 billion.

    The IMF has called on euro-zone governments to accept losses on their loans to Greece in a form of debt forgiveness, in order to ease the debt burden on the country and give it breathing room to grow. Greece's economy has lost about one-quarter of its output since 2008.

    But euro-zone leaders have rejected the idea, noting that the terms of the bailout loans to Greece are very favorable, with an interest rate near the refinancing cost of the loans and maturities that stretch out over the next three decades.

    Mr. Mersch said debt forgiveness wouldn't "help promote fiscal discipline and could create higher costs in the long run."

    A haircut on Greece's debt would "do nothing to address the fundamental weakness in the Greek economy," Mr. Mersch added.

    A delegation from the troika of institutions overseeing Greece's bailout--the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission--is currently in Athens conducting a review of its progress. The mission had been suspended in September and has been fraught with disagreements over fresh austerity measures in the 2014 budget, as well as the speed at which the Greek government is implementing structural reforms.

    Greece can only hope to get a fresh slice from its aid package if the review is successfully completed and euro-zone finance ministers approve a new disbursement. The earliest this might happen, given the delays in the review, is December.
  • In the Media | November 2013

    Europe's Deflation Paradox


    By Jörg Bibow
    Investors Chronicle, November 4, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The news that euro area inflation fell to a four-year low of 0.7 per cent last month raises a paradox.

    On the one hand, it’s widely agreed that such a rate is, as Societe Generale’s Michala Marcussen says, “uncomfortably low”. This is because it poses the risk of deflation - falling prices. And this could be a big problem. It would tighten monetary policy because falling prices mean a higher real interest rate. And if consumers expect deflation to last, they might postpone spending in the hope of picking up bargains later, and in doing so kill off the fragile recovery. Many economists therefore expect the ECB to react by cutting interest rates, possibly as soon as this week.

    However, for the most stricken countries in the euro area, deflation is supposed to be a solution, not a problem. The reason for this is simple. The euro area’s crisis was due in large part to current account imbalances within the region, with the south borrowing heavily from the north. These occurred because southern economies lost price competitiveness against the north and so sucked in imports whilst exports faltered. For example, between 2000 and 2010 Germany’s relative unit labour costs fell by 11.7 per cent, whilst Portugal’s rose by 9.2 per cent and Greece’s by 22.5 per cent. As Jorg Bibow of New York’s Levy Economics Institute put it: “At the heart of today’s euro debt crisis is an intra-area balance of payments crisis caused by seriously unbalanced intra-area competitiveness positions.”

    The official solution to these imbalances is for the south to cut wages relative to the north to restore competitiveness. The IMF is calling on Portugal to “reduce production costs” and Greece to use “wage adjustment” (a euphemism for cuts) to close the “competitiveness gap” with Germany. And – thanks to mass unemployment - they are doing just this. David Owen at Jefferies Fixed Income points out that hourly labour costs are falling in Greece and Portugal. And falling wages mean falling prices. In September, Greek consumer price inflation was minus one per cent, Portugal’s was 0.3 per cent and Spain’s 0.5 per cent.

    This poses the question. How can deflation be a danger for the euro area as a whole, when it is supposed to be a solution for the south?

    One could argue that the export and import sectors are a bigger fraction of GDP in individual countries than they are for the eurozone as a whole, and so improved competitiveness would do more to boost growth in Greece or Portugal than it would for the euro area as a whole. And one might add that investment is more sensitive to costs within the eurozone than it is between the eurozone and rest of the world, and so improved competitiveness would do more to attract inward investment into Greece or Portugal than it would into the euro area.

    These, though, aren’t the whole story. As I argue elsewhere, it’s not at all certain that falling wages will be sufficient to turn around Greece and Portugal.

    Instead, this paradox highlights a flaw within the euro area - that it contains a bias towards unemployment and deflation. In theory, Greek and Portuguese competitiveness could be improved not just by wage cuts there but by inflation (and higher demand) in the north. But this isn’t happening. Yes, German wages are rising. But only slowly. And it is still running a big external surplus which is, as the US Treasury recently said, creating “a deflationary bias for the euro area.” In this sense, low inflation in the euro area isn’t merely a problem in itself, but is a symptom of a deeper structural malaise.
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  • In the Media | October 2013

    Focus on Greece: Optimists Reap Dividends in Return for Their Faith


    Reforms Are Beginning to Bite and to Stimulate a Broad Economic Recovery
    By Catherine Bolger

    The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2013. All Rights Reserved.


    Investing in Greece has been highly profitable for a number of foreign investors, and they're going back for more. Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou comments on the outlook for long-term investment.

  • In the Media | October 2013

    Fitch Ratings Warns U.S. on Credit Rating


    Tim Mullaney
    USA Today, October 16, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Fitch Ratings took a step toward cutting the U.S. government's AAA debt rating Tuesday, as the clock ticked toward the Thursday deadline to raise the nation's debt ceiling or risk default.

    Chicago-based Fitch, the third-largest of the major debt-rating companies behind Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investors Service, put U.S. Treasury bonds on Rating Watch Negative, which is sometimes but not always a first step before a downgrade. Fitch said in a statement that it still thinks the debt ceiling will be raised in time to prevent a default.
      Fitch said the government would have only limited capacity to make payments on the $16.7 trillion national debt after Treasury Department's emergency measures run out Thursday.

    Some Republicans have advocated Treasury make debt service payments before paying day-to-day bills, but Fitch said that may not be legal or technologically possible. Even Treasury could do that, a failure to act would still leave the U.S. missing payments for Social Security and payments to government contractors, Fitch said.

    "All of (these) would damage the perception of U.S. sovereign creditworthiness and the economy,'' Fitch said in a statement. "The prolonged negotiations over raising the debt ceiling ... risks undermining confidence in the role of the U.S. dollar as the preeminent global reserve currency, by casting doubt over the full faith and credit of the U.S. This `faith' is a key reason why the U.S. 'AAA' rating can tolerate a substantially higher level of public debt than other AAA" bonds.

    Fitch said it could make a decision on whether to lower its AAA rating on U.S. debt by the end of the first quarter.

    "The announcement reflects the urgency with which Congress should act to remove the threat of default hanging over the economy," the Treasury Department said in response.

    One money manager quickly backed Fitch's action, which affects all U.S. bonds.

    "This action by Fitch is not about ability to pay,'' said Cumberland Advisors chief investment officer David Kotok. "It is about governance and our willingness to pay. In that category the United States has reached the brink of political failure.'' Economists have warned that there are two main ways failing to raise the debt ceiling could hurt the economy.

    One is by causing chaos in financial markets, forcing stock prices lower and freezing credit to many borrowers. The other is by forcing the government to cut spending by as much as $130 billion over as little as six weeks to avoid borrowing more, Moody's Analytics estimated last week.

    A study Tuesday by Bard College estimated that a rapid-fire balanced budget scenario would cause the U.S. economy to shrink by almost 3% in 2014 and the unemployment rate to surge to more than 9.5%.

    That is before accounting for the chance that a failure to raise the debt ceiling will push U.S. trading partners into recession, the Bard study says.

    "A recession in the United States would certainly exert a negative influence on growth in the rest of the world, which would in turn feed back to the States," Bard economist Michalis Nikiforos said.

    Moody's says it has no plans to change its Aaa rating on U.S. debt.

    Political brinksmanship was a key reason for S&P's downgrade of the U.S. to AA+ from AAA in 2011, the last time Washington flirted with refusing to raise the debt ceiling. The lack of an agreement on the debt limit this week would not necessarily trigger another S&P downgrade, spokesman John Piecuch said.

    "Passing (Oct.) 17th is not a specific trigger," Piecuch said.

    If the U.S. missed a debt payment, however, its rating would be lowered to selective default, he added.

    Contributing: John Waggoner, Adam Shell and David M. Jackson 
  • In the Media | October 2013

    Fundamentos da economia estão razoáveis, diz diretor do FMI


    Agência Brasil
    DCI, 26 Setembro 2013. © 2013 DCI - Diário Comércio Indústria & Serviços. Todos os direitos reservados.

    RIO DE JANEIRO - Batista citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial...

    RIO DE JANEIRO - O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse nesta quinta-feira (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Der Prophet der Instabilität


    Mark Dittli
    Finanz und Wirtschaft, September 30, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Hyman Minsky erkannte die Gefahr exzessiver Kreditschöpfung durch die Banken. Er hielt es für eine Torheit der Ökonomie, den Finanzsektor zu ignorieren.


    Man stelle sich vor: eine Mischung aus John Maynard Keynes und Joseph Schumpeter, mit einem Schuss Hayek. Das Resultat ist einer der wichtigsten Ökonomen des vergangenen Jahrhunderts, der bis heute in der breiten Öffentlichkeit kaum bekannt ist: Hyman Minsky (1919–1996).

    In den Jahren seit dem Ausbruch der Finanzkrise ist der Name des Amerikaners wieder in der ökonomischen Debatte ­aufgetaucht; als «Minsky Moment» wurde die verhängnisvolle Periode im August 2007 bezeichnet, als das Finanzsystem ­begann, aus den Fugen zu geraten. Angesichts der heutigen Renaissance Minskys geht leicht vergessen, dass er während ­seiner akademischen Karriere ein Randdasein fristete, kaum ernst genommen in der Mainstream-Ökonomie.

    Das war ein folgenschwerer Fehler. ­Hyman Minsky befasste sich als Ökonomieprofessor mit dem Finanzsektor und der Rolle, die dieser in der Realwirtschaft spielt. Er zeigte, dass das Finanzsystem ­inhärent instabil ist, zu Übertreibungen und Krisen neigt. Wer seine hauptsächlich in den Siebziger- und Achtzigerjahren verfassten Schriften liest, findet erschreckend präzise Parallelen zu den Ereignissen von 2007 und danach. Lebte Minsky heute noch, könnte er zu Recht ein «Ich habe es ja gesagt» in die Runde werfen.

    Der wahre Keynes

    Hyman Philip Minsky, 1919 als Sohn jüdischer weissrussischer Immigranten in Chicago geboren, studierte Mathematik und Ökonomie an der University of Chicago. Master- und Doktortitel in Ökonomie erlangte er an der Harvard University, sein Doktorvater war Joseph Schumpeter. Nach dem Studium folgten Lehraufträge an der Brown University sowie in Berkeley. 1965 übernahm Minsky einen Lehrstuhl an der Washington University in St. Louis, den er bis 1990 behielt. Danach forschte er weitere sechs Jahre bis zu seinem Tod am Levy Economics Institute.

    Auf einen simplen Satz reduziert war der Kern von Minskys Lehre die Suche nach dem wahren Keynesianismus. Hierzu ein kurzer Exkurs: John M. Keynes löste 1936 mit der «General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money» in der Volkswirtschaftslehre eine Revolution aus. Das Werk war jedoch in vielen Belangen bruchstückhaft, und Keynes hatte die Absicht, auf etliche Aspekte näher einzugehen. 1937 erlitt er jedoch einen Herzinfarkt und konnte mehrere Jahre kaum arbeiten. Später absorbierten ihn der Weltkrieg und seine Arbeit an der Konzeption des Bretton-Woods-Systems. 1946 starb Keynes; er kam nicht mehr dazu, die General Theory zu verfeinern. Das Werk blieb eine Art Bibel, deren Interpretation anderen überlassen war.

    Diesen Part übernahmen John Hicks und später Alvin Hansen sowie Paul Samuelson. Sie erschufen auf Basis der General Theory die sogenannte neoklassische Synthese, die Lehrbuchökonomie, die ab den Fünfzigerjahren zum Mainstream wurde.

    Grundannahme der neoklassischen Synthese ist das Equilibriumsmodell, das besagt, dass die Wirtschaft stets ein Gleichgewicht sucht.

    «Die populäre, mathematisch hergeleitete Modellierung der General Theory, besonders in der Gestalt des IS/LM-Modells von Hicks (...), tut sowohl dem Geist als auch dem Gehalt von Keynes’ Werk Gewalt an.»

    Herzstück der Hicks’schen Interpretation der General Theory war das IS/LM-Modell, das den Markt für Güter und den Markt für Geld im Gleichgewicht darstellt. In diesem Modell ist Geld eine neutrale Grösse, es entsteht exogen, durch die Entscheide der Zentralbank. Der Finanzsektor wird daher weitgehend ausgeblendet respektive als irrelevant betrachtet. Das Finanzsystem ist nichts anderes als ein Mechanismus, um Geld von Sparern zu Investoren zu transferieren.

    Vom Wesen der Ungewissheit

    Minsky sah in der neoklassischen Synthese eine Perversion von Keynes’ Lehre. «Die mathematisch hergeleitete Modellierung der General Theory transformierte Keynes’ Theorie in ein das Gleichgewicht suchendes System», schrieb er: «Sie tut ­sowohl dem Geist wie auch dem Gehalt von Keynes’ Werk Gewalt an.» Die Ausblendung des Finanzsektors hielt er für eine absurde Abstraktion der Realität.

    Minsky verstand sich sehr wohl als Keynesianer, aber für ihn lag der Schlüssel in der Interpretation der General Theory in deren Kapitel 12. Dieses befasst sich mit der Rolle der Spekulation an den Märkten, mit Massenpsychologie und Herdentrieb. In ihrer Versessenheit auf mathematische Modelle hätten Hicks und seine Nachfolger vergessen, wie wichtig für Keynes der ­Begriff der Ungewissheit war und was diese für die Entscheidungsfindung von Investoren bedeute, warnte er.

    Schon in den späten Fünfzigerjahren prophezeite Minsky, die populäre Auslegung des «Keynesianismus» werde zu Inflation und finanzieller Instabilität führen. Zwanzig Jahre später sollte sich die Warnung bewahrheiten.

    1975, mittlerweile war der populäre Keynesianismus angesichts steigender ­Inflationsraten diskreditiert, publizierte Minsky sein erstes grosses Werk mit dem Titel «John Maynard Keynes». Er sah es als Versuch, die wahre Substanz der General Theory, die Rolle der Finanzbeziehungen in einem fortgeschrittenen kapitalistischen System, ans Licht zu bringen. Die Mainstream-Ökonomie hatte den Finanzsektor wegrationalisiert: Minsky setzte ihn ins Zentrum seiner Arbeit.

    1986 legte er mit seinem zweiten Werk, «Stabilizing an Unstable Economy», nach. Darin formulierte er seine Hypothese der finanziellen Instabilität, die zu seinem Hauptvermächtnis werden sollte.

    «Ein komplexes Finanzsystem wie das unsere generiert destabilisierende Kräfte. Depressionen sind natürliche Konsequenz des ungehinderten Kapitalismus (...). Das Finanzsystem kann nicht dem freien Markt überlassen werden.»

    Nach Minsky – in diesem Punkt folgt er Schumpeter – ist das kapitalistische ­System nicht stabil. Es findet kein Equilibrium; das Gleichgewicht ist bloss eine Station auf dem Weg von einem Ungleichgewicht ins nächste. Der Grund dafür liegt im Verhalten der Marktakteure: Gefühlte Stabilität in der Gegenwart verleitet sie dazu, immer risikofreudiger zu werden – was den Grundstein für die nächste Krise legt. «Stabilität führt zu Instabilität», beschrieb Minsky sein Paradoxon.
    Die zentrale Rolle in diesem Prozess spielt der Finanzsektor. Nach Minsky – und Schumpeter – entsteht Geld nicht exogen, sondern endogen, innerhalb des Wirtschaftssystems, «aus dem Nichts», durch die Kreditschöpfung der Banken. Diese befeuert den Gang der Wirtschaft und treibt die Spekulation an.

    Minsky unterschied zwischen drei Zuständen in der Finanzierungsstruktur von Unternehmen oder Personen: Abgesichert («Hedge»), Spekulativ und Ponzi. Im ersten Stadium erwirtschaften die Schuldner aus ihrer Arbeit genügend Cashflow, um die Zinslast zu bedienen und die Schulden allmählich abzuzahlen. Im zweiten Stadium reicht der Cashflow nur zur Bedienung der Zinsen, aber nicht zur Amortisation der Schuld. Ein spekulativer Schuldner ist darauf angewiesen, dass er seine Kredite am Fälligkeitstermin durch neue ablösen kann. Das letzte Stadium im ­Zyklus nannte Minsky Ponzi, nach dem Hochstapler Charles Ponzi, der in den Zwanzigerjahren mit einem Pyramidensystem 15 Mio. $ ergaunert hatte. In diesem Stadium reicht der erarbeitete Cashflow des Schuldners nicht einmal mehr, um die Zinsen zu bedienen. Um über Wasser zu bleiben, muss er darauf zählen, dass sich der Wert der Anlagen in seiner Bilanz laufend erhöht.

    Mit diesem Modell erklärt sich das Minsky-Paradoxon, wonach Stabilität zu Instabilität führt: In einer gesunden Wirtschaft sind die meisten Kredite an abgesicherte Schuldner verliehen. In der gefühlten Stabilität werden diese jedoch risikofreudiger und nehmen immer mehr Schulden auf, um verheissungsvolle Investitionsprojekte zu realisieren. Die Banken agieren in dieser Phase nicht als Korrektiv, sondern ­legen ihre Risikoscheu ebenfalls ab und vergeben immer freimütiger Kredit. Der Kreislauf treibt sich in die Höhe, bis die Wirtschaft aus zahlreichen spekulativen oder Ponzi-Schuldnern besteht – und höchst fragil geworden ist.

    Die Bändigung des Biestes

    Irgendwann kippt dann die Stimmung. Schlagartig können sich Schuldner nicht mehr refinanzieren, die Banken frieren die Kreditvergabe ein, die Preise von Vermögenswerten geraten ins Rutschen, Notverkäufe beschleunigen den Prozess. Die deflationäre Schuldenliquidation beginnt.

    Für den Ausbruch der Krise ist kein exogener Schock nötig. «Instabilität entsteht durch die Mechanismen innerhalb des Systems, nicht ausserhalb», schrieb Minsky, «unsere Wirtschaft ist nicht instabil, weil sie durch den Ölpreis oder Kriege geschockt wird. Sie ist instabil, weil das in ihrer Natur liegt.» In beiden Extremen des Ungleichgewichts, im Spekulationsboom wie in der deflationären Schuldenliquidation, entsteht kein Korrektiv: Der Boom nährt sich selbst, genauso wie sich die Wirtschaft in der Depression immer weiter in die Tiefe schraubt.

    Minsky sah nur eine Möglichkeit, das Biest zu bändigen. In den extremen Phasen des Ungleichgewichts muss der Staat einspringen. In der Depression bedeutet das fiskal- und geldpolitische Stützung, um die selbstzerstörerische deflationäre Schuldenliquidation zu stoppen. Als Korrektiv im Boom sah Minsky vor allem institutionelle Bremsen im Bankensektor: Er empfahl harte Eigenmittelanforderungen für die Banken sowie Beschränkungen in ihrer Gewinnausschüttung. Grossbanken, deren Bilanz eine winzige Eigenkapital­decke aufweist, waren Minsky ein Gräuel. «Ein komplexes Finanzsystem wie das Unsere generiert auf endogenem Weg gefährliche destabilisierende Kräfte», schrieb er, «Depressionen sind eine natürliche Konsequenz des ungehinderten Kapita­lismus.» Und in letzter Konsequenz: «Das Finanzsystem kann nicht dem freien Markt überlassen werden.»

    Das Ende der Geschichte

    Es erstaunt kaum, dass Minsky mit diesen Ansichten in den Achtzigern keine Chance hatte. Eine Theorie des Ungleichgewichts war damals weltfremd. Neukeynesianer, Neoklassiker, Monetaristen sowie die Anhänger der österreichischen Schule waren sich in der Annahme einig, dass das Wirtschaftssystem – zumindest in der langen Frist – in ein Gleichgewicht strebt. Es war die Zeit der Theorie der rationalen Erwartungen, der effizienten Finanzmärkte, untermauert mit der Präzision mathematischer Modelle. Es war die Zeit der Deregulierungswellen im Bankensektor, gestartet unter Reagan und Thatcher, fortgesetzt in den USA unter Bill Clinton. Es war die Zeit der «grossen Moderation», mit robustem Wachstum und flachen, harmlosen Rezessionen. Sogar die Inflation war besiegt. Es war das «Ende der Geschichte» in der Ökonomie.

    Für Hyman Minsky war in dieser Welt kein Platz mehr. Nur ein verlorenes Grüppchen Post-Keynesianer scharte sich noch um ihn. 1996 starb er an Krebs.

    Vier Jahre später war Minsky in den «Essays on the Great Depression» des Princeton-Professors Ben Bernanke nur eine Fussnote wert. Ein exzessiver Schuldenaufbau – wie von Minsky gewarnt – sei in einer freien Marktwirtschaft gar nicht möglich, weil das irrationales Verhalten der Marktteilnehmer voraussetzen würde. «Und das», schrieb der spätere Chef der US-Notenbank, «ist kaum vorstellbar.»

    Zur selben Zeit begann am US-Häusermarkt ein beispielloser, von Krediten befeuerter Anstieg der Preise. Dasselbe Muster war in Spanien, England, Irland zu beobachten. Überall explodierte die Kreditschöpfung, überall regierte der spekulative Exzess, bereitwillig angetrieben von den Banken. Überall konnten lehrbuchmässig die drei Stufen von Minskys Instabilitätshypothese beobachtet werden. Und dann kam es zum Knall, der beinahe das globale Finanzsystem in die Tiefe riss. «Hyman Minsky ist der analytischste und überzeugendste aller zeitgenössischen Ökonomen, die in exzessivem Schuldenaufbau die Achillesferse des ­Kapitalismus sehen», schrieb der Ökonom James Tobin 1987 in einer Besprechung von «Stabilizing an Unstable Economy».

    Hätte man bloss auf ihn gehört.
  • In the Media | September 2013

    A more radical “serious adjustment” would only harm Italy


    Financial Times, September 27, 2013. © The Financial Times Ltd.

    Sir, Professor Christopher Gilbert in his letter of September 25 suggests that "some of the most important southern countries [including Italy] ... do so little to help themselves" that they therefore should not seek greater co-operation from euro institutions, as advocated by Professors Emiliano Brancaccio and other economists including myself (Letters, September 23). Prof Gilbert himself does not offer suggestions on which further reforms should be implemented in Italy to restore prosperity through "serious adjustment".

    Italy has already undergone a major reform in its pension system, which implied a large structural reduction in perspective payments from the public sector. It should also be noted that the number of parttime workers has risen from about 13 per cent of total employment in 2004 to about 18 per cent this year, with full-time employment steadily declining since the beginning of the recession period in 2007, surely a sign of increased flexibility ("serious adjustment?") in the labour market. Public employees' wages have been frozen and public employment has been in free fall since 2007.

    It seems that "more radical domestic efforts" in these directions, as advocated by Prof Gilbert, would surely imply a further increase in poverty and social exclusion, further weakening of the industrial structure due to depressed domestic demand and stronger political support to nationalistic parties, exactly the fears that motivated the letter of warning from economists.

    Gennaro Zezza, Associate Professor, Università di Cassino, Italy 
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Fundamentos da economia estão razoáveis e país está em recuperação, diz diretor do FMI


    Marcos Barbosa
    RBV News, 27 Setembro 2013. © 2012 www.rbvnews.com.br. Todos os Direitos Reservados.

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Fundamentos da economia estão razoáveis e país está em recuperação, diz diretor do FMI


    Fator Brasil, 27 Setembro 2013. © Copyright 2006 - 2013 Fator Brasil.

    Rio de Janeiro – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse no dia 26 de setembro (quinta-feira), que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas. 

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo. 

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute. 

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.  “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse. 

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Pesquisador argentino diz que América do Sul não vai escapar de desvalorização cambial: Roberto Frenkel afirma que vulnerabilidade externa da região foi reduzida


    Lucianne Carneiro
    O Globo Econômico, 26 Setembro 2013.  © 1996–2013. Todos direitos reservados a Infoglobo Comunicação e Participações S.A. 

    RIO – Professor da Universidade de Buenos Aires e pesquisador do Centro de Estudos de Estado e de Sociedade (Cedes), Roberto Frenkel afirma que os países emergentes, especialmente na América do Sul, não escaparão de um processo de desvalorização cambial para se ajustar ao novo cenário mundial, com elevação das taxas de juros nos Estados Unidos e menor ritmo de expansão da economia chinesa. A atual situação do câmbio muito apreciado tende a dificultar esse ajuste, com consequências como inflação.

    — Peru, Colômbia, Chile, Brasil e Argentina são alguns dos países que apreciaram demais suas moedas e agora terão que subir o câmbio — diz Frenkel, que está no Rio para participar do seminário “Governança Financeira depois da Crise”, promovido pelo Minds, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia, em parceria com o Levy Economics Institute.

    Na avaliação de Frenkel, a vulnerabilidade externa dos países sul-americanos recuou e não se deve ver uma crise como no passado. A região não aproveitou integralmente, no entanto, o bom momento da economia mundial nos últimos anos. Crítico às políticas do governo de Cristina Kirchner, Frenkel diz que a Argentina tem um grave desequilíbrio em seu balanço de pagamentos, além de uma inflação “insustentável”.

    Alguns economistas afirmam que a recuperação da economia mundial está forte, outros dizem que o movimento não é sustentável. Qual é a sua avaliação?

    Os Estados Unidos estão se recuperando lentamente. Aliás, é isso que tem provocado o ajuste na política monetária. A Europa, por sua vez, continua na crise, a situação não está resolvida para nenhum país. Houve um incremento do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB, soma dos bens e riquezas de um país), mas a União Europeia vai continuar com sua grande crise. O que se vê de diferente é o ritmo de crescimento econômico dos países emergentes. Os países emergentes continuam crescendo mais rápido que os desenvolvidos, mas a taxa de expansão desacelerou. Aquele ganho mais rápido dos emergentes acabou.

    Países emergentes tiveram um certo alívio quando o Federal Reserve (Fed, o banco central americano) manteve os estímulos à economia na última semana. O que veremos agora?

    A decisão do Federal Reserve (Fed, banco central americano) de manter os estímulos é temporária. É certo que em algum momento as taxas de juros dos Estados Unidos vão subir. Essa perspectiva é bem concreta, mesmo que o Fed diga que vai manter o estímulo. É certo que a política monetária vai mudar. E a China também está mudando seu ritmo de crescimento para permitir a transição de seu modelo de crescimento de uma base de exportações para ser puxado pelo consumo interno. O que vemos é um novo ritmo de crescimento da economia mundial, e é preciso se ajustar a isso.

    Como os emergentes devem ficar nesse cenário?

    O crescimento menor da China afeta principalmente os exportadores de minerais e metais, já que o investimento será menor. E muitos emergentes estão com o câmbio apreciado e terão que se ajustar. A Índia, com um déficit grande em conta corrente e saída de capitais, tem uma situação mais complicada.

    A vulnerabilidade externa dos países da América do Sul está menor?

    A situação hoje na maioria dos países é robusta, existe um endividamento menor e esse ajustamento (ao novo ritmo da economia) não vai gerar crise como no passado. A vulnerabilidade externa foi muito reduzida. Mas o que na verdade se viu é que quase uma década excepcionalmente boa para a economia (entre 2002 e 2012) não foi aproveitada pelos países da América do Sul. A Argentina vive hoje tomada pelo forte populismo. O Brasil, por sua vez, alcançou um crescimento baixo. A região precisa de um crescimento econômico maior, que seja suficiente para alcançar um novo nível de desenvolvimento.

    Como os países da América do Sul terão que lidar com o câmbio?

    O tema central da economia da América do Sul hoje é como lidar com a desvalorização do câmbio neste momento de ajustamento ao novo cenário mundial, que complica a política econômica. Os países da região estão com o câmbio muito apreciado. Os exportadores foram beneficiados pela melhora do preço de exportações. Houve uma desvalorização transitória, mas seguiu-se uma apreciação cambial. Nessa situação de câmbio apreciado, fica mais difícil se ajustar a um novo cenário mundial. Esse ajuste se faz pelo câmbio mais alto. Quanto mais apreciado o câmbio, mais custoso é o ajustamento. E a desvalorização cambial traz consequências como o impacto na inflação e a queda salarial a curto prazo. Peru, Colômbia, Chile, Brasil, Argentina são alguns dos países que apreciaram demais suas moedas e agora terão que subir o câmbio.

    Quais as principais dificuldades hoje da economia argentina?

    Há um problema grave no balanço de pagamentos. Nós estamos perdendo reservas e, por causa do risco político, não temos acesso ao financiamento do mercado externo. E nesse contexto temos um controle forte do câmbio. Há o câmbio paralelo e o fixo, com uma diferença de cerca de 60%. Esse câmbio paralelo é o sintoma do grande desequilíbrio atual. Vamos ter que sair dessa situação.

    É possível esperar um ajuste pelo governo?

    Está claro que o governo de Cristina Kirchner não deve ser reeleito. A dúvida é se esse governo vai fazer esse ajuste antes de sair ou deixar os problemas para o próximo presidente.

    A desvalorização do câmbio deve ter impacto maior na Argentina por causa de uma inflação já elevada?

    A inflação na Argentina está muito distante dos números oficiais, o governo falsifica os dados. É uma situação insustentável. Nós temos uma inflação de 25% ao ano. No Brasil, os economistas estão preocupados com o efeito do câmbio na inflação. Agora imagine o impacto na Argentina. O país vai enfrentar uma aceleração inflacionária grande por causa do câmbio, que terá que passar por uma desvalorização significativa.
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou: Regulação atual é incapaz de evitar nova crise


    Ana Paula Grabois
    Brasil Econômico, 26 Setembro 2013. © Copyright 2009–2012 Brasil Econômico. Todos os Direitos Reservados.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou defende uma regulação do sistema financeiro mais forte: “A vigente não foi capaz de evitar o colapso de 2008.”

    Pesidente do Instituto Levy Economics, de Nova York, Dimitri Papadimitriou, é um crítico feroz da autorregulação do mercado financeiro. O economista grego, radicado há 45 anos nos Estados Unidos, dirige o instituto que elabora pesquisas sobre os mercados financeiros e sobre o que se pode fazer para evitar crises, como a de 2008. Papadimitriou defende uma regulação financeira mais forte que se antecipe aos choques. "Precisamos re-regular o sistema financeiro. Porque a regulação vigente não foi capaz de evitar o colapso de 2008".

    Em sua primeira visita ao Brasil, para participar da conferência "Governança financeira depois da crise", organizada pelo instituto que preside em parceria com o Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia (Minds), o economista diz que a instabilidade é inexorável ao sistema capitalista. "O aspecto mais importante é como regular esse sistema para prevenir que esse tipo de coisa aconteça de novo. Ou se entende as crises como acasos que ocorrem por choques e que não podem ser regulados", afirma o economista, ao Brasil Econômico, na véspera da conferência, que ocorre hoje e amanhã, no Rio.

    Para o economista, é possível prever eventos que determinam instabilidades futuras, e assim, evitar crises mais complexas. Apesar de governos espalhados pelo mundo defenderem a ampliação dos mecanismos de regulação financeira, Papadimitriou diz que muito pouco foi feito.

    "Desde o colapso de Lehman Brothers, nós ainda não tivemos nenhum progresso para prevenir que isso aconteça de novo", afirma. Parte do progresso quase nulo diz respeito à concentração das transações financeiras mas mãos de um grupo pequeno de grandes bancos. "É mais fácil regular os bancos pequenos porque você sabe o que realmente ele faz. Algumas vezes, é difícil entender o que os grandes bancos fazem e precificar o risco. A tendência desde 2008 é subprecificar os riscos dos bancos".

    Com tantos tipos de transações, entre depósitos, empréstimos, títulos, investimento, derivativos em poucos bancos, a atual estrutura regulatória - seja nos Estados Unidos, na Europa ou na América Latina - é ineficaz. "É preciso saber quem regula e supervisiona quem e o quê", completa.

    Na sua avaliação, os grandes bancos atingidos pela crise e depois ajudados pelo governo americano, como Citibank, JPMorgan e Chase Manhattan, continuam no controle das transações financeiras no mundo, sem avanços na regulação de suas atividades. "As restrições foram incapazes, por exemplo, de controlar questões como o caso da Baleia de Londres. O JP Morgan perdeu US$ 6 bilhões para seus clientes e teve US 1 bilhão de multa. Isso mostra que ainda falta regulação", diz. O escândalo do JP Morgan envolveu operações de alto risco com papeis derivativos.

    O presidente do Levy Economics afirma que num mundo onde as transações financeiras equivalem a 35 vezes o valor do comércio de bens e serviços entre os países, a complexidade das transações aumenta, o que dificulta ainda mais a supervisão do mercado. Papadimitriou defende a modificação das estruturas de regulação no mundo, a começar pelos Estados Unidos. "O grande problema é o lobby dos bancos no Congresso, que querem evitar a regulação. O governo Obama não é muito agressivo em implementar novas regulamentações", complementa.

    Totalmente favorável ao controle de capitais, o economista do instituto de pesquisa ressalta a conexão entre as crises financeiras e a economia real de vários países no ambiente globalizado atual.

    "Wall Street não é isolado da economia real", diz. Uma crise financeira pode aumentar desemprego, retrair o crescimento da atividade econômica de vários países, além de forçar o corte de gastos do governo para evitar déficits de orçamento. "Isso significa menos infraestrutura, menos educação, menos seguridade social", afirma.
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Fundamentos da economia estão razoáveis e país está em recuperação, diz FMI O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação


    Agência Brasil
    Correio Braziliense, 20 Setembro 2013.

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse nesta quinta-feira (26/9) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o único ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (O Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis, diz diretor do FMI


    Jornal do Brasil, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright © 1995-2013 | Todos os direitos reservados

    Paulo Nogueira Batista ressalta que o único ponto que merece atenção são as contas externas

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o único ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (O Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Sobre reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up?, Batista acredita que país está apresentando recuperação progressiva


    Vladimir Platonow / Agência Brasil
    Exame, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright © Editora Abril - Todos os direitos reservados

    Rio de Janeiro – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta.

    Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Diretor do FMI diz que economia brasileira está em recuperação


    Vladimir Platonow, Agência Brasil
    Brasil 247, 26 de Setembro de 2013.  © Brasil 247. Todos os direitos reservados.

    Segundo Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, os fundamentos fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa; "no setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta", afirma

    Rio de Janeiro
    – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (O Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Brasil está em recuperação, diz diretor do FMI


    Vladimir Platonow / Agência Brasil
    RedeTV, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright © 2013 - RedeTV! Todos os direitos reservados.

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse nesta quinta-feira (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada "Has Brazil blown up" ("Será que o Brasil estragou tudo", em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Nogueira Batista: Economia em recuperação, apesar da crise mundial


    Vladimir Platonow
    Vio Mundo, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright 2005-2013 - Todos os direitos reservados

    Fundamentos da economia estão razoáveis e país está em recuperação, diz diretor do FMI

    Rio de Janeiro – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Representante do Brasil no FMI diz que há exagero na percepção sobre a economia do país: Para Paulo Nogueira Batista, cenário no país já é de recuperação


    Lucianne Carneiro
    O Globo Economia, 26 Setembro 2013. © 1996 - 2013. Todos direitos reservados a Infoglobo Comunicação e Participações S.A.

    RIO - O diretor executivo para o Brasil e outros países do Fundo Monetário Internacional, Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., afirmou nesta quinta-feira que a economia brasileira já está se recuperando e há um exagero da imprensa internacional sobre a situação do Brasil, ao comentar a capa da revista britânica “The Economist”.

    - O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda, referência, havia um certo exagero. Agora (a percepção) está indo para o extremo oposto. O Brasil está crescendo menos do que poderia (...), mas agora estamos vendo uma recuperação clara. O desempenho não é tão favorável, mas a recuperação já começou - disse Nogueira Batista, ao participar do seminário “Governança Financeira depois da Crise”, promovido pelo Minds, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia, em parceria com o Levy Economics Institute e a Fundação Ford.

    Na avaliação do economista, os fundamentos fiscais e a política monetária do Brasil vão bem. Embora a deterioração do déficit em contas correntes preocupe, apontou, as reservas internacionais são elevadas. Na contramão da opinião de Nogueira Batista, o professor da Universidade de Georgetown Albert Keidel afirmou mais cedo, no mesmo evento, que o Brasil tem um nível baixo de reservas internacionais, considerando a ausência de mecanismos de controle de capitais.

    Pressão por melhora nas moedas emergentes
    Nogueira Batista negou que o fim dos estímulos do Federal Reserve (Fed, o banco central americano) à economia vá provocar uma crise nos países emergentes.

    Acho que há muito exagero (sobre a reação dos emergentes ao fim da política do Fed).

    A situação hoje é muito diferente da época da crise asiática. As reservas estão muito mais altas, a situação fiscal teve muita melhora, com a dívida líquida caindo. É claro que a situação não é perfeita, mas acho exagerado dizer que podemos ter uma crise - afirmou o economista, destacando que falava em seu próprio nome e não como diretor do Fundo.

    Nogueira Batista disse que o alívio nos mercados com a decisão do banco central americano não suspender por enquanto seus estímulos já se refletiu em uma pressão de valorização das moedas emergentes, como o real. E que é preciso minimizar esses efeitos.

    - O programa de intervenção do Banco Central lançado no momento de tensão deu impacto para segurar o câmbio, o Brasil está apertando a política monetária. Apesar das capas das revistas, as pessoas veem isso lá fora.

    Em sua apresentação, Nogueira Batista afirmou que os emergentes ganharam espaço na governança global, mas que as mudanças nessa estrutura estão estagnadas desde 2011 e algumas metas no âmbito do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) já passaram dos prazos estabelecidos, como a redistribuição dos votos e das cotas.

    - Após o Lehman Brothers, o G-20 emergiu com um importante fórum de líderes. No âmbito do FMI, fizemos algumas mudanças no sistema de votos. (...) Desde 2011, no entanto, o processo de mudanças na governança global vive uma certa estagnação. A implementação de acordos já assinados, por exemplo, têm sido adiada - disse o economista.

    Ele alertou sobre o risco de “uma tentação” de se voltar ao formato antigo, em que apenas Estados Unidos e europeus tinham peso forte nas decisões internacionais.

    Para combater este retrocesso, defende Paulo Nogueira, é preciso aprofundar ainda mais a cooperação entre os países dos Brics (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul). Ele ressaltou os avanços tanto na criação de um fundo de reservas internacionais dos países dos Brics - para proteger contra oscilações cambiais e também de um banco de desenvolvimento. O primeiro rascunho do projeto de um fundo de reservas dos Brics será apresentado em uma reunião dos Brics em Washington, em duas semanas.

    O economista lembrou as dificuldades ainda existentes para uma participação maior dos emergentes no Fundo. Em 2011, quando Dominique Strauss-Khan deixou a entidade, os europeus defenderam a candidatura de Christine Lagarde antes mesmo do fim do período de inscrição de candidatos, disse Nogueira Batista.

    Segundo ele, até que se mude a estrutura dos votos no Fundo será difícil conseguir uma candidatura vitoriosa de um país emergentes. Hoje, Estados Unidos, europeus e Japão têm peso de mais de 50% nos votos.

    - Se o cargo de diretor-geral ficar vago em breve, pode ser que tenhamos o mesmo tipo de dificuldades que tivemos em 2011.

    Cálculo da dívida bruta será discutido em outubro
    Sobre o atraso na divulgação de algumas partes do Relatório Artigo IV do FMI sobre o Brasil, Nogueira Batista explicou que o país pediu a revisão de alguns aspectos do documento, como faz todos os anos, mas que a equipe do Fundo está demorando a responder. Sua expectativa é que isso pode ser concluído em breve.

    O relatório é divulgado para os diferentes países e analisa o desempenho macroeconômico das nações. Revisões podem ser pedidas no caso de erros factuais e passagens que podem ser consideradas ambíguas, entre outros aspectos.

    A questão sobre o cálculo da dívida bruta - que foi alterado pelo Brasil, mas vem sendo questionado pelo Fundo - será tratado em outubro, com uma equipe do Ministério da Fazenda que vai ao FMI. 
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Brasil não deve mais recorrer à ajuda do câmbio para controlar inflação, diz Nelson Barbosa


    Lucianne Carneiro
    Ex-secretário executivo da Fazenda acredita que governo pode trazer a taxa para o centro da meta, de 4,5%, até 2015

    O Globo Economia, 26 Setembro 2013. © 1996 - 2013. Todos direitos reservados a Infoglobo Comunicação e Participações S.A.

    RIO – Na primeira aparição pública no Brasil desde que deixou o governo, o ex-secretário-executivo do Ministério da Fazenda e hoje professor da UFRJ, Nelson Barbosa Filho, afirmou que não existe mais espaço para apreciar o câmbio de maneira a ajudar no controle da inflação. O câmbio se apreciou demais nos últimos anos, segundo ele, e é preciso atingir a meta de inflação mesmo num cenário de taxa de câmbio estável ou até mesmo de depreciação. 

    - Todos os anos em que o Brasil cumpriu a meta da inflação, a taxa de câmbio se apreciou, com exceção do ano passado. O ajuste já começou. Estamos numa fase da economia brasileira de cumprir a meta de inflação sem depender tanto da apreciação cambial. Só que aí fica mais difícil a inflação cair mais rápido - disse Barbosa, ao participar do seminário "Governança Financeira depois da Crise", promovido pelo Minds, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia, em parceria com o Levy Economics Institute e a Fundação Ford. 

    Sua avaliação é que o cenário com que o governo trabalha de trazer a inflação para 4,5% ao ano, que é o centro da meta, até 2015, é possível. O que vai influenciar esse resultado é a desvalorização cambial e a magnitude de um eventual aumento nos preços de combustíveis. Para Barbosa, a discussão sobre a necessidade de reduzir a atual meta da inflação brasileira só deve ocorrer depois que a taxa for mantida em 4,5% por um ou dois anos. 

    O governo vai trazer a inflação para 4,5% mas talvez leve um pouco mais de tempo porque houve esses choques recentemente. O principal esforço para isso é o aumento da produtividade - apontou. 

    Barbosa defendeu a manutenção do câmbio flutuante no país, lembrando que tanto depreciação quanto apreciação cambial excessiva têm consequências para a economia. A depreciação pressiona a inflação, enquanto a apreciação ajuda no cumprimento mais rápido da meta de inflação, mas prejudica a longo prazo a competitividade da economia. 

    Para o ex-secretário-executivo do Ministério da Fazenda, o câmbio ideal no momento deve variar entre R$ 2,20 e R$ 2,50, embora destaque que essa taxa de câmbio ideal para a economia está em constante mudança:

    - Um câmbio muito apreciado ou muito depreciado é ruim para a economia. Ir para muito abaixo de R$ 2,20 neste momento não é muito recomendável, assim como ficar acima de R$ 2,50 seria muito excessivo comparado com o que aconteceu com outros países.

    O economista, que deixou o governo em junho, disse que embora o país não tenha uma meta de taxa de câmbio, a oscilação cambial tem sido controlada por causa da meta de inflação. Quando a taxa de câmbio é elevada, a inflação também tende a ser elevada. Se a taxa de câmbio é mais baixa, a tendência é de uma inflação menor. 

    Barbosa explicou que existem três alternativas teóricas para reduzir o custo unitário do trabalho e aumentar a competitvidade. A primeira é uma desvalorização interna, com desaceleração do crescimento econômico e redução de salário. A segunda é uma desvalorização externa, com elevação da taxa de câmbio. A terceira é por aumento de produtividade. 

    - Na prática, o ajuste acontece nas três coisas. Na Europa, tem sido um pouco no salário. No Brasil, o que o governo tem tentado fazer é que seja mais na produtividade, para que seja menos via câmbio e desemprego - disse.
  • In the Media | September 2013

    I Monito degli Economisti


    La Sinistra per Gualdo, 25 Settembre 2013. Tutti i diritti riservati.

    La crisi economica in Europa continua a distruggere posti di lavoro. Alla fine del 2013 i disoccupati saranno 19 milioni nella sola zona euro, oltre 7 milioni in più rispetto al 2008: un incremento che non ha precedenti dal secondo dopoguerra e che proseguirà anche nel 2014. La crisi occupazionale affligge soprattutto i paesi periferici dell’Unione monetaria europea, dove si verifica anche un aumento eccezionale delle sofferenze bancarie e dei fallimenti aziendali; la Germania e gli altri paesi centrali dell’eurozona hanno invece visto crescere i livelli di occupazione. Il carattere asimmetrico della crisi è una delle cause dell’attuale stallo politico europeo e dell’imbarazzante susseguirsi di vertici dai quali scaturiscono provvedimenti palesemente inadeguati a contrastare i processi di divergenza in corso. Una ignavia politica che può sembrare giustificata nelle fasi meno aspre del ciclo e di calma apparente sui mercati finanziari, ma che a lungo andare avrà le più gravi conseguenze.

    Come una parte della comunità accademica aveva previsto, la crisi sta rivelando una serie di contraddizioni nell’assetto istituzionale e politico dell’Unione monetaria europea. Le autorità europee hanno compiuto scelte che, contrariamente agli annunci, hanno contribuito all’inasprimento della recessione e all’ampliamento dei divari tra i paesi membri dell’Unione. Nel giugno 2010, ai primi segni di crisi dell’eurozona, una lettera sottoscritta da trecento economisti lanciò un allarme sui pericoli insiti nelle politiche di “austerità”: tali politiche avrebbero ulteriormente depresso l’occupazione e i redditi, rendendo ancora più difficili i rimborsi dei debiti, pubblici e privati. Quell’allarme rimase tuttavia inascoltato. Le autorità europee preferirono aderire alla fantasiosa dottrina dell’“austerità espansiva”, secondo cui le restrizioni dei bilanci pubblici avrebbero ripristinato la fiducia dei mercati sulla solvibilità dei paesi dell’Unione, favorendo così la diminuzione dei tassi d’interesse e la ripresa economica. Come ormai rileva anche il Fondo Monetario Internazionale, oggi sappiamo che in realtà le politiche di austerity hanno accentuato la crisi, provocando un tracollo dei redditi superiore alle attese prevalenti. Gli stessi fautori della “austerità espansiva” adesso riconoscono i loro sbagli, ma il disastro è in larga misura già compiuto.

    C’è tuttavia un nuovo errore che le autorità europee stanno commettendo. Esse appaiono persuase dall’idea che i paesi periferici dell’Unione potrebbero risolvere i loro problemi  attraverso le cosiddette “riforme strutturali”. Tali riforme dovrebbero ridurre i costi e i prezzi, aumentare la competitività e favorire quindi una ripresa trainata dalle esportazioni e una riduzione dei debiti verso l’estero. Questa tesi coglie alcuni problemi reali, ma è illusorio pensare che la soluzione prospettata possa salvaguardare l’unità europea. Le politiche deflattive praticate in Germania e altrove per accrescere l’avanzo commerciale hanno contribuito per anni, assieme ad altri fattori, all’accumulo di enormi squilibri nei rapporti di debito e credito tra i paesi della zona euro. Il riassorbimento di tali squilibri richiederebbe un’azione coordinata da parte di tutti i membri dell’Unione. Pensare che i soli paesi periferici debbano farsi carico del problema significa pretendere da questi una caduta dei salari e dei prezzi di tale portata da determinare un crollo ancora più accentuato dei redditi e una violenta deflazione da debiti, con il rischio concreto di nuove crisi bancarie e di una desertificazione produttiva di intere regioni europee.

    Nel 1919 John Maynard Keynes contestò il Trattato di Versailles con parole lungimiranti: «Se diamo per scontata la convinzione che la Germania debba esser tenuta in miseria, i suoi figli rimanere nella fame e nell’indigenza […], se miriamo deliberatamente alla umiliazione dell’Europa centrale, oso farmi profeta, la vendetta non tarderà». Sia pure a parti invertite, con i paesi periferici al tracollo e la Germania in posizione di relativo vantaggio, la crisi attuale presenta più di una analogia con quella tremenda fase storica, che creò i presupposti per l’ascesa del nazismo e la seconda guerra mondiale. Ma la memoria di quegli anni sembra persa: le autorità tedesche e gli altri governi europei stanno ripetendo errori speculari a quelli commessi allora. Questa miopia, in ultima istanza, è la causa principale delle ondate di irrazionalismo che stanno investendo l’Europa, dalle ingenue apologie del cambio flessibile quale panacea di ogni male fino ai più inquietanti sussulti di propagandismo ultranazionalista e xenofobo.

    Occorre esser consapevoli che proseguendo con le politiche di “austerità” e affidando il riequilibrio alle sole “riforme strutturali”, il destino dell’euro sarà segnato: l’esperienza della moneta unica si esaurirà, con ripercussioni sulla tenuta del mercato unico europeo. In assenza di condizioni per una riforma del sistema finanziario e della politica monetaria e fiscale che dia vita a un piano di rilancio degli investimenti pubblici e privati, contrasti le sperequazioni tra i redditi e tra i territori e risollevi l’occupazione nelle periferie dell’Unione, ai decisori politici non resterà altro che una scelta cruciale tra modalità alternative di uscita dall’euro.

    Promosso da Emiliano Brancaccio e Riccardo Realfonzo (Università del Sannio), il “monito degli economisti” è sottoscritto da Philip Arestis (University of Cambridge), Georgios Argeitis (Athens University), Wendy Carlin (University College of London), Jesus Ferreiro (University of the Basque Country), Giuseppe Fontana (Università del Sannio), James Galbraith (University of Texas), Mauro Gallegati (Università Politecnica delle Marche), Eckhard Hein (Berlin School of Economics and Law), Alan Kirman (University of Aix-Marseille III), Jan Kregel (University of Tallin), Heinz Kurz (Graz University), Alfonso Palacio-Vera (Universidad Complutense Madrid), Dimitri Papadimitriou (Levy Economics Institute), Pascal Petit (Université de Paris Nord), Dani Rodrik (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton), Malcolm Sawyer (Leeds University), Willi Semmler (New School University, New York), Felipe Serrano (University of the Basque Country), Engelbert Stockhammer (Kingston University), Tony Thirlwall (University of Kent). 
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Diretor da Fundação Ford diz que bancos ameaçam democracia


    Léa De Luca
    Brasil Econômico, 24 Setembro 2013. © Copyright 2009-2012 Brasil Econômico. Todos os Direitos Reservados.


    Para Leonardo Burlamaqui lobby dessas instituições impede o avanço de uma governança financeira global

    São Paulo - Cinco anos depois da crise financeira internacional, as coisas mudaram muito pouco no mercado financeiro. Para Leonardo Burlamaqui, diretor da Fundação Ford, e Rogério Silveira, diretor executivo do Minds (Instituto multidisciplinar para desenvolvimento e estratégias, na sigla em inglês), a saída para evitar novas crises seria estabelecer uma governança financeira global. Entre as propostas, estão aumentar a regulação (inclusive de funcionamento dos fundos de "hedge"), adotar o controle de entrada de capitais como uma rotina e acabar com os paraísos fiscais, por exemplo.

    Mas a ideia de um novo conjunto de regras para o sistema financeiro global enfrenta dificuldades para avançar e uma das razões, segundo eles, é o forte poder político e econômico das instituições financeiras. "Elas não querem mais regulação. Vivemos uma governança movida pelo lobby dessas instituições. É uma ameaça à democracia", diz Burlamaqui.

    Silveira concorda, mas acredita que, ao menos, a crise de 2008 abriu espaço para discussão, apesar das resistências. "Pode não acontecer de forma orgânica e organizada, mas confio que caminharemos sim para mais regulação", diz. Para ele, a defesa da autorregulação das instituições financeiras, somada ao "mantra" de que a desregulamentação seria benéfica e aumentaria a eficiência do mercado, reduzindo custos de intermediação, foi uma combinação desastrosa. "A ideia de que a desregulamentação tornaria mais eficiente a intermediação na transferência de recursos, de quem poupa para os que investem, mostrou-se equivocada com a crise", diz Silveira. Para ele, a falta de leis não aumentou a eficiência, e pior : aumentou a especulação. "Os bancos não vivem só de intermediação. O que dá dinheiro mesmo é a especulação. E como instituições privadas, visam lucrar mais".

    Burlamaqui lembra que países como Brasil e China, com forte presença dos bancos públicos no sistema - e também leis mais rígidas - foram os que menos sofreram com a crise. "Não adianta querer eliminar os bancos públicos, como fizeram os Estados Unidos. Os bancos privados não tem apetite para fazer o que eles fazem", diz Silveira. Para ele, é urgente resgatar o que chama de "funcionalidade" dos bancos - financiar o sistema produtivo. "No Brasil, apenas um banco fornece recursos de longo prazo para investimentos, que é o BNDES", completa Burlamaqui.

    O diretor da Fundação Ford lembra ainda que até hoje não existe nenhuma entidade global para cuidar da governança financeira. Tanto ele quanto Silveira consideram as regras da terceira fase do acordo de capitais entre bancos, conhecido como Basileia III (cujo objetivo é reforçar o capital das instituições e protegê-las contra crises) são "o mínimo do mínimo necessário". Para ele, o acordo anterior (Basileia II) era "irresponsável, permitia muita margem de manobra". Burlamaqui diz que ao contrário do que defendiam alguns, a globalização financeira foi prejudicial: "Criou-se um cassino em escala global", diz. "Se não for possível estabelecer uma governança financeira global, melhor será promover uma ‘desglobalização' dos mercados", acredita.

    Na próxima quinta-feira, no Rio de Janeiro, Burlamaqui e Silveira farão os discursos de abertura de um evento promovido pelo Minds e o Levy Economics Institute, sobre a governança financeira pós-crise. O evento é parte de um programa patrocinado pela Fundação Ford desde 2006.
  • In the Media | September 2013

    The Economists' Warning


    Financial Times, September 23, 2013. 

    The European crisis continues to destroy jobs. By the end of 2013 there will be 19 million unemployed in the eurozone alone, over 7 million more than in 2008, an increase unprecedented since the end of World War II and one that will stretch on into 2014. The employment crisis strikes above all the peripheral member countries of the European Monetary Union, where an exceptional rise in bankruptcy is also under way, whereas Germany and the other central countries of the eurozone have instead witnessed growth on the job front. This asymmetry is one of the causes of Europe’s present-day political paralysis and the embarrassing succession of summit meetings that result in measures glaringly incapable of halting the processes of divergence under way. While this sluggishness of political response may appear justified in the less severe phases of the cycle and moments of respite on the financial market, it could have the most serious consequences in the long run.

    As foreseen by part of the academic community, the crisis is revealing a number of contradictions in the institutions and policies of the European Monetary Union. The European authorities have taken a series of decisions that have in actual fact, contrary to announcements, helped to worsen the recession and widen the gaps between the member countries. In June 2010, when the first signs of the eurozone crisis became apparent, a letter signed by three hundred economists pointed out the inherent dangers of austerity policies, which would further depress the demand for goods and services as well as employment and incomes, thus making the payment of debts, both public and private, still more difficult. This alarm was, however, unheeded. The European authorities preferred to adopt the fanciful doctrine of “expansive austerity”, according to which budget cuts would restore the markets’ confidence in the solvency of the EU countries and thus lead to a drop in interest rates and economic recovery. As the International Monetary Fund itself recognises, we know today that the policies of austerity have actually deepened the crisis, causing a collapse of incomes in excess of the most widely-held expectations. Even the champions of “expansive austerity” now acknowledge their errors, but the damage is now largely done. 

    The European authorities are, however, now making a new mistake. They appear to be convinced that the peripheral member countries can solve their problems by implementing “structural reforms”, which will supposedly reduce costs and prices, boost competitiveness, and hence foster export-driven recovery and a reduction of foreign debt. While this view does highlight some real problems, the belief that the solution put forward can safeguard European unity is an illusion. The deflationary policies applied in Germany and elsewhere to build up trade surpluses have worked for years, togeteher with other factors, to create huge imbalances in debt and credit between the eurozone countries. The correction of these imbalances would require concerted action on the part of all the member countries. Expecting the peripheral countries of Union to solve the problem unaided means requiring them to undergo a drop in wages and prices on such a scale as to cause a still more accentuated collapse of incomes and violent debt deflation with the concrete risk of causing new banking crises and crippling production in entire regions of Europe.

    John Maynard Keynes opposed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 with these far-sighted words: “If we take the view that Germany must be kept impoverished and her children starved and crippled […] If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp.” Even though the positions are now reversed, with the peripheral countries in dire straits and Germany in a comparatively advantageous position, the current crisis presents more than one similarity with that terrible historical phase, which created the conditions for the rise of Nazism and World War II. All memory of those dreadful years appears to have been lost, however, as the German authorities and the other European governments are repeating the same mistakes as were made then. This short-sightedness is ultimately the primary reason for the waves of irrationalism currently sweeping over Europe, from the naive championing of flexible exchange rates as a cure for all ills to the more disturbing instances of ultra-nationalistic and xenophobic propaganda.

    It is essential to realise that if the European authorities continue with policies of austerity and rely on structural reforms alone to restore balance, the fate of the euro will be sealed. The experience of the single currency will come to an end with repercussions on the continued existence of the European single market. In the absence of conditions for a reform of the financial system and a monetary and fiscal policy making it possible to develop a plan to revitalise public and private investment, counter the inequalities of income and between areas, and increase employment in the peripheral countries of the Union, the political decision makers will be left with nothing other than a crucial choice of alternative ways out of the euro.

    Emiliano Brancaccio and Riccardo Realfonzo (Sannio University, promoters of “the economists’ warning”), Philip Arestis (University of Cambridge), Wendy Carlin (University College of London), Giuseppe Fontana (Leeds and Sannio Universities), James Galbraith (University of Texas), Mauro Gallegati (Università Politecnica delle Marche), Eckhard Hein (Berlin School of Economics and Law), Alan Kirman (University of Aix-Marseille III), Jan Kregel (University of Tallin), Heinz Kurz (Graz University), Alfonso Palacio-Vera (Universidad Complutense Madrid), Dimitri Papadimitriou (Levy Economics Institute), Pascal Petit (Université de Paris Nord), Dani Rodrik (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton), Willi Semmler (New School University, New York), Engelbert Stockhammer (Kingston University), Tony Thirlwall (University of Kent).

    ...and also: Georgios Argeitis (Athens University), Marcella Corsi (Sapienza University of Rome), Jesus Ferreiro (University of the Basque Country), Malcolm Sawyer (Leeds University), Sergio Rossi (University of Fribourg), Francesco Saraceno (OFCE, Paris), Felipe Serrano (University of the Basque Country), Lefteris Tsoulfidis (University of Macedonia).
     
  • In the Media | September 2013

    The Loneliest Man in Greece


    By Chanan Tigay
    The New Yorker, September 17, 2013. © 2013 Condé Nast. All Rights Reserved.


    A bullet hole mars the window in the office of Yannis Stournaras, the finance minister of Greece. It is tempting to see it as yet another unpleasant outcome of austerity: in the face of crippling government debt, maybe he can’t afford to fix it.

    But he insists that austerity has nothing to do with his decision to leave the window unrepaired; he’s kept the hole, a pot shot at a predecessor from a 2010 protest, as a “memoir” of the rough path he’s had to hew. The central figure in Greece’s economic maelstrom, Stournaras, a fifty-six-year-old economics professor, has become the face of painful deprivations—firings, tax hikes, slashed wages and pensions—as the country struggles to emerge from its fiscal troubles.

    The concern about whether he has money for renovations isn’t too far-fetched. Recently, the aging wallpaper in a number of Ministry of Finance offices began to crumble, and Stournaras had the rooms painted at a cost of fifteen hundred euros. When word of this extravagance leaked, the rightist newspaper Democracy condemned him as “wasteful.”

    Stournaras laughed as he told me this story; his office appeared to have been furnished sometime during the first Bush Administration. It featured laminate floors, scruffy wood bookshelves, and shiny red sofas arranged in an L. In the waiting room, a month-old copy of the Financial Times grew brittle on an unused coffee table.

    The underlying rot—in the walls and in the economy—long preceded Stournaras’s ascendance. And, by some measures, the belt-tightening is working: two weeks after we spoke, the government reported that the shrinking of Greece’s economy had slowed in the second quarter of this year. Yet Stournaras has, perhaps inevitably, become a target for criticism. In February, a prominent parliamentarian slammed him as “arrogant” after he questioned a prior government’s proclivity for spending. In July, another blasted the “knife he puts against our throats.” In August, a third member of Parliament threatened to seek Stournaras’s removal.

    It is worth noting that the politicians unleashing these attacks were members of Stournaras’s own governing coalition, which includes the conservative New Democracy and the socialist Pasok parties, historical adversaries.

    “There is no friendship at all,” said Theodore Pelagidis, an economist and friend of Stournaras’s. “Yannis is alone.”
     

    In 2010, an alliance
    of international creditors known as the troika—the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund—agreed to bail out Greece to the tune of a hundred and ten billion euros, on the condition that the country starve itself into solvency. When economic problems persisted, the troika agreed to a second rescue package, to be doled out in stages, this one running a hundred and thirty billion euros. By the time Antonis Samaras became Prime Minister in the summer of 2012, Greece was still living up to its reputation as “the last Soviet economy.” The bloated public sector was addicted to outsize salaries and pensions, patronage was rampant, and tax evasion seemed to outpace soccer as the national sport.

    Samaras, representing the New Democracy party, was elected on a promise to slow austerity. Yet in appointing a finance minister, he chose Stournars, an Oxford-educated economist whose work had called for public-sector reductions. Stournaras is widely seen as a straight-talking “technocrat” and not a politician. If the troika demanded austerity, he could push reforms forward without being distracted by an angry political base.

    Within hours of taking office in July of 2012, Stournaras found himself across a table from representatives of the troika. They were back in Athens to decide whether to award a tranche of thirty-one and a half billion euros to a desperate Greece. This time, in return, they wanted even deeper spending cuts.

    Without the billions of euros, Greece risked going broke and being forced out of the eurozone, which Stournaras believed could lead to the collapse of Greek banks and, he told me, “looting of supermarkets.” Squeezed between intense domestic pressure to roll back reductions and what he believed was economic necessity, Stournaras sided with the troika and its austerity program. “We can’t ask for anything from our creditors before we get it back on course,” he had told journalists shortly after taking office. This was not the message many ordinary Greeks wanted to hear, and their representatives in Parliament castigated him. In his defense, Stournaras reëmphasized that Greece had to show skeptical creditors that it could be trusted, by owning up to past indulgences and trying to correct them.

    Negotiations with the troika dragged on for five months. Then, in November of 2012, European finance ministers gathered in Brussels for a series of dramatic meetings to determine Greece’s fate.

    In Belgium, Stournaras negotiated constantly. He went two days without sleep. He quarreled with Austria’s finance minister. He communicated constantly with Samaras. “Our two mobile phones were on fire,” the Prime Minister told me.

    Between meetings, Stournaras shuttled home to Athens to help cajole a reluctant Parliament into passing new austerity legislation to pacify the paymasters in Brussels. The omnibus bill would, among other things, raise the retirement age, cut pensions, and slash lump-sum payments for retirees. A vote was slated for midnight on November 8th—just in time to meet a troika deadline.

    At six o’clock on the evening before the vote, Stournaras introduced an amendment that would have ended the “special salaries” enjoyed by employees at the Hellenic Parliament. The staffers revolted: their union announced an immediate strike that threatened to paralyze Parliament and prevent a vote altogether. With the troika deadline looming, Stournaras was forced to relent. He withdrew his amendment, but did not do so quietly. In an address to Parliament later that evening, he denounced the bitterly anti-austerity parties who had painted him as a puppet of the troika: "We condemn them. Because of what’s at stake tonight, and because of the urgent nature of the bill, I am forced to withdraw the amendment in question. He who has eyes let him see."
    The measures passed, narrowly, setting up Greece’s moment of truth. Would it all be enough to convince the troika that Greece had changed its ways?

    “I’ve called it the ‘thriller,’” said Raphael Moissis, the deputy chairman of the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research, the think tank from which Stournaras was plucked to lead the Ministry of Finance. “We literally stayed up the night to hear whether the Europeans were going to say yes to a restructuring program for Greece, or whether they were going to say ‘the hell with you.’”

    On November 27th, the troika announced that it would release the next round of loans. Greece would remain in the Eurozone. The decision was a victory for Stournaras, one step forward in what he described as a “multifaceted war.”


    But was the triumph
    really so clear-cut?

    One morning in 2009, Chris Spirou was laid off by an Athens bakery. A divorced father, he spent three months looking diligently for a job but found nothing, eventually making his way to Norway and the Netherlands to find work before returning home when his father died. After getting the boot from a friend’s trailer, he suddenly became homeless—an “indescribable” realization, he said.

    “I am below zero. Wrecked. Devastated,” said Spirou, who is fifty-four. He said he feels “hate” for the people who put him in this position: members of Parliament and technocrats like Stournaras. “He doesn’t look at the political cost even if human beings are committing suicide, losing their jobs, their children are hungry.” Austerity, Spirou said, has killed the economy.

    Some prominent economists echo Spirou’s analysis. Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, said that although large-scale cutbacks may in fact be reducing Greece’s budget deficit, these gains have come with “catastrophic consequences”: homelessness, suicides, unemployment, once-comfortable families reduced to rummaging through trash bins.

    Other economists, meanwhile, are asking a larger question: Does austerity even work? Paul Krugman has argued that Europe’s reliance on austerity—not just in Greece—is precisely the opposite of what should be done: according to the logic popularized by John Maynard Keynes, economies falter when people stop spending, and when that happens, only governments can step in as spenders to get things going again.

    Of course, given Greece’s economic woes, the country could not have implemented this theory on its own. Other Europeans, with Germany in the lead, were willing to kick in enough for Athens to close its deficits over a period of years, but they would not offer up sufficient sums for the Greeks to spend their way out of the desert. To the contrary, they insisted on cuts.

    Describing the decisions he made, Stournaras, whose compact, athletic build and frequent smile made him look younger than his years, was resolute. Along with Prime Minister Samaras, he said, he fought to mitigate the pain—by cutting property taxes, for example. But even now, Stournaras—who calls himself a “reconstructed Keynesian”—believes that cuts, though upsetting, are working; unfortunately, there aren’t many other ways to reduce the public-sector deficit, and to forgo the cuts would only damage the economy further.

    “But this is not something easy that you can tell the public,” he said. “That the alternative is Argentina or even Syria.”

    It was muggy during my visit, and while Stournaras spoke, he wore shirtsleeves and a tightly cinched purple tie, having removed a dark suit jacket. He ticked off the government’s accomplishments: an operating budget surplus for the first seven months of this year, increased competitiveness in once-closed markets, and a slowing of the economy’s contraction. Most of which means little to the twenty-eight per cent of Greeks who are out of work, or to those who have suffered debilitating cuts to their pay and pensions.

    “It’s not easy for somebody who was earning two thousand euros suddenly to earn one thousand,” Stournaras said. The cuts he has championed have affected even his own mother. “A poor woman, because my father had died very young,” he said. “So she lives on the minimum pension.”

    How does that make you feel? I asked.

    “Very bad,” said the father of two, his eyes now fixed on his desk. “Very bad, really.”


    Stournaras was born
    in Athens, in 1956. His father was a Communist, he told me, whom “ultra-rightist” gangs persecuted and tried to have arrested; years later, when Stournaras was doing graduate work at Oxford, his father, who died at the age of sixty-two, asked him not to return home because he feared his own politics would haunt his son. Early on, Stournaras took up swimming and still regularly swims long distances. (He also jogs and plays ping-pong.) In his car on the way to a meeting with the Prime Minister, he told me that swimming was the best preparation he received for the rigors of his position. These days, he avoids swimming in pools, which could seem luxurious while other Greeks are forced into homeless shelters. “So I have to train myself and go to the sea,” he said. During a recent six-kilometre swim, the waters near his vacation home on the island of Syros turned rough. When I met him, he was unable to hear from his right ear.

    In many ways, Stournaras is the ideal messenger for Greece’s tough news: he is respected in European economic circles, seen as someone who operates above partisan politics. Before taking office, he was a professor at the University of Athens, chairman and C.E.O. of Emporiki Bank, and advised prior governments. Stournaras was appointed to the Ministry of Finance, not elected. This gives him the freedom to make controversial decisions, but on the flip side, of course, if his policies become too unpopular, Prime Minister Samaras can summarily fire him. The afternoon before I met Stournaras, Michael Massourakis, the chief economist at Alpha Bank, told me that in choosing Stournaras, “the political parties wanted to find somebody who is nonpolitical so they can scapegoat him if things go bad.”

    For the moment that seems unlikely. Although Samaras came to office on a pledge to slow austerity measures and Stournaras has supported them, the two are now friends who work together closely, meeting often, sharing jokes.

    In the midst of our discussion, Stournaras’s phone rang. It was the Prime Minister.

    “I have a reporter here from the The New Yorker,” Stournaras told him. “Shall I put you on?”

    Stournaras activated the speakerphone setting so I could hear. Samaras—laughing knowingly—informed me that despite “previous ideological differences” he and Stournaras share a common goal: keeping Greece in the eurozone.

    “That’s what I told him!” Stournaras said.

    “Do you hear me, Yannis?”

    “Yeah, yeah, I do.”

    “Am I correct in this assessment?”

    “Absolutely.”

    Then Samaras quoted Neil Diamond. “You know that song that says, ‘Used-to-bes don’t count anymore, they just lay on the floor till we sweep them away?’” he said. “The idea is that differences don’t matter as long as there is a common cause that links us together.”

    As Samaras spoke, Stournaras smiled appreciatively. Despite this display of seemingly genuine affection, it was hard for me to forget what I’d been told a day earlier: that for all this friendship, Stournaras could yet prove dispensable.



    Greece still has
    a long way to go. The government is again under pressure from its lenders, with the troika evaluating the country’s economic recovery and money-saving efforts as it weighs a third bailout package. “All the low-hanging fruit has been reaped at this point,” Alpha Bank’s Massourakis said. “It has to do major things that Greek governments were not very eager to do.”

    Future objectives include reforming Greece’s tax system, opening closed markets, and restructuring or even privatizing some public businesses. A new round of protest marches has already begun, with civil servants taking to the streets in late August to oppose planned suspensions and firings.

    “Stournaras is very unlucky in the sense that now people are very tired,” Alexis Papahelas, the executive editor of the respected newspaper Kathimerini, said. “Every time someone hears about a reform, they think they’re going to lose part of their income.”

    Compounding Stournaras’s problems, observers said, is the fact that the Samaras-led coalition, with an advantage of just five seats in Parliament, could be sunk by even a small disagreement. And if the coalition falls apart, many believe it will be succeeded by extremists—from either the far right or the far left, a scenario Samaras called “catastrophic.”

    Nonetheless, a March poll found that Stournaras’s approval rating was unusually high for a finance minister. This may reflect his penchant for directness, and his distance from the political elite that has ruled Greece for decades. When I asked Stournaras why he took his current job—and with it a large pay cut—after having rejected several prior ministerial appointments, he sounded a philosophical note. “Patriotic duty,” he responded. “It’s like being at war and you’re asked to participate and you say no. You cannot say no.”

    Chanan Tigay is the author of the forthcoming book “Unholy Scriptures: Fraud, Suicide, Scandal & the Bible that Rocked the Holy City” (Ecco/HarperCollins).
  • In the Media | September 2013

    Embracing Wynne Godley, an Economist Who Modeled the Crisis


    By Jonathan Schlefer

    The New York Times, September 10, 2013. All rights Reserved.

    Wynn Godley

    BOSTON — With the 2008 financial crisis and Great Recession still a raw and painful memory, many economists are asking themselves whether they need the kind of fundamental shift in thinking that occurred during and after the Depression of the 1930s. “We have entered a brave new world,” Olivier Blanchard, the International Monetary Fund’s chief economist, said at a conference in 2011. “The economic crisis has put into question many of our beliefs. We have to accept the intellectual challenge.”

    If the economics profession takes on the challenge of reworking the mainstream models that famously failed to predict the crisis, it might well turn to one of the few economists who saw it coming, Wynne Godley of the Levy Economics Institute. Mr. Godley, unfortunately, died at 83 in 2010, perhaps too soon to bask in the credit many feel he deserves.

    But his influence has begun to spread. Martin Wolf, the eminent columnist for The Financial Times, and Jan Hatzius, chief economist of global investment research at Goldman Sachs, borrow from his approach. Several groups of economists in North America and Europe — some supported by the Institute for New Economic Thinking established by the financier and philanthropist George Soros after the crisis — are building on his models.

    In a 2011 study, Dirk J. Bezemer, of Groningen University in the Netherlands, found a dozen experts who warned publicly about a broad economic threat, explained how debt would drive it, and specified a time frame.

    Most, like Nouriel Roubini of New York University, issued warnings in informal notes. But Mr. Godley “was the most scientific in the sense of having a formal model,” Dr. Bezemer said.

    It was far from a first for Mr. Godley. In January 2000, the Council of Economic Advisers for President Bill Clinton hailed a still “youthful-looking and vigorous” expansion. That March, Mr. Godley and L. Randall Wray of the University of Missouri-Kansas City derided it, declaring, “Goldilocks is doomed.” Within days, the Nasdaq stock market peaked, heralding the end of the dot-com bubble.

    Why does a model matter? It explicitly details an economist’s thinking, Dr. Bezemer says. Other economists can use it. They cannot so easily clone intuition.

    Mr. Godley was relatively obscure in the United States. He was better known in his native Britain — The Times of London called him “the most insightful macroeconomic forecaster of his generation” — though often as a renegade.

    Mainstream models assume that, as individuals maximize their self-interest, markets move the economy to equilibrium. Booms and busts come from outside forces, like erratic government spending or technological dynamism or stagnation. Banks are at best an afterthought.

    The Godley models, by contrast, see banks as central, promoting growth but also posing threats. Households and firms take out loans to build homes or invest in production. But their expectations can go awry, they wind up with excessive debt, and they cut back. Markets themselves drive booms and busts.

    Why did Mr. Godley, who had barely any formal economics training, insist on developing a model to inform his judgment? His extraordinary efforts to overcome a troubled childhood may be part of the explanation. Tiago Mata of Cambridge University called his life “a search for his true voice” in the face of “nagging fear that he might disappoint [his] responsibilities.”

    Mr. Godley once described his early years as shackled by an “artificial self” that kept him from recognizing his own spontaneous reactions to people and events. His parents separated bitterly. His mother was often away on artistic adventures, and when at home, she spent long hours coddling what she called “my pain” in bed.

    Raised by nannies and “a fierce maiden aunt who shook me violently when I cried,” Mr. Godley was sent at age 7 to a prep school he called a “chamber of horrors.”

    Despite all that, Mr. Godley, with his extraordinary talent, still managed to achieve worldly success. He graduated from Oxford with a first in philosophy, politics and economics in 1947, studied at the Paris Conservatory, and became principal oboist of the BBC Welsh Orchestra.

    But “nightmarish fears of letting everyone down,” he recalled, drove him to take a job as an economist at the Metal Box Company. Moving to the British Treasury in 1956, he rose to become head of short-term forecasting. He was appointed director of the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge in 1970.

    In the early 1980s, the British Tory government, allied with increasingly conventional economists at Cambridge, began “sharpening its knives to stab Wynne,” according to Kumaraswamy Velupillai, a close friend who now teaches at the New School in New York. They killed the policy group he headed and, ultimately, the Department of Applied Economics.

    But after warning of a crash of the British pound in 1992 that took official forecasters by surprise, Mr. Godley was appointed to a panel of “six wise men” advising the Treasury.

    In 1995 he moved to the Levy Institute outside New York, joining Hyman Minsky, whose “financial instability hypothesis” won recognition during the 2008 crisis.

    Marc Lavoie of the University of Ottawa collaborated with Mr. Godley to write “Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth” in 2006, which turned out to be the most complete account he would publish of his modeling approach.

    In mainstream economic models, individuals are supposed to optimize the trade-off between consuming today versus saving for the future, among other things. To do so, they must live in a remarkably predictable world.

    Mr. Godley did not see how such optimization is conceivable. There are simply too many unknowns, he theorized.

    Instead, Mr. Godley built his economic model around the idea that sectors — households, production firms, banks, the government — largely follow rules of thumb.

    For example, firms add a standard profit markup to their costs for labor and other inputs. They try to maintain adequate inventories so they can satisfy demand without accumulating excessive overstock. If sales disappoint and inventories pile up, they correct by cutting back production and laying off workers.

    In mainstream models, the economy settles at an equilibrium where supply equals demand. To Mr. Godley, like some Keynesian economists, the economy is demand-driven and less stable than many traditional economists assume.

    Instead of supply and demand guiding the economy to equilibrium, adjustments can be abrupt. Borrowing “flows” build up as debt “stocks.”

    If rules of thumb suggest to households, firms, or the government that borrowing, debt or other things have gone out of whack, they may cut back. Or banks may cut lending. The high-flying economy falls down.

    Mr. Godley and his colleagues expressed just this concern in the mid-2000s. In April 2007, they plugged Congressional Budget Office projections of government spending and healthy growth into their model. For these to be borne out, the model said, household borrowing must reach 14 percent of G.D.P. by 2010.

    The authors declared this situation “wildly implausible.” More likely, borrowing would level off, bringing growth “almost to zero.” In repeated papers, they foresaw a looming recession but significantly underestimated its depth.

    For all Mr. Godley’s foresight, even economists who are doubtful about traditional economic thinking do not necessarily see the Godley-Lavoie models as providing all the answers. Charles Goodhart of the London School of Economics called them a “gallant failure” in a review. He applauded their realism, especially the way they allowed sectors to make mistakes and correct, rather than assuming that individuals foresee the future. But they are still, he wrote, “insufficient” in crises.

    Gennaro Zezza of the University of Cassino in Italy, who collaborated with Mr. Godley on a model of the American economy, concedes that he and his colleagues still need to develop better ways of describing how a financial crisis will spread. But he said the Godley-Lavoie approach already is useful to identify unsustainable processes that precede a crisis.

    “If everyone had remained optimistic in 2007, the process could have continued for another one or two or three years,” he said. “But eventually it would have broken down. And in a much more violent way, because debt would have piled up even more.”

    Dr. Lavoie says that one of the models he helped develop does make a start at tracing the course of a crisis. It allows for companies to default on loans, eroding banks’ profits and causing them to raise interest rates: “At the very least, we were looking in the right direction.”

    This is just the direction that economists building on Mr. Godley’s models are now exploring, incorporating “agents” — distinct types of households, firms and banks, not unlike creatures in a video game — that respond flexibly to economic circumstances. Stephen Kinsella of the University of Limerick, the Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz and Mauro Gallegati of Polytechnic University of Marche in Italy are collaborating on one such effort.

    In the meantime, Mr. Godley’s disciples say his record of forecasting still stands out. In 2007 Mr. Godley and Dr. Lavoie published a prescient model of euro zone finances, envisioning three outcomes: soaring interest rates in Southern Europe, huge European Central Bank loans to the region or brutal fiscal cuts. In effect, the euro zone has cycled among those outcomes.

    So what do the Godley models predict now? A recent Levy Institute analysis expresses concern not about serious financial imbalances, at least in the United States, but weak global demand. “The main difficulty,” they wrote, “has been in convincing economic leaders of the nature of the main problem: insufficient aggregate demand.” So far, they are not having much success.

    A version of this article appears in print on September 11, 2013, on page B1 of the New York edition with the headline: Embracing Economist Who Modeled the Crisis.

  • In the Media | August 2013

    Greece: Can It Get Even Worse?


    By Ronald Janssen

    Social Europe Journal, August 27, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    While the German public opinion, courtesy of the debate in the run up to the next political elections, is discovering the fact that Greece will be needing a third bail out, a team of economists from the US – based Levy Institute describes how things look like from the side of Greece.

    Click here for the full article.

  • In the Media | August 2013

    Greece Needs a 21st Century Marshall Plan


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Ekathimerini.com, August 12, 2013. © 2013 H Kaθhmepinh. All Rights Reserved.

    At their White House meeting last week, U.S. President Barack Obama assured Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras of his support as Greece prepares for talks with creditors on additional debt relief amid record-high unemployment.

    The U.S. should also endorse a new blueprint for recovery based on one of the most successful economic assistance programs of the modern era: the Marshall Plan.

    It is clear by now that the European Union’s policies in Greece have failed. Projections that government spending cutbacks would stop the economy’s free-fall proved to be wildly optimistic. The 240 billion euro ($319 billion) bailout from the euro area and International Monetary Fund has shown little sign of success, and Greece is experiencing its sixth year of recession.

    The spending cuts and tax increases, along with the dismissal of huge numbers of public-sector employees, demanded as a condition of the loans and assistance have only deepened the economic pain.

    Instead of changing course, however, euro-area economists have responded to bad news by revising their forecasts to reflect lower expectations. Those numbers document a staggering record of mistaken assumptions that has led to today’s failure.

    In December 2010, the so-called troika of lenders—the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund—predicted that their measures would move Greece’s unemployment rate to just under 15 percent by 2014. A year later, it changed the forecast to almost 20 percent.

    This month, the Hellenic Statistical Authority reported that unemployment rose to a record in May, with a seasonally adjusted jobless rate of 27.6 percent. The rate was 64.9 percent for people 15 to 24.

    Bold declarations that belt-tightening would produce growth have been pared back, too. Since 2010, the troika has gradually dropped its forecast for 2014 gross domestic product (in money terms) by almost 40 percent. IMF staff reported last week that GDP contracted 6.4 percent in 2012 and will drop 4.2 percent this year before expanding only a little in 2014.

    Yet, despite admissions that mistakes were certainly made, no consideration is being given to ending austerity measures. Nor has there been effort to devise a renewal agenda for Greece. The Marshall Plan offers a spectacularly successful model that could easily be adapted.

    Greece last faced economic ruin immediately after World War II. By 1949, the country was bankrupt, with virtually no industry; transportation networks, farmland and villages had been devastated, and about a quarter of the population was homeless.

    Marshall Plan funds allowed Greece to rebuild, start power utilities, finance businesses and aid the poor. And, because social chaos had created an opening for communist and extremist parties, the U.S. hoped the stimulus would stabilize democracy, even as it created wealth.

    Like other Marshall Plan nations, Greece experienced growth on a scale it had never known. The astonishing transformation was widely hailed as an “economic miracle,” and the nation continued to surge more than 20 years after the assistance ended.

    With that enormous achievement in mind, the Levy Economics Institute has constructed a macroeconomic model of what a Marshall-type recovery plan could do for the Greek economy today. We assumed a modest stimulus from EU institutions of 30 billion euros between 2013 and 2016 that would be directed at public consumption and investment, and particularly jobs. Here is how an EU-funded plan for recovery could succeed. Although past bailout funds benefited banks and financial institutions, with a large portion devoted to interest payments for creditors, the new program would focus on debt forgiveness, and then turn to reconstruction projects to rebuild national infrastructure and create public projects at the local level.

    A rebuilding plan could address Greece’s tremendous need to renovate schools, hospitals, libraries, parks, roads and bridges. Forests need to be replenished: Catastrophic fires have led to deforestation. Tourism once accounted for more than 25 percent of the economy; now, extraordinary beach cleanups are badly needed to attract visitors.

    University graduates, after having been trained at public expense, are now forced to seek opportunity outside Greece. They could make valuable contributions, introducing information technology and other know-how to the government, health and education sectors.

    These efforts could draw an idled, but ready and trained labor force, to construction, education, social service and technology. More employment would increase aggregate demand, which is now severely depressed. In turn, the multiplier effect of these expenditures would increase GDP substantially.

    Instead, Greece is applying “expansive austerity.” The idea is based on a contested theory, and the real-world results have been a humanitarian disaster. These policies are lowering demand by reducing incomes, which cuts into tax revenue. The inevitable result is higher deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios.

    For comparison, we modeled what we expect to happen in the coming years if Greece stays on its scheduled fiscal diet. The government has consistently been unable to meet troika-mandated deficit-reduction targets, and the lenders have consistently required further cutbacks.

    The results of our modeling exercise were clear: Under today’s policies, unemployment would continue to increase, reaching almost 34 percent by the end of 2016. Under a Marshall Plan scenario, the rate would fall to about 20 percent.

    Similarly, if Greece institutes the currently planned austerity measures, we calculate that its gross domestic product would reach about 158 billion euros by the end of 2016, compared with 162 billion euros projected for 2013. That would be more than 15 billion euros short of the troika-mandated target.

    If, alternatively, government squeezes harder to meet the required deficit-to-GDP ratio goals, the endgame will be even worse: A poor and increasingly out of work population, among other factors, will push GDP to about 148 billion euros, more than 30 percent below its 2008 peak. A Marshall Plan scenario would put GDP a little above the troika’s target.

    The first Marshall Plan wasn’t an act of charity or a bailout: It was an effective investment strategy to create a vibrant European economic market and prevent political disintegration. To institute a modern version, we need to revise discredited austerity theories—or the euro-area institutions that promote them.

    *Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
     
  • In the Media | August 2013

    Greece Needs a 21st Century Marshall Plan


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Bloomberg, August 11, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    At their White House meeting last week, U.S. President Barack Obama assured Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras of his support as Greece prepares for talks with creditors on additional debt relief amid record-high unemployment.

    The U.S. should also endorse a new blueprint for recovery based on one of the most successful economic assistance programs of the modern era: the Marshall Plan.

    It is clear by now that the European Union’s policies in Greece have failed. Projections that government spending cutbacks would stop the economy’s free-fall proved to be wildly optimistic.

    The 240 billion euro ($319 billion) bailout from the euro area and International Monetary Fund has shown little sign of success, and Greece is experiencing its sixth year of recession.

    The spending cuts and tax increases, along with the dismissal of huge numbers of public-sector employees, demanded as a condition of the loans and assistance have only deepened the economic pain.

    Instead of changing course, however, euro-area economists have responded to bad news by revising their forecasts to reflect lower expectations. Those numbers document a staggering record of mistaken assumptions that has led to today’s failure.

    Shifting Forecasts
    In December 2010, the so-called troika of lenders—the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund—predicted that their measures would move Greece’s unemployment rate to just under 15 percent by 2014. A year later, it changed the forecast to almost 20 percent.

    This month, the Hellenic Statistical Authority reported that unemployment rose to a record in May, with a seasonally adjusted jobless rate of 27.6 percent. The rate was 64.9 percent for people 15 to 24.

    Bold declarations that belt-tightening would produce growth have been pared back, too. Since 2010, the troika has gradually dropped its forecast for 2014 gross domestic product (in money terms) by almost 40 percent. IMF staff reported last week that GDP contracted 6.4 percent in 2012 and will drop 4.2 percent this year before expanding only a little in 2014.

    Yet, despite admissions that mistakes were certainly made, no consideration is being given to ending austerity measures. Nor has there been effort to devise a renewal agenda for Greece. The Marshall Plan offers a spectacularly successful model that could easily be adapted.

    Greece last faced economic ruin immediately after World War II. By 1949, the country was bankrupt, with virtually no industry; transportation networks, farmland and villages had been devastated, and about a quarter of the population was homeless.

    Marshall Plan funds allowed Greece to rebuild, start power utilities, finance businesses and aid the poor. And, because social chaos had created an opening for communist and extremist parties, the U.S. hoped the stimulus would stabilize democracy, even as it created wealth.

    Like other Marshall Plan nations, Greece experienced growth on a scale it had never known. The astonishing transformation was widely hailed as an “economic miracle,” and the nation continued to surge more than 20 years after the assistance  ended.

    With that enormous achievement in mind, the Levy Economics Institute has constructed a macroeconomic model of what a Marshall-type recovery plan could do for the Greek economy today. We assumed a modest stimulus from EU institutions of 30 billion euros between 2013 and 2016 that would be directed at public consumption and investment, and particularly jobs.

    Debt Forgiveness
    Here is how an EU-funded plan for recovery could succeed. Although past bailout funds benefited banks and financial institutions, with a large portion devoted to interest payments for creditors, the new program would focus on debt forgiveness, and then turn to reconstruction projects to rebuild national infrastructure and create public projects at the local level.

    A rebuilding plan could address Greece’s tremendous need to renovate schools, hospitals, libraries, parks, roads and bridges. Forests need to be replenished: Catastrophic fires have led to deforestation. Tourism once accounted for more than 25 percent of the economy; now, extraordinary beach cleanups are badly needed to attract visitors.

    University graduates, after having been trained at public expense, are now forced to seek opportunity outside Greece. They could make valuable contributions, introducing information technology and other know-how to the government, health and education sectors.

    These efforts could draw an idled, but ready and trained labor force, to construction, education, social service and technology. More employment would increase aggregate demand, which is now severely depressed. In turn, the multiplier effect of these expenditures would increase GDP substantially.
    Instead, Greece is applying “expansive austerity.” The idea is based on a contested theory, and the real-world results have been a humanitarian disaster. These policies are lowering demand by reducing incomes, which cuts into tax revenue. The inevitable result is higher deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios.

    For comparison, we modeled what we expect to happen in the coming years if Greece stays on its scheduled fiscal diet. The government has consistently been unable to meet troika-mandated deficit-eduction targets, and the lenders have consistently required further cutbacks.

    The results of our modeling exercise were clear: Under today’s policies, unemployment would continue to increase, reaching almost 34 percent by the end of 2016. Under a Marshall Plan scenario, the rate would fall to about 20 percent.

    Shrinking GDP
    Similarly, if Greece institutes the currently planned austerity measures, we calculate that its gross domestic product would reach about 158 billion euros by the end of 2016, compared with 162 billion euros projected for 2013. That would be more than 15 billion euros short of the troika-mandated target.

    If, alternatively, government squeezes harder to meet the required deficit-to-GDP ratio goals, the endgame will be even worse: A poor and increasingly out of work population, among other factors, will push GDP to about 148 billion euros, more than 30 percent below its 2008 peak. A Marshall Plan scenario would put GDP a little above the troika’s target.

    The first Marshall Plan wasn’t an act of charity or a bailout: It was an effective investment strategy to create a vibrant European economic market and prevent political disintegration. To institute a modern version, we need to revise discredited austerity theories—or the euro-area institutions that promote them.

    (Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.)
  • In the Media | August 2013

    Amnesty for Undocumented Immigrants Would Not Burden US Economy—Levy Economics Institute


    By Ellen Freilich

    Reuters, August 9, 2013. © Thomson Reuters. All Rights Reserved.

    The recently passed Senate bill—S. 744, or the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act—that would take significant steps toward comprehensive reform, is being held up in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, with a “path to citizenship” for undocumented immigrants the apparent sticking point.

    A recent report from the Congressional Budget Office estimated the following:

    All told, relative to the committee-approved bill, the Senate-passed legislation would boost direct spending by about $36 billion, reduce revenues by about $3 billion, and increase discretionary costs related to S. 744 by less than $1 billion over the 2014-2023 period.

    Nathan Sheets and Robert Sockin at Citigroup are even more sweeping in their endorsement of immigration’s economic upside:

    We find that immigration has been a major driver of growth in the United States, the euro area, and the United Kingdom. Specifically, we find that about one-third of the growth in these economies over the past decade can be attributed to immigration. Stated bluntly, the average immigrant appears to have contributed roughly as much to GDP as the average person in the domestic-born population. We also find that a more rapid pace of immigrant inflows in the decades ahead will result in a corresponding increase in the level and growth rate of GDP.

    Yet according to a report rom the Levy Economics Institute, a liberal research group at Bard College, these broad endorsements fail to push back appropriately against the specific claim that is the law’s major point of contention: the purported economic costs of granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants.

    The Levy research argues that “legalizing a significant proportion of the undocumented immigrant population would not impose serious costs on either the economy in general or the social insurance system in particular.”

    In fact, author Selçuk Eren, a Levy research scholar, finds maintaining the status quo would be economically wasteful.

    Legalization would lead to increased benefit payouts for social insurance programs, since it would make a portion of the currently undocumented population eligible for benefits. At the same time, bringing undocumented immigrants into the legal labor pool would boost capital accumulation in the U.S. economy, the Institute said. Compared to legal immigrants, undocumented workers end up sending more of their savings back to their home countries as remittances.

    Moreover, offering a path to legal immigration status should increase labor productivity as newly legalized immigrants become able to better match their skills to the jobs available without having to maneuver through the shadows of the grey labor market.

    When we ran the numbers on a scenario in which 50 percent of undocumented immigrants became legal immigrants, the positive effects of the former outweighed the costs of the latter, leading to net benefits in the form of overall increases in capital stock, output, consumption, and labor productivity. These positive macroeconomic effects would also feed into improvements in the finances of the social insurance system.

    As a result, the overall costs to the system would ultimately be negligible: in order to support new beneficiaries, Social Security and unemployment insurance tax rates would need to increase by only 0.13 and 0.01 percentage points, respectively. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity we assumed that all currently undocumented immigrants pay into Social Security and unemployment insurance.

    Macroeconomic improvements would be fairly modest, amounting to around one- to two-tenths of 1 percent for many measures, the report said. The Institute also estimates an overall contribution of $36 billion per year to the U.S. economy. But while small, that’s hardly a downside.

    Still,  Eren concludes:

    We cannot reasonably oppose comprehensive immigration reform on the basis of the alleged economic burden of offering a pathway to citizenship. Even when we isolate this most controversial element of reform, maintaining the status quo is the most costly option.

  • In the Media | August 2013

    Austerity's Failure in Greece: Time to Think the Unthinkable


    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Truthout, August 7, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Further austerity can only worsen Greece's economic plight, particularly already-catastrophic unemployment, warns Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute, according to the Institute's macro-economic model. But "unthinkable" economic policies—suggested by conservative and progressive economists alike—could.

    In early 2010, Greece's staggering deficit/debt problems turned into a major financial crisis when its sovereign debt was downgraded by rating agencies into junk territory, freezing Greece out of international capital markets. On May of that year, Europe and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a €110 billion financing plan for Greece, which involved major budget cuts, slashes in wages and pensions, sharp tax increases, labor market reforms and privatization of state assets—i.e., a financing plan with the usual neoliberal adjustment strings attached. The plan was such a flop that it led less than two years later to a second bailout program worth €130 billion, which included even harsher structural adjustment and austerity measures than the first loan agreement.

    The primary aim of the first financial bailout of Greece was the repayment of loans, mainly to German and France banks, which were highly exposed to Greek sovereign debt. Today—and after a rather large haircut for private holders of Greek debt—most Greek public debt is held by the official sector—European Union (EU) government treasuries, the IMF, and the European Central Bank (ECB).

    Greece's financial sovereignty is under the direct command of the troika of the European Commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB), and virtually all of the money received by Greece's international lenders and through the privatization of state assets and publicly owned enterprises goes toward the repayment of debt. In the meantime, the Greek economy and society are administered shock therapy of the kind described by Naomi Klein in her book The Shock Doctrine, with the explicit aim of institutionalizing an extreme neoliberal order. Already, Greek wages are being steadily reduced to 1970s levels (the actual intent is to bring Greek wages in line with those of other Balkan nations—i.e., Bulgaria, Romania); workers' rights have all but disappeared; social public services are being dismantled and the unemployment rate, currently at 27.4%, is the highest in the European Union. Amazingly enough, IMF, EU and Greek government officials treat these developments as evidence that the Greek program is on the right track—in fact, insisting on more austerity measures.

    In the midst of this economic catastrophe, Greece is experiencing social decomposition not seen in Western societies since the end of the second world war—highlighted by the massive shrinkage of the middle class and the meteoric rise of the new poor—and a profound political crisis, underlined by the complete distrust exhibited by 90% of the population toward the government and the parliament (i.e., the political system as a whole). According to the same recent poll, 80% of the population mistrusts the European Union, while 68% brace themselves for worse days ahead. It is no surprise, therefore, that the sharpest rise of a neo-Nazi party in all of Europe is taking place today in Greece. Most of the support for Golden Dawn, a political party of thugs whose members do their best to imitate Hitler's "brown shirts," comes from unemployed and uneducated youth.

    On the positive side, Greece's Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) has also surged in the polls, receiving in the last round of national elections, held in June 2012, nearly 27% of the popular vote, slightly less than three percentage points below the conservatives who came first. In the 2009 national elections, Syriza had managed to attract only 4.6% of the popular vote. However, in the event of a victory in the next elections, the challenges it faces are daunting: Will it form a government with the conservatives? If not, will it opt for political anarchy? Will it be able to secure the renegotiation of the loan terms with the troika, which has so far been its main strategy for dealing with the catastrophe of Greece? If not, will it force Greece out of the euro?

    The international bailouts of Greece have been an unmitigated economic and social disaster, as a recently released econometric analysis of the Greek economic crisis by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College attests, dispelling EU/IMF and Greek government officials' myths and lies about the alleged success of the Greek program. Even so, the options for the future of Greece remain starkly limited.

    In an interview for Truthout, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, executive vice president and Jerome Levy Professor of Economics at Bard, discusses with C. J. Polychroniou (a research associate and policy fellow at the Levy Institute and columnist for the Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia) the findings of the Institute's study on the Greek economic crisis and their implications for the future of Greece.

    The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College has just published a major econometric analysis of the impact of "expansionary austerity" in Greece, with you as its lead author, which contradicts European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) claims that the experiment is producing positive results and actually makes a mockery of the Greek government's portrayal of the experiment as a "success story." How would you summarize the state of the Greek economy?

    This is the sixth year of Greece's Great Depression, with an economy in free fall after the EU/IMF austerity kicked into effect as part of the May 2010 bailout agreement, a policy which not only continues unabated but insists on an even higher dosage of the same medicine when the patient's condition deteriorates. The Greek GDP shrank by almost 5% in 2010, by over 7% in 2011, by 6.5% in 2012, and it is expected to shrink by an additional 4.5-5% by the end of 2013. The country's unemployment rate hit double digits shortly after the austerity measures were implemented and is currently above 27%. As expected, poverty and inequality have skyrocketed during the last three and a half years, and suicides plague a nation that was traditionally immune to such phenomena. Moreover, in spite of all the sacrifices made by average Greek citizens who have seen their standard of living reduced to 1970s levels because of major cuts in wages, social benefits and pensions and sharp tax increases as part of the classic IMF structural adjustment program imposed by the country's international lenders and followed by the compliant Greek governments, the nation's debt has been steadily increasing and currently stands at 160.50% of the GDP even after a large "haircut" of sovereign debt held by the private sector took place in 2012.

    In this context, it is simply mind boggling that anyone can possibly consider such outcomes as positive signs of an economic policy at work, let alone a "success story." But the dreadful economic and social trends we are witnessing are not surprising at all; on the contrary, they were long expected as consequences of discredited economic dogmas associated with neoliberalism. The simulations of the Levy Institute's specially constructed stock-flow macro-model show clearly that any fiscal consolidation during recessionary times does not result in a "success story" but, instead, in further economic decline.

    The ongoing Greek catastrophe is so immense that it staggers the imagination. Reversing Greece's downward economic trend poses now severe policy challenges as the options have become truly narrow. In the course of three and a half years of wild neoliberal experimentation, Greece has been transformed from an advanced economy into an emerging economy on the verge of a humanitarian crisis.

    Indeed, on what grounds then did the IMF and the EU expect austerity to work in the case of Greece, especially when the economy was already in a recession, and why don't they terminate this dangerous pursuit when all economic evidence is stacked against it?

    Recent reports from the IMF reveal that concerns from employees of the Fund about the first bailout program succeeding were voiced in 2010. But it's obvious that they were ignored and, instead of doing the obvious, that is, providing Greece with a much larger bailout program and in the spirit of true assistance rather than in the spirit of punishment, they focused on saving large French and German banks from incurring big losses on their holdings of Greek sovereign debt and, in so doing, hoping to prevent erosion of investors' confidence and contagion for other Eurozone highly indebted countries like Spain and Italy.

    Both the IMF and the EU produced rather optimistic scenarios about the effects of their policies on Greece, but all their projections were based on faulty evaluations of the country's public finances and erroneous estimates of the fiscal multipliers and their effect on austerity for an economy already in recession. However, despite the Fund's admission of big errors, both the IMF and the EU dismiss the need for either a revision or termination of the program, insisting dogmatically in turn that the program is "broadly correct." In the end, though, they will have to consider yet another debt restructuring before terminating the program, since the failure of the Greek program may seal the ultimate demise of the Fund and the dissolution of the Eurozone.

    One of the major arguments often made by troika in defense of neoliberal economic reforms in Greece is that the nation's labor market is highly inflexible. How does one define inflexible labor markets, and do they actually exact a high economic toll as neoliberals claim that they do?

    The word "inflexible" is cosmetic; it means workers should not be protected by strong unions with bargaining agreements covering wages and benefits, adhering to hiring and separation, and nondiscrimination clauses with recourse to state authority for noncompliance. The neoliberal doctrine makes no distinction between product and labor markets. But labor is not like rice where its price is bid up or pushed down dependent on supply and demand. In this line of thought, labor is simply a cost that can be cut and not an asset that can be developed. More and more evidence provides contrary results to those claimed by the neoliberal thinking.

    Wages have been dramatically cut in Greece, yet the unemployment rate continues to rise. Who benefits from low-income workers?

    Based on a Harmonized Competitiveness Indicator measuring unit labor costs, the relative Greek unit labor costs have decreased more than in any other Eurozone member country except for Germany, which systematically maintains lower values by severely suppressing wages. Despite the lower wages, unemployment is soaring because the country is in a deepening recession caused by the continuing and ever stronger grip of austerity that compresses both private and public consumption and investment. Under these circumstances, rising unemployment will further push wages downward - benefiting the private corporate sector, to be sure, much smaller now than its precrisis size. And as it has been widely reported, in Greece, many workers are either not "officially" employed, or paid regularly (in many private sector jobs workers are paid in small installments or are unpaid for several months) and/or have their social insurance contributions made on their behalf. Above all, the declining fortunes do not affect consumer prices that are continuously rising, pushing more and more people into deeper poverty.

    Both the Greek government and the EU have shown remarkable indifference so far to the problem of unemployment in Greece, which, among other things, has led to the increasing strength of the neo-Nazi party "Golden Dawn." Why isn't anything being done to address the unemployment problem?

    I don't think the Greek government is indifferent to the scourge of unemployment. But once you are forced to accept other people's money you have no choice but to abide with conditions placed from the lenders. Lenders are indifferent about lost output and unemployment, rising poverty and all other social and economic ills that come along. Where a government can be faulted is in its very poor negotiation skills with its lenders. The Greek governments clearly did not play their cards right against Berlin, Brussels and Frankfurt and Washington. The Greek governments can be blamed for continuously accepting even harsher austerity, pretending that ideological shifts are divorced from the economic conditions emanating from its very actions. The blame game is already a tired and unconvincing ploy.

    The econometric analysis on the state of the Greek economy involves model simulations in order to assess the impact of austerity for the next three years. What should we expect if the current policies of austerity continue?

    Our projections, which are derived from a stock-flow-consistent macroeconomic model especially constructed for Greece, show the faulty design of the troika program that yields inconsistent targets of deficit to GDP ratios, growth of GDP and unemployment. Our own simulations show that, should the agreed program of austerity continue unrevised, it will deliver a rising unemployment - reaching a high rate of 34% by the end of 2016, contradicting the troika's corresponding rate of slightly more than 20%. It is astonishing to think that even if their projections are correct - and there is plenty of evidence from their past four worsening revisions that they are not - that a higher than 20% unemployment should render the effort "successful."

    Greek political life is undergoing profound changes, and the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) has an historic opportunity to rise to power. What should it do in the event that it forms a government but fails to compel Greece's international lenders to put an end to the vicious austerity measures and the ongoing national catastrophe?

    A progressive party like Syriza may have the unique opportunity by its sheer rise to power to engage in a different sort of negotiation. We should not forget that there is already a division in the house of troika. If Syriza were able to band with the other South European Eurozone members, this can become easier. Irrespective of this synergy, the division between the IMF and the European Commission can turn out to be advantageous to the strategy that Syriza has advocated: suspension of interest payments until growth emerges and then resumption of interest payments linked to GDP growth.

    Furthermore, this will need to be supplemented with a higher allocation of structural funds with no matching contribution for a number of years. (More than 40 billion euros have been paid toward interest that can be refunded). This can be made possible only if the present government's pronouncements of achieving a primary budget balance are realized. If this is not achievable—most likely it is not—then the options are more or less of the unthinkable sort. This includes the introduction of a parallel national nonconvertible currency, including government tax-based bonds traded and used for payment of taxes at par. The parallel currency can start with government consumption expenditures including the instituting of a carefully designed and monitored guaranteed public service employment program as advocated by the late Hyman Minsky. The experience of such jobs programs is encouraging. Design, monitoring and evaluation of the program would be under the aegis of a central state authority with many regional branches along the lines of the successfully designed Americorps structure in the US. The parallel currency will eventually replace the euro for all internal transactions, but more importantly, as mentioned, it will not be convertible to the euro—avoiding speculative attacks. Even though this may sound like a radical idea, it has been suggested by many conservative and progressive economists alike. 
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    C. J. Polychroniou
  • In the Media | August 2013

    Financial Benefits of Legalizing Undocumented Immigrants Outweigh Costs


    By Mike Sunnucks
    The benefits of legalizing many of the 11 million undocumented immigrants under business-backed reforms being considered by Congress outweigh the costs.

    That is according to a new study by the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in New York.

    A white paper by Selcuk Eren contends legalized unauthorized immigrants would leave under-the-table jobs and start paying Social Security and other taxes, get better paying jobs and may save and spend more on their lives here in the U.S. rather than sending that money back to family in Mexico and other home countries.

    “Legalization should be expected to increase the level of capitalization in the U.S. economy,” Eren said.

    Immigrants send as much as $25 billion a year back to home countries, according to the Center for Immigration Studies.

    In many cases, undocumented immigrants also live on cash without credit cards or even bank accounts.

    Business and economic advocates of legalization argue the reform bill in Congress will bring those workers out of the shadows and into the mainstream economy.

    Eren acknowledges legalizing undocumented immigrants could add some strains on social services and welfare programs, but concludes the economic benefits outweigh those costs.

    A study earlier this year by Arizona State University's Morrison Institute expects legalization to increase immigrants’ wages by as much as $3,100 each per year. The ASU report said immigrants with legal status can get better jobs and earn higher wages than those being paid under the table or working with fake identification. Currently, unauthorized immigrants in Arizona make $27,100 a year on average.

    A Congressional Budget Office report also expects reforms — if passed by Congress — to hike immigrants wages by 12 percent. But the same report said American worker wages would remain flat or decline slightly over the next two decades if reforms pass.

    National and Arizona business interests are pushing hard for reforms to pass Congress. Agriculture and construction companies as well as chambers of commerce in Arizona back reforms as do high-tech CEOs such as Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, Google’s Eric Schmimdt and Yahoo’s Marissa Meyer. The reform bill increases the number of foreign worker visas, including for engineers and high-tech workers.
  • In the Media | July 2013

    A Marshall Plan for Greece


    By Ellen Freilich
    Reuters, July 30, 2013. @2013 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved. 

    The spectacular failure of “expansionary austerity” policies has set Greece on a path worse than the Great Depression, according to a study from the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.

    Using their newly-constructed macroeconomic model for Greece, the Levy scholars recommend a recovery strategy similar to the Marshall Plan to increase public consumption and investment.

    “A Marshall-type recovery plan directed at public consumption and investment is realistic and has worked in the past,” the authors of the report said.

    Employment in Greece is in free fall, with more than one million jobs lost since October 2008 — a drop of more than 28 percent, leaving the “official” unemployment rate in March at 27.4 percent, the highest level seen in any industrialized country in the free world during the last 30 years, the Levy Institute scholars said.

    The study argues the austerity policies espoused by the “troika,” the group of international lenders who funded Greece’s bailouts, have failed and that continuing those prescriptions will only worsen Greece’s jobs, growth, and deficit outlook.

    “With joblessness in Greece now above 27 percent – a stark indicator of the troika’s failure to accurately project the consequences of their own policies, it’s astonishing that (European Commission) and (International Monetary Fund) officials continue to ask for more of the same,” Levy Institute President Dimitri Papadimitriou and Research Scholars Michalis Nikiforos and Gennaro Zezza wrote in their analysis.

    “The Greek Economic Crisis and the Experience of Austerity: A Strategic Analysis,” seeks answers to Greece’s downward spiral of lost growth and employment combined with higher public deficits and debt.

    That spiral is the consequence of “foolish policy” enacted by the Greek government as it tried to comply with the terms of a fiscal consolidation program imposed by its international lenders, the economists said.

    Using the Levy Institute macroeconomic model of the Greek economy, or LIMG – a stock-flow consistent model similar to the Institute’s model of the U.S. economy, the Levy scholars analyze the economic crisis in Greece and recommend policies to restore growth and increase employment.

    Based on the LIMG simulations, the authors found that a continuation of austerity policies would lead to lower GDP and higher unemployment numbers than those forecast by the troika.

    In their baseline scenario, the authors contend that, based on the troika’s projections for changes in government revenues and outlays, GDP will grow more slowly and the unemployment rate will rise more sharply (to near 34 percent by the end of 2016) than the troika contends they will.

    The baseline scenario asserts that deficit targets will not be met, with the deficit-to-GDP ratio reaching 7.6 percent by 2016.

    Meeting the troika’s deficit targets, the LIMG model shows, would cause GDP and employment to decline even further than in the baseline scenario – another example of the “faulty thinking” used to support the troika’s projections, which the Levy scholars call too optimistic.

    “In addition to the errors in the values of the fiscal multipliers and the doctrine of ‘expansionary austerity,’ there are implicit supply-side effects emanating from market liberalization and internal devaluation, with all effects converging to produce higher output growth and employment, together with lower deficit-to-GDP ratios,” Papadimitriou, Nikiforos, and Zezza argue.

    “These flaws help to explain why, in the absence of any level of economic stimulus, the troika projections are so optimistic,” they said.

    The study’s authors conclude by recommending a recovery strategy centered on an expanded direct public-service job creation program.

    Their projections show that, using funds from the European Investment Bank or other EU institution, a modest fiscal boost of $30 billion (used at a rate of about $2 billion each quarter) would fundamentally change the outlook for Greece’s economy.

    GDP growth would exceed all previous scenarios. Jobs would  increase more than 200,000 jobs over the baseline “troika” scenario, and the government deficit would be lower than their baseline and GDP-target scenarios.

    “The simulations discussed show clearly that any form of fiscal austerity results in output growth and employment falling into a tailspin that becomes harder and harder to reverse,” the Levy scholars write.

    “We have shown that a relatively modest fiscal boost funded by the appropriate European Union institutions could not only arrest the further declines in GDP and employment, but also reverse their trend and put them on the road to recovery,” the authors of the study said.
  • In the Media | July 2013

    The Greek Catastrophe and a Possible Way Out


    Open Democracy, July 24, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The lead author of a major econometric analysis of the Greek economic crisis discusses the disastrous outcomes of the policies enforced on Greece by its international lenders, and the IMF’s admission that it made serious errors in its assessment of the impact of austerity on the Greek economy and society. 

    C. J. Polychroniou: The Levy Economics Institute has just released a Strategic Analysis report (pdf), with you as its lead author, on the Greek economic crisis and the effects of austerity on growth and employment. The analysis relies on the Institute’s specially designed macroeconomic model for the Greek economy, which is similar to the Institute’s model of the US economy. First, what does the model consist of and how accurate has it been so far in assessing and predicting trends in the US economy?

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    :
    The model’s theoretical foundations are rooted in Wynne Godley’s new Cambridge approach to economics, developed in the 1980s, enabling economists and the public alike to produce a serious study of how the whole economic system functions. The determination of national income, GDP growth, inflation and unemployment are all predominant concerns by which the public judges the success or failure of governments. The US model on which the model for Greece is based has had a rather spectacular success in predicting first the 2001-02 recession and subsequently very early on the American and the global financial crisis of 2007-08. An increasing number of economists and policymakers have come to realize the power of its predictive capacity, at least for the US.

    C.J.P: Reading the report, the first thing that stands out is that Greece is in a depression today (in addition to suffering from malaria, hungry school children and a surge in suicides) which is worse than anything experienced during the Great Depression of the 1930s in the US. This is shocking when we consider that benefits for those in retirement and the unemployed for example, did not even exist in the US until 1935. From this analysis, what is the driving force behind the ongoing and deepening economic crisis in Greece?


    D.B.P:
     
    It is true the Great Depression never looked so good as seen currently from Greece. Whereas during the Great Contraction, US government spending for consumption not infrastructure continued to grow, helping to arrest the economy’s decline, in Greece the same spending has fallen severely every year since 2008 with last year being the steepest drop in the country’s continuing downturn.

    This continuous decline is in concert with the country’s international lenders’ requirement in exchange for the two bail-out plans. This is an application of the dangerous idea of austerity that has been proven catastrophic wherever it has been applied during recessions, with the predictable consequences we are currently witnessing. During downturns, private consumption and investment are on declining paths and it falls on the public purse to stimulate the declining aggregate demand. The economic and social conditions you mention are the consequences of a foolish policy based on a discredited economic theory of “expansive austerity” along with labour market reforms as the best, most appropriate medicine for growth in countries like Greece running large government deficits and debt as percentages of GDP.       

    C.J.P: The IMF has admitted to miscalculations of the fiscal multipliers in the implementation of the austerity measures in Greece, yet the European authorities insist on fiscal restraint and implicitly accuse the IMF of playing politics. Who’s kidding whom here?  The IMF and the EU represent today what I call the “twin monsters of global neoliberalism.” So why should any economist be paying attention to what the IMF says? Action, after all, is what matters – and theirs towards Greece certainly haven’t changed. Correct? 

    D.B.P
    :
    The IMF’s confession to big errors in the first rescue programme about three years ago has been viewed as irrelevant, and the Fund still insists that no matter what it did, then, Greece would have suffered a deep downturn. In effect, all three - IMF, EC and ECB (the troika) - still refuse to acknowledge the flawed handling of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, maintaining to the contrary that the overall policy was correct.

    As my colleagues and I at the Levy Institute suggested when the first bailout programme was arranged, the amount was far smaller than required and the consequences of government spending cuts and tax increases were deeply underestimated.  But those charged with running the European Union and the IMF would not increase the bail-out funds to assist Greece, opting instead for muddling through until the big European banks (read German and French primarily) were willing to slough off their Greek bond holdings, thereby not risking contagion and the erosion of investor confidence in other troubled southern European economies, i.e., Spain and Italy. 

    Conventional wisdom and free market ideology are alive and well, and very many economists consider themselves as high priests and defenders of this religion that informs IMF’s standard austerity remedies, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.   

    C.J.P: These “twin monsters of global neoliberalism” and the Greek government seem to have placed their recovery hopes for the domestic economy on an exports boost.  The Institute’s report analysis challenges this assumption. Why?

    D.B.P
    :
    Exports have been on caught up in an unstable trend before and after the crisis and unable to offset the drop in domestic demand. The strategy imposed by the troika aimed at increasing exports through internal devaluation (a decrease in unit labour costs) has not brought about the anticipated effects, despite the reduction in relative unit labour costs achieved since in 2010.

    Despite this decline in unit labour costs, consumer prices have not followed suit unlike in the single case of the European hegemon, Germany, that systematically maintains lower values in both. An analysis of the country’s exports by destination and technology content shows that the countries that import the bulk of Greek agricultural and medium-low technology goods and services are outside the euro area.

    Greece has suffered a reduction in its exports to countries such as Germany, once a major foreign market. The recent large increase in the value of Greek exports is due to oil refinery operations positively affected by increases in the price of oil. In short, the current strategy of grounding Greece’s recovery on exports is not only wrong-headed but also will shift production toward sectors with lower value added, and larger volatility in oil-related trade.

    C.J.P: Levy Institute projections are also highly pessimistic about unemployment and GDP growth rates in the middle term, questioning once again the rather optimistic predictions made recently by the European Commission and the IMF.  How much worse can unemployment get in Greece, which, as the Institute’s report states, already suffers“the highest level of any industrialized country in the free world during the last 30 years?”

    D.B.P
    :
    IMF and EC projections of GDP growth and employment are bizarrely incompatible within the framework of the imposed austerity policy. As our model simulations show, to meet the troika’s targets of government deficit to GDP ratios from now to 2016, even more austerity would be necessary, further depressing GDP and employment.

    On the other hand, to meet the troika’s growth and employment targets will require the reversal of austerity and a fiscal stimulus of close to a further 41 billion euros between now and 2016. Their projections have been consistently revised downwards four times between May 2010 and the latest occasion in June 2013. 

    The fact is that since the peak in October 2008, over 1 million jobs have been lost, and there are no signs of meaningful easing of the flawed programme forthcoming. With joblessness now at 27%, a stark indicator of the troika’s and the government’s failure to accurately project the consequences of their own policies, it is astonishing that they continue to ask for more of the same. Our own simulations of unemployment show that more jobs would be lost should the current austerity policy be continued, with unemployment climbing the charts, and soaring close to 34% by the end of 2016.  

    C.J.P: To the surprise of many observers abroad, the Greek population has remained rather stoical (or, some might say, politically apathetic) in the midst of a deepening crisis and the collapse of the nation. How do you explain this attitude when, for years, the impression given to the outside world was that contemporary Greek society thrived on a culture based on political radicalism?

    D.B.P
    :
    One easy answer would be that Greeks have are suffering from austerity fatigue. The other and perhaps more important explanation is that we should never take underestimate the capacity for a social meltdown. The Greek population may appear politically apathetic at present but the continuing social chaos has created a ever-wider opening for an extremist party. Only a progressive party of the left can reverse today’s carnage on the ground.    

    C.J.P: The way out of the crisis, according to the Institute’s Strategic Analysis report, is a recovery strategy along the lines of the Marshall Plan. Is it economics or politics and ideology that blocks discussions and initiatives from relying on the public sector for providing the necessary economic stimulus, via increases in public consumption and investment for a return to growth?


    D.B.P
    :
    Our model’s simulations demonstrate that an EU-funded Marshall-type recovery programme would be a real “success story” for Greece. If it were directed at public consumption and investment and particularly at jobs this would put Greece on the road to recovery. The first Marshall plan wasn’t charity or a bailout. It was an effective investment strategy to create a vibrant European economic market and prevent political disintegration.

    As Winston Churchill told us, we should learn from history. European leaders and our government need to learn fast. Instituting such a programme would necessitate our revising what are now discredited economic theories, together with the European institutions that continue to promote them. 
  • In the Media | June 2013

    Coming Soon: Another London Whale Shocker?


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The Huffington Post, June 18, 2013. Copyright © 2013 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    Remember last summer? The London Whale, that blockbuster adventure thriller, triggered one chill after another as the high-risk action at JPMorgan Chase was revealed. Today, the threats posed by megabanks remain just below the surface—no crisis at the moment—but they’re equally dangerous. A major sequel this year cannot be ruled out.

    Dodd-Frank, the law designed to reform the financial system, had already been on the books for two years when JPMorgan’s troubles surfaced. In an effort to figure out how it failed to prevent massive losses by one of the world’s largest banks, a Senate subcommittee investigated. This spring, it issued its report on the outsize positions taken by the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO)—with a lead trader known as ‘the London Whale’—and the department’s subsequent six billion dollar crash.

    The committee detailed a list of concealed high-risk activities, and determined that the CIO’s so-called ‘hedging’ activities were really just disguised propriety trading, that is, volatile, high-profit trades on behalf of the bank itself, rather than on behalf of its customers in return for commissions.

    Levy Economics Institute Senior Scholar Jan Kregel has taken these conclusions a step further, after analyzing the evidence. In a new research paper he makes the case that the primary cause of the bank’s difficulties was not that it engaged in proprietary trading: It was the concealment of this activity through the creation of a ‘shadow bank’, with the express purpose of this hardly-visible bank-within-the-bank being to create profits. What began as a unit to hedge risks—a safeguard—no longer served that purpose. He argues that when megabanks operate across all aspects of finance, this expansion of propriety trading becomes inevitable.

    The solution, Kregel says, is not to prevent hedging, but rather to recognize that it can never be consistently profitable. A true hedging unit only generates profits when a bank’s bets on its primary investments are unexpectedly wrong. The legitimate hedge is expected to run losses most of the time, if the bank’s strategy and credit assessments are accurate. And for this reason, hedging activity should never be funded from customer deposits.

    Did the London Whale revelations result in protections for bank customers—and their federal insurers—from this kind of gambling?

    Dodd-Frank will reach its third anniversary in July. It mandated that Congress write 398 rules. About two-thirds of the deadlines for those rules have been missed. In addition, the hiring of regulators has been stalled in Washington, further undermining implementation of the law.

    One rule that limited trading on derivatives contracts, the kind of activity that led to the London Whale debacle, was successfully challenged in the courts by a finance trade group. Another, the “Volcker Rule,” would require banks to separate consumer lending from speculative trading. It was Dodd-Frank’s most ambitious provision. Bank lobbyists have successfully kept regulators way behind schedule on finalizing it. Last week, an anti-regulatory bill to roll back other restrictions on derivatives trading passed in the House (the same bill was shelved last summer while the spotlight was on the London Whale). These are only a few examples. Attempts to reign in the recklessness are relentlessly dismantled as soon as they’re proposed.

    A new bill to increase capital standards for the biggest banks has also recently surfaced. The requirement that these institutions hold less debt and more assets, sponsored by Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) and David Vitter (R-Louisiana), would, in addition, limit the federal safety net to only cover traditional banking activities. It faces tough opposition.

    I’ve written before about the limits of Dodd-Frank’s scope, and the fundamental changes we need to make in how we approach financial regulation if it is going to succeed. Kregel’s analysis pinpoints some of the key abuses that urgently need to be addressed. Despite all the obstacles, the responsibility remains to reform banks that are too big to fail, and even, apparently, to regulate.

    Meanwhile, the Senate subcommittee’s report has been forwarded to the Justice Department, where no particular indictments are anticipated. Until our increasingly fragile system is strengthened, expect a remake of the London Whale story. Only the cast and crew will change.
  • In the Media | May 2013

    Gli azionisti di JP Morgan al voto sulla doppia poltrona di Dimon. Le tre lezioni della "Balena"


    Di Elena Bonanni
    FIRSTOnline, 21 Maggio 2013. Tutti i diritti riservati.

    Gli azionisti votano oggi in assise sulla separazione delle cariche di presidente e ceo dopo gli scandali—Trema la doppia poltrona di Dimon—Le tre lezioni della balena di Londra dell'economista Jan Kregel (Bard College)—Il caso JPMorgan è diventato il terreno di gioco su cui si sta disputando la sfida sulla Volcker rule tra Senato e lobbies finanziarie

    Il regno di Jamie Dimon non è imploso (per ora) sullo scandalo della Balena di Londra (ma non solo). L’ultimo re di Wall Street, come è stato soprannominato dal Financial Times, non dovrà dividere il trono con un nuovo presidente (solo il 32% ha votato a favore della separazione delle poltrone di ceo e presidente). Più scivolosa risulta invece la posizione di tre membri della Commissione sui rischi (David Cote, ceo Honeywell International; James Crown, presidente di Henry Crown and Company; Ellen Futter, presidente del Museo americano di storia naturale) che hanno ottenuto sostegno da meno del 60% dei soci. 

    CtW Investment group, che rappresenta i fondi pensione dei sindacati, ha già chiesto le loro dimissioni. Tra i soci “ribelli” è diffusa la convinzione che i tre direttori non abbiano le competenze e che la banca abbia bisogno di nuovi manager in grado di supervisionare il risk management. Un cambio della guardia e un miglioramento delle competenze può sempre essere utile. Così come è necessaria la sostituzione di chi non ha supervisionato bene. Oltre al trader Bruno Iksil, soprannominato “la Balena di Londra”, JP Morgan ha infatti già licenziato anche i vertici del Chief Investment Office, la divisione londinese responsabile delle perdite, compresa la numero uno Ina Drew. E ha fatto causa a Javier Martin-Artajo, il supervisore di Iksil.

    Ma, nella realtà finanziaria di oggi, non sembra questa una soluzione sufficiente per evitare in futuro una nuova Balena. Né a JPMorgan né in qualsiasi altra istituzione finanziaria. Tutti si sono infatti focalizzati su “chi sapeva cosa e quando” e su chi era responsabile per aver dissimulato la situazione agli azionisti e alla comunità finanziaria. Ma nello studio “More swimming lessons from the london whale”, l’economista Jan Kregel (Bard College-New York), che analizza e amplia le conclusioni del report della Sottocommissione permanente per le indagini del Senato americano, rileva come il caso della Balena di Londra evidenzi implicazioni più importanti la stabilità del sistema finanziario. 

    Infatti, se i problemi fossero dovuti a incompetenza o stupidità, come suggerito dallo stesso ceo Dimon, allora la questione potrebbe essere risolta con la rimozione dei responsabili. “Da questo punto di vista—rileva Kregel—una volta che i responsabili vengono rimossi (come è successo) e le condizioni ripristinate (lo smantellamento dell’unità), tutta la questione può in effetti essere trattata se non come “una tempesta in una teiera”, come è stata inizialmente descritta da Dimon, come una goccia nel mare dei profitti di JPMorgan complessivi, come è stata successivamente presentata. 

    Dopo tutto, nessuno è perfetto e tutti fanno errori. Ma questa lettura farebbe perdere di vista le importanti questioni sistemiche sollevate dalle operazioni del Cio in generale e del Scp in particolare”. E che devono invece riportare l’attenzione sui rischi non risolti dalla normativa Dodd-Frank. A partire dalle stesse dimensioni delle istituzioni finanziarie  troppo grandi perché il management possa sapere effettivamente cosa succede e troppo grandi per essere regolate, la prima delle tre lezioni che emergono dallo studio di Kregel sul report della Sottocommissione del Senato e che Firstonline ripercorre in una serie di articoli.

    TROPPO GRANDE PER ESSERE SUPERVISIONATA

    I documenti dell’indagine del Senato hanno dato disclosure aggiuntiva e più dettagliata sulle comunicazioni tra i trader del Synthetic credit Portfolio (Scp), i loro manager del Chief investment office (Cio) e il top management della banca. “Questi scambi—scrive Kregel—non solo  riconfermano il fatto che il management ha dato una rappresentazione non corretta agli azionisti e ai regolatori dei dettagli e l’ampiezza delle difficoltà della divisione Chief investment office (Cio), ma ha anche reso chiaro che il management non aveva una comprensione approfondita delle operazioni  del Scp o dei motivi delle difficoltà di questa divisione”.  

    Per l’economista i documenti suggeriscono che è altamente probabile che i diversi livelli di management accusati di aver diffuso false informazioni non avevano la più pallida idea delle operazioni dell’unità Scp e del perché fosse entrata in sofferenza: nessun a quanto pare si era accorto delle difficoltà del Scp fino all’inizio del 2012. “Le comunicazioni del primo trimestre del 2012—rileva Kregel—suggeriscono che il management stesse lottando per capire cosa stesse andando male anche quando approvò misure che nelle intenzioni avrebbero dovuto risolvere il problema”. Ma che invece causarono un deterioramento più veloce del valore del portafoglio dell’unità che chiaramente non era stato compreso.

    Kregel rileva come né il Senato né l’indagine interna di JPMorgan sostengano l’idea che la banca fosse semplicemente troppo grande perché qualsiasi manager potesse avere conoscenza diretta delle operazioni multiple della divisione di cui era responsabile. E ovviamente non poteva neanche il boss di JPMorgan quando parlò della famosa “tempesta nella teiera”. Kregel spiega che ogni livello di management faceva affidamento sulle informazioni passate dai subordinati, i quali a loro volta avevano poca conoscenza diretta dell’unità che stavano gestendo, fino ai trader che per loro stessa ammissione non capivano le performance del portafoglio che loro stessi avevano creato e che furono poi sostituiti da individui con ancora meno comprensione delle difficoltà che stavano fronteggiando. 

    “La spiegazione più probabile della cattiva informazione relativa alla Balena—conclude Kregel—è un enorme fallimento del controllo e della regia manageriale che non è stato il risultato di un inganno deliberato ma piuttosto la risposta naturale di individui che erano pagati generosamente per assumersi la responsabilità ma che semplicemente non sapevano cosa stesse succedendo perché la taglia e la complessità dell’organizzazione lo rendeva impossibile—ancora una volta, la prova di una istituzione troppo grande da gestire efficacemente e a maggior ragione da regolare. Se la complessità è chiaramente una minaccia maggiore alla stabilità finanziaria rispetto alla grandezza, è di solito, ma non solo, la grandezza che porta alla complessità”.     
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
  • In the Media | May 2013

    JPMorgan e la Balena, l'economista Jan Kregel: sostituire i responsabili non basta


    Di Elena Bonanni
    FIRSTOnline, 21 Maggio 2013. Tutti i diritti riservati.

    LE TRE LEZIONI DELLA BALENA DI LONDRA/1 Jamie Dimon ha superato il voto sulla doppia poltrona mentre la fronda degli azionisti "ribelli" chiede le dimissioni dei tre membri della Commissione rischi che non hanno superato il 60% dei consensi— Ma il problema di JPMorgan non è solo la sostituzione dei manager “incompetenti”—Lo spiega l'economista Jan Kregel.

    Il regno di Jamie Dimon non è imploso (per ora) sullo scandalo della Balena di Londra (ma non solo). L’ultimo re di Wall Street, come è stato soprannominato dal Financial Times, non dovrà dividere il trono con un nuovo presidente (solo il 32% ha votato a favore della separazione delle poltrone di ceo e presidente). Più scivolosa risulta invece la posizione di tre membri della Commissione sui rischi (David Cote, ceo Honeywell International; James Crown, presidente di Henry Crown and Company; Ellen Futter, presidente del Museo americano di storia naturale) che hanno ottenuto sostegno da meno del 60% dei soci.

    CtW Investment group, che rappresenta i fondi pensione dei sindacati, ha già chiesto le loro dimissioni. Tra i soci “ribelli” è diffusa la convinzione che i tre direttori non abbiano le competenze e che la banca abbia bisogno di nuovi manager in grado di supervisionare il risk management. Un cambio della guardia e un miglioramento delle competenze può sempre essere utile. Così come è necessaria la sostituzione di chi non ha supervisionato bene. Oltre al trader Bruno Iksil, soprannominato “la Balena di Londra”, JP Morgan ha infatti già licenziato anche i vertici del Chief Investment Office, la divisione londinese responsabile delle perdite, compresa la numero uno Ina Drew. E ha fatto causa a Javier Martin-Artajo, il supervisore di Iksil.

    Ma, nella realtà finanziaria di oggi, non sembra questa una soluzione sufficiente per evitare in futuro una nuova Balena.
     Né a JPMorgan né in qualsiasi altra istituzione finanziaria. Tutti si sono infatti focalizzati su “chi sapeva cosa e quando” e su chi era responsabile per aver dissimulato la situazione agli azionisti e alla comunità finanziaria. Ma nello studio “More swimming lessons from the london whale”, l’economista Jan Kregel (Bard College-New York), che analizza e amplia le conclusioni del report della Sottocommissione permanente per le indagini del Senato americano, rileva come il caso della Balena di Londra evidenzi implicazioni più importanti la stabilità del sistema finanziario. 

    Infatti, se i problemi fossero dovuti a incompetenza o stupidità, come suggerito dallo stesso ceo Dimon, allora la questione potrebbe essere risolta con la rimozione dei responsabili. “Da questo punto di vista—rileva Kregel—una volta che i responsabili vengono rimossi (come è successo) e le condizioni ripristinate (lo smantellamento dell’unità), tutta la questione può in effetti essere trattata se non come “una tempesta in una teiera”, come è stata inizialmente descritta da Dimon, come una goccia nel mare dei profitti di JPMorgan complessivi, come è stata successivamente presentata. 

    Dopo tutto, nessuno è perfetto e tutti fanno errori. Ma questa lettura farebbe perdere di vista le importanti questioni sistemiche sollevate dalle operazioni del Cio in generale e del Scp in particolare”. E che devono invece riportare l’attenzione sui rischi non risolti dalla normativa Dodd-Frank. A partire dalle stesse dimensioni delle istituzioni finanziarie  troppo grandi perché il management possa sapere effettivamente cosa succede e troppo grandi per essere regolate, la prima delle tre lezioni che emergono dallo studio di Kregel sul report della Sottocommissione del Senato e che Firstonline ripercorre in una serie di articoli.

    TROPPO GRANDE PER ESSERE SUPERVISIONATA

    I documenti dell’indagine del Senato hanno dato disclosure aggiuntiva e più dettagliata sulle comunicazioni tra i trader del Synthetic credit Portfolio (Scp), i loro manager del Chief investment office (Cio) e il top management della banca. “Questi scambi—scrive Kregel—non solo  riconfermano il fatto che il management ha dato una rappresentazione non corretta agli azionisti e ai regolatori dei dettagli e l’ampiezza delle difficoltà della divisione Chief investment office (Cio), ma ha anche reso chiaro che il management non aveva una comprensione approfondita delle operazioni  del Scp o dei motivi delle difficoltà di questa divisione”.  

    Per l’economista i documenti suggeriscono che è altamente probabile che i diversi livelli di management accusati di aver diffuso false informazioni non avevano la più pallida idea delle operazioni dell’unità Scp e del perché fosse entrata in sofferenza: nessun a quanto pare si era accorto delle difficoltà del Scp fino all’inizio del 2012. “Le comunicazioni del primo trimestre del 2012—rileva Kregel—suggeriscono che il management stesse lottando per capire cosa stesse andando male anche quando approvò misure che nelle intenzioni avrebbero dovuto risolvere il problema”. Ma che invece causarono un deterioramento più veloce del valore del portafoglio dell’unità che chiaramente non era stato compreso.

    Kregel rileva come né il Senato né l’indagine interna di JPMorgan
     sostengano l’idea che la banca fosse semplicemente troppo grande perché qualsiasi manager potesse avere conoscenza diretta delle operazioni multiple della divisione di cui era responsabile. E ovviamente non poteva neanche il boss di JPMorgan quando parlò della famosa “tempesta nella teiera”. Kregel spiega che ogni livello di management faceva affidamento sulle informazioni passate dai subordinati, i quali a loro volta avevano poca conoscenza diretta dell’unità che stavano gestendo, fino ai trader che per loro stessa ammissione non capivano le performance del portafoglio che loro stessi avevano creato e che furono poi sostituiti da individui con ancora meno comprensione delle difficoltà che stavano fronteggiando.

    “La spiegazione più probabile della cattiva informazione relativa alla Balena—conclude Kregel—è un enorme fallimento del controllo e della regia manageriale che non è stato il risultato di un inganno deliberato ma piuttosto la risposta naturale di individui che erano pagati generosamente per assumersi la responsabilità ma che semplicemente non sapevano cosa stesse succedendo perché la taglia e la complessità dell’organizzazione lo rendeva impossibile—ancora una volta, la prova di una istituzione troppo grande da gestire efficacemente e a maggior ragione da regolare. Se la complessità è chiaramente una minaccia maggiore alla stabilità finanziaria rispetto alla grandezza, è di solito, ma non solo, la grandezza che porta alla complessità”. 
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
  • In the Media | May 2013

    Rania Antonopoulos: In Greece, 173,000 Persons among the 950,000 Registered Unemployed Are Less Than 24 years old


    Interview by Kostas Kalloniatis
    Eleftheritypia, May 19, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Youth unemployment is just one part of the wider problem of unemployment and of course requires specialized interventions to tackle it, according to Rania Antonopoulou, professor at Bard College, director of the research division for gender equality of the Levy Economics Institute, and associate researcher with the Labour Institute of the GSEE.

    Antonopoulos considers largely inadequate, if not hypocritical, the recent interest of the European political leadership in youth unemployment and considers the motivation to be in part fear of the risk of social explosion (recent media statements by Draghi, Barroso Leta, etc., provide support for this claim).

    She informs us that in the eurozone in 2012 there were 3.4 million unemployed young people aged 15–24, but roughly four times more unemployed were between 25 and 54 years old (12.6 million), with the result that young people constitute 27 percent of this total unemployed (up to 54 years old). In Greece, respectively, young unemployed stood at 173,000 persons in 2012, as compared to 950,000 unemployed aged 25–54 years, comprising a mere 18.2 percent.

    Antonopoulos underlines a crucial difference, especially for policy, between:

    A. the unemployment rate: for youth it was 55.3 percent in Greece in 2012; namely, for every 100 employed and unemployed young people, 55.3 were unemployed, when for the 24–54 age working age population group this rate was 23.4 percent;

    B. the ratio of unemployment to the total population of a certain age group, which includes everyone (the employed, the unemployed, and those not looking for work): for the young in Greece was only 16.2 percent in 2012 due to the fact that the vast majority are students, soldiers, etc. (i.e, a rate that is much less than the rate of unemployment) when the comparable number for ages 24–54 years was 20 percent ( much closer to their corresponding unemployment rate above); and

    C. the share of the unemployed by age group among the total number of persons that are unemployed, which for the young unemployed in Greece amounted in 2012 to 14.4 percent, which means that the remaining 85.6 percent of the unemployed were 25 years of age or older.

    Now, for Mr. Barroso and Co. the most important criterion is the unemployment rate. But for Ms. Antonopoulos the most important measure for guiding policy is the last measure, the share by age composition of the unemployed.

    With all this, Antonopoulos does not claim that there is  no need to pay attention to youth unemployment or university graduates seeking their first job. Instead, she proposes that equal attention, perhaps more attention, needs to be directed  to those who lost their jobs and are not as young.

    Therefore, she believes that the issue of unemployment in general needs to be addressed with anti-austerity pro-growth policies based on domestic demand stimulus, and that a focus in this particular period exclusively on youth unemployment based on erroneous calculations or political considerations (supposedly in response to the lost generation) is misguided. Priority should be given to the creation of an employer-of-last-resort policy—like the New Deal—capable of designing employment programs that match the capabilities of the unemployed to social needs, with the assistance of the trade unions, local communities and their elected governments, and the unemployed themselves.

    For youth unemployment, she indicated that specialized interventions along the lines of current interventions in Sweden and Finland are appropriate.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Rania Antonopoulos: The Value Added of the Levy Institute Measure of Time and Income Poverty (LIMTIP)


    Latin America and Gender Equality Bulletin (UNDP), April 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    In this interview, Rania Antonopoulos, a senior scholar and co-author of the research project report “Why Time Deficits Matter: Implications for the Measurement of Poverty,” discusses the importance of combining income and time poverty measurements in order to reach an effective reduction of poverty and promote more egalitarian societies.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Banking Regulation: Closed for Business


    By David Dayen
    The American Prospect, April 24, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Satisfied with the meager reforms of the Dodd-Frank financial-reform bill, the Treasury is standing in the way of further efforts to rein in mega-banks.


    These are heady times for the bipartisan group of reformers seeking a safer and more manageable U.S. financial system. The leaders of this movement, Senators Sherrod Brown and David Vitter, introduced legislation yesterday to force the biggest banks to foot the bill for their own mistakes by imposing higher capital requirements. The bill would increase equity (either retained earnings or stock) in the financial system by $1.1 trillion and incentivize mega-banks to break themselves up, according to a Goldman Sachs report. Brown and Vitter previewed the legislation earlier this week at the National Press Club, insisting that the new regulations on risky mega-banks would diminish threats to the U.S. economy and prevent taxpayers from having to bail out banks in the future. Vitter also said the legislation would “level the playing field and take away a government policy subsidy, if you will, that exists in the market now favoring size.” With momentum, broadening support, and tangible legislation to push, bank reformers feel better positioned for success than they have since the passage of Dodd-Frank.

    Or rather, they did until the Treasury Department poured a giant bucket of cold water on their effort. In a speech to the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College's annual Minsky Conference last Thursday, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance Mary Miller claimed that Dodd-Frank had already solved the “Too Big to Fail” problem. Miller indicated that mega-banks do not enjoy an unfair advantage in their borrowing costs and that recent boosts to capital standards were already working to strengthen the financial system. Having a big public speech at an important venue by a top official the week before the release of Brown-Vitter sends a clear message about the Treasury’s position. “She is not going off the cuff in a policy speech like that,” said former Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and persistent bank critic Neil Barofsky. “This seems like a carefully measured response to Brown-Vitter that the regulatory-reform shop, from the Treasury perspective, is closed.”

    The resistance should not surprise anyone. Under Timothy Geithner, Treasury was openly hostile to far-reaching congressional proposals to constrain mega-banks. Despite the change in leadership at the department, many holdovers from the Geithner era, including Miller, still hold high-level positions. In his confirmation hearings, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew stated flatly that Dodd-Frank had dealt with the Too Big to Fail problem. Most important, Lew works for President Obama: Reaching an agreement to break up mega-banks by forcing them to carry more capital would represent a tacit admission that Dodd-Frank, widely touted as a centerpiece of the president's first term, failed in its core mission of stabilizing the financial system.

    Given that Miller is a 26-year veteran of the investment-management firm T. Rowe Price, it is no surprise that she espouses Wall Street’s worldview.

    What’s striking about Miller’s speech is how closely it mirrors the arguments set forth in several recent papers put out by the big banks, their lobbyists, and their allies. This includes the previously mentioned report on Brown-Vitter by Goldman Sachs; a policy brief by the Financial Services Forum and co-signed by the leading lobbyist groups for the banking industry; and a report with the cheery title "Banking on Our Future" by Hamilton Place Strategies (HPS), a public-relations firm staffed by top communications officials from the last three Republican presidential campaigns (HPS has admitted that its clients include large financial institutions). All of these reports were released in the past few months in an effort to derail Brown-Vitter. Given that Miller is a 26-year veteran of the investment-management firm T. Rowe Price, it is no surprise that she espouses Wall Street’s worldview.   For example, Miller discounts an influential working paper from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) showing an $83 billion annual subsidy for mega-banks from their Too Big to Fail status by saying its evidence “predates the financial crisis and Dodd-Frank’s reforms.” This is precisely the argument the Financial Services Forum made, ignoring the fact that there are plenty of post-crisis studies hat show the subsidies persist. Miller highlights the resolution authority granted to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) under Dodd-Frank, which allows the FDIC to wind down any systemically important financial institution verging on collapse rather than resorting to a bailout. She says that, to the extent that a cost-of-borrowing advantage exists for mega-banks, resolution authority “should help wring it the rest of the way out of the market.” In practically the same language, HPS writes that resolution authority “helps eliminate any potential funding advantage big banks are thought to have.” And in providing statistical support for increased capital, Miller notes, “The 18 largest bank-holding companies … doubled the amount of their Tier 1 common equity capital over the last four years.” Goldman Sachs uses precisely this statistic, writing that “common equity has doubled for U.S. banks” since the financial crisis.

    Critics have assailed the bank-industry papers for their unrealistic views about the risks in the current system and over-optimistic evaluations of the impact of the most recent regulatory changes. The truth is that Dodd-Frank has emerged from the gate slowly, bank lobbyists have successfully gutted many of its provisions, and much of it remains in flux. Miller approvingly highlights the Volcker rule as a key financial reform, but the final rule has been delayed nearly a year and has yet to be adopted. The proposed rule to tax systemically important institutions, for example, would cost as little as $28 million, about .2 percent of annual earnings. Other provisions like resolution authority could prove unworkable in an interconnected, global financial system and amid the pressure of catastrophic collapse. Stanford economics professor Anat Admati, author of the book The Banker's New Clothes does not believe Dodd-Frank will hold up in a crisis, comparing it to “preparing for a disaster like an earthquake by putting an ambulance at the corner.”

    Since Brown-Vitter relies so heavily on imposing new capital requirements, Miller’s alignment with the industry on capital is the most telling section of her speech. Miller says that recently imposed capital rules—negotiated under an international process in Basel, Switzerland—are sufficient for banks to cover their own losses. But while the Basel rules as much as tripled capital requirements, as the Financial Times’s Martin Wolf quipped, when the standards were released in 2010, “tripling almost nothing does not give one very much.” Critics also argue that current capital rules afford banks far too many opportunities to use creative accounting to game the system. The rules allow banks to calculate their capital needs using “risk-weighted” assets, counting each type of asset differently based on its assumed level of risk. Banks use risk-weighting to sharply reduce the amount of capital they have to hold—by as much as 50 percent, according to some calculations. In the event of a systemic collapse where all assets fail, regardless of the accounting games, banks would not have the funds necessary to stay solvent. Indeed, during the 2008 financial crisis, investment banks like Lehman Brothers were allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to risk-weight assets, and nearly all of them failed. Meanwhile, Sheila Bair at the FDIC rejected risk-weighting, and the commercial banks her agency insured fared better. Brown-Vitter would ban risk-weighting in their capital standards, but Miller simply counsels to stay the course.

    Treasury’s rejection of Brown-Vitter has serious implications. On Monday, Senate Banking Committee chairman Tim Johnson reacted to Brown-Vitter by saying that regulators should finish implementing Dodd-Frank before Congress moves to enact additional reforms. Johnson didn’t cite Miller’s speech, but he didn’t have to: Democratic leaders in Congress will naturally resist turning against the wishes of their president and his economic team. And many rank-and-file lawmakers will cede to the perceived expertise of the Treasury Department. This gives Treasury outsized control of the financial-reform debate, which they’ve used to weaken and soften reforms at virtually every step of the Dodd-Frank process and beyond. In fact, Treasury officials credit themselves with stopping Sherrod Brown’s 2010 proposal to cap bank size. An anonymous senior official said at the time, “If we’d been for it, it probably would have happened. But we weren’t, so it didn’t.”

    This all means that Brown-Vitter is likely to sit on a shelf unless and until Wall Street generates another crisis. With Sherrod Brown in line to potentially take over the Senate Banking Committee in 2014, reformers may benefit from the wait. But it will be a wait.

    Financial-reform advocates see Brown-Vitter as a major opportunity for President Obama to “get on the right side of history” and address the continued riskiness and complexity of modern finance. But Treasury’s primary concern appears to be limiting any constraints on the record profits of those mega-banks, rather than protecting the public from threats to the rest of the economy. As Barofsky concluded, “Treasury has defended the status of the Too Big to Fail banks every step of the way, why would they stop now?”
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Narayana Kocherlakota at 2013 Minsky Conference


    For video excerpts from Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota’s speech "Low Real Interest Rates," presented at the Levy Institute’s 22nd Annual Minsky Conference in New York on April 18, click here. Includes audience and press Q&A.

  • In the Media | April 2013

    Is the Fed's Medicine Really Poison?


    By Caroline Baum
    Bloomberg View, April 22, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    It's not every day that a central banker admits that his medicine for curing the last crisis may be laying the groundwork for the next. But that's exactly what Narayana Kocherlakota, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, said last week at the annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.

    Kocherlakota said low real interest rates are necessary to achieve the Fed's dual mandate of maximum employment and stable prices. He also said that low real rates lead to inflated asset prices, volatile returns and increased merger activity, all of which are signs of financial market instability. Listen to what he calls his "key conclusion"—and what I'd call a true conundrum:

    "I've suggested that it is likely that, for a number of years to come, the FOMC will only achieve its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability if it keeps real interest rates unusually low. I’ve also argued that when real interest rates are low, we are likely to see financial market outcomes that signify instability. It follows that, for a considerable period of time, the FOMC may only be to achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets."

    Just think about that for a minute: What the Fed needs to do in order to achieve its macroeconomic objectives will create instability in financial markets. There's more:

    "On the one hand, raising the real interest rate will definitely lead to lower employment and prices. On the other hand, raising the real interest rate may reduce the risk of a financial crisis —- a crisis which could give rise to a much larger fall in employment and prices. Thus, the Committee has to weigh the certainty of a costly deviation from its dual mandate objectives against the benefit of reducing the probability of an even larger deviation from those objectives."

    Damned if we do, damned if we don't. Other Fed officials have warned about froth in asset markets, but none to my knowledge has been as forthright in describing the Fed's life-saving medicine as systemic poison.

    Like his colleagues, Kocherlakota believes effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector are the best ways to address threats to macroeconomic stability. Yeah, and the tooth fairy leaves money under your pillow if you're good.

    For central bankers to believe regulation is the answer, they have to ignore history and disregard the tendency for regulators to be co-opted by those they are assigned to regulate, a phenomenon known as "regulatory capture."

    The Minsky Conference was the ideal place for Kocherlakota to deliver his remarks. Minsky observed that, during periods of prosperity and financial stability (the Great Moderation), investors are lulled into taking on more risk with borrowed money.

    At some point, investors are forced to sell assets to repay loans, sending asset prices into a downward spiral as cash becomes king. This is what's known as a "Minsky moment."

    Kocherlakota seems to be saying such an outcome is inevitable. If only he could tell us when.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Economists Slow to Detect Dodgy Data


    By Gareth Hutchens
    The Age (Melbourne), April 21, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    If we needed more evidence that economics is not a science, we have it now.

    A shock wave hit the economics world this week when two of its most famous practitioners—Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart—were found to have produced some very dodgy data to support their claims about the consequences of high government debt.

    It comes back to a research paper of theirs, Growth in a Time of Debt widely quoted since it was published in 2010. The paper shows that if government debt becomes too high—say, around 90 per cent of gross domestic product—then economic growth will almost always suffer. Global policymakers have taken it to mean that if countries with too-high debt levels want to kick-start flagging economies then they ought to begin the resuscitation process by reducing debt levels first.

    It has been repackaged into a simple message: Reduce your debt and economic growth will begin to pick up. But the corollary is that highly indebted governments should not try to spend their way out of economic stagnation because spending more will only make things worse. It has helped to provide the intellectual justification that the proponents of austerity wanted; thus the wave of austerity policies washing around the world since 2010. Millions of people have suffered because of it.

    But the intellectual edifice for the global austerity movement was severely weakened this week after it emerged that professors Reinhart and Rogoff had made some basic errors in their interpretation of data that supported their research. The errors were discovered by Thomas Herndon, a student at the University of Massachusetts Amherst's doctoral program in economics. He published a paper this week explaining what he found, with help from two of his teachers, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin.

    The paper shows Reinhart and Rogoff had omitted data, made a mistake in their Excel spreadsheet, and used a bizarre statistical methodology, all of which skewed results. It set the academic world ablaze.

    As Nobel laureate Paul Krugman wrote: "In this age of information, maths errors can lead to disaster. NASA's Mars Orbiter crashed because engineers forgot to convert to metric measurements; JPMorgan Chase's "London Whale" venture went bad because modellers divided a sum instead of an average. So, did an Excel coding error destroy the economies of the Western world?"

    Reinhart and Rogoff have acknowledged they made a spreadsheet error, but they also say it didn't affect their result much.

    "It is sobering that such an error slipped into one of our papers despite our best efforts to be consistently careful," they said. "We do not, however, believe this regrettable slip affects in any significant way the central message of the paper or that in our subsequent work."

    But in the brouhaha that followed, a few people have been asking why it took so long for Reinhart and Rogoff's research to be tested.

    Imagine you've handed your assignment in at school. You make some wonderful claims in it about the way the world works. Your research—based on an analysis of data of 44 countries spanning 200 years—has led you to discover that high government debt to GDP ratios above a "90 per cent threshold" almost always lead to a slowdown in economic growth. It's a law that seems to hold no matter what you throw at it. You can compare different countries in disparate regions, and once you try to take account of the fact that a country's political and financial systems evolve over time you can mix and match these things across centuries of data and the law stays the same.

    It's a striking thesis. And luckily for you, you're not expected to hand your data in with your assignment so your work can be checked. Your teacher takes your word for it. That's not how the scientific method is supposed to work. Some economists, such as L. Randall Wray of the Levy institute, say they have written to Reinhart and Rogoff in the past to ask for data, but have been rebuffed. "They ignored our request. I have heard from several other researchers that Reinhart and Rogoff also ignored their repeated requests for the data," Professor Wray wrote this week.

    It is sobering to be reminded that economic analyses, produced in this way, can have such influence in the real world. It's worth remembering next time we hear some politician referring to "economic modelling" that supports his or her claim.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    There's No Need for All This Economic Sadomasochism


    By David Graeber
    The Guardian, April 21, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    If Reinhart and Rogoff's 'error' has discredited the prevailing policy dogma, now is the time for an alternative that works

    The intellectual justification for austerity lies in ruins. It turns out that Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, who originally framed the argument that too high a "debt-to-GDP ratio" will always, necessarily, lead to economic contraction – and who had aggressively promoted it during Rogoff's tenure as chief economist for the IMF – had based their entire argument on a spreadsheet error. The premise behind the cuts turns out to be faulty. There is now no definite proof that high levels of debt necessarily lead to recession.

    Will we, then, see a reversal of policy? A sea of mea culpas from politicians who have spent the last few years telling disabled pensioners to give up their bus passes and poor students to forgo college, all on the basis of a mistake? It seems unlikely. After all, as I and many others have long argued, austerity was never really an economic policy: ultimately, it was always about morality. We are talking about a politics of crime and punishment, sin and atonement.

    True, it's never been particularly clear exactly what the original sin was: some combination, perhaps, of tax avoidance, laziness, benefit fraud and the election of irresponsible leaders. But in a larger sense, the message was that we were guilty of having dreamed of social security, humane working conditions, pensions, social and economic democracy.

    The morality of debt has proved spectacularly good politics. It appears to work just as well whatever form it takes: fiscal sadism (Dutch and German voters really do believe that Greek, Spanish and Irish citizens are all, collectively, as they put it, "debt sinners", and vow support for politicians willing to punish them) or fiscal masochism (middle-class Britons really will dutifully vote for candidates who tell them that government has been on a binge, that they must tighten their belts, it'll be hard, but it's something we can all do for the sake of our grandchildren). Politicians locate economic theories that provide flashy equations to justify the politics; their authors, like Rogoff, are celebrated as oracles; no one bothers to check if the numbers actually add up.

    If ever proof was required that the theory is selected to suit the politics, one need only consider the reaction politicians have to economists who dare suggest this moralistic framework is unnecessary; or that there might be solutions that don't involve widespread human suffering.

    Even before we knew Reinhart and Rogoff's study was simply wrong, many had pointed out their historical survey made no distinction between the effects of debt on countries such as the US or Japan – which issue their own currency and therefore have their debt denominated in that currency – and countries such as Ireland, Greece, that do not. But the real solution to the eurobond crisis, some have argued, lies in precisely this distinction.

    Why is Japan not in the same situation as Spain or Italy? It has one of the highest public debt-to-GDP ratios in the world (twice that of Ireland), and is regularly featured in magazines like the Economist as a prima facie example of an economic basket case, or at least, how not to manage a modern industrial economy. Yet they have no problem raising money. In fact the rate on their 10-year bonds is under 1%. Why? Because there's no danger of default. Everyone knows that in the event of an emergency, the Japanese government could simply print the money. And Japanese money, in turn, will always be good because there is a constant demand for it by anyone who has to pay Japanese taxes.

    This is precisely what Ireland, or Spain, or any of the other troubled southern eurozone countries, cannot do. Since only the German-dominated European Central Bank can print euros, investors in Irish bonds fear default, and the interest rates are bid up accordingly. Hence the vicious cycle of austerity. As a larger percentage of government spending has to be redirected to paying rising interest rates, budgets are slashed, workers fired, the economy shrinks, and so does the tax base, further reducing government revenues and further increasing the danger of default. Finally, political representatives of the creditors are forced to offer "rescue packages", announcing that, if the offending country is willing to sufficiently chastise its sick and elderly, and shatter the dreams and aspirations of a sufficient percentage of its youth, they will take measures to ensure the bonds will not default.

    Warren Mosler and Philip Pilkington are two economists who dare to think beyond the shackles of Rogoff-style austerity economics. They belong to the modern money theory school, which starts by looking at how money actually works, rather than at how it should work. On this basis, they have made a powerful case that if we just get back to that basic problem of money-creation, we may well discover that none of this is ever necessary to begin with. In conjunction with the Levy Institute at Bard College, they propose an ingenious, yet elegant solution to the eurobond crisis. Why not simply add a bit of legal language to, say, Irish bonds, declaring that, in the event of default, those bonds could themselves be used to pay Irish taxes? Investors would be reassured the bonds would remain "money good" even in the worst of crises – since even if they weren't doing business in Ireland, and didn't have to pay Irish taxes, it would be easy enough to sell them at a slight discount to someone who does. Once potential investors understood the new arrangement, interest rates would fall back from 4-5% to a manageable 1-2%, and the cycle of austerity would be broken.

    Why has this plan not been adopted? When it was proposed in the Irish parliament in May 2012, finance minster Michael Noonan rejected the plan on completely arbitrary grounds (he claimed it would mean treating some bond-holders differently than others, and ignored those who quickly pointed out existing bonds could easily be given the same legal status, or else, swapped for tax-backed bonds). No one is quite sure what the real reason was, other than perhaps an instinctual bureaucratic fear of the unknown.

    It's not even clear that anyone would even be hurt by such a plan. Investors would be happy. Citizens would see quick relief from cuts. There'd be no need for further bailouts. It might not work as well in countries such as Greece, where tax collection is, let us say, less reliable, and it might not entirely eliminate the crisis. But it would almost certainly have major salutary effects. If the politicians refuse to consider it – as they so far have done – it's hard to see any reason other than sheer incredulity at the thought that the great moral drama of modern times might in fact be nothing more than the product of bad theory and faulty data series.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    There Could Still Be Runs on the Money Market Funds


    By Robert Lenzner
    Forbes, April 20, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Erick Rosengren, suggested this week that there could still be runs on money market mutual funds, as took place at the peak of the 2008 financial crisis, since these funds have “no capital” and invest in uninsured short term securities of banks and other financial service firms. While debate over potential regulatory solutions for money market funds continues on, the Boston Fed chief, emphasized that the safety of the money market mutual funds are a “significant unresolved issue.”

    As of April 13 there was $903.56 billion in retail money market funds sponsored by Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, Dreyfus, Invesco and others, The total amount of all kinds of money market funds, some owned by institutional investors, was $2.6 trillion. The average weekly yield was a record low of only 0.02%.

    He also singled out the issue of capital for the broker-dealer fraternity, where he raised the problem of “virtually no change for broker-dealers since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September, 2008 and the shotgun marriage of Merrill Lynch into BankAmerica. The solution Rosengren recommended was that the “larger(these investment firms) get the higher the capital ratio”: should be imposed on them. The Boston Fed chief executive, speaking at Bard College’s Levy Institute conference on the economy and financial markets, seemed to be suggesting that the cause for this vacuum in policy is that “Regulatory bodies haven’t evolved as much as the financial markets.” In other words, 5 years after the 2008 meltdown we still have a major challenge in trying to make the global financial system secure against runs and speculative bubbles. There is still further to go in the structural reorganization of the danger from derivatives, but he believes clearing derivatives contracts on exchanges and the decline in bilateral transactions has reduced an element of risk.

    Nevertheless, Rosengren made crystal clear in conversation after his talk that he “sees no bubbles anywhere, not even in real estate where prices are still below their 2006 peak.” He believes prices of residential real estate in Boston and New York are still 15-20% under their peak—and prices in Miami, Phoenix, Las Vegas, California– are still priced at a steeper discount to the peak in 2006.

    As for the economy in general, Rosengren sees “traction” picking up momentum, in which case he would support the “prudent” position of gradually reducing the QE stimulus program. However, he is troubled by the fact that monetary policy(quantitative easing and record low interest rates) are in conflict with fiscal policy, the restraint of sequester and reduction of federal, state and local government spending, ie “the Obama cuts.”
  • In the Media | April 2013

    The Wealthiest 20% Own 72%; The Poorest 20% Only 3%


    By Robert Lenzner
    Forbes, April 19, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The growing disparity in wealth made the great recession worse and the recovery weaker than ever before. This nation’s wealth disparity widened more than ever before over the last five years because of the steep decline in the value of residential homes and stagnant wages for the lower and middle income groups in the U.S., explained a member of the Federal Reserve Board, Sarah Bloom Raskin, in a speech that explored for the first time a fresh explanation about the obstacles holding back economic growth.

    This “financial vulnerability and marginal ability” to recover from the decline in the wealth of lower income and middle income Americans is “undermining our country’s strength,” Governor Raskin emphasized in New York yesterday at an economic conference sponsored by the Levy Institute at Bard College and the Ford Foundation. Raskin admitted to a feeling of frustration at the central bank about the inability of the Fed’s low interest rate policy together with the expansion in the money supply to alleviate this growing disparity between the wealthy and the rest of American families. She admitted there was current exploration at the Board level of the central bank that “our macro models should be adjusted,” because four years into the recovery a confluence of factors have contributed to a weak recovery.

    “Inequality contributed to the severity of the recession,” Raskin said flatly, and blamed this inequality- for the “differential expectations” in the future between well-off families– with those families not so well off, who were battered by a plunge in the value of their homes, a high level of debt and a continuance of lower wages. I had never heard that theme so sharply expressed as the blame for the mediocre rate of growth we are experiencing.

    Here are the Fed’s latest breakdown on the disparity in wealth. The top 20% of the population own 72% of the nation’s wealth in large part due to their vast holdings in the common shares of publicly held companies. By comparison, the poorest 20% of the U.S. population only own 3% of the wealth, and so were unable to shelter themselves when their homes declined in value, often below the face value of their mortgage and their take-home pay was not growing– or they lost their jobs.

    The distribution of wealth inequality is far worse than the disparity in incomes. Nonetheless, the Fed Governor suggested it does explain the lower levels of consumer spending. As to income disparity between 1979 and 2007, the Federal Reserve figures shows the highest income cohort doubled their annual compensation when adjusted for inflation. The top 1% of earners in the nation saw their share of the national income rise from 10% to 20%. Meanwhile the bottom 40% of the nation’s workers saw their share of the national income decline slightly from 13% to 10%.

    The middle class average income rose in those 30 years to 2007 by only 20% or less than 1% a year, underscoring just how much middle income Americans have fallen behind their wealthier brethren. Fed Governor Raskin called this performance “sluggishness.”

    One hopeful sign is the gradual increase in prices for residential homes throughout the United States. This trend has restored some semblance of household wealth for homeowners from low income and middle income sectors of the population. Another 10% increase in home values, Gov. Raskin suggested, would allow many more low income families to stay in their homes.

    More worrisome, however, is the trend for more and more jobs to be only part-time with less pay and less benefits. “We have lost 9 million jobs,” she said and the growing trend for new jobs to be part-time employment or involving contingent work is “no way to upward mobility” in America.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Treasury's Miller: No Banks Will Be Bailed Out


    By Greg Robb
    MarketWatch, April 19, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) – No financial institution, regardless of its size, will be bailed out by taxpayers again, Treasury Undersecretary for Domestic Finance Mary Miller said Thursday. As a result of the Dodd-Frank bank regulatory reform, "shareholders of failed companies will be wiped out; creditors will absorb losses; culpable management will not be retained and may have their compensation clawed back; and any remaining costs associated with liquidating the company must be recovered from disposition of the company's assets and, if necessary, from assessments on the financial sector, not taxpayers," Miller said in a speech at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Miller also said evidence was mixed on whether large financial institutions continue to benefit from lower borrowing costs. The Treasury will continue to work to reduce the risks posed by large financial companies and to put in place measures to wind the companies down if the need arises, Miller said. 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Inflation Is Very, Very Low. Time to Worry?


    By Annalyn Kurtz
    CNNMoney, April 19, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Prices aren't going up very much. Should we celebrate?

    Not really. Inflation that's too low could be a bad sign for the U.S. economy, and some Federal Reserve officials are starting to get concerned. 

    Speaking to reporters on Wednesday, St. Louis Fed President James Bullard pointed to the Fed's preferred measure of inflation—personal consumption expenditures, minus food and energy—which recently has shown that prices are up 1.3% over a year ago.

    "That's pretty low," Bullard said at a Levy Economics Institute event. "I'm getting concerned about that, and I think that gives the FOMC some room to maneuver on its monetary policy."

    The Fed typically aims to keep inflation around 2% a year. Inflation at that level is considered healthy, coinciding with solid economic growth, a growing job market and gradually rising wages.

    "Economic history has shown that economies perform best with slightly higher levels of inflation, such as 2% to 3%," said Bernard Baumohl, chief global economist for the Economic Outlook Group. "Low and dormant inflation translates into a dormant economy."

    Why is low inflation bad? There are a few key reasons.

    First, when companies don't have any leeway to raise prices, they're more apt to cut costs, which could mean a cutback in hiring. Second, if inflation remains so low, consumers are not as motivated to rush out and spend, Baumohl said.

    Third, when inflation is low, it doesn't offer a large buffer against deflation if an economic shock occurs. Deflation—when prices fall—often freezes up spending, because who wants to go out and buy an item now, if they expect it to be cheaper in six months?

    Related: The Geeky Debt Fix that Might Work
    And fourth, low inflation often comes along with lower wage and revenue growth.

    Even with the recent low inflation data, Bullard's comments Wednesday came as a bit of a surprise to Fed watchers. For one, most Fed criticism lately has focused on how the central bank's unprecedented push to stimulate the U.S. economy could eventually lead to rapid inflation or asset bubbles. Fed policies are already cited as a key reason why stocks have recently hovered near five-year highs.

    Second, Bullard is known for leaning slightly hawkish. Just minutes before he met with reporters Wednesday, he gave a speech arguing that the Fed's stimulative policies probably won't solve the job market's problems.

    "I found Bullard's comments yesterday the most interesting in some time," said Ellen Zentner, senior economist for Nomura. "It suggests that other hawks could follow suit if lower inflation persists."

    The Fed has kept its key short-term interest rate near zero since 2008. When that wasn't enough to boost the U.S. economy, it launched several bond-buying sprees, known as quantitative easing, in an attempt to lower long-term interest rates.

    The Fed is now running its third such round of asset purchases, buying $85 billion in Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities each month.

    The program remains highly controversial, and most of the conversation lately has been speculation about when the Fed will start tapering off, and eventually ending, those bond buys.

    But on Wednesday, Bullard went so far as to say that if the inflation rate falls further, the Fed may have to think about increasing its monthly asset purchases, rather than winding them down anytime soon.

    His colleague, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, backed that sentiment Thursday.

    Kocherlakota is considered a Fed dove and has long favored stimulus, but if inflation was to fall even further, he said "that would make me in favor of even more accommodation," he told reporters.

    Bullard is a voting member on the Fed's policymaking committee this year, but Kocherlakota is not. Even so, if low inflation persists, expect to hear more Fed officials discuss the issue in the months ahead. 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Raskin: Accommodative Pol to Help Econ Cont Gain Traction


    By Brai Odion-Esene
    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (MNI) – Federal Reserve Board Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin Wednesday underlined her support for ongoing aggressive push by the Fed to support economic growth, saying that it will help the recovery gain a more secure foothold, with the measures potentially becoming "increasingly potent" as the housing market rebound continues.

    Why? Because the 2008–2009 recession had a disproportionate impact on low- and middle-income American families, the majority of whom have their wealth tied to housing - particularly home prices—she said in remarks prepared for delivery at the Hyman Minsky conference hosted by the Levy Institute.

    Many have argued the Fed of pursuing policies that favor a few over the many, but Raskin believes that "accommodative monetary policy that lifts economic activity more generally is expected to increase the odds of good outcomes for American families."

    Low- to middle-income families bore the brunt of the recession, and many are still struggling to reduce their debt burdens, she noted, while also seeing the values of their homes plummet.

    "Arguably, the FOMC's conduct of monetary policy in recent years has in part been designed to address this particular landscape," she said.

    "I believe that the accommodative policies of the FOMC and the concerted effort we have made to ease conditions in the mortgage markets will help the economy continue to gain traction," Raskin added. "And the resulting expansion in employment will likely improve income levels at the bottom of the distribution."

    The Fed has kept interest rates at exceptionally low levels since late 2008, but Raskin noted that borrowers that have been through foreclosure or have underwater mortgages are less able to take advantage of the lower interest rates, either for home buying or other purposes, reducing the intended impact of the Fed's policies.

    However, "as the housing market recovers, though, I think it is possible that accommodative monetary policy could be increasingly potent," she said.

    Raskin spent significant time discussing the growing wealth inequality gap in America, and its implications for the macroeconomy.

    She argued that rising inequality and stagnating wages have contributed to the "tepid" recovery, noting that in wage gains in particular "have remained more muted than is typical during a recovery."

    Going forward, "it is very likely that, for many households, future labor earnings will be well below what they had anticipated in the years before the recession," Raskin predicted.

    Raskin also defended the Fed's focus on boosting the housing market and spurring faster job creation, noting that the house price shock and less than rosy employment prospects have households curtailing their spending in order to rebuild their nest eggs, while also trimming their budgets "in order to bring their debt levels into alignment with their new economic realities."

    "In this case, the effects of the plunge in net wealth and the jump in unemployment on subsequent spending have been long lasting and lingering," she said.

    Raskin also noted that the recovery has also been hampered by a continuation of longer-term trends that have reduced employment prospects for those at the lower end of the income distribution and produced weak wage growth - such as technological advances and globalization.

    "Given the long-standing trends toward greater income and wealth inequalities, it is unlikely that cyclical improvements in the labor markets will do much to reverse these trends," she said.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed Policies Helping Low-Income Americans – Raskin


    By Jonathan Spicer and Leah Schnurr
    Reuters, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    (Reuters) – Easy money policies are bringing some relief to lower-income Americans hard-hit in the recession and the easing could become increasingly potent as the housing market recovers, a top U.S. Federal Reserve official said on Thursday.

    In a speech on equality and the U.S. economy, Fed Governor Sarah Raskin backed the policy accommodation and argued it would continue to help the overall economic recovery. But the long-running trend of inequality and stagnating wages in the United States has slowed that rebound, she said.

    "The accommodative policies ... and the concerted effort we have made to ease conditions in the mortgage markets will help the economy continue to gain traction. And the resulting expansion in employment will likely improve income levels at the bottom of the distribution," Raskin said in prepared remarks to the Hyman P. Minsky conference.

    "However, given the longstanding trends toward greater income and wealth inequalities, it is unlikely that cyclical improvements in the labor markets will do much to reverse these trends," she said.

    Raskin has consistently supported the central bank's policy of low interest rates and large-scale bond-buying, both of which are meant to spur investment, hiring and broader economic growth in the wake of the 2007–2009 recession.

    Gross Domestic Product growth was very tepid at the end of last year, but is expected to have rebounded strongly to 3-percent or more in the first quarter of this year. Still, recent economic signals have been weaker and the Fed is concerned that could hamper growth.

    Raskin's speech amounted to a in depth look into what effects growing economic inequality, which has been on the rise for decades in the United States, has on the current recovery and on Fed policy.

    "As the housing market recovers, I think it is possible that accommodative monetary policy could be increasingly potent," she said.

    Still, the recession's plunge in net wealth and jump in unemployment will have "long lasting and lingering" effects on spending.

    "Although it is too early to state with certainty what the long-term effect of this recession will be on the earnings potential of those who lost their jobs, given the severity of the job loss and sluggishness of the recovery ... it is very likely that, for many households, future labor earnings will be well below what they had anticipated in the years before the recession," said Raskin, who has a permanent vote on Fed policy.

    She noted that the country remains almost 2.5 million jobs short of pre-recession levels.

    The U.S. unemployment rate was 7.6 percent last month, down from 10 percent in 2009, but short of the 5-6 percent range to which Americans are accustomed.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed’s Raskin Asks Economists to Pay More Attention to the Poor


    By Greg Robb
    MarketWatch, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    If economists focused more research on the experiences of  less-advantaged households, they might gain new insight on the current struggles of the U.S. economy, said Federal Reserve Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin on Thursday.

    “It strikes me that macroeconomists are far from a comprehensive understanding of how wealth and income inequality may affect business cycle dynamics,” Raskin said in a speech on the economy sponsored the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.

    For the sake of simplicity, the typical economic model focuses on “representative” households that focus on average gauges of wealth.

    While this might work in certain circumstances, it creates blind spots in research in the wake of the financial crisis, Raskin said.

    With real-wage growth stagnant, in the early years of the 2000s, many households had pinned their hopes on advancement on higher home prices, Raskin said. As a result, they were most vulnerable to the rapid decline in house prices and the contraction of credit that followed.

    “I am persuaded that because of how hard these lower- and middle-income households were hit, the recession was worse and the recovery has been weaker,” Raskin said.

    “The recovery has also been hampered by a continuation of longer-term trends that have reduced employment prospects for those at the lower end of the income distribution and produced weak wage growth,” she noted.

    At the moment, it is not part of the Fed’s mandate to address inequality. The distribution of wealth and income has not been a primary consideration in the way most macroeconomists think about business cycles. But if it’s effects are hurting the economy, perhaps our thinking should be adjusted, Raskin said.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Raskin: Monetary Policy to Gain Potency as Housing Picks Up


    By Michael S. Derby
    The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve stimulus aimed at spurring growth will likely grow more powerful as the housing market recovers further, but the trends that have fueled income inequality aren’t likely to change much, a U.S. central bank official said Thursday.

    “The accommodative policies of the [Federal Open Market Committee] and the concerted effort we have made to ease conditions in the mortgage markets will help the economy continue to gain traction,” Fed governor Sarah Bloom Raskin said.

    “As house prices rise, more and more households have enough home equity to gain renewed access to mortgage credit and the ability to refinance their homes at lower rates,” she said.

    “I think it is possible that accommodative monetary policy could be increasingly potent” as the housing market picks up, Ms. Raskin said.

    The official said Fed staffers estimate house price increases of 10% or less from current levels would be enough to help around 40% of homeowners who owe more on their homes that the properties are worth to get back into the black. If more households regain a positive equity position, it will help unclog some of the traditional channels monetary policy operates in, which will over time make the stimulus better able to lift growth, Ms. Raskin said.

    The central banker is a voting member of the monetary policy setting FOMC. Her comments came from the text of a speech prepared for delivery before a gathering held by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in New York. The bulk of Ms. Raskin’s speech was devoted to trying to understand how wealth and income inequality played a role in creating the financial crisis, and how it might be affecting a recovery that has thus far been weak despite four years of mostly positive momentum.

    The official allowed that the issue isn’t well understood by mainstream economists. But she said the evidence suggests inequality very likely did play a significant part in the downturn. Ms. Raskin pointed to a long standing and widening gulf between top earners and the rest of the nation. Those who saw incomes stagnate relied more on debt and homeownership to cover the lack of rising wages, and when housing prices began to fall, these households were exposed and without sufficient resources to withstand the storm.

    As housing prices turned south, “not only did [these households] receive an unwelcome shock to their net current wealth, but they also undoubtedly have come to realize that house prices will not rise indefinitely and that their labor income prospects are less rosy than they had believed,” Ms. Raskin said.

    “As a result, they are curtailing their spending in an effort to rebuild their nest eggs and may also be trimming their budgets in order to bring their debt levels into alignment with their new economic realities,” the official said. Add the unemployed to that mix, and it isn’t much of a surprise the economy has struggled to recover, the official said.

    Ms. Raskin also said that even as monetary policy is likely to work better when housing picks up further, it is unlikely it will be able to do much right now for wealth and income inequalities. She said “it is unlikely that cyclical improvements in the labor markets will do much to reverse these trends.”
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Kocherlakota Warns of Consequences of ‘Mandate-consistent' Lower Rates


    CentralBanking.com, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Narayana Kocherlakota, said today that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will have to live with a "considerable period" of financial instability as the price of meeting the targets of its dual unemployment-price stability mandate.

    Speaking at the 22nd Annual Hyman P Minsky Conference, held at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York, Kocherlakota said the "unusually low" interest rates that he advocates are likely to cause "inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity" - all of which "are often interpreted as signifying financial market instability".

    However, Kocherlakota - who does not sit on the FOMC in 2013 - said that low interest rates in the US are as necessary a response to poor economic indicators as is putting on a coat when the weather is cold.

    He said: "...when I decide what coat to wear, my goal is to keep myself at a temperature that I view as appropriate, given prevailing conditions that I cannot influence. Similarly, when the FOMC decides on a level of the real interest rate, its goal is to keep the macroeconomy at an appropriate ‘temperature', given prevailing conditions that it cannot influence."

    Given unemployment is currently significantly above target levels, and inflation is running below the target of 2% per annum, Kocherlakota said the FOMC "needs to put on some more serious 'winter gear' if it is to get the economy back to the right temperature".

    "It seems likely", he said, "that the mandate-consistent time path of real interest rates could be unusually low for a considerable period of time".

    Volatile prices and more mergers likely
    Kocherlakota then discussed three likely financial market outcomes of a sustained low interest rate environment: inflated asset prices, unusually volatile asset returns and high merger activity.

    He said mergers will become more common because they "typically involve enduring current costs in exchange for a flow of future benefits". When credit is relatively cheap, businesses "will be more willing to pay the upfront costs of a merger in exchange for the anticipated flow of future benefits".

    Asset prices will experience more volatility, he said: "When the real interest rate is very high, only the near term matters to investors. Hence, variations in an asset's price only reflect changes in investors' information about the asset's near-term dividends or risk premiums.

    "But when the real interest rate is unusually low, then an asset's price will become correspondingly sensitive to information about dividends or risk premiums in what might seem like the distant future."

    Cost-benefit calculation
    Kocherlakota said the FOMC has to confront "an ongoing probabilistic cost-benefit calculation" as "raising the real interest rate will definitely lead to lower employment and prices" while "raising the real interest rate may reduce the risk of a financial crisis-a crisis which could give rise to a much larger fall in employment and prices".

    Thus, he said, "the committee has to weigh the certainty of a costly deviation from its dual mandate objectives against the benefit of reducing the probability of an even larger deviation from those objectives."
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Kocherlakota Says Low Fed Rates Create Instability


    The Kansas City Star, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Narayana Kocherlakota said the central bank’s low interest rate policies, though necessary, will probably generate signs of financial instability.

    “Unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity,” Kocherlakota said Thursday in the prepared text of a speech in New York. “All of these financial market outcomes are often interpreted as signifying financial market instability.”

    Fed Governor Jeremy Stein and Kansas City Fed President Esther George are among those who have voiced concerns that an extended period of low interest rates is heightening the risk of asset bubbles in markets such as junk bonds and farmland.
    While George has dissented from this year’s Federal Open Market Committee decisions because of this risk, Kocherlakota is among the strongest supporters of additional monetary stimulus on the committee.

    In speeches earlier this month Kocherlakota said he sees an “ongoing modest recovery” with unemployment staying at 7 percent or more through late 2014. The slow recovery calls for “more accommodation,” he said in a speech, repeating his call to postpone consideration of any increase in interest rates. He doesn’t vote on policy this year.

    “It is likely that, for a number of years to come, the FOMC will only achieve its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability if it keeps real interest rates unusually low,” Kocherlakota said at the Levy Economics Institute’s 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Kocherlakota: Might Have To Keep Rates Low Next 5-10 Yrs


    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (MNI) – The Federal Reserve has lowered interest rates to support an economy battered by the 2008-2009 recession, however the weak macroeconomic outlook suggests the central bank's actions have not been enough, and it has not lowered the real interest rate sufficiently, Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank Governor Narayana Kocherlakota said Thursday.

    In remarks prepared for the Hyman Minsky conference hosted by the Levy Institute, Kocherlakota said the Fed's policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee might have to keep rates at exceptionally low levels for many years to come. Kocherlakota does not hold a voting position on the FOMC this year.

    He noted that over the past six years, the demand for safe assets has grown, while the supply of those assets has shrunk. The global supply of assets perceived as safe has also fallen, as the value of American residential land, and assets backed by land, and investors no longer view all forms of European sovereign debt as a safe investment.

    "I suggest that these dramatic changes in asset demand and asset supply are likely to persist over a considerable period of time -- possibly the next five to 10 years," Kocherlakota said. "If that forecast holds true, it follows that the FOMC will only be able to meet its congressionally mandated objectives over that time frame by taking policy actions that ensure that the real interest rate remains unusually low."

    In addition, using the analogy of deciding what clothes to wear based on weather conditions, Kocherlakota argued that "the truth is that the FOMC's choice of winter garb is actually insufficient to keep the U.S. economy appropriately warm." He pointed to the outlook for both employment and prices, which is too low relative to the FOMC's goals. Unemployment is currently 7.6%, and expected to fall only slowly, while inflation pressures are muted.

    "The Committee needs to put on some more serious winter gear if it is to get the economy back to the right temperature," he argued. "More prosaically, the FOMC can only achieve its dual mandate objectives by lowering the real interest rate even further below its 2007 level."

    Harking back to his comment on higher demand for safe assets, Kocherlakota said this is being fueled by tighter credit access, heightened perceptions of macroeconomic risk and increased uncertainty about federal fiscal policy. In particular, he said that restrictions on households' and businesses' ability to borrow typically lead them to spend less and save more.

    "Thus, the FOMC is confronted with a greater demand for safe assets and tighter supply of safe assets than in 2007. These changes in asset markets mean that, at any given level of real interest rates, households and businesses spend less. Their decline in spending pushes down on both prices and employment. As a result, the FOMC has to lower the real interest rate to achieve its objectives," he said.

    Kocherlakota predicted that over the five-to-10-year horizon, credit market access will remain limited relative to what borrowers had available in 2007, businesses will continue to feel a heightened degree of uncertainty about taxes and households will continue to feel a heightened degree of uncertainty about the level of federal government benefits.

    "These considerations suggest that, for many years to come, the FOMC will have to maintain low real interest rates to achieve its congressionally mandated goals," he reiterated.

    He acknowledged, however, that keeping real interest rates low for a considerable period of time will likely be associated with other "unusual financial market outcomes" - not to mention give rise to "signs of financial market instability."

    The "unusual financial market outcomes" are inflated asset prices, unusually volatile asset returns and high merger activity, Kocherlakota said.

    These financial market phenomena could pose macroeconomic risks, and he believes that is best addressed using effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector.

    "It is possible, though, that these tools may only partly mitigate the relevant macroeconomic risks. The FOMC could respond to any residual risk by tightening monetary policy," he added.

    Kocherlakota counseled, however, that the FOMC should only take that action "if the certain loss in terms of the associated fall in employment and prices is outweighed by the possible benefit of reducing the risk of an even larger fall in employment and prices caused by a financial crisis."

    Meaning? "The FOMC's decision about how to react to signs of financial instability will necessarily depend on a delicate probabilistic cost-benefit calculation," he said.

    The FOMC, Kocherlakota said, has to weigh the certainty of "a costly deviation from its dual mandate objectives" against the benefit of reducing the probability of "an even larger deviation from those objectives."
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Two Fed Presidents: Praise and Bash QE and Bond Buying


    by Jon C. Ogg
    24/7 Wall Street, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The Federal Reserve may have released its Beige Book on Wednesday showing no real risks to quantitative easing and to the $85 billion per month used for buying bonds. Despite three weak economic readings so far on Thursday, two different speeches from regional presidents of the Federal Reserve are taking different sides of the easy money from quantitative easing and bond buying.

    Lacker went on to say that he favors slowing the rate of bond purchases immediately, and he is leaning toward a swift end to the program. He thinks that the continued buying will make a Fed exit that much trickier. One last note is that inflation is tame now, but Lacker is worried that inflation risks will rise once the Federal Reserve and Ben Bernanke get closer to their decision to end quantitative easing.Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker gave an interview to CNBC on Thursday morning saying that the bond-buying efforts have not had much of an impact on the labor market. He thinks that the labor market is struggling due to wider challenges. As a reminder, Lacker was the lone monetary policy hawk throughout 2012, but he is not considered a voting member who gets to cast dissenting public views at each FOMC meeting due to term rotations.

    A second speech of caution may be taken out of context from headlines, but Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank president Narayana Kocherlakota spoke at the Levy Institute in New York this morning. His take was that very low interest rates could persist for close to decade because the economic risks and economic instability will be with us for so long. His take is that the FOMC will have to maintain very low real interest rates to achieve its dual mandate of full employment and low inflation.

    Where the Narayana Kocherlakota speech gets interesting is that he thinks this will be met with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and even with heightened merger activity. Be advised that Narayana Kocherlakota also is not a voting member of the FOMC, and he is considered dovish as a big supporter of quantitative easing. Kocherlakota even went on to say that he supports lowering the Fed’s unemployment target down to 5.5% rather than 6.5%.

    You have to love it when two non-voting Fed presidents offer differing views. Lacker is as hawkish as a member of the Fed can be. Kocherlakota is on the other end of the spectrum.

  • In the Media | April 2013

    Stimulus to Gain Potency as Housing Picks Up, Raskin Says


    NASDAQ, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK – Federal Reserve stimulus aimed at spurring growth will likely grow more powerful as the housing market recovers further, but the trends that have fueled income inequality aren't likely to change much, a U.S. central bank official said Thursday.

    "The accommodative policies of the [Federal Open Market Committee] and the concerted effort we have made to ease conditions in the mortgage markets will help the economy continue to gain traction," Fed governor Sarah Bloom Raskin said.

    "As house prices rise, more and more households have enough home equity to gain renewed access to mortgage credit and the ability to refinance their homes at lower rates," she said.

    "I think it is possible that accommodative monetary policy could be increasingly potent" as the housing market picks up, Ms. Raskin said.

    The official said Fed staffers estimate house price increases of 10% or less from current levels would be enough to help around 40% of homeowners who owe more on their homes that the properties are worth to get back into the black. If more households regain a positive equity position, it will help unclog some of the traditional channels monetary policy operates in, which will over time make the stimulus better able to lift growth, Ms. Raskin said.

    The central banker is a voting member of the monetary policy setting FOMC. Her comments came from the text of a speech prepared for delivery before a gathering held by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in New York. The bulk of Ms. Raskin's speech was devoted to trying to understand how wealth and income inequality played a role in creating the financial crisis, and how it might be affecting a recovery that has thus far been weak despite four years of mostly positive momentum.

    The official allowed that the issue isn't well understood by mainstream economists. But she said the evidence suggests inequality very likely did play a significant part in the downturn. Ms. Raskin pointed to a long standing and widening gulf between top earners and the rest of the nation. Those who saw incomes stagnate relied more on debt and homeownership to cover the lack of rising wages, and when housing prices began to fall, these households were exposed and without sufficient resources to withstand the storm.

    As housing prices turned south, "not only did [these households] receive an unwelcome shock to their net current wealth, but they also undoubtedly have come to realize that house prices will not rise indefinitely and that their labor income prospects are less rosy than they had believed," Ms. Raskin said.

    "As a result, they are curtailing their spending in an effort to rebuild their nest eggs and may also be trimming their budgets in order to bring their debt levels into alignment with their new economic realities," the official said. Add the unemployed to that mix, and it isn't much of a surprise the economy has struggled to recover, the official said.

    Ms. Raskin also said that even as monetary policy is likely to work better when housing picks up further, it is unlikely it will be able to do much right now for wealth and income inequalities. She said "it is unlikely that cyclical improvements in the labor markets will do much to reverse these trends."
  • In the Media | April 2013

    US's Miller Q&A: Weak TIPS Sale Reflects Reassessed Infl Fear


    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (MNI) - Treasury Under Secretary Mary Miller Thursday night avoided a specific direct comment on the day's relatively weak $18 billion TIPS 5-year note auction.

    But she did tell MNI in an exclusive comment that "over the past week, people have been reassessing their inflation expectations."

    She also hailed the cooperation between the Bank of England and the U.S. FDIC on banking regulation.

    Miller was answering questions from the audience at the annual Human Minsky Conference where she had delivered a speech saying, as reported earlier, that as much as current commentary ascribes great funding advantages to those banks of a size to be considered "too big to fail," that the perception may be increasingly out of date.

    The U.S. TIPS market declined sharply Thursday afternoon after the auction tailed nearly seven basis points although it drew reasonably good indirect bids. The auction size had been increased $2 billion over a similar previous auction. Miller also parried when asked by an audience member if the U.S. regulators such as Treasury should make U.S. banks leave ISDA. "You need to step back and look at the totality of financial regulation," said Miller.

    Adapting to the "clarity" of the Dodd-Frank Act about how taxpayers will be spared any future bank bailouts, credit ratings firms that had given the biggest banks a seven-notch uplift beyond their underlying creditworthiness, have now taken back as much as six notches. "One rating agency," she noted "has also recently indicated it may further reduce or eliminate its remaining ratings uplift assumptions by the end of 2013," she said.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Kocherlakota: Not Concerned About Fin Stability Risks Right Now


    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (MNI) - Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank President Narayana Kocherlakota Thursday called on the central bank to provide even more support to the ongoing economic recovery, arguing concerns about risks to financial stability do not yet supersede the need to spur faster job creation and maintain price stability.

    Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the Hyman Minsky conference in New York, Kocherlakota said , with regard to possible bubbles forming in asset classes, "Right now ... I don't see those kinds of risks out there."

    Kocherlakota is not a voter on the policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee this year.

    The question to be asked, he said, is do financial stability risks loom large enough to warrant taking monetary policy action to do something about them.

    "Is it (monetary policy) effective enough at mitigating that risk to warrant the loss of jobs and the disinflationary pressures? The answer to that is absolutely not at this stage," Kocherlakota said.

    "The worry about financial stability is still so tenuous that I would not want to be robbing the immediate stimulus to the economy on that basis," he added.

    Kocherlakota said he sees inflation running below target over the next two years, while the unemployment rate remains elevated.

    Speaking at the same conference Wednesday, St. Louis Fed President James Bullard has said he would support ramping up the Fed's bond purchases - currently at a pace of $85 billion a month - should inflation continue to decline.

    Asked for his thoughts, Kocherlakota said his outlook for inflation has not changed yet although the recent drop "is certainly a cause for concern."

    The Fed cannot risk delivering too little inflation relative to what it promises, he said, so it is important to protect the FOMC's 2% inflation target "both from above ... and from below as well."

    "I'm in favor of more accommodation," Kocherlakota declared, and so inflation softening "would make me even more in favor of more accommodation."

    In his prepared remarks, Kocherlakota had argued that the FOMC needs to put on "some more serious winter gear if it is to get the economy back to the right temperature."

    Asked by MNI what would constitute more serious action by the Fed, Kocherlakota again said the FOMC would provide additional stimulus to the economy by lowering its unemployment threshold to 5.5% from 6.5%.

    "That would provide even more of a guarantee in terms of how long interest rates were going to remain (exceptionally low), that would push downward further on real interest rates and provide more stimulus to demand," he said.

    Kocherlakota was then asked whether "more serious winter gear" also meant upping the scale of the Fed's asset purchases.

    "We have to become a lot more clear about what exactly are the metrics associated with that," Kocherlakota said, noting that the FOMC's vow to maintain the aggressive bond purchases until there is a "substantial improvement" in the labor market outlook, is being subjected to different interpretations.

    "I think we'd really solve a lot of problems, in terms of the fed funds rate, by being much more explicit about the markers for that (QE3)," Kcoherlakota said.

    Kocherlakota added that he feels more confident in the ability of forward guidance to provide the requisite stimulus because the FOMC has been so clear about it.

    As to the effectiveness of the Fed's policies, Kocherlakota argued that they are having an impact on the economy, arguing that the Fed's asset purchases have not only pushed down the yields of the securities being bought, but also yields "across the economy."

    "So I think that there is evidence that our actions are being effective," he said, before adding, "it would be nice if we did even more."
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Kocherlakota Warns Low-Rate World Risks Bubbles


    By Michael S. Derby
    4-Traders, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK--A Federal Reserve official said Thursday interest rates are likely to stay very low for years to come, which raises the prospect that chronic financial instability will be an enduring threat.

    "For a considerable period of time, the [Federal Open Market Committee] may only be to achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Narayana Kocherlakota said.

    "For many years to come, the FOMC will have to maintain low real interest rates to achieve its congressionally mandated goals," the official said. "Unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity," he said.

    In an environment where bubbles regularly threaten to form, and other markets see prices move away from fundamentals, the Fed will be confronted with difficult choices. "These potentialities are best addressed through effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector," Mr. Kocherlakota said, although he allowed that it is possible the Fed may also have to employ the blunt tool of monetary policy to cool markets down if risks rise enough.

    The official, when asked if he saw any markets devolving into a bubble, responded "the answer is absolutely not at this stage." At the current moment, "I don't see those kind of risks out there."

    But he also said that given the importance now placed on financial stability, bank regulators and supervisors face greater challenges as they do their work.

    Mr. Kocherlakota's comments came from a speech he gave at a conference held in New York by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. He took questions from the audience and spoke with reporters as well. The official is not currently a voting member of the monetary policy setting FOMC.

    Mr. Kocherlakota has been one of the biggest supporters of aggressive Fed action to support the economy, and has argued in recent speeches the Fed is not going far enough to aid the economy, and should add more stimulus by saying it wants to achieve a lower unemployment rate before hiking interest rates.

    He reiterated that he'd still like to lower the threshold at which the Fed would potentially entertain raising rates, from 6.5% to 5.5%. He said weakening inflation pressures were "definitely a cause for concern" but he hasn't changed his outlook for price pressures. Mr. Kocherlakota said he still expects economic growth of 2.5% this year and 3% next year, and believes that will be enough to help raise inflation over time from its current very low level.

    In his speech, the central banker said that the low interest rate world that could persist for "possibly the next five to 10 years" is in part the result of Fed actions over the course of the financial crisis and its aftermath. But the central banker said that other forces are also conspiring to keep rates very low.

    The three that are most important beyond Fed policy are tighter credit availability, increased worry about economic risk and uncertainty surrounding the outlook for U.S. government finance, he said.

    These factors are causing investors, households and firms to keep their money where it is safest, and it is also causing them to save more. At the same time, those who need better yields will go into riskier assets, creating the risk prices for those markets could go haywire, the official explained.

    In as much as Fed policy has helped create the low returns savers are wounded by, so too have market forces, Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    "I often hear that the FOMC has created a low interest rate environment that is harmful for savers and others," he said. "That seems about as compelling as blaming me for creating winter in Minnesota by putting on my long johns," Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    The official said in his speech he expects unemployment to fall "only slowly," and he said "inflation pressures are muted."
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Kocherlakota: Very Low Rates Could Persist for a Decade


    By Michael S. Derby
    Euroinvestor, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK – A Federal Reserve official said Thursday interest rates are likely to stay very low for years to come, which raised the prospect that chronic financial instability risks will dog the economy for a long time.

    "For a considerable period of time, the [Federal Open Market Committee] may only be to achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Narayana Kocherlaktoa said.

    "For many years to come, the FOMC will have to maintain low real interest rates to achieve its congressionally mandated goals," the official said. "Unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity," he said.

    In an environment where bubbles regularly threaten to form, and other markets see prices move away from fundamentals, the Fed will be confronted with difficult choices. "These potentialities are best addressed through effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector," Mr. Kocherlakota said, although he allowed that it is possible the Fed may also have to employ the blunt tool of monetary policy to cool markets down if risks rise enough.

    Mr. Kocherlakota's comments came from the text of a speech that was to be presented at a conference held in New York by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. The official is not currently a voting member of the monetary policy setting FOMC.

    Mr. Kocherlakota has been one of the biggest supporters of aggressive Fed action to support the economy, and has argued in recent speeches the Fed is not going far enough to aid the economy, and should add more stimulus by saying it wants to achieve a lower unemployment rate before hiking interest rates.

    In his speech, the central banker said that the low interest rate world that could persist for "possibly the next five to 10 years" is in part the result of Fed actions over the course of the financial crisis and its aftermath. But the central banker said that other forces are also conspiring to keep rates very low.

    The three that are most important beyond Fed policy are tighter credit availability, increased worry about economic risk and uncertainty surrounding the outlook for U.S. government finance, he said.

    These factors are causing investors, households, and firms to keep their money where it is safest, and it is also causing them to save more. At the same time, those who need better yields will go into riskier assets, creating the risk prices for those markets could go haywire, the official explained.

    In as much as Fed policy has helped create the low returns savers are wounded by, so too have market forces, Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    "I often hear that the FOMC has created a low interest rate environment that is harmful for savers and others," he said. "That seems about as compelling as blaming me for creating winter in Minnesota by putting on my long johns," Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    The official said in his speech he expects unemployment to fall "only slowly," and he said "inflation pressures are muted."
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Money Beat: ‘A Dose of Healthy Competition’ for Banking Regulators


    By Dan Fitzpatrick
    The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    New York Department of Financial Services Superintendent Benjamin Lawski signaled in a speech Thursday that he will not shy away from taking the “lead” among regulators while confronting U.S. financial giants.

    Lawsky rankled other regulators last year when he pursued a money laundering case against British bank Standard Chartered that ended with a settlement of $340 million. His agency, which serves as New York’s top banking regulator, was less than a year old at the time.

    “A dose of healthy competition among regulators is helpful and necessary to safeguarding the stability of our nation’s financial system,” Lawsky told a crowd in New York gathering for the Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies.

    During his talk  Lawsky dropped hints about new lines of inquiry for his department. He mentioned a trend of private equity companies buying insurance companies; the use of captive insurance subsidiaries to shift risk and take advantage of looser oversight requirements; and the use of outside consultants to monitor bank abuses.

    “The monitors are hired by the banks, they’re embedded physically at the banks, they are paid by the banks and they depend on the banks for future business,” he said.

    Lawsky said to expect actions in “the coming weeks and months” on the consultancy issue. “We expect that those actions will help propel reform at both the state and federal levels.” 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Raskin: Record Easing Will Aid Low-Income Americans


    Money News, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Easy money policies are bringing some relief to lower-income Americans hard-hit in the recession and the easing could become increasingly potent as the housing market recovers, a top U.S. Federal Reserve official said on Thursday.

    In a speech on equality and the U.S. economy, Fed Governor Sarah Raskin backed the policy accommodation and argued it would continue to help the overall economic recovery. But the long-running trend of inequality and stagnating wages in the United States has slowed that rebound, she said.

    "The accommodative policies ... and the concerted effort we have made to ease conditions in the mortgage markets will help the economy continue to gain traction. And the resulting expansion in employment will likely improve income levels at the bottom of the distribution," Raskin said in prepared remarks to the Hyman P. Minsky conference.

    "However, given the longstanding trends toward greater income and wealth inequalities, it is unlikely that cyclical improvements in the labor markets will do much to reverse these trends," she said.

    Raskin has consistently supported the central bank's policy of low interest rates and large-scale bond-buying, both of which are meant to spur investment, hiring and broader economic growth in the wake of the 2007-2009 recession.

    Gross Domestic Product growth was very tepid at the end of last year, but is expected to have rebounded strongly to 3-percent or more in the first quarter of this year. Still, recent economic signals have been weaker and the Fed is concerned that could hamper growth.

    Raskin's speech amounted to an in-depth look into what effects growing economic inequality, which has been on the rise for decades in the United States, has on the current recovery and on Fed policy.

    "As the housing market recovers, I think it is possible that accommodative monetary policy could be increasingly potent," she said.

    Still, the recession's plunge in net wealth and jump in unemployment will have "long lasting and lingering" effects on spending.

    "Although it is too early to state with certainty what the long-term effect of this recession will be on the earnings potential of those who lost their jobs, given the severity of the job loss and sluggishness of the recovery ... it is very likely that, for many households, future labor earnings will be well below what they had anticipated in the years before the recession," said Raskin, who has a permanent vote on Fed policy.

    She noted that the country remains almost 2.5 million jobs short of pre-recession levels.

    The U.S. unemployment rate was 7.6 percent last month, down from 10 percent in 2009, but short of the 5-6 percent range to which Americans are accustomed.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Raskin Says Record Fed Easing to Aid Low-Income Americans


    By Jeff Kearns
    Bloomberg, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin said the Fed should press on with record easing, predicting that current policy will increasingly improve the economic outlook for low-income Americans.

    The Fed’s near-zero interest rate policy and asset purchases are growing more effective by supporting the housing market and spurring economic activity, Raskin said today in a speech at a Ford Foundation conference in New York.

    “Accommodative monetary policy could be increasingly potent” as the housing market recovers, Raskin said. “As house prices rise, more and more households have enough home equity to gain renewed access to mortgage credit and the ability to refinance their homes at lower rates.”

    The Federal Open Market Committee in March agreed to continue buying $85 billion in Treasuries and mortgage bonds per month in an effort to bolster growth and reduce unemployment that was at 7.6 percent last month. Fed officials are debating how to eventually curtail asset purchases that have swollen the central bank’s balance sheet to a record $3.3 trillion.

    “The accommodative policies of the FOMC and the concerted effort we have made to ease conditions in the mortgage markets will help the economy continue to gain traction,” Raskin said. “And the resulting expansion in employment will likely improve income levels at the bottom of the distribution.”

    Financial Shocks

    At the December 2007 start of the 18-month recession, there were an “unusually large” number of low- and middle-income households that were vulnerable to financial shocks after 30 years of “sluggish” wage growth, Raskin said.

    “Their exposure to house prices had increased dramatically,” and they were more likely to be affected by lost jobs and reduced savings, Raskin said. That deepened the recession and prolonged the recovery, she said today at the foundation’s 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference.

    U.S. growth slumped to 0.4 percent in the fourth quarter, the slowest since the first quarter of 2011, amid government budget cuts and military spending that plunged the most since the waning days of the Vietnam War four decades ago.

    Economists expect growth to rebound. Gross domestic product probably grew at a 3 percent annualized rate from January through March, according to the median forecast in an April 5-9 Bloomberg survey of 69 economists. That’s up from the 2 percent gain projected by economists last month.

    The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index slumped for a second day, dropping 0.7 percent to a six-week low of 1,541.61 as earnings from UnitedHealth Group Inc. to EBay Inc. disappointed investors. The yield on the benchmark 10-year Treasury note decreased 0.01 percentage point to 1.68 percent.

    Raskin, 52, was appointed by President Barack Obama  in 2010 for a term that expires in 2016. Before joining the Fed she was Maryland’s Commissioner of Financial Regulation, according to the Fed Board website.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Política expansiva de la Fed, necesaria: Kocherlakota


    El Financiero, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Nueva York. – Las políticas ultraexpansivas de la Reserva Federal de Estados Unidos inevitablemente resultarán en la inestabilidad de los mercados financieros por años pero tales riesgos son necesarios para impulsar el empleo y la inflación, dijo el jueves un banquero central estadounidense.

    Relacionando a la Fed con una excursión en el estado de Minnesota en medio del invierno, el presidente de la Fed de Minneapolis Narayana Kocherlakota dijo que las tasas de interés reales bajas son tan necesarias como vestir una cálida parka, y probablemente sean necesarias "por varios años más".

    Reforzando su argumento expansionista, de que hay que aliviar aún más el crédito, el funcionario dijo que el débil panorama económico sugiere que las tasas deberían ser todavía más bajas pese a la resultante inflación de los precios de los activos, los retornos volátiles y la mayor actividad de fusiones corporativas.

    "Por muchos años más", dijo, el comité monetario de la Fed "solo podrá lograr sus objetivos establecidos por el Congreso si sigue políticas que resulten en señales de inestabilidad de los mercados financieros", dijo Kocherlakota en comentarios preparados para una conferencia Hyman P. Minsky.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    The Fed Is Inflating Asset Prices and Increasing Volatility, and It Should Do More, Kocherlakota Says


    Forbes, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Admitting that the Federal Reserve is responsible for creating financial instability, and possibly brewing the next toxic asset bubble, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota said they have to do more to stimulate the economy, as inflation is too low.  Kocherlakota predicted five to ten years of financial instability, as the Fed marches on with unusually low, and currently negative, interest rates, yet suggested the alternative would be “much worse.”

    Going much further than Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke. Kocherlakota directly tied high levels of financial instability with the Fed’s policies designed to keep rates “unusually low.”  Interestingly, though, he didn’t suggest this was a reason to reverse course, rather, he felt it was an unwanted but tolerable side effect.

    Speaking at the Levy Economics Institute’s Minsky conference, Kocherlakota spoke of “incredible demand for safe assets,” which, in conjunction with Fed policy, will conspire to keep real rates very low for possibly five to ten years.

    Demand for safety has risen, as tight credit access pushes households and some businesses to increase saving.  At the same time, fears of a coming macroeconomic shock diminishes demand for businesses and workers’ products.  Add the fiscal situation, where spending and revenues are completely out of whack, and one sees a constant yearning for safety.  In part this has helped the dollar remain relatively resilient, while fueling gold’s rise during times of market stress, despite recent weakness.

    On the supply side, investors knew where to find it before the crash: in U.S. real state or assets backed by it, in European sovereign debt, and in Treasuries. With the real estate sector obliterated and Europe in shambles, supply of safe assets has fallen dramatically, Kocherlakota explained.

    This environment undoubtedly sets the stage for “unusual” events in financial markets.  Kocherlakota spoke of Fed policy inflating asset prices, while accelerating volatility; he also mentioned increased merger activity.  Indeed, U.S. stock markets have been trading at or near record highs for some time, while stocks in the housing sector, such as KB Home and Lennar, are up near their 52-week highs.  Financial stocks like Citigroup, JPMorgan Cahse, and Bank of America are all outperforming the market dramatically over the past six months, while gold, eternally seen as a safe asset, is down hard in the same time period.

    The risk of creating another destructive bubble is there, according to Kocherlakota, but he doesn’t see it as imminent.  The Fed’s current state of surveillance is vastly superior than it was before the financial crisis, the Minneapolis Fed chief said, giving him comfort that they will be able to anticipate, or at least mitigate, any dangers.

    So, the Fed has to do more.  Kocherlakota’s two-year inflation projection is well below trend, and fearing deflation, he’s ready to do more.  Even after defending quantitative easing, Kocherlakota said he prefers to use forward guidance to affect market perceptions.   Specifically, he’d like to lower the unemployment target from 6.5% to 5.5%, signaling that easing will remain in place for longer.  QE isn’t as well understood from a metric perspective, he explained.

    Asked about diminishing returns, and if Fed policy was at a point where it is increasingly ineffective, while risks continue to mount, Kocherlakota was quick to reject the hypothesis.  There’s ample evidence the Fed has been effective, particularly in mortgage markets and in real rates, as seen in TIPS, while raising rates would be destructive, helping a few to the detriment of many, he said.

    Kocherlakota echoed comments made by his colleague from St. Louis, James Bullard, who on Wednesday also said inflation was “too low,” arguing for the Fed to do more. While Bullard said forward guidance is ineffective, and asked for a modification in the flow rate of asset purchases (Fed code for more money printing), they both agree the Fed has to do more to stimulate the economy.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    UPDATE: Fed's Kocherlakota Warns Low Rate World Risks Bubbles


    By Michael S. Derby
    Capital.gr, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    (Adds Kocherlakota's comments on market imbalances, inflation)

    NEW YORK--A Federal Reserve official said Thursday interest rates are likely to stay very low for years to come, which raises the prospect that chronic financial instability will be an enduring threat.

    "For a considerable period of time, the [Federal Open Market Committee] may only be to achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Narayana Kocherlakota said.

    "For many years to come, the FOMC will have to maintain low real interest rates to achieve its congressionally mandated goals," the official said. "Unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity," he said.

    In an environment where bubbles regularly threaten to form, and other markets see prices move away from fundamentals, the Fed will be confronted with difficult choices. "These potentialities are best addressed through effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector," Mr. Kocherlakota said, although he allowed that it is possible the Fed may also have to employ the blunt tool of monetary policy to cool markets down if risks rise enough.

    The official, when asked if he saw any markets devolving into a bubble, responded "the answer is absolutely not at this stage." At the current moment, "I don't see those kind of risks out there."

    But he also said that given the importance now placed on financial stability, bank regulators and supervisors face greater challenges as they do their work.

    Mr. Kocherlakota's comments came from a speech he gave at a conference held in New York by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. He took questions from the audience and spoke with reporters as well. The official is not currently a voting member of the monetary policy setting FOMC.

    Mr. Kocherlakota has been one of the biggest supporters of aggressive Fed action to support the economy, and has argued in recent speeches the Fed is not going far enough to aid the economy, and should add more stimulus by saying it wants to achieve a lower unemployment rate before hiking interest rates.

    He reiterated that he'd still like to lower the threshold at which the Fed would potentially entertain raising rates, from 6.5% to 5.5%. He said weakening inflation pressures were "definitely a cause for concern" but he hasn't changed his outlook for price pressures. Mr. Kocherlakota said he still expects economic growth of 2.5% this year and 3% next year, and believes that will be enough to help raise inflation over time from its current very low level.

    In his speech, the central banker said that the low interest rate world that could persist for "possibly the next five to 10 years" is in part the result of Fed actions over the course of the financial crisis and its aftermath. But the central banker said that other forces are also conspiring to keep rates very low.

    The three that are most important beyond Fed policy are tighter credit availability, increased worry about economic risk and uncertainty surrounding the outlook for U.S. government finance, he said.

    These factors are causing investors, households and firms to keep their money where it is safest, and it is also causing them to save more. At the same time, those who need better yields will go into riskier assets, creating the risk prices for those markets could go haywire, the official explained.

    In as much as Fed policy has helped create the low returns savers are wounded by, so too have market forces, Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    "I often hear that the FOMC has created a low interest rate environment that is harmful for savers and others," he said. "That seems about as compelling as blaming me for creating winter in Minnesota by putting on my long johns," Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    The official said in his speech he expects unemployment to fall "only slowly," and he said "inflation pressures are muted."
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Kocherlakota Sees Fed’s Low Rates Creating Financial Instability


    Money News, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Narayana Kocherlakota said the central bank’s low interest rate policies, though necessary, will probably generate signs of financial instability.

    “Unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity,” Kocherlakota said in the prepared text of a speech in New York.

    “All of these financial market outcomes are often interpreted as signifying financial market instability.”

    Fed Governor Jeremy Stein and Kansas City Fed President Esther George are among those who have voiced concerns that an extended period of low interest rates is heightening the risk of asset bubbles in markets such as junk bonds and farmland.

    While George has dissented from this year’s Federal Open Market Committee decisions because of this risk, Kocherlakota is among the strongest supporters of additional monetary stimulus on the committee.

    In speeches earlier this month Kocherlakota said he sees an “ongoing modest recovery” with unemployment staying at 7 percent or more through late 2014. The slow recovery calls for “more accommodation,” he said in a speech, repeating his call to postpone consideration of any increase in interest rates. He doesn’t vote on policy this year.

    “It is likely that, for a number of years to come, the FOMC will only achieve its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability if it keeps real interest rates unusually low,” Kocherlakota said at the Levy Economics Institute’s 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference.

    Near Zero
    The Minneapolis Fed chief has said the central bank should hold its target interest rate near zero until unemployment falls to 5.5 percent. That’s a full percentage point below the 6.5 percent threshold that has been adopted by the FOMC.

    “For a considerable period of time, the FOMC may only be able to achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets,” Kocherlakota said. “These financial market phenomena could pose macroeconomic risks. In my view, these potentialities are best addressed using effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector.”
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Kocherlakota Says Low Fed Rates Create Financial Instability


    By Joshua Zumbrun
    Bloomberg, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President  Narayana Kocherlakota said the central bank’s low interest-rate policies, though necessary, will probably generate signs of financial instability.

    “Unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity,” Kocherlakota said today in the prepared text of a speech in New York.  “All of these financial market outcomes are often interpreted as signifying financial market instability.” He told reporters later he doesn’t see financial instability as imminent.

    Fed Governor Jeremy Stein and Kansas City Fed President Esther George are among those who have voiced concerns that an extended period of low interest rates is heightening the risk of asset bubbles in markets such as junk bonds  and farmland.

    While George has dissented from this year’s Federal Open Market Committee decisions because of this risk, Kocherlakota is among the strongest supporters of additional monetary stimulus on the committee.

    In speeches earlier this month, Kocherlakota said he sees an “ongoing modest recovery” with unemployment staying at 7 percent or more through late 2014. The slow recovery calls for “more accommodation,” he said in a speech, repeating his call to postpone consideration of any increase in interest rates. He doesn’t vote on policy this year.

    Dual Mandate
    “It is likely that, for a number of years to come, the FOMC will only achieve its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability if it keeps real interest rates unusually low,” Kocherlakota said at the Levy Economics Institute’s 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference.

    The Minneapolis Fed chief has said the central bank should hold its target interest rate near zero until unemployment  falls to 5.5 percent. That’s a percentage point below the 6.5 percent threshold that has been adopted by the FOMC.

    Answering audience questions, Kocherlakota said the recovery in the housing market is evidence that the Fed’s monthly purchases of $85 billion in Treasuries and mortgage securities are effective.

    “They are having an impact on the economy,” he said. “Look at what’s going on in the mortgage market.”

    “It would be nice if we did even more along those lines because I think our tools have been effective,” he said. “In the housing market, in particular, you’ve certainly seen direct effects of that kind of stimulus.”

    Growth Outlook
    Kocherlakota told reporters that the current growth outlook is sufficient to raise inflation, currently measured at 1.3 percent by the Fed’s preferred price gauge, closer to the Fed’s goal of 2 percent.

    “It’s very important to protect the target both from above, which gets so much attention, but from below as well,” he said.

    “Given the stimulus we’re providing, given the growth I see in the economy, 2.5 percent in 2013, 3 percent in 2014, that kind of growth I see as sufficient to put upward pressure on inflation,” Kocherlakota said.

    He said he’s already “in favor of more accommodation” and further declines in the inflation rate would make him “even more” supportive of additional stimulus.

    In his speech, Kocherlakota said that “for a considerable period of time,” the FOMC may only be able to “achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets. These financial market phenomena could pose macroeconomic risks. In my view, these potentialities are best addressed using effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector.”

    “The low interest-rate environment” in coming years “will put even more pressure on the regulatory framework,” Kocherlakota told reporters after his speech.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    NY Doubles Down on Captives, Private Equity Firm Scrutiny


    By Elizabeth D. Festa
    LifeHealthPro, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    New York insurance regulators have the captives industry and private equity firms that own annuity companies under a microscope for their effect on financial solvency and stability, and the fear policyholders may be left holding the bag.

    The use of captives of insurers places the stability of the broader financial system at greater risk, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) lead supervisor said today in New York.

    DFS Superintendent Ben Lawsky even invoked AIG and analogized the use of captives to the same risky practices that precipitated the 2008 financial crisis, issuing subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS) through structured investment vehicles and writing credit default swaps on higher-risk MBS.

    Lawsky also said his state regulators are ramping up their scrutiny of private equity firms that are acquiring insurance companies, particularly fixed and indexed annuity writers. He warned that their failure could put policyholders, retirees and the financial system at risk.

    He also suggested that regulators might need to beef up existing regulations to prevent the easy acquisition of annuity-rich insurance companies.

    The long term nature of the life insurance business raises similar issues, yet under current regulations it is less burdensome for a private equity firm to acquire an insurer than a bank.

    The specific risk DFS is concerned about is whether these private equity firms are more short-term focused when this is a business that’s all about the long haul.

    “There can be exceptions, but generally private equity firms follow a model of aggressive risk-taking and high leverage, typically making high-risk investments,” Lawsky said. “Private equity firms typically manage their investments with a much shorter time horizon – for example, three to five years -- than is typically required for prudent insurance company management.”

    If they don’t happen to be long-term players in the insurance industry, their short-term focus may result in an incentive to increase investment risk and leverage in order to boost short-term returns.

    Private equity-controlled insurers now account for nearly 30 percent of the indexed annuity market (up from 7 percent a year ago) and 15 percent of the total fixed annuity market (up from 4 percent a year ago).

    Lawsky said he hopes to “shed light on and further stimulate a national debate on the use of captive insurance companies and special purpose vehicles (SPVs) by some of the world’s largest financial firms.

    He hopes to do this though the DFS’ ongoing “serious investigation” into what he believes is not even a true risk transfer. Lawsky, who is superintendent of both banking and insurance in the state, suggested in his remarks the shaky ground of solvency upon which some insurers, he believes, are standing. When the time finally comes for a policyholder to collect their promised benefits, the reserves of insurers have shrunk so there is a smaller buffer available to ensure that the policyholders receive the benefits to which they are legally entitled, he explained.

    Lawsky said that many times captives do not actually transfer the risk for policies off the parent company’s books because the parent company is ultimately still on the hook for paying claims if the shell company’s weaker reserves are exhausted.

    Lawsky spoke of his concerns with what he terms “shadow insurance” or “financial alchemy” during a speech Thursday in New York City at the annual Hyman P. Minsky conference on the state of the U.S. and world economies organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Morning Money: Lawsky on Regulatory Competition


    Politico, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    FIRST LOOK III: LAWSKY ON REGULATORY COMPETITION
     — Excerpts from remarks New York Superintendent of Financial Services Ben Lawsky is to give this morning at the Minsky Conference at the Ford Foundation in NYC on “healthy competition” in financial regulation: “The New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) is only about 18 months old. So, in many ways, we’re the new regulator on the block. And at DFS, we’re fortunate to work with federal partners who have a deep well of institutional knowledge and expertise — which complements our own. But we also have another key attribute at DFS. We’re nimble. And we’re agile. And we’re able to take a fresh look at issues across the financial industry — both new and old." 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Easy Policies Necessary as a Parka in Winter: Kocherlakota


    Reuters, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    (Reuters) – The Federal Reserve's ultra accommodative policies will inevitably result in financial market instability for years but such risks are necessary to boost employment and inflation, a top U.S. central bank official said on Thursday. 

    Likening the Fed to a Minnesotan heading out into the winter cold, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota said low real interest rates are as necessary as wearing a warm parka, and will probably be needed for many more years.

    Kocherlakota is probably the most dovish of the 19 policymakers at the Fed, which has kept borrowing costs low for more than four years and is snapping up $85 billion in bonds each month to stimulate the U.S. economic recovery.

    Bolstering his argument for yet more easing, the Minneapolis policymaker said the weak economic outlook suggests borrowing costs should be lower for even longer than the Fed now plans despite the inflated asset prices, volatile returns, and higher corporate merger activity that will result.

    "For many years to come," he said, the Fed's policy-setting committee "will only be able to achieve its congressionally mandated objectives by following policies that result in signs of financial market instability," Kocherlakota told a Hyman P. Minsky conference.

    Financial regulation is the best defense against such instability, he said.

    But if the Fed considers raising rates to stabilize things, it has to weigh "the certainty of a costly" departure from achieving maximum employment and price stability against the benefit of reducing "the probability of an even larger" departure those objectives, Kocherlakota warned.

    Central bank policymakers would also have to consider the effect a sooner-than-desired rate-rise would have on the Fed's overall credibility, he later told reporters. "That's going be part of the question you have to ask yourself," he said.

    Frustrated with the slow and erratic recovery, the central bank has said it will keep short-term rates low until the unemployment rate falls to at least 6.5 percent, from 7.6 percent last month, as long as inflation, now below the Fed's 2-percent target, remains contained.

    Meanwhile the Fed's bond-buying is meant to depress longer term rates and encourage investing, hiring and economic growth.

    Kocherlakota is alone among policymakers in wanting the central bank to aim to keep rates low until unemployment falls as low as 5.5 percent, a level to which Americans are more accustomed.

    Kocherlakota, whose hometown is expecting yet another spring snowfall, said the policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is responding to forces beyond its control when it decides how long to keep rates low, given it is falling short of both its employment and inflation goals.

    "When I decide what coat to wear, my goal is to keep myself at a temperature that I view as appropriate, given prevailing conditions that I cannot influence," he said.

    "Similarly, when the FOMC decides on a level of the real interest rate, its goal is to keep the macro economy at an appropriate temperature, given prevailing conditions that it cannot influence," he added. "But the truth is that the FOMC's choice of winter garb is actually insufficient to keep the U.S. economy appropriately warm."

    Talking to reporters, he did not go so far as to call for more asset purchases. But he said it was very important that the Fed protects its 2-percent inflation target "both from above, which gets so much attention, but from below as well."

    On Wednesday, St. Louis Fed President James Bullard surprised some economists when he said the central bank should ramp up its quantitative easing program if inflation continues to fall. According to the Fed's preferred measure, inflation is at about 1.3 percent.

    In his speech, Kocherlakota added he expects credit markets will remain limited over the next five to 10 years, causing headaches for investors seeking safe-haven assets.    
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Lawsky Reviews Private Equity’s ‘Troubling’ Insurance Role


    By Zachary Tracer
    The Washington Post, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    (Updates with Lawsky’s comment in the fourth paragraph.)

    April 18 (Bloomberg) -- New York’s financial regulator is scrutinizing what he called the “troubling role” of private equity firms as they expand into the insurance industry through acquisitions, according to a speech today.

    Private-equity firms “may not be long-term players in the insurance industry and their short-term focus may result in an incentive to increase investment risk and leverage in order to boost short-term returns,” New York Department of Financial Services Superintendent Benjamin Lawsky said today in prepared remarks. “This type of business model isn’t necessarily a natural fit for the insurance business, where a failure can put policyholders at significant risk.”

    Leon Black’s Apollo Global Management LLC has agreed to buy four insurers since 2008, including a $1.8 billion deal in December for Aviva Plc’s U.S. life and annuity business. A firm owned by Guggenheim Partners LLC shareholders agreed the same month to buy a variable-annuity unit from Sun Life Financial Inc. for $1.35 billion.

    “DFS is moving to ramp up its activity” monitoring private-equity firms’ role, he said today, without naming companies, at the Hyman P. Minsky Conference in New York. “We hope that other regulators will soon follow suit.” 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed’s Kocherlakota: Very Low Rates Could Persist for a Decade


    By Michael S. Derby
    The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve official said Thursday interest rates are likely to stay very low for years to come, which raised the prospect that chronic financial instability risks will dog the economy for a long time.

    “For a considerable period of time, the [Federal Open Market Committee] may only be to achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Narayana Kocherlaktoa said.

    “For many years to come, the FOMC will have to maintain low real interest rates to achieve its congressionally mandated goals,” the official said. “Unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity,” he said.

    In an environment where bubbles regularly threaten to form, and other markets see prices move away from fundamentals, the Fed will be confronted with difficult choices. “These potentialities are best addressed through effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector,” Mr. Kocherlakota said, although he allowed that it is possible the Fed may also have to employ the blunt tool of monetary policy to cool markets down if risks rise enough.

    Mr. Kocherlakota’s comments came from the text of a speech that was to be presented at a conference held in New York by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. The official is not currently a voting member of the monetary policy setting FOMC.

    Mr. Kocherlakota has been one of the biggest supporters of aggressive Fed action to support the economy, and has argued in recent speeches the Fed is not going far enough to aid the economy, and should add more stimulus by saying it wants to achieve a lower unemployment rate before hiking interest rates.

    In his speech, the central banker said that the low interest rate world that could persist for “possibly the next five to 10 years” is in part the result of Fed actions over the course of the financial crisis and its aftermath. But the central banker said that other forces are also conspiring to keep rates very low.

    The three that are most important beyond Fed policy are tighter credit availability, increased worry about economic risk and uncertainty surrounding the outlook for U.S. government finance, he said.

    These factors are causing investors, households, and firms to keep their money where it is safest, and it is also causing them to save more. At the same time, those who need better yields will go into riskier assets, creating the risk prices for those markets could go haywire, the official explained.

    In as much as Fed policy has helped create the low returns savers are wounded by, so too have market forces, Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    “I often hear that the FOMC has created a low interest rate environment that is harmful for savers and others,” he said. “That seems about as compelling as blaming me for creating winter in Minnesota by putting on my long johns,” Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    The official said in his speech he expects unemployment to fall “only slowly,” and he said “inflation pressures are muted.”
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Kocherlakota Says Low Fed Rates Create Financial Instability


    By Joshua Zumbrun
    Bloomberg Businessweek, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Narayana Kocherlakota said the central bank’s low interest rate policies, though necessary, will probably generate signs of financial instability.

    “Unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity,” Kocherlakota said today in the prepared text of a speech in New York. “All of these financial market outcomes are often interpreted as signifying financial market instability.”

    Fed Governor Jeremy Stein and Kansas City Fed President Esther George are among those who have voiced concerns that an extended period of low interest rates is heightening the risk of asset bubbles in markets such as junk bonds and farmland.

    While George has dissented from this year’s Federal Open Market Committee decisions because of this risk, Kocherlakota is among the strongest supporters of additional monetary stimulus on the committee.

    In speeches earlier this month Kocherlakota said he sees an “ongoing modest recovery” with unemployment staying at 7 percent or more through late 2014. The slow recovery calls for “more accommodation,” he said in a speech, repeating his call to postpone consideration of any increase in interest rates. He doesn’t vote on policy this year.

    “It is likely that, for a number of years to come, the FOMC will only achieve its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability if it keeps real interest rates unusually low,” Kocherlakota said at the Levy Economics Institute’s 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference.

    Near Zero

    The Minneapolis Fed chief has said the central bank should hold its target interest rate near zero until unemployment falls to 5.5 percent. That’s a full percentage point below the 6.5 percent threshold that has been adopted by the FOMC.

    Answering audience questions, Kocherlakota said the recovery in the housing market is evidence that the Fed’s monthly purchases of $85 billion in Treasuries and mortgage securities are effective.

    “They are having an impact on the economy,” he said. “Look at what’s going on in the mortgage market.”

    “It would be nice if we did even more along those lines because I think our tools have been effective,” he said. “In the housing market in particular you’ve certainly seen direct effects of that kind of stimulus.”

    In his speech, Kocherlakota said that “for a considerable period of time, the FOMC may only be to achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets. These financial market phenomena could pose macroeconomic risks. In my view, these potentialities are best addressed using effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector.”
  • In the Media | April 2013

    UPDATE: Fed's Kocherlakota Warns Low Rate World Risks Bubbles


    By Michael S. Derby
    The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK – A Federal Reserve official said Thursday interest rates are likely to stay very low for years to come, which raises the prospect that chronic financial instability will be an enduring threat.

    "For a considerable period of time, the [Federal Open Market Committee] may only be to achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Narayana Kocherlakota said.

    "For many years to come, the FOMC will have to maintain low real interest rates to achieve its congressionally mandated goals," the official said. "Unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity," he said.

    In an environment where bubbles regularly threaten to form, and other markets see prices move away from fundamentals, the Fed will be confronted with difficult choices. "These potentialities are best addressed through effective supervision and regulation of the financial sector," Mr. Kocherlakota said, although he allowed that it is possible the Fed may also have to employ the blunt tool of monetary policy to cool markets down if risks rise enough.

    The official, when asked if he saw any markets devolving into a bubble, responded "the answer is absolutely not at this stage." At the current moment, "I don't see those kind of risks out there."

    But he also said that given the importance now placed on financial stability, bank regulators and supervisors face greater challenges as they do their work.

    Mr. Kocherlakota's comments came from a speech he gave at a conference held in New York by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. He took questions from the audience and spoke with reporters as well. The official is not currently a voting member of the monetary policy setting FOMC.

    Mr. Kocherlakota has been one of the biggest supporters of aggressive Fed action to support the economy, and has argued in recent speeches the Fed is not going far enough to aid the economy, and should add more stimulus by saying it wants to achieve a lower unemployment rate before hiking interest rates.

    He reiterated that he'd still like to lower the threshold at which the Fed would potentially entertain raising rates, from 6.5% to 5.5%. He said weakening inflation pressures were "definitely a cause for concern" but he hasn't changed his outlook for price pressures. Mr. Kocherlakota said he still expects economic growth of 2.5% this year and 3% next year, and believes that will be enough to help raise inflation over time from its current very low level.

    In his speech, the central banker said that the low interest rate world that could persist for "possibly the next five to 10 years" is in part the result of Fed actions over the course of the financial crisis and its aftermath. But the central banker said that other forces are also conspiring to keep rates very low.

    The three that are most important beyond Fed policy are tighter credit availability, increased worry about economic risk and uncertainty surrounding the outlook for U.S. government finance, he said.

    These factors are causing investors, households and firms to keep their money where it is safest, and it is also causing them to save more. At the same time, those who need better yields will go into riskier assets, creating the risk prices for those markets could go haywire, the official explained.

    In as much as Fed policy has helped create the low returns savers are wounded by, so too have market forces, Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    "I often hear that the FOMC has created a low interest rate environment that is harmful for savers and others," he said.

    "That seems about as compelling as blaming me for creating winter in Minnesota by putting on my long johns," Mr. Kocherlakota said.

    The official said in his speech he expects unemployment to fall "only slowly," and he said "inflation pressures are muted."
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Kocherlakota: Low Rates May Last 5-10 Years


    By Greg Robb
    MarketWatch, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) – Financial market conditions requiring the Federal Reserve to keep rates unusually low may persist for the next five to 10 years, said Narayana Kocherlakota, the president of the Minneapolis Fed Bank on Thursday. This low-rate environment, and Fed policy, in turn, can be expected to "be associated with financial market phenomena that are seen as signifying instability," such as inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity, Kocherlakota said, in a speech at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. This instability is best addressed through effective supervision and regulation, Kocherlakota said. However, the Fed may have to confront the dilemma of whether to raise rates to reduce the risks of a financial crisis with the certainty that any tightening would lead to lower employment and prices, he said. The Fed is in a better position to address this challenge than it was in 2007, he said. 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Bullard: Inflation Too Low; May Need Response


    Hellenic Shipping News, April 18, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard on Wednesday said he is concerned inflationary pressures may be growing too weakly and the central bank may have to do something about it.

    "Inflation is running very low" as measured by the personal consumption expenditures price index, the Fed's favored inflation gauge, the policymaker said. "I'm getting concerned about that," he said, adding that the low rate of price pressure "gives the [Federal Open Market Committee] some room to maneuver" on the monetary-policy front.

    The central banker didn't suggest that any move toward a more-stimulative monetary policy was imminent. The Fed is currently pursuing a policy of buying bonds to drive up growth and lower the unemployment rate. While most expect the bond-buying program to continue for some months to come, improving economic conditions have driven some central bankers to say the pace of buying could be reduced at some point.

    The Fed wants inflation at 2% and it considers under-target inflation to be undesirable. Central bankers consider a deflationary environment as damaging to the economy.

    In his speech, Mr. Bullard also appeared to take issue with the central bank's latest move to provide increased monetary-policy guidance, saying the Fed is limited in what it can do to affect labor-market conditions.

    The best and most-effective action the Fed can take is to focus on its traditional mandate of inflation control, the official said. "Frontline research suggests that price stability remains the policy advice even in the face of serious labor-market inefficiencies," Mr. Bullard said. "This research should provide the benchmark for contemporary monetary policy," he explained.

    At the same time, "the current high level of unemployment is causing some to suggest that the [FOMC] should put more weight on unemployment in its decision-making process," he said. That would be a mistake, he said, as research shows "monetary policy alone cannot effectively address multiple labor-market inefficiencies...One must turn to more-direct labor-market policies to address those problems."

    Monetary policy by itself is "too blunt" to help lower high unemployment levels, the policymaker said. When it comes to aiding the labor market, "it's not that you can't do something about it, it's just that maybe you shouldn't lean on the monetary-policy maker" to do it.

    Mr. Bullard is a voting member of the monetary-policy-setting FOMC. His comments came from a speech given before a conference held by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, in New York. Much of his talk referenced work by economists Federico Ravenna and Carl Walsh.

    Mr. Bullard has long argued that monetary policy faces limits in what it can do to aid the labor market, and he has said that, if the Fed were to target achieving a given unemployment rate, it could lead policy to go seriously wrong. But he also gave his qualified support to the Fed's decision last December to job and inflation thresholds.

    At that time, the Fed said it would keep short-term interest rates near 0% so long as the unemployment rate is above 6.5% and expected inflation is below 2.5%. Officials have been careful to note that these levels aren't targets and that they don't promise immediate action if breached. Some have said the Fed could easily keep rates unchanged with a sub-6/5% unemployment rate if inflation remained under the threshold.

    The Fed's new policy guidance reflects in large part its congressionally given mandate to keep prices stable and to promote maximum sustainable job growth. The Fed is unique among major central banks in having this goal, with other major central banks charged with pursuing stable inflation alone.

    Mr. Bullard's comments Wednesday appeared to reflect an ongoing discomfort with this new policy regime, one that is unlikely to bring a rate increase for several more years if the Fed is right about how the labor market will perform.

    In his prepared remarks, Mr. Bullard said the Fed over recent years has done a good job of keeping inflation near the central bank's official target of 2%. He said the unemployment rate "remains high" and, compared to its current 7.6% level, it will likely be in the "low-7% range" by year's end. 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed’s Bullard Emphasizes Inflation, Not Unemployment


    By Greg Edwards
    St. Louis Dispatch, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    St. Louis Fed President Jim Bullard said Wednesday the Federal Reserve should keep its focus on inflation instead of putting more weight on high unemployment.

    More emphasis on unemployment “may be highly counterproductive,” he said at a conference in New York. Bullard said he expects unemployment, which was 7.6 percent last month, will drop to the low 7 percent range by the end of the year.

    He made the remarks at the annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference in New York City, organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Boston Fed Chief Rosengren Calls For Crackdown on Broker-Dealers


    Boston Herald, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President Eric Rosengren called for more regulation of broker-dealers and money market mutual funds in a speech at a New York conference today, but he began his remarks by acknowledging the victims of Monday’s Marathon attack.

    “I want to take a moment to acknowledge that I join you from a community in Boston that on Monday endured a terrible and profoundly cruel tragedy at the Marathon,” Rosengren told the audience at the 22nd annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies. “My thoughts are with the many people who were wounded, with those — including Boston Fed staff — who were uninjured but at the scene, and most of all with the families and friends of those whose lives were lost.”

    Rosengren told conference-goers that maintaining financial stability has been a key focus since the mortgage meltdown. “The financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath have significantly increased the attention policymakers devote to financial stability issues. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) and a variety of new bank regulatory initiatives, including the Basel III capital accord, are intended to reduce the risk of similar problems in the future,” the Boston Fed chief said. “For commercial banks, the policy changes stemming from the crisis have been increases in bank capital, stress tests to ensure capital is sufficient to weather serious problems, increased attention to liquidity and new measures intended to improve the resolution of large systemically important commercial banks.”
    But Rosengren said tougher regulations have not been applied to money market mutual funds and broker-dealers, whose failure was at the center of the financial crisis.

    Specifically citing the failure of prominent broker-dealers Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers at “critical junctures during the crisis,” Rosengren said: “Despite the central role that broker-dealers played in exacerbating the crisis, too little has changed to avoid a repeat of the problem, I am sorry to say. In short, I firmly believe that a reexamination of the solvency risks of large broker-dealers is warranted.”

    Because little has changed with regard to broker-dealers, Rosengren direly concluded: “The status quo represents an ongoing and significant financial stability risk.”

    To remedy the situation, he suggested: “In my view, then, consideration should be given to whether broker-dealers should be required to hold significantly more capital than depository institutions, which have deposit insurance and pre-ordained access to the central bank’s Discount Window.”
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Can Monetary Policy Create Jobs?


    By Ylan Q. Mui
    Wonkblog, The Washington Post, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    How much power does monetary policy have to create jobs?

    That question is at the heart of the debate over the Federal Reserve’s recent policy decisions. A majority on the Fed’s policy committee has explicitly endorsed keeping low interest rate policies in place until the unemployment rate falls to 6.5 percent (or inflation becomes a problem). But on Wednesday morning, St. Louis Fed President James Bullard warned that focusing on unemployment could put the central bank’s decades of work stabilizing inflation at risk.

    The title of his speech at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College’s annual Minsky Conference said it all: “Unpleasant implications for unemployment targeters.” He cited work by  economists Federico Ravenna and Carl Walsh that suggests that keeping prices contained is the best way the central bank can help the economy, even when the labor market is in turmoil.

    “The idea that the Fed should put more weight on unemployment does not fare very well in this analysis,” Bullard said. “In fact, such an approach might be counterproductive.”

    The problem, Bullard said, is that the Fed really only has one antidote for an ailing economy — adjusting the price of money — and that tool’s impact on unemployment is indirect.

    “The monetary guys can really do one thing,” he said. “ It’s not that you don’t want to address unemployment. It’s that it’s not a good way to address unemployment efficiency.”

    But while Bullard sees pursuing easy money policies to try get boost hiring as problematic, he is more open to such easing when the inflation rate is falling below the Fed’s 2 percent target. Indeed, Bullard said he is becoming “concerned” that inflation is too low, and that if prices fell further, he would be ready to ratchet up the Fed’s $85-billion-a-month bond-buying program.

    Bullard was one of the first Fed officials to push for changing the pace of the central bank’s asset purchases to match economic conditions. He has said he would consider reducing purchases by small amounts, perhaps even at each of the Fed’s policymaking meetings, as the economy improves. But Wednesday was the first time he has broached the policy of increasing bond purchases to reach the inflation goal.

    “We should defend our inflation target from the low side,” Bullard said. “If we say 2 percent, we should get 2 percent.”
  • In the Media | April 2013

    The Fed's Bullard Thinks Inflation Is Dangerously Low


    By Annalyn Kurtz
    CNNMoney, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Cue the flashback to summer 2010. Ben Bernanke and other officials at the Federal Reserve were warning that inflation was approaching dangerous lows, perhaps even flirting with the dreaded "D" word -- deflation. Bernanke gave a key speech in Jackson Hole that August hinting that more Fed stimulus might be in the pipeline. Sure enough, it was. The Fed launched QE2 about two months later.

    A similar murmur is starting up again: Could inflation be getting too low? St. Louis Fed President James Bullard thinks so.

    "Inflation is pretty low right now, and it's been drifting down," he told reporters at a Levy Economics Institute event Wednesday morning.

    "If it doesn't start to turn around soon, I think we'll have to rethink where we stand on our policy," he added.

    The Federal Reserve usually aims to keep inflation around 2% a year, but recently has said it would be willing to tolerate inflation up to 2.5% a year in exchange for a lower unemployment rate. (The unemployment rate has been stuck above 7% for more than four years now.)

    Where is the inflation rate currently? It was 1.3% as of February, according to the Fed's preferred measure, which strips out gas and food prices.

    Should it get any lower, Bullard said he would push his Fed colleagues to ramp up their asset purchases. The Fed is currently buying $85 billion a month in Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities, in an attempt to lower long-term interest rates and stimulate more spending.

    The policy has no official end-date, but Bernanke has made it clear that the Fed can adjust its purchasing depending on economic activity. Fed watchers mostly interpreted that language as a sign that the Fed may taper down its purchases later this year. Few have been discussing the possibility that the Fed may do just the opposite, increasing its purchases in the coming months.

    Bullard made it clear that he thinks more purchases are a possibility. In his scrum with reporters Wednesday, he repeated multiple times that he's "willing" to "defend" the Fed's inflation target from the low side -- meaning, if inflation gets uncomfortably below the Fed's 2% long-term goal.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Rosengren: Broker-Dealers Are Potential Threat to Stability


    By Michael S. Derby
    Fox Business, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The most recent reforms of the financial regulatory system have left Wall Street's broker-dealers largely untouched and a continued threat to the financial stability, a Federal Reserve official said Wednesday.

    "Despite this history of failure and substantial government support, little has changed in the solvency requirements of broker-dealers," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President Eric Rosengren said. "The status quo represents an ongoing and significant financial stability risk."

    "Consideration should be given to whether broker-dealers should be required to hold significantly more capital than depository institutions" to help mitigate the threat these institution might pose in a period of renewed financial stress, the central banker said.

    Mr. Rosengren is a voting member of the monetary policy Federal Open Market Committee. His comments came from the text of a speech to be delivered before a gathering held by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, in New York.

    Mr. Rosengren did not address monetary policy or the economic outlook in his formal remarks. The official has in a number of speeches shown a great interest in financial stability and unresolved matters that exist in the wake of the passage of the Dodd-Frank reform legislation. In past speeches, Mr. Rosengren has shown a considerable amount of alarm about money market funds, which he sees as subject to destabilizing runs.

    In his speech, the official highlighted the role broker-dealers like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers played in the financial crisis. In the current environment, many of these types of operations have been subsumed into bank holding companies with levels of access to the traditional safety net, but he sees still insufficient levels of capital compared to the risks these firms may be exposed to.

    "Being housed within a bank holding company should not obviate the need for the broker-dealer subsidiary to hold more capital," Mr. Rosengren said. "Broker-dealers remain vulnerable to losing the confidence of funders and counterparties should the world economy again experience a significant financial crisis."

    The official worried that under the status quo, new trouble could force a return of Fed emergency lending facilities that are tailored to support broker-dealer operations. That would be a bad outcome, Mr. Rosengren says.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    If U.S. Inflation Keeps Falling, Buy More Bonds – Fed's Bullard


    Reuters, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    (Reuters) – The Federal Reserve should buy bonds if inflation continues to fall, a top Fed official said on Wednesday, stressing the U.S. central bank needs to prevent inflation from being too far below its target.

    Still, St. Louis Fed President James Bullard cautioned that more monetary policy accommodation is not yet needed and said he does not currently fear deflation.

    "If inflation continues to go down, I would be willing to increase the pace of purchases," Bullard told reporters after a speech at the Hyman P. Minsky Conference in New York.

    The comments from Bullard, a pragmatic centrist and a voting member of the Fed's policy committee this year, provide an interesting twist to a policy debate that has recently been focused on what level of improvement in the labor market would prompt the central bank to dial down its $85 billion in monthly asset purchases.

    The Fed has an official 2-percent inflation target and has said it will keep benchmark interest rates near zero until unemployment falls to at least 6.5 percent, as long as inflation expectations do not breach 2.5 percent.

    "I'm very willing to defend the inflation target from the low side. If we say 2 percent, we should hit 2 percent," Bullard said. The Fed's preferred measure of inflation, the Personal Consumption Expenditures or PCE rate, is around 1.3 percent and is not expected to rise much over the next two years, in large part because of the droves of Americans who are unemployed.

    "If it doesn't start to turn around here soon, I think we'll have to rethink where we are on the policy," said Bullard.

    In the past, Bullard has talked about tapering bond purchases based on where the unemployment level stands.

    Asked about this, Bullard said his stance on inflation is in line with that thinking because part of that analysis was watching how far inflation drifts from the central bank's target, which was made official last year.

    The Fed is currently buying $45 billion in Treasuries and another $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities through the latest round of quantitative easing, known as "QE3", as it tries to bolster the economic recovery.

    The central bank has said it will continue buying bonds until the outlook on jobs improves substantially. Financial markets have started to turn their attention to how long purchases might go on.

    Ward McCarthy, chief financial economist at Jefferies, sent a note to clients following the comments that read: "So much for tapering ... upsizing may be in order."

    Bullard said he would prefer to ramp the easing up if needed by buying Treasuries rather than mortgage-backed securities, in part because the Fed should aim to have only government bonds in its portfolio in the longer term.

    A different measure of inflation, the consumer price index, showed on Tuesday that prices fell last month.

    In his speech, Bullard said the Fed should remain focused on inflation and resist putting more weight on the employment part of its dual mandate.

    Unlike most central banks in the developed world, the Fed is tasked with both maintaining price stability and achieving full employment. Since the deep recession, it has eased monetary policy to unprecedented levels to lower the unemployment rate, which last month was 7.6 percent.

    "People have been focusing on employment a lot, but have maybe gotten a little bit blinded about the inflation numbers that have come in very low," Bullard told reporters.

    At the same time, he acknowledged it hurts the central bank's credibility to look past headline inflation in favor of so-called core inflation, which strips out volatile items food and gasoline. He said doing so creates a disconnect between Main Street and policymakers.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    St Louis Fed's Bullard: Ready to Up QE3 if Infl Conts to Fall


    MNI | Duetsche Börse Group, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (MNI) – Many religiously monitor and analyze labor market data for clues on how long the Federal Reserve will maintain its aggressive measures to help the recovery, but one influential Fed official Wednesday said he would support increasing the bond buying program to arrest a continued decline in inflation.

    "People have been focusing on unemployment a lot but maybe are a little bit blinded that the inflation numbers have come in very low," St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank James Bullard told reporters on the sidelines of the Minsky conference hosted by the Levy Institute in New York.

    During the question and answer session with the audience, Bullard noted that inflation, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures index, is running very low right now.

    "I'm getting concerned by that," Bullard said, adding that inflation running below the policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee's price stability target gives the group "room to maneuver."

    Pressed by reporters to indicate exactly what "room to maneuver" means, Bullard - a voter on the FOMC this year - said, "I think if inflation continued to go down I'd be willing to increase the pace of (asset) purchases.

    "As it stands right now inflation has drifted lower on a PCE basis. This is not what I expected and I think inflation should be closer to target than it is."

    Asked by MNI if his decision to adjust the $85 billion a month in bond buying is tied to just price stability, and not the outlook for the labor market as the FOMC has said, Bullard said he looks at all economic data "But I'm going to put a lot of weight on inflation that's for sure, and I'm very willing to defend the inflation target from the low side.

    "If we say 2%, we should get 2% and we shouldn't let that lapse," he said. "We should defend our inflation target from the low side."

    Bullard said while he is not advocating the FOMC up its asset purchases tomorrow, it does have the capacity to increase the size should it decide to with causing market imbalances.

    If Committee where to make such a decision, Bullard said he would favor buying more U.S. Treasury securities.

    He stressed that the current fall in prices is not on par with that seen in the summer of 2010, when the Fed unveiled a $600 billion asset purchase program, so it is "too early" for to talk about deflation.

    However, "if it doesn't start to turn around here soon, I think we'll have to rethink where we are on our policy," Bullard said.

    Bullard has said he favors tying the pace of the current asset purchase program to economic conditions, and argued that where inflation is relative to target is one of those conditions.

    At the same time, he cautioned that conditions could turn around and PCE could be back up closer to target. "That is what I expect to happen but so far it hasn't been happening," Bullard said.

    Responding to questions from the audience, Bullard said he does not believe there is nothing that can be done to address the problems in the market, but the issue is that "maybe you shouldn't lean on the monetary policymaker to do a lot about it."

    What is needed is a more targeted approach to helping those without a job, Bullard said, since the impact of monetary policy is too indirect. 

  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed’s Bullard Says Low Inflation Could Require More Stimulus


    By Joshua Zumbrun and Steve Matthews
    Bloomberg Businessweek, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    James Bullard, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, said U.S. inflation has fallen too far below the central bank’s 2 percent goal and a further drop could prompt increased bond buying.

    “Inflation should be closer to target than it is and we should defend the inflation target from the low side,” Bullard told reporters today after a speech in New York. “If it doesn’t start to turn around here soon, I think we’ll have to rethink where we are in our policy.”

    One option would be for the Federal Open Market Committee to increase monthly purchases from $85 billion, the level reaffirmed in March, Bullard said. The policy group said asset purchases will continue until the labor market outlook improves “substantially” and pledged to keep interest rates near zero as long as unemployment is above 6.5 percent and inflation doesn’t exceed 2.5 percent.

    “I think we could do more if we had to,” Bullard said. “I don’t want to give you the impression that I’m willing to do more today.”

    Consumer prices rose 1.3 percent in February from a year earlier, according to the Fed’s preferred gauge of inflation. Bullard said the current disinflation is “not quite as bad as it was in the fall of 2010.”

    Second Round That year, Bullard initiated calls for a second round of bond buying, which ran from November 2010 until June 2011. Any new purchases should be in Treasury securities rather than mortgage bonds because the market is larger, he said. Bullard said he “would like to see the Fed eventually return to an all-Treasuries portfolio.”

    By contrast, minutes of the March 19-20 FOMC meeting showed that a number of Fed officials said the central bank should begin slowing its bond buying program later this year and stop it by year end.

    A recent plunge in gold prices doesn’t have implications for forecast inflation though does point to weakness in the global economy, the St. Louis Fed president said.

    “Europe is in recession, and China is not growing quite as fast as before so those two factors would seem to suggest global commodity demand would be down some,” Bullard told reporters.

    Monetary Policy In his prepared remarks, Bullard said monetary policy should be guided by the central bank’s price-stability goal and it would be a mistake to place a greater focus on high unemployment.

    The unemployment rate has been dropping 0.7 percentage point a year since its peak after the recession, and will be in the “low 7 percent range by the end of 2013,” he said at the Hyman Minsky Conference, hosted by the Levy Economics Institute.

    In response to audience questions, Bullard cited the example of Germany’s labor-market reforms as a model for U.S. policy makers.

    “Germany has been very impressive on the labor market dimension” in recent years, he said. “You could copy their policies” to encourage jobs, while monetary policy itself is a “very blunt instrument” that can’t be targeted.

    Among Fed policy makers, Fed Minneapolis Bank President Narayana Kocherlakota has urged more stimulus for economic growth by reducing the threshold for consideration of a policy tightening to a 5.5 percent unemployment rate.

    Fed Vice Chairman Janet Yellen yesterday said she favors holding the benchmark interest rate “lower for longer,” while New York Fed President William C. Dudley said a slowdown in the pace of employment growth in March highlights the need to maintain the pace of bond purchases.

    Bullard joined the St. Louis Fed’s research department in 1990 and became president of the regional bank in 2008. His district includes all of Arkansas and parts of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed’s Bullard: Softer Inflation May Lead to Boosted Bond Buying


    By Michael S. Derby
    Real Time Economics Blog, The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President
     James Bullard said Wednesday inflationary pressures may be growing too weakly and if they soften further, the central bank may have to boost its asset buying to bring price pressures back up to more desirable levels.

    “Inflation is running very low” as measured by the personal consumption expenditures price index, the Fed’s favored inflation gauge, the policymaker said. “I’m getting concerned about that,” he said.

    “If inflation [gains] continues to go down, I’d be willing to increase the pace of purchases” of bonds the Fed is now engaged in, Mr. Bullard said. “This is not what I expected, and I think inflation should be closer to the target than it is,” the official said, adding he considers it just as important to defend the Fed’s 2% inflation target from the low side, as it is to keep prices from going over 2%.

    The central banker didn’t suggest that any move toward a more-stimulative monetary policy was imminent, and he said it remains possible price pressures could pick up. If the Fed were to have to increase its purchases, he believes it could be done without harming market functioning, and he said he would favor Treasury bonds over mortgages.

    The Fed currently is pursuing a policy of buying bonds to drive up growth and lower the unemployment rate. While most expect the bond-buying program to continue for some months to come, improving economic conditions have driven some central bankers to say the pace of buying could be reduced at some point.

    The Fed wants inflation at 2%, and it considers under-target inflation to be undesirable. Central bankers consider a deflationary environment as damaging to the economy.

    Mr. Bullard is a voting member of the monetary-policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee. His comments came from a speech given before a conference held by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, in New York. In his formal speech, Mr. Bullard appeared to take issue with the central bank’s latest move to provide increased monetary-policy guidance, saying the Fed is limited in what it can do to affect labor-market conditions.

    “Frontline research suggests that price stability remains the policy advice even in the face of serious labor-market inefficiencies,” Mr. Bullard said.

    At the same time, “the current high level of unemployment is causing some to suggest that the [FOMC] should put more weight on unemployment in its decision-making process,” he said. That would be a mistake, he said, as research shows “monetary policy alone cannot effectively address multiple labor-market inefficiencies…One must turn to more-direct labor-market policies to address those problems.”

    Monetary policy by itself is “too blunt” to help lower high unemployment levels, the policymaker said. When it comes to aiding the labor market, “it’s not that you can’t do something about it, it’s just that maybe you shouldn’t lean on the monetary-policy maker” to do it.

    Mr. Bullard long has argued that monetary policy faces limits in what it can do to aid the labor market, and he has said that, if the Fed were to target achieving a given unemployment rate, it could lead policy to go seriously wrong. But he also gave his qualified support to the Fed’s decision last December to job and inflation thresholds.

    At that time, the Fed said it would keep short-term interest rates near 0% so long as the unemployment rate is above 6.5% and expected inflation is below 2.5%. Officials have been careful to note that these levels aren’t targets and that they don’t promise immediate action if breached. Some have said the Fed easily could keep rates unchanged with a sub-6.5% unemployment rate if inflation remained under the threshold.

    The Fed’s new policy guidance reflects in large part its congressionally given mandate to keep prices stable and to promote maximum sustainable job growth. The Fed is unique among major central banks in having this goal, with other major central banks charged with pursuing stable inflation alone.

    Mr. Bullard’s comments Wednesday appeared to reflect an ongoing discomfort with this new policy regime, one that is unlikely to bring a rate increase for several more years if the Fed is right about how the labor market will perform.

    In his prepared remarks, Mr. Bullard said the Fed over recent years has done a good job of keeping inflation near the central bank’s official target of 2%. He said the unemployment rate “remains high” and, compared to its current 7.6% level, it likely will be in the “low-7% range” by year’s end.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Bullard Says He’s Ready to Increase QE as Inflation Is “Too Low”


    Forbes, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    St. Louis Fed President James Bullard spoke in New York on Wednesday, warning that inflation remains too low and suggesting he’d be ready to increase the rate of asset purchases, or QE, to defend their target “from below.”

    Making sure to dispel any rumors of the Federal Reserve looking to tighten its monetary stance any time soon, St. Louis Fed chief Bullard told academics easy money is here to stay. The Fed has “room to maneuver,” and the capacity to increase its rate of purchases, Bullard explained at the Levy Economic Institute’s Minsky Conference, adding that quantitative easing is a better tool than forward guidance to signal the central bank’s intention to markets.

    It’s commonplace these days to attribute recent risk asset strength to the Bernanke Fed. Even the International Monetary Fund is doing it. Market participants have been nervous about the future path of Fed policy, which has sent U.S. stocks to record highs, particularly as recent FOMC minutes seem to suggest consensus within the committee, which has supported Ben Bernanke’s expansive policies consistently, might begin to break.

    Bullard was sure to dispel those rumors as well, noting that as Fed transparency has gone up, subtle differences in opinion have surfaced. “I don’t think there has been any breakdown of consensus,” said the St. Louis Fed boss, who didn’t dissent last meeting, adding there are “nuanced positions.”

    Interestingly Bullard suggested strong unemployment targets shouldn’t be part of policymakers’ toolkit. “Should the Fed, or any central bank, put more weight on unemployment than price stability?” he asked the crowd, before presenting research by economists Ravenna and Walsh suggesting that those targets would further distort labor markets. The Fed currently has a soft target for both inflation and the unemployment rate.

    Instead, central bankers should focus on price stability, as monetary policy is too “blunt” of an instrument to target the intricacies of the labor market. As mentioned above, Bullard did say QE is a more direct, and preferable way, for the Fed to act (given nominal rates in the zero range and forward guidance as the other major tool), but said he sees asset purchases affecting labor markets in the same way as interest rate moves.   Bullard’s bullishness wasn’t enough to boost markets, though. Wall Street was a sea of red at 11:32 AM in New York, with all three major equity indexes well in the red. The Nasdaq led the way, down 1.9%, followed by the S&P 500 and the Dow, which lost 1.6% and 1% respectively. Gold slid to $1,385.50 an ounce while the yield on 10-year Treasuries stood at 1.57%.   Asked about the huge amount of excess reserves sitting at the Fed, rather than being lent out by the banks, Bullard chose to speak of the possibility to tighten policy through interest. Depositary institutions like JPMorgan Chase, Bank of New York Mellon, and Citigroup, among others, have nearly $1.7 trillion sitting at the Fed, according to the St. Louis Fed, yet they have been criticized for failing to lend those out, given tighter credit markets and lower loan demand amid a slow economy.

    The so-called Bernanke put has been one of the major factors helping investors jump back into the market and prop asset prices to new highs. While there has been dissent within the Federal Reserve, Bernanke has always reaffirmed his intention to pursue his easy policies. Bullard seems to agree, even though he does suggest the flow rate, or pace, of asset purchases, should be the way for them to signal their intentions to markets. Still, it seems, QE is here to stay.

  • In the Media | April 2013

    Boston Fed's Rosengren: Strongly Support Current Monetary Pol


    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (MNI) – Boston Federal Reserve Bank President Eric Rosengren Wednesday said the Fed has not yet hit its employment or inflation targets, and he remains a strong supporter of its aggressive measures to spur the economic recovery - which are starting to yield results.

    Taking questions from the audience after a speech at the Minsky conference in New York, Rosengren said he has been in favor of the path monetary policy has taken since the 2008 crisis, and continues to be.

    Rosengren holds a voting position on the policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee this year, and he said he is "strongly supportive" of the FOMC's buying of $85 billion a month in U.S. Treasury securities and mortgage bonds to support the recovery.

    The quantitative easing program is working, he said, although the recovery is still not as fast as he would like to see. Stronger growth than the 2.5% average seen so far during the recovery is needed, but there continue to be some bright spots, he said.

    The circumstances have changed in the housing sector, for instance, with the market improving "quite dramatically."

    Auto sales are also almost back to their pre-crisis levels, showing that in interest-sensitive sectors where the Fed's actions can have an effect, "our policies are having a big impact, an important impact. We are getting a much better outcome," Rosengren said.

    Rosengren focused on the subject of bank regulation in his prepared remarks, and he reiterated that the pace of regulatory reform is not moving as fast as he would like.

    He said he believes some regulatory agencies do not view financial stability as part of their mandate but said the work being done now is moving in the right direction.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Bullard Concerned About Low Inflation


    By Greg Robb
    MarketWatch, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — Inflation might be too low and the Federal Reserve may need to respond, said James Bullard, the president of the St. Louis Fed Bank on Wednesday.

    “Inflation is running very low,” as measured by the personal consumption expenditures prices index, Bullard said in a question-and-answer period after a speech at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.

    “I’m getting concerned about that,” Bullard said, according to Dow Jones Newswires.

    Prices of the 10-year benchmark Treasury note rose Wednesday, pushing yields down nearly 3 basis points to 1.699%.    The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, the personal consumption expenditures price index, increased at a 1.3% annual rate in February. This is well below the Fed’s target of 2%.

    Earlier this week, an alternate measure of inflation, the consumer price index, posted a surprising 0.2% decline in March. The index rose at 1.5% annual rate, the slowest pace since last July.

    Bullard’s comments suggest a growing risk of deflation, a general decline in prices.

    The implication is that the Fed will continue its easy-policy stance, and perhaps augment it with other steps, said Michael Moran, chief U.S. economist at Daiwa Securities America Inc.

    The Fed’s bond buying has been successful at keeping deflation at bay. It is designed to push down interest rates and boost asset prices, sparking demand that prevents prices from falling.

    The asset purchases also influences inflation expectations, Moran said.

    Bullard didn’t suggest any move to a more-stimulative policy. But he said the low inflation rate gives the Fed “room to maneuver,” a suggestion that there is no need to hurry to slow down the Fed’s asset purchases.

    The Fed is buying $85 billion in Treasurys and mortgage-backed securities each month. Markets are focused on when the Fed might taper or end the purchases because many see this as the first sign that higher interest rates may be in the offing.

    In his prepared remarks, Bullard said the goal of Fed policy should be to keep inflation close to its inflation target.

    Bullard said new research has found it would be counterproductive for the Fed to “put more weight” on unemployment over price stability in its decision-making process.

    Bullard noted that since 1995, the Fed has been following “New Keynesian” advice by keeping inflation close to a 2% target. The problem since the financial crisis is that the New Keynesian model doesn’t take unemployment into account.

    Now, cutting-edge research that puts employment into these models has found that monetary policy alone can’t impact the labor market, he said. The best way to help the job market remains direct labor-market policies.

    Bullard is a voting member of the Fed’s interest-rate-setting committee this year. 
    Greg Robb is a senior reporter for MarketWatch in Washington. 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Rosengren: Banks With Broker-Dealer Units Need More Capital


    Money News, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Boston Federal Reserve President Eric Rosengren said banks should hold more capital if they own a broker-dealer unit because such businesses pose greater risks during periods of financial stress.

    “Bank holding companies with large broker-dealer affiliates should hold more capital to reflect the reduced stability of their liabilities during times of stress,” Rosengren said in prepared remarks for a speech in New York.

    Rosengren made his call as members of Congress and regulators try to reduce the risk that a large bank failure might result in a taxpayer-funded bailout. Senate Republicans and Democrats are discussing legislation that would boost capital standards. Fed officials are considering ways to curb balance-sheet expansion at the largest banks and toughen capital requirements for the largest firms.

    “Despite the central role that broker-dealers played in exacerbating the crisis, too little has changed to avoid a repeat of the problem,” Rosengren said at the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference in New York. “I firmly believe that a reexamination of the solvency risks of large broker-dealers is warranted.”

    The Fed-assisted emergency sale of Bear Stearns Cos. to JPMorgan Chase & Co. in March 2008 was the first time since the Great Depression that the U.S. central bank had come to the assistance of a securities firm, as opposed to a bank.

    Lehman Bankruptcy
    Six months later, the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns’s larger rival, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., shocked financial markets and led the three biggest U.S. securities firms — Merrill Lynch & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley — to be acquired by or convert to banks in an effort to get the backing of the Fed.

    To help keep the firms afloat during the financial crisis in 2008, the Fed launched the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which at its peak lent out $156 billion. A second facility, the Term Securities Lending Facility, lent an additional $246 billion at its peak.

    “Given that recent history, the assumption that collateralized lenders like broker-dealers are not susceptible to runs has been proven wrong,” Rosengren said at the conference, hosted by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and the Ford Foundation.

    SEC Regulation

    “Broker-dealer capital regulation by the SEC remains largely unchanged, despite the lessons of the financial crisis,” he said. “Consequently, broker-dealers remain vulnerable to losing the confidence of funders and counterparties should the world economy again experience a significant financial crisis.”

    The Boston Fed chief, formerly his bank’s head of supervision, has previously taken the lead in calling for additional regulations on the money-market fund industry that were subsequently endorsed by all 12 Fed presidents.

    The 2011 bankruptcy of MF Global Holdings Ltd. once again called into question the ability of independent securities firms to survive on funding provided by the capital markets. Jefferies Group Inc., which staved off a run on its own funding in the wake of MF Global’s collapse, agreed in November to combine with its largest shareholder to shore itself up against future market turmoil.

    “The status quo represents an ongoing and significant financial-stability risk,” Rosengren said.

    Basel Standards

    U.S. and international regulators have an analytical approach that requires more capital for risks embedded in large bank holding companies. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has decided that systemically important global banks should bear a charge of 1 percent to 2.5 percent more capital to total assets weighted for risk based on their size, complexity and interconnectedness.

    The Financial Stability Board in November listed 28 banks that should be subject to the requirement for additional capital. The list is updated annually and a phase-in period begins in 2016.

    Global trading banks such as Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase, HSBC Holdings Plc, and Deutsche Bank AG occupy the top tier in the group, bearing a charge of 2.5 percent. Barclays and BNP Paribas are in the second tier, with a charge of 2 percent; Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America Corp., Credit Suisse Group AG and four other banking groups are in the third tier, at 1.5 percent.

    Stress Tests
    In addition, the Fed determines capital adequacy through its stress tests which include a separate diagnostic for firms with large-scale trading operations.

    The Fed tested the 19 largest banks this year against three different scenarios with 26 variables including exchange rates, incomes and interest rates. In addition, six bank holding companies with “significant trading activity” — Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo & Co. — had their portfolios stressed under conditions of a global market shock.

    Rosengren said that securities-trading units should face higher capital requirements whether they are in a bank-holding company or not.

    “Given the very different risks of runs posed by broker-dealers and their less stable liability structure, an argument can be made for higher capital requirements for broker-dealers as well as organizations, such as bank holding companies, with significant broker-dealer operations,” he said.

    Rosengren, 55, became president of the Boston Fed in July 2007, and previously served in the economic and supervision departments of the bank.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Rosengren Says Banks Owning Broker Units Need More Capital


    By Joshua Zumbrun and Craig Torres
    Bloomberg, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Boston Federal Reserve President Eric Rosengren  said banks should hold more capital if they own a broker-dealer unit because such businesses pose greater risks during periods of financial stress.

    “Bank holding companies with large broker-dealer affiliates should hold more capital to reflect the reduced stability of their liabilities during times of stress,” Rosengren said in prepared remarks for a speech today in New York.

    Rosengren made his call as members of Congress and regulators try to reduce the risk that a large bank failure might result in a taxpayer-funded bailout. Senate Republicans and Democrats are discussing legislation that would boost capital standards. Fed officials are considering ways to curb balance-sheet expansion at the largest banks and toughen capital requirements for the largest firms.

    “Despite the central role that broker-dealers played in exacerbating the crisis, too little has changed to avoid a repeat of the problem,” Rosengren said at the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference in New York. “I firmly believe that a reexamination of the solvency risks of large broker-dealers is warranted.”

    The Fed-assisted emergency sale of Bear Stearns Cos. To JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) in March 2008 was the first time since the Great Depression that the U.S. central bank had come to the assistance of a securities firm, as opposed to a bank. 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Brokers Need More Rainy-day Funds: Fed’s Rosengren


    By Greg Robb
    MarketWatch, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — The financial health of large U.S. broker-dealers remains a significant financial stability risk five years after the financial crisis, and regulators should consider making them increase their capital buffers, said Eric Rosengren, the president of the Boston Fed Bank, on Wednesday.

    “Despite the central role that broker-dealers played in exacerbating the crisis, too little has changed to avoid a repeat of the problem, I am sorry to say,” Rosengren said in a speech to a conference in New York sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.

    “The status quo represents an ongoing and significant financial stability risk,” he said. “Broker-dealers remain vulnerable to losing the confidence of funders and counterparties should the world economy again experience a significant financial crisis.”

    Some broker-dealers, like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, became bank holding companies during the crisis. Rosengren said bank holding companies with large broker-dealer affiliates might have to hold more capital than other banks to reflect the reduced stability of their liabilities during times of stress.

    It is rare for Fed officials to comment on the financial health of broker-dealers.

    Regulation of these firms primarily falls under the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Rosengren said he was concerned that broker-dealers represent a moral hazard, similar to “too big to fail” banks.

    If there were another crisis, the Fed might have to consider relaunching emergency credit facilities that were used by broker-dealers in 2008 and 2009.

    “If broker-dealers assume that they will once again have access to such government support should markets be disrupted, they will have little incentive to take the steps necessary to shield themselves from financing problems during a crisis and thus minimize their need for a government backstop,” Rosengren said.

    The Fed set up two emergency facilities during the crisis. The first, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, provided overnight loans to primary dealers in return for collateral. At its peak, lending in the program was $156 billion.

    A second plan, the Term Securities Lending Facility, allowed primary dealers to lend less-liquid securities to the Fed for one month in exchange for Treasurys. The peak balance of that program was $246 billion. 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Bullard: Jobs Focus Over Inflation May Be Counter Productive


    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (MNI) - St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank President James Bullard Wednesday argued that monetary policy may not be the ideal tool to tackle the nation's jobs crisis, and that more direct policies are needed, while the Fed would be better served focusing more on its price stability mandate.

    In remarks prepared for delivery at the Hyman Minsky Conference hosted by the Levy Institute in New York, Bullard said that "the essential problem is that monetary policy is not a good tool to address labor market inefficiency."

    He noted that the current high level of unemployment is causing some to suggest the policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee should "put more weight" on unemployment in its decision-making process.

    Bullard holds a voting position on the FOMC this year, and he countered that "frontline research suggests that 'price stability' remains the policy advice even in the face of serious labor market inefficiencies."

    Bullard said the FOMC should focus on keeping inflation close to its target, citing recent research that suggests deviating from this policy can lead to "substantially worse" outcomes for households.

    "The idea that the Fed should 'put more weight' on unemployment does not fare well in this analysis," he said. "Such an approach may be highly counter-productive."

    "Monetary policy alone cannot effectively address multiple labor market inefficiencies, and so one must turn to more direct labor market policies to address those problems," he added.

    Bullard noted that the unemployment rate has declined about 0.7 percentage points each year since its post-recession peak, and that at this pace unemployment should be "in the low 7% range" by the end of 2013.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    UPDATE: Fed's Rosengren Says Broker-Dealers Need More Capital


    By Michael S. Derby
    The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK--The most recent overhauls of the financial regulatory system have left Wall Street's broker-dealers largely untouched and a continued threat to the financial stability, a Federal Reserve official said Wednesday.

    "Despite this history of failure and substantial government support, little has changed in the solvency requirements of broker-dealers," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President Eric Rosengren said. "The status quo represents an ongoing and significant financial stability risk."

    "Consideration should be given to whether broker-dealers should be required to hold significantly more capital than depository institutions" to help mitigate the threat these institutions might pose in a period of renewed financial stress, the central banker said.

    Mr. Rosengren is a voting member of the monetary-policy setting Federal Open Market Committee. His comments came from the text of a speech delivered before a gathering held by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, in New York.

    Mr. Rosengren didn't address monetary policy or the economic outlook in his formal remarks. The official has, in a number of speeches, shown a great interest in financial stability and unresolved matters that exist in the wake of the passage of the Dodd-Frank overhaul legislation. In past speeches, Mr. Rosengren has shown a considerable amount of alarm about money-market funds, which he sees as subject to destabilizing runs.

    In his speech, the official highlighted the role broker-dealers like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers played in the financial crisis. In the current environment, many of these types of operations have been subsumed into bank-holding companies with levels of access to the traditional safety net, but he sees still insufficient levels of capital compared with the risks these firms may be exposed to.

    "Being housed within a bank-holding company should not obviate the need for the broker-dealer subsidiary to hold more capital," Mr. Rosengren said. "Broker-dealers remain vulnerable to losing the confidence of funders and counterparties should the world economy again experience a significant financial crisis."

    The official worried under the status quo, new trouble could force a return of Fed emergency-lending facilities tailored to support broker-dealer operations. That would be a bad outcome, Mr. Rosengren said.

    In comments to the audience, Mr. Rosengren said he believes Fed stimulus policies were helping the economy, and he remains concerned credit standards for the mortgage market have become tighter than they should be. He said there are signs of life now appearing in the housing and car markets.

    Mr. Rosengren also said he is strongly supportive of the current stance of monetary policy.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed’s Bullard Opposes Putting More Weight on High Unemployment


    By Steve Matthews and Joshua Zumbrun
    Bloomberg, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    James Bullard, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, said monetary policy should be guided by the central bank’s price-stability goal even with historically high unemployment.

    “The idea that the Fed should ‘put more weight’ on unemployment does not fare well,” Bullard said in a speech in New York. “Such an approach may be highly counterproductive.”

    Bullard supported the Federal Open Market Committee decision in March to continue to buy $85 billion in bonds every month until the labor market outlook improves “substantially.” It also pledged to keep interest rates near zero as long as unemployment is above 6.5 percent and inflation doesn’t exceed 2.5 percent. The unemployment rate stood at 7.6 percent in March.

    Bullard, in his presentation on the current economy, said the U.S. unemployment rate has been declining at about 0.7 percentage point per year since peaking after the last recession ended.

    “At this pace, the unemployment rate will be in the low 7 percent range by the end of 2013,” he said to the Hyman Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies.

    While that rate is “high by historical standards,” Bullard cited academic work by economists Federico Ravenna and Carl Walsh as suggesting the Fed should use its inflation goal, which is 2 percent, as the main guide to policy.
    Serious Inefficiencies “Frontline research suggests that ‘price stability’ remains the policy advice even in the face of serious labor market inefficiencies,” Bullard said. “Attempts to address the various labor market inefficiencies solely with monetary policy do not work very well because improvements on one dimension are simultaneously detriments on other dimensions.”

    “The essential finding is that monetary policy alone cannot effectively address multiple labor market inefficiencies, and so one must turn to more direct labor market policies to address those problems,” Bullard said.

    Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Janet Yellen yesterday said she favors holding the benchmark interest rate “lower for longer,” while New York Fed President William C. Dudley said a slowdown in the pace of employment growth in March highlights the need to maintain the pace of bond purchases.

    Bullard joined the St. Louis Fed’s research department in 1990 and became president of the regional bank in 2008. His district includes all of Arkansas and parts of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Federal Reserve: Bör Fokusera På Traditionellt Mandat – Bullard


    By Robert Hultqvist
    di.se, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve bör fokusera på sitt traditionella mandat i form av prisstabilitet och det finns begränsningar i vad centralbanken kan göra för arbetsmarknaden.  "Penningpolitik isolerat kan inte effektivt åtgärda multipla ineffektiviteter på arbetsmarknaden... Man måste rikta sig mot mer direkta arbetsmarknadsåtgärder för att åtgärda de problemen", säger James Bullard, ordförande för Federal Reserve Bank i St Louis, enligt en presentation inför ett tal han kommer att hålla vid the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, enligt Dow Jones Newswires.  I talet uppger Fed-ledamoten att centralbanken har gjort ett bra jobb med att hålla inflationen i närheten av tvåprocentsmålet. Arbetslösheten är fortsatt hög och kommer sannolik att sjunka till ett lågt sjuprocentspann vid slutet av året, bedömer han vidare.  
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Bullard Warns Against a Fed Too Focused on Jobs


    Reuters, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    (Reuters) - The Federal Reserve should remain focused on inflation and resist putting more weight on its employment mandate, a top U.S. central bank official said on Wednesday.

    St. Louis Fed President James Bullard, in a speech, cited research by Federico Ravenna and Carl Walsh that suggests "price stability remains the policy advice even in the face of serious labor market inefficiencies."

    Unlike most central banks in the developed world, the Fed is tasked with maintaining price stability and achieving full employment. Since the deep recession, it has eased policy to unprecedented levels to lower the unemployment rate, which last month was 7.6 percent.

    "The idea that the Fed should put more weight on unemployment ... may be highly counter-productive," Bullard, an inflation hawk and a voting member of the Fed's policy committee this year, said according to prepared remarks.

    "The essential finding (of the research) is that monetary policy alone cannot effectively address multiple labor market inefficiencies, and so one must turn to more direct labor market policies to address those problems," he was to tell the annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference in New York.

    Bullard expects unemployment to drop to the low 7 percent range by year end.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed preocupada por la baja inflación en EU


    Televisa, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Daña la credibilidad hablar de inflación subyacente pues crea una desconexión entre los precios minoristas y las políticas del gobierno

    NUEVA YORK, EU, abr. 17, 2013.- La actual tasa baja de inflación en Estados Unidos deja a la Reserva Federal con "espacio para maniobrar" mientras intenta apuntalar la economía estadounidense a través de sus políticas monetarias extraordinarias, dijo un alto representante de la Fed.

    Sin embargo, el presidente de la Fed en St. Louis James Bullard dijo que estaba preocupado sobre el ambiente de baja inflación.

    Bullard dijo que daña la credibilidad del banco central hablar de "inflación subyacente", que es la que descarta rubros volátiles como los precios del los alimentos y la gasolina, creando una desconexión entre los precios minoristas y las políticas del gobierno.

    Bullard estaba respondiendo preguntas del público tras un discurso en la conferencia anual Hyman P. Minsky en Nueva York.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Bullard Says Fed Is Limited in Its Ability to Affect Labor Markets


    By Michael S. Derby
    The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    St. Louis Fed leader James Bullard appeared to take issue with the central bank’s latest move to provide increased monetary policy guidance, saying in a speech Wednesday the Fed is limited in what it can do to affect labor market conditions.

    The best and most effective thing the Federal Reserve can do is focus on its traditional mandate of inflation control, the official said. “Frontline research suggests that price stability remains the policy advice even in the face of serious labor market inefficiencies,” Mr. Bullard said. “This research should provide the benchmark for contemporary monetary policy,” he explained.

    At the same time, “the current high level of unemployment is causing some to suggest that the [Federal Open Market Committee] should put more weight on unemployment in its decision-making process,” he said. That would be a mistake, as research shows “monetary policy alone cannot effectively address multiple labor market inefficiencies…. One must turn to more direct labor market policies to address those problems,” the official said.

    Mr. Bullard is a voting member of the monetary policy setting FOMC. His comments came from slides that were associated with a talk he was to give at a conference held by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, in New York.

    Mr. Bullard has long argued that monetary policy faces limits in what it can do to aid the labor market, and he has said if the Fed were to target achieving a given unemployment rate, it could lead policy to go seriously wrong. But he also gave his qualified support to the Fed’s decision last December to job and inflation thresholds.

    The Fed said then that it would keep short term interest rates near zero percent so long as the unemployment rate is above 6.5% and expected inflation is below 2.5%. Officials have been careful to note these levels aren’t targets and don’t promise immediate action if breached. Some have said the Fed could easily keep rates unchanged with a sub-6/5% unemployment rate if inflation remained under the threshold.

    Mr. Bullard’s comments Wednesday appeared to reflect an ongoing discomfort with this new policy regime, one that is unlikely to bring a rate hike for several more years if the Fed is right about how the labor market will perform.

    In his prepared remarks, Mr. Bullard said the Fed has over recent years done a good job of keeping inflation near the central bank’s official target of 2%. He said the unemployment rate “remains high” and compared to its current 7.6% level, it will likely be in the “low 7% range” by year’s end. 
  • In the Media | April 2013

    St. Louis Fed’s Bullard Discusses Whether the Fed Should “Put More Weight” on Unemployment


    PRWeb, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard gave remarks Wednesday on "Some Unpleasant Implications for Unemployment Targeters" at the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference.

    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard gave remarks Wednesday on “Some Unpleasant Implications for Unemployment Targeters” at the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference.

    During his presentation, Bullard noted that the U.S. unemployment rate remains high by historical standards and that it has declined about 0.7 percentage points per year from its post-recession peak level. “At this pace, the unemployment rate will be in the low 7 percent range by the end of 2013,” he said.

    Given this current high level of unemployment, some have suggested that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) should “put more weight” on unemployment in its decision-making process, Bullard said. “However, frontline research suggests that ‘price stability’ remains the policy advice even in the face of serious labor market inefficiencies.” In Bullard’s view, the results from this recent research, by economists Federico Ravenna and Carl Walsh, should be considered as an important benchmark for contemporary monetary policy.

    Price Stability
    Bullard noted that the New Keynesian macroeconomics literature has been extraordinarily influential in monetary policy. The standard policy advice from this literature is “price stability,” he said, explaining that “practically speaking, this means ‘focus on keeping inflation close to target.’”

    Technically, Bullard said, the policy advice is to maintain a price level path that is consistent with the inflation target. The FOMC has maintained such a price level path since 1995, which he has discussed previously. (See, for example, Bullard’s speech on Sept. 20, 2012, “A Singular Achievement of Recent Monetary Policy.”)

    Thus, actual FOMC monetary policy during the past 18 years seems to have mimicked the policy advice from the New Keynesian literature. However, Bullard noted that the standard model does not include unemployment. In light of today’s high level of unemployment, he said that the main question is whether the FOMC should adopt a policy rule that “puts more weight” on this variable.

    Unemployment To determine how the policy advice changes when unemployment is included in the model, Bullard examined recent research by Ravenna and Walsh. In a 2011 paper(1), they found that “the optimal policy is still very close to price stability, even with unemployment explicitly in the model,” Bullard said. That is, the policymaker should still “keep inflation as close to target as is practicable,” he explained. “Expressed as a Taylor-type rule, it would mean putting almost all the weight on the inflation term.”

    Furthermore, the authors suggest that deviating from this policy can lead to substantially worse outcomes for households, Bullard said. “The idea that the Fed should ‘put more weight’ on unemployment does not fare well in this analysis. Such an approach may be highly counter-productive,” he stated.

    In a 2012 paper(2), Ravenna and Walsh asked why price stability remains close to optimal. “Attempts to address the various labor market inefficiencies solely with monetary policy do not work very well because improvements on one dimension are simultaneously detriments on other dimensions,” Bullard said, which means that other policy tools are needed.

    “The essential finding is that monetary policy alone cannot effectively address multiple labor market inefficiencies, and so one must turn to more direct labor market policies to address those problems,” Bullard said.

    1. Ravenna, Federico, and Walsh, Carl E. “Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy with Unemployment and Sticky Prices: A Linear-Quadratic Framework.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, April 2011, 3(2), pp. 130–62.

    2. Ravenna, Federico, and Walsh, Carl E. “Monetary Policy and Labor Market Frictions: A Tax Interpretation.” Journal of Monetary Economics, March 2012, 59(2), pp. 180–95.  
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Bullard Favors Bond Buys if Inflation Continues Decline


    Reuters, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    A top Federal Reserve official said Wednesday that If inflation continues to fall he would be willing to increase the pace of the central bank's bond-buying to defend its 2 percent inflation target.

    St. Louis Fed President James Bullard cautioned that further accommodation in monetary policy is not needed yet, however, and said he does not currently fear deflation.

    "If inflation continues to go down, I would be willing to increase the pace of purchases," Bullard told reporters after a speech at the annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference in New York.

    The Fed has an official 2 percent inflation target and has said that, as long as inflation expectations do not breach 2.5 percent, it will keep benchmark interest rates near zero until unemployment falls to 6.5 percent.

    (Watch More: Fed's Bullard Discounts Weak Job Report)

    "I'm very willing to defend the inflation target from the low side," Bullard said. "If we say 2 percent, we should hit 2 percent."

    The comments from Bullard, a pragmatic centrist and a voter on Fed policy this year, provide an interesting twist to a policy debate that has recently been focused on what level of improvement in the labor market would prompt the central bank to dial down the purchases.

    The Fed's preferred measure of inflation, the Personal Consumption Expenditures rate, is around 1.3 percent and is not expected to rise much over the next two years, in large part because of the millions of unemployed workers.

    The Fed is buying $85 billion a month in Treasurys and mortgage-backed securities through the latest round of quantitative easing, known as QE3, as it tries to bolster the economic recovery.

    An inflation hawk, Bullard said he would prefer to ramp up if needed by buying Treasurys rather than MBS.

    The central bank has said it will keep buying bonds until the labor market outlook improves substantially; financial markets have began turning their attention to how long purchases might go on.

    In his speech, Bullard said the Fed should remain focused on inflation and resist putting more weight on the employment part of its dual mandate.

    Unlike most central banks in the developed world, the Fed is responsible for both maintaining price stability and achieving full employment. Since the Great Recession, it has eased monetary policy to unprecedented levels to lower the unemployment rate, which stood at 7.6 percent last month.

    "People have been focusing on employment a lot but have maybe gotten a little bit blinded about the inflation numbers that have come in very low," Bullard told reporters.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Fed's Bullard: Low Inflation Leaves Room to Maneuver


    Reuters, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    (Reuters) – The current low inflation rate leaves the Federal Reserve with "room to maneuver" as it tries to boost the U.S. economy through its extraordinary monetary policies, a top Fed official said on Wednesday.

    Still, St. Louis Fed President James Bullard said he was concerned about the low inflation environment. Bullard said it hurts the central bank's credibility to talk about so-called core inflation, which strips out volatile items such as food and gasoline prices, by creating a disconnect between Main Street and policymakers.

    Bullard was fielding questions from the audience following a speech at the annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference in New York.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    UPDATE: Fed's Bullard: Inflation Too Low; May Need Response


    By Michael S. Derby
    The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK--Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard on Wednesday said he is concerned inflationary pressures may be growing too weakly and the central bank may have to do something about it.

    "Inflation is running very low" as measured by the personal consumption expenditures price index, the Fed's favored inflation gauge, the policymaker said. "I'm getting concerned about that," he said, adding that the low rate of price pressure "gives the [Federal Open Market Committee] some room to maneuver" on the monetary-policy front.

    The central banker didn't suggest that any move toward a more-stimulative monetary policy was imminent. The Fed is currently pursuing a policy of buying bonds to drive up growth and lower the unemployment rate. While most expect the bond-buying program to continue for some months to come, improving economic conditions have driven some central bankers to say the pace of buying could be reduced at some point.

    The Fed wants inflation at 2% and it considers under-target inflation to be undesirable. Central bankers consider a deflationary environment as damaging to the economy.

    In his speech, Mr. Bullard also appeared to take issue with the central bank's latest move to provide increased monetary-policy guidance, saying the Fed is limited in what it can do to affect labor-market conditions.

    The best and most-effective action the Fed can take is to focus on its traditional mandate of inflation control, the official said. "Frontline research suggests that price stability remains the policy advice even in the face of serious labor-market inefficiencies," Mr. Bullard said. "This research should provide the benchmark for contemporary monetary policy," he explained.

    At the same time, "the current high level of unemployment is causing some to suggest that the [FOMC] should put more weight on unemployment in its decision-making process," he said. That would be a mistake, he said, as research shows "monetary policy alone cannot effectively address multiple labor-market inefficiencies...One must turn to more-direct labor-market policies to address those problems."

    Monetary policy by itself is "too blunt" to help lower high unemployment levels, the policymaker said. When it comes to aiding the labor market, "it's not that you can't do something about it, it's just that maybe you shouldn't lean on the monetary-policy maker" to do it.

    Mr. Bullard is a voting member of the monetary-policy-setting FOMC. His comments came from a speech given before a conference held by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, in New York. Much of his talk referenced work by economists Federico Ravenna and Carl Walsh.

    Mr. Bullard has long argued that monetary policy faces limits in what it can do to aid the labor market, and he has said that, if the Fed were to target achieving a given unemployment rate, it could lead policy to go seriously wrong. But he also gave his qualified support to the Fed's decision last December to job and inflation thresholds.

    At that time, the Fed said it would keep short-term interest rates near 0% so long as the unemployment rate is above 6.5% and expected inflation is below 2.5%. Officials have been careful to note that these levels aren't targets and that they don't promise immediate action if breached. Some have said the Fed could easily keep rates unchanged with a sub-6/5% unemployment rate if inflation remained under the threshold.

    The Fed's new policy guidance reflects in large part its congressionally given mandate to keep prices stable and to promote maximum sustainable job growth. The Fed is unique among major central banks in having this goal, with other major central banks charged with pursuing stable inflation alone.

    Mr. Bullard's comments Wednesday appeared to reflect an ongoing discomfort with this new policy regime, one that is unlikely to bring a rate increase for several more years if the Fed is right about how the labor market will perform.

    In his prepared remarks, Mr. Bullard said the Fed over recent years has done a good job of keeping inflation near the central bank's official target of 2%. He said the unemployment rate "remains high" and, compared to its current 7.6% level, it will likely be in the "low-7% range" by year's end.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Bullard Says Price Stability Is Best Mission for Fed


    By Michael S. Derby
    Dow Jones Business News, April 17, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK—St. Louis Fed leader James Bullard appeared to take issue with the central bank's latest move to provide increased monetary policy guidance, saying in a speech Wednesday the Fed is limited in what it can do to affect labor market conditions.

    The best and most effective thing the Fed can do is focus on its traditional mandate of inflation control, the official said. "Frontline research suggests that price stability remains the policy advice even in the face of serious labor market inefficiencies," Mr. Bullard said. "This research should provide the benchmark for contemporary monetary policy," he explained.

    At the same time, "the current high level of unemployment is causing some to suggest that the [Federal Open Market Committee] should put more weight on unemployment in its decision-making process," he said. That would be a mistake, as research shows "monetary policy alone cannot effectively address multiple labor market inefficiencies... One must turn to more direct labor market policies to address those problems," the official said.

    Mr. Bullard is a voting member of the monetary policy setting FOMC. His comments came from slides that were associated with a talk he was to give at a conference held by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, in New York.

    Mr. Bullard has long argued that monetary policy faces limits in what it can do to aid the labor market, and he has said if the Fed were to target achieving a given unemployment rate, it could lead policy to go seriously wrong. But he also gave his qualified support to the Fed's decision last December to job and inflation thresholds.

    The Fed said then that it would keep short-term interest rates near zero% so long as the unemployment rate is above 6.5% and expected inflation is below 2.5%. Officials have been careful to note these levels aren't targets and don't promise immediate action if breached. Some have said the Fed could easily keep rates unchanged with a sub-6/5% unemployment rate if inflation remained under the threshold.

    Mr. Bullard's comments Wednesday appeared to reflect an ongoing discomfort with this new policy regime, one that is unlikely to bring a rate hike for several more years if the Fed is right about how the labor market will perform.

    In his prepared remarks, Mr. Bullard said the Fed has over recent years done a good job of keeping inflation near the central bank's official target of 2%. He said the unemployment rate "remains high" and compared to its current 7.6% level, it will likely be in the "low 7% range" by year's end.
  • In the Media | April 2013

    INET Conference in Hong Kong: Remarks by Jan Kregel


    On April 5, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel was featured on the panel "China in the World: Growth, Adjustment, and Integration" at the INET (Institute for New Economic Thinking) conference "Changing of the Guard?" in Hong Kong. The conference, cosponsored by the Fung Global Institute and the Centre for International Governance Innovation, focused on some of today's most pressing global concerns, including economic inequality and financial instability, set against the backdrop of Asia's rising share of the world economy. Click here for the panel video (Kregel’s remarks begin at 28:00).  
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
  • In the Media | April 2013

    Op-ed: To create jobs, the U.S. must spend


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The government can and should increase the deficit to return us to prosperity. Without such outlays we can’t get enough GDP growth to seriously attack unemployment.

    Just before the congressional spring break, a Senate budget proposal to decrease, but not eliminate, the deficit over 10 years was denounced as “pro debt” by an Alabama senator. It was the kind of proud and loud anti-deficit rhetoric that, no matter how nonsensical, plays nicely into Washington group-think on the subject.

    The deficit has arguably gained the distinction of being the single most widely misunderstood public policy issue in America. Just 6% (6!) of respondents in a recent poll correctly stated that it had been shrinking, which has in fact been the case for several years, while 10 times more, 62%, wrongly believed that it’s been getting bigger.

    Despite prevailing notions in the capital and throughout the nation, those of us at the Levy Economics Institute—along with many other analysts and economists—have concluded that the deficit should be increased.

    Why add to the deficit right now? Jobs. Our economic models clearly show that without increased government outlays we’ll be unable to generate enough GDP growth to seriously attack unemployment. If we tried to balance the budget through tax hikes, our still-recovering economy would be hurt. That leaves a temporarily bigger deficit as an important option.

    A mutation in the link between growth and jobs makes the issue urgent. While we are seeing some economic growth, the unemployment rate is not responding as strongly to the gains as it did in the past.

    This slow job growth—today’s “jobless recovery”—isn’t an outlier. It’s a phenomenon that has been increasing over the last three decades, with jobs coming back more and more slowly after a downturn, even when GDP is increasing. The weak employment response has been an almost straight-line trend for more than 30 years.

    Our institute’s newest econometric models show that each 1% boost in the GDP today will create, roughly, only a third as much improvement to the unemployment rate as the same 1% rise did in the late 1970s.

    Traditionally, we’ve assumed that GDP growth would be followed by an employment surge. The break in that link is now very clear. It’s especially worrisome this year, with only a small GDP rise universally anticipated.

    The Federal Reserve, for one, just reduced its growth outlook to 2.8% at most for 2013. The shallow recovery we’re seeing may indeed continue through 2014 and beyond. Since employment now consistently lags well behind GDP, we’ll have a long slog before we reach pre-crisis unemployment levels (below 4.6%). Some Federal Reserve officials believe it might take three years just to get from today’s 7.7% down to 6.5%. Full employment would still be nowhere in sight.

    The quantitative data are telling us that without a stimulus, we can’t expect a strong employment lift. But instead of stimulus, we’re devising federal budgets that cut spending and lay off workers. The sequester is expected to depress GDP growth by perhaps half a percentage point—when we know that more growth than ever will be needed to raise employment—and cost anywhere from 700,000 to more than 1 million jobs.

    Slower government spending is one reason that post-recession growth has been below par compared with other recoveries, Fed Vice Chair Janet Yellen has argued. As government outlays and employment have shrunk, the contribution of public funds to national growth has also fallen. By our estimates, that contribution now stands at about zero. That’s another data point indicating that federal deficits need to be increased.

    To better understand the changing relationship between growth and jobs, the Levy Institute recently looked at three scenarios through 2016: what the results might be of a small, medium or large stimulus. A strong stimulus was clearly the most effective option, since it had a powerful, positive influence on employment growth and, in the long term, on deficit reduction. Of course, that route is completely unfeasible in the current political climate. But we saw that even a small amount of deficit spending could help put the recovery on track if it were combined with a mix of private investment, increased exports and good policy alternatives.

    That points toward a way forward. Increasing the deficit while our economy is fragile is not “pro deficit,” any more than a family with a 30-year home mortgage is “pro debt.” To reclaim a phrase that deficit hawks have tried to make their own, it is “sensible and serious.” The federal government can run a deficit, as it almost always has, to help the nation return to prosperity.

    With our new understanding of the fraying tie between GDP growth and jobs, we know that millions of Americans are on course for an agonizingly slow march out of joblessness unless we make a move. The nature of slumps and recoveries has changed, and the policies to manage them need to change too.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and executive vice president of Bard.
  • In the Media | March 2013

    Rethinking the State: Interview with Jan Kregel


    March 27, 2013
    “Rethinking the State” is a video project funded by the Ford Foundation and the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) with the aim of using the recent economic crisis to question assumptions behind economic theory and to rethink the role of the state, finance, and austerity in promoting growth and innovation. In the first of a series of interviews with leading economists, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel discusses the causes and consequences of the Greek crisis, and the ineffectiveness and side effects of austerity. Click here for the complete interview. More information on “Rethinking the State” is available from INET
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
  • In the Media | March 2013

    Cyprus Bailout Could Rally U.S. Markets


    By Tom Krisher
    The Associated Press, March 25, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The last-ditch effort to save the banking system in Cyprus should bring a rally when U.S. stock markets open today, according to several investment managers.

    Cyprus and its international creditors agreed early today on key elements of a deal for a 10-billion-euro ($13-billion) bailout. Cyprus’ second-biggest bank, Laiki, will be restructured, and holders of deposits exceeding 100,000 euros will have to take losses, a European Union diplomat said. The diplomat spoke on condition of anonymity pending the official announcement.

    It was unclear just how big of a hit big depositors will have to take, but the tax on deposits was expected to net several billion euros, reducing the amount of rescue loans the country needs.

    U.S. investors won’t care too much about who takes losses in Cyprus, as long as there’s a bailout that stops the run on banks in the Mediterranean island nation and keeps the eurozone stable, said Karyn Cavanaugh, market strategist at ING Investment Management in New York.

    “If this works out, regardless of the terms, this is going to be good for the market,” she said Sunday night.

    The tax on large deposits likely will be 10 to 20 per cent, in order to raise about $7.5 billion, said Jack Ablin, chief investment officer for BMO Private Bank in Chicago.

    The move should be well received by U.S. investors because it’s the third bailout deal in the eurozone, including Greece and Spain, and in each case the countries have agreed to austerity plans.

    “I suspect investors will take that news pretty well,” he said.

    The Dow Jones industrial average dropped more than 90 points Thursday in part on fears that the crisis in Cyprus will intensify. But it rebounded and erased the loss on Friday.

    Late Sunday, Dow Jones industrial futures were up 42 points to 14,501. The broader S&P futures added six points to 1,558.00 and Nasdaq futures rose fractionally as well. Japan’s benchmark Nikkei 225 gained 1.35 per cent to 12,505.51 in early trading.

    The European Central Bank had threatened to stop providing emergency funding to Cyprus’ banks after today if there is no agreement on a way to raise 5.8billion euros needed to get a 10-billion-euro rescue loan package from the International Monetary Fund and the other countries that use the euro currency.

    If Cyprus fails to get a bailout, some of its banks could collapse within days, rapidly dragging down the government and possibly forcing the country of around one million people out of the eurozone.

    Analysts say that could threaten the stability of the currency used by more than 300 million people in 17 EU nations.

    A plan agreed to in marathon negotiations earlier this month called for a one-time levy on all bank depositors in Cypriot banks. But the proposal ignited fierce anger among Cypriots and failed to garner a single vote in the Cypriot Parliament.

    The idea of some sort of deposit grab has returned to the fore after Cyprus’ attempt to gain Russian financial aid failed this past week, with deposits above 100,000 euros at the country’s troubled largest lender, Bank of Cyprus, possibly facing a levy of up to 25 per cent.

    Monday’s deal between Cyprus, the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission still needs approval by the 17-nation eurozone’s finance ministers. The deal could still be scuttled if Parliament rejects the tax on depositors, said Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.

    And Cavanaugh said any glitch that thwarts the deal could still cause U.S. markets to plunge later. She’s still concerned that the U.S. economy, with recent weak corporate earnings, may be hurt by economic troubles in Europe. She’s advising investors to be defensive, staying in the market but moving some of their portfolios into bonds.

    However, Ablin said tiny Cyprus shouldn’t have much of an impact on U.S. markets short of a total default.

    “We’ve been through a lot, and the euro has not yet fallen off the table,” he said. “I guess the conventional wisdom is the euro can sustain a big setback in Cyprus and still continue to move forward.”
  • In the Media | March 2013

    The Banking Crisis in Cyprus and the Targeting of Russian Deposits


    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    March 18, 2013. Copyright © 2013 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Pacifica Radio host Ian Masters interviews Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou about the banking meltdown in Cyprus that has revived concerns about the viability of the eurozone. They also look into the exposure that Russian companies and individuals have in troubled banks in Cyprus, where banking assets are eight times the size of the country’s economy.

    Full audio is available here.  
  • In the Media | March 2013

    Una nueva forma de medir la pobreza


    Cómo usar la información de uso del tiempo para informar a las políticas de reducción de la pobreza con perspectiva de género
    Latin America and Gender Equality Bulletin (UNDP), March 2013. All Rights Reserved.
     Desde que la Plataforma para la Acción de Beijing instara a los países a relevar encuestas de uso del tiempo para medir “cuantitativamente el valor del trabajo no remunerado que no se incluye en las cuentas nacionales, por ejemplo, el cuidado de los familiares a cargo y la preparación de alimentos”, el levantamiento de encuestas de uso del tiempo ha avanzado sin pausa en los países en desarrollo. En nuestra región, un importante número de países han recolectado información de uso del tiempo, con variadas metodologías y alcances.

    Puede decirse que México y Uruguay muestran los avances más sostenidos en este campo, ya que han levantado o están por levantar su tercera encuesta de uso del tiempo. Pero no están solos: en los últimos años Argentina (en Buenos Aires y en Rosario), Bolivia, Brasil, Costa Rica (en la Gran Área Metropolitana), Colombia, Chile (en Gran Santiago), Ecuador, Panamá, Perú y Venezuela han levantado encuestas de uso del tiempo. Aquellas de las que se conocen los resultados –algunas son muy recientes, como la de Venezuela, o están en campo, como la de Colombia– muestran que las mujeres realizan más trabajo doméstico y de cuidados que los varones, en particular las madres de hijas e hijos pequeños y las ocupadas, y que mujeres y varones provenientes de hogares pobres por ingresos realizan más trabajo doméstico y de cuidados que quienes provienen de hogares no pobres.

    La Plataforma para la Acción de Beijing asocia de manera muy clara la visibilización, medición, y valoración del trabajo doméstico y de cuidados a su incorporación en las cuentas nacionales –comparables al Producto Bruto Interno– a través de cuentas satélites. Esto implica reconocer que el trabajo doméstico y de cuidados “expande” el ingreso nacional, y por lo tanto el bienestar.

    El nivel “macro” de análisis tiene su correlato a nivel micro.

    El consumo de los hogares es superior a sus gastos en bienes y servicios, ya que el trabajo doméstico y de cuidados no remunerado que se realiza en ellos expande las posibilidades de consumo de sus miembros. La valoración de los “servicios” que brinda el trabajo doméstico y de cuidados complementa el ingreso monetario, y brinda una medida “ampliada” del bienestar.

    El consumo de los hogares es superior a sus gastos en bienes y servicios, ya que el trabajo doméstico y de cuidados no remunerado que se realiza en ellos expande las posibilidades de consumo de sus miembros. La valoración de los “servicios” que brinda el trabajo doméstico y de cuidados complementa el ingreso monetario, y brinda una medida “ampliada” del bienestar.

    Si en las medidas de pobreza absoluta, la medición de requerimientos de ingresos no implica que el hogar (o las personas) estén efectivamente consumiendo la canasta de pobreza, sino sólo que tengan los ingresos para adquirirla, el establecimiento de un requerimiento de tiempo implica determinar si las personas (y por lo tanto los hogares en que viven) podrían realizar el trabajo doméstico y de cuidados necesario para vivir con la canasta de pobreza (dada la estructura de los hogares, el tiempo de trabajo remunerado, y la distribución intra-hogar del trabajo doméstico y de cuidados),  no que efectivamente lo estén realizando. Si “no les alcanza el tiempo”, entonces tienen “déficits” que las hacen pobres de tiempo.

    Si el ingreso del hogar alcanza para compensar el valor de estos déficits, entonces, serán pobres de tiempo pero no de ingreso “ajustado”. Pero si el ingreso no alcanza para comprar sustitutos de estos déficits, entonces las personas y los hogares en que habitan serán pobres de tiempo e ingresos. La medida de pobreza de ingreso y tiempo LIMTIP no hace otra cosa que corregirlas medidas de pobreza absoluta que estamos acostumbradas y acostumbrados a utilizar, para hacerlas más fieles a sus supuestos.Con una notable excepción, especialmente bienvenida si, además de las diferencias de ingreso nos preocupan las diferencias de género y la desigual división sexual del trabajo: mientras que en las medidas de pobreza de ingreso se supone que al interior del hogar la distribución del consumo es “justa” (acorde a las necesidades), y que un hogar pobre lo es porque no alcanza a cubrir en conjunto un nivel de consumo mínimo, en la medida LIMTIP no se realiza ningún supuesto, sino que se toma la distribución del trabajo doméstico y de cuidados del observada en el hogar. Y los déficits de tiempo se calculan a nivel individual, no conjunto, y por lo tanto no se “compensan” entre miembros del hogar.

    Aunque este último es un supuesto fuerte, no tomarlo implicaría borrar una diferencia de género crucial, que además conocemos. Podría argumentarse que la medida LIMTIP combina dos modos muy distintos de medir la pobreza –el ingreso a nivel hogar, el tiempo a nivel individual. Pero no se hace porque se esté de acuerdo con el modo en que se mide la pobreza por ingresos, sino porque no tenemos, todavía, una mejor medida del consumo de bienes y servicios remunerados al interior de los hogares.

    La medida de pobreza LIMTIP permite conjugar, como ninguna otra hasta el momento, dos mandatos de la Plataforma para la Acción de Beijing, que no por casualidad, aparecen a continuación uno del otro: “hacer evidente la desigualdad en la distribución del trabajo remunerado y el no remunerado entre mujeres y varones” y “perfeccionar los conceptos y métodos de obtención de datos sobre la medición de la pobreza entre hombres y mujeres”. Hacia allí estamos trabajando.
  • In the Media | March 2013

    Athens Policy Forum: Remarks by James K. Galbraith


    "Exiting The Crisis: The Challenge of an Alternative Policy Road Map," a policy forum oganized by the Athens Development and Governance Institute and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, was held at the Athinais Cultural Centre in Athens, Greece, March 8–9.
    Speaking at the Athens policy forum on March 9, Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith noted that Greece is effectively powerless in its present situation because what’s being done within the country—a program of austerity that has led to widespread poverty and the highest unemployment rate in the European Union—is dictated and constrained from without. Real change, said Galbraith, will come about only when the north of Europe realizes that things cannot continue. At that point, Germany in particular must decide whether to save the eurozone with a policy of solidarity and mutual support, or to follow what is an emerging political tendency, which is to effectively break the eurozone in two.

    Click here for a video of his remarks.
  • In the Media | March 2013

    Athens Policy Forum: Remarks by Jan Kregel


    “Exiting The Crisis: The Challenge of an Alternative Policy Road Map,” a policy forum oganized by the Athens Development and Governance Institute and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, was held at the Athinais Cultural Centre in Athens, Greece, March 8–9.
    Speaking at the Athens forum on March 8, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel observed that, on a global level, productivity is higher than it’s ever been, yet policies have been imposed within the European Union that prevent large segments of its population from benefitting. Policies that bring about a resumption of income growth and employment are the only solution—a solution that is wholly dependent upon north-south cooperation.
    Click here for a video of his remarks.
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
  • In the Media | February 2013

    Legends of the Greek Fall


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The Huffington Post, February 20, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Why has the world’s premiere deficit-reduction laboratory produced such a dismal failure? European leadership still expects the painful über austerity measures imposed on Greece to result in a dramatic improvement of its debt to GDP ratio. But the experiment in endurance is not succeeding for an important reason: Austerity programs have been rooted in myths about what caused the crisis in the first place.

    The popular notion that government overspending is the basis of Greece’s deficit woes is simply wrong. Evidence doesn’t support what seems to be a never-ending scolding about profligate spending.

    Greek national expenditures were at about 45 percent of GDP in 1990, long before the crisis. That share remained stable through 2006. Proportionally, its size was well below that of France, Italy, or even Germany. While Greece has a reputation for a nasty, historically oversized public sector, in the lead up to the crisis it behaved no differently than its neighbors, and its rate of spending didn’t prevent it from catching and surpassing affluent eurozone nations in growth. Rapid spending increases weren’t notable until the 2008 recession. The timeline reinforces the conviction that long-term government extravagance hasn’t been key to the Greek meltdown.

    Its debt picture was also steady. For years, Greece ran a deficit of 3 to 5 percent of GDP, and roughly a 120 percent debt to GDP ratio without any market upheaval. In 2000, just before it joined the euro, its deficit was 3.8 percent, where it more or less remained through the early euro years. Government borrowing didn’t explode until the sovereign debt crisis surfaced in 2009, which indicates that its record of national debt wasn’t the primary cause of Greece’s deficit crunch, either.

    Other trends were more worrisome than government spending and borrowing. Revenues, for one, had been a creeping problem. Even before Greece joined the euro, it lagged considerably behind other European economies in tax collection. A Levy Institute analysis shows that by 2005, revenues from income and wealth taxes in particular, were still well below other European countries. The notable increase in government revenue, from 9.8 percent of GDP in 1988 to 2005’s high of 13.5 percent (before stabilizing at a slightly lower level), was mainly from an increase in social contributions. Tax evasion was rampant in the robust shadow economy.

    In the late 1990s another danger emerged. Investment was concentrated in construction, while machinery and transportation equipment, more important for creating productive capacity, played a smaller part. Greece’s increase in investment relative to savings and its strong growth in real GDP became dependent on private sector demand that was driven by debt. Household consumption, meanwhile, was being financed by running down family financial assets, as well as by borrowing. The private sector became a net borrower against the rest of the world.

    Sound familiar?

    These weren’t the only issues underlying the Greek crisis, of course. To tick a few more linked fundamentals off the list: A problematic effective exchange rate was propelling a deterioration in the trade balance. Export prices had risen much faster in Greece than in the rest of the eurozone, with Greek companies unable or unwilling to absorb euro appreciation by lowering their margins. At the same time, the transfer balance—mostly remittances from abroad—declined. Then property income fell.

    Most importantly for the future, in contrast to some other troubled countries, Greece’s private sector, as well as its government, has a net debt against foreigners. This combination means that Greece must transfer real assets, rather than just financial ones, if it is going to reduce total debt.

    Not one of these problems is likely to improve under a continued austerity regime. And while the probability of reaching European Commission targets is a fantasy, the fallout from making deficit reduction the foremost priority has been radioactive. Poverty and unemployment have increased disastrously. The threat of even more worker lay-offs, with a resulting national collapse, remains. Per capita GDP has declined by at least 5 percent in each of the last four years. By these and numerous other measures, cost-cutting has fueled a deep recession and devastating economic and social corrosion.

    Before Greece’s debt and deficit troubles can be resolved, GDP growth needs to be restored, not the other way around. This in no way minimizes the debt’s alarming potential, and the need to roll it over at low or even zero rates. Even at the current lower interest level, payments could quickly become astronomical. Despite this, a focus on growth must be central.

    Last year we finally saw small, scattered walk-backs from support for austerity policies. Let’s hope that this year will bring a giant step away from cherished—but nonetheless imaginary—legends of Greece’s fall.
  • In the Media | January 2013

    A Teachable Moment for Deficit Hawks


    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    January 30, 2013. Copyright © 2013 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Pacific Radio host Ian Masters interviews President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou about the unexpected contraction in GDP in the last quarter of 2012 and what it means for a slowing recovery—unwelcome news that might give Republican deficit hawks pause as they insist on more budget cuts. Full audio of the interview is available  here.

     

  • In the Media | January 2013

    Who, What, Why: Could the US Get a $1tn Platinum Coin?


    By Jon Kelly

    BBC News Magazine, January 9, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Campaigners want to prevent the US’s rising debt from bringing government spending to a halt by minting the world’s most expensive coin. Could this bizarre scheme become reality?

    It sounds like the plot of some whimsical comedy‑the 1954 Gregory Peck film The Million Dollar Note springs to mind—but a drive to create super-valuable loose change is being taken seriously in the corridors of Washington DC.

    A petition urging the creation of platinum coin worth $1tn (£624bn) has attracted nearly 7,000 signatures and the support of some heavyweight economists.

    Experts say the plan would be lawful and should allow the government to keep spending if President Barack Obama fails to convince lawmakers to raise the “debt ceiling”—a cap, set by Congress, on the US government’s borrowing ability.

    But most believe the coin is more likely to be used as a threat than ever actually come into being.

    “When people first hear about it they think, ‘Oh, it’s a gimmick,’“ says L Randall Wray, professor of economics at the University of Missouri–Kansas City.

    “But it makes you think harder about the way the government spends.”

    The coin owes its widely discussed, though still hypothetical existence to the looming deadline over the debt ceiling—which, as things stand, will prevent the US government issuing new bonds and paying bills, in about two months.

    Republicans, who control the US House of Representatives, have pledged to seek spending cuts before consenting to any increase in this limit.

    But opponents fear this brinksmanship could threaten the US’s credit rating if the country’s debt reaches or breaks through this ceiling.

    These mostly centre-left critics, including Democratic Congressman Jerrold Nadler, have pointed to a loophole in US law that allows the Treasury Secretary to allocate any value he or she likes to a coin.

     

    They say the Treasury could order the coin to be minted and then deposit it at the Federal Reserve, the US’s central bank.

    Effectively, the coin is an accounting trick, says Cullen Roche, who blogs about finance and economics at Pragmatic Capitalism.

    Its real purpose, however, would be political—to neutralise the threat by Republicans in Congress that federal employees would not be paid, he adds.

    “It’s a loophole to replace something that’s totally insane with something that’s slightly less insane,” he says.

    The campaign has been taken seriously by such eminent people as Nobel prize-winning economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, and Philip Diehl, the former director of the United States mint. It has also inspired the Twitter hashtag, #MintTheCoin.

    But it has attracted opposition, too. Republican Congressman Greg Walden has promised to introduce a bill to ban the government from creating high-value coins to pay its debts.

    Walden said he feared the practice would be “very inflationary.”

    Wray disagrees. “These trillion-dollar coins are held only by the Fed,” he says. “There’s no increase in the money supply out there.”

    Supporters of the scheme also say the Federal Reserve could sell bonds, which would withdraw money from circulation.

    As yet, however, no such coins exist anywhere. And even those who believe the plan is perfectly feasible concede that it is likely to remain a bargaining chip in the debt-ceiling talks, rather than becoming a reality.

    “I think the president will be reluctant to do it because it undermines everyone’s credibility,” says Roche.

    Coin collectors might be advised not to hold their breath about this new denomination turning up on eBay any time soon.

     

  • In the Media | January 2013

    Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Bard Economics Professor, Wins Award


    Daily Freeman, January 7, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    ANNANDALE-ON-HUDSON, N.Y. — The Association for Social Economics  has awarded Pavlina R. Tcherneva, research associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and assistant professor of economics at Bard, the 2013 Helen Potter Prize.

    The prize was created and endowed by the Association for Social Economics in 1975 and is awarded each year to a promising scholar of social economics for authoring the best article in The Review of Social Economy. Tcherneva is being awarded the prize for her article “On-the-spot Employment: Keynes’s Approach to Full Employment and Economic Transformation” published in the March 2012 issue.

    She will be presented with the award at the Association for Social Economics  presidential breakfast to be held in San Diego, Calif., this month. For more information, visit www.socialeconomics.org.

    Tcherneva conducts research in the fields of modern monetary theory and public policy, and has collaborated with policymakers from Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Turkey, and the United States on developing and evaluating various job-creation programs.

    Her current research examines the nexus between monetary and fiscal policies under sovereign currency regimes and the macroeconomic merits of alternative stabilization programs. She has also examined the role, nature, and relative effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s alternative monetary policies and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act during the Great Recession.

  • In the Media | January 2013

    The Good, Bad, and Ugly of the Fiscal Cliff


    Pacifica Radio, January 4, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray talks to KPFK’s Suzi Weissman about the economic prospects waiting on the far side of the fiscal cliff. Full audio of the interview is available here.

  • In the Media | December 2012

    Conference on “Debt, Deficits, and Unstable Markets” at the Deutsche Bank Headquarter in Berlin’s Unter der Linden, Germany


    By Mitja Stefancic
    The University of Ljubljana Faculty of Economics provides an overview of the Institute's Minsky Conference on Financial Instability here.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Why the Fiscal Cliff Is a Scam


    Interview with James K. Galbraith
    The Real News Network, November 30, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    The first in a planned series of six interviews with Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith on the validity of the "fiscal cliff." Full audio and a transcript of the interview are available here.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Finanzas Evans de la Fed desea más alivio, Fisher quiere límites


    Por Andrea Hopkins y Sarah Marsh, Reuters

    El Periòdico de México, 28 de Noviembre de 2012. Copyright © 2006 El Periòdico de México. Todos los derechos reservados.

    TORONTO / BERLIN — Las profundas divisiones de la Reserva Federal quedaron expuestas el martes, apenas dos semanas antes de la siguiente reunión de política monetaria del banco central de Estados Unidos, con un funcionario de la Fed impulsando un mayor alivio y otro defendiendo la fijación de límites.

    La brecha pone de relieve los obstáculos que enfrenta el presidente de la Fed, Ben Bernanke, en su intento de alcanzar un consenso entre sus compañeros sobre los esfuerzos políticos a veces polémicos del banco central por reducir la elevada tasa de desempleo del país, que registró un 7,9 por ciento el mes pasado.

    Charles Evans, presidente de la Reserva Federal de Chicago y uno de los moderados de la Fed, dijo que las tasas de interés deberían permanecer cerca de cero hasta que la tasa de desempleo caiga a menos del 6,5 por ciento. Tal política acarrearía "sólo riesgos mínimos de inflación", y podría impulsar el crecimiento más rápido que en otro caso, dijo.

    Evans, que pasará a ocupar en enero un asiento con derecho a voto en el panel de fijación de política de la Fed, también dijo que la Fed debería intensificar su programa de alivio cuantitativo en el nuevo año para mantener su nivel global de compras de activos en 85.000 millones de dólares al mes por la mayor parte, si no todo, el 2013.

    Pero el presidente de la Fed de Dallas, Richard Fisher, un duro que se inclina por el rigor fiscal, dijo que el banco central de Estados Unidos podría meterse en problemas si no se establece un límite a la cantidad de activos que está dispuesto a comprar.

    "No se puede expandir de manera ilimitada sin consecuencias terribles", dijo a periodistas en el marco de la conferencia organizada por el Levy Economics Institute de Berlín. "No hay un infinito en la política monetaria, sabemos eso a partir de la experiencia alemana", agregó.

    En septiembre, la Fed lanzó un abierto programa de compra de activos, partiendo con 40.000 millones de dólares en valores respaldados por hipotecas y prometiendo continuar o reforzar el programa a menos que las perspectivas del mercado laboral mejoren sustancialmente.

    Esas compras se suman a los 45.000 millones de dólares en bonos del Tesoro a largo plazo que la Fed está comprando cada mes bajo la Operación Twist, compras que se financian con la venta de una cantidad igual de bonos del Tesoro a corto plazo.

    "Es importante mantener el nivel general de compra de activos en 85.000 millones de dólares, al menos por un tiempo hasta que podamos ver si lo estamos haciendo mejor o no, o si las cosas van más lento, podemos ajustarlo, dependiendo de esa evaluación", dijo a los periodistas que asistían a una conferencia en el Instituto CD Howe en Toronto.

    "Creo que debemos tener una discusión sobre qué es una 'mejoría sustancial'. ¿lo hemos visto? En mi opinión, no lo hemos hecho", agregó.

    Evans dijo que juzgaría que el mercado laboral ha mejorado sustancialmente una vez que vea ganancias mensuales de al menos 200.000 puestos de trabajo durante unos seis meses, así como sobre una tendencia de crecimiento del Producto Interno Bruto que conduzca a la disminución del desempleo.

    "Estaría muy sorprendido si pudiéramos alcanzar eso antes de que hayan pasado seis meses, y no me sorprendería si tarda hasta fines del 2013", declaró.

    Evans dijo que la Fed debería mantener las tasas bajas mucho más allá de esa fecha, hasta que la tasa de desempleo llegue al 6,5 por ciento, siempre y cuando las perspectivas de inflación para los próximos dos o tres años se mantengan por debajo del 2,5 por ciento. El objetivo de inflación de la Fed es del 2 por ciento.

    Evans durante el último año había pedido tasas bajas hasta que la tasa de desempleo caiga al 7 por ciento, mientras la inflación no amenace con superar la barrera del 3 por ciento.

    El martes Evans dijo que ahora considera que un umbral de desempleo de un 7 por ciento es "demasiado conservador". El también dijo que ahora cree que una garantía de que la inflación no supere el 2,5 por ciento es apropiada, dado que un umbral mayor "pone a muchas personas ansiosas", y no es necesario para que la política funcione.

    "Es mucho más probable que alcancemos el umbral de un 6,5 por ciento de desempleo antes de que la inflación comience incluso a acercarse a un número modesto como un 2,5 por ciento", afirmó.

    La Fed han estado aumentando las discusiones sobre los llamados umbrales -puntos específicos de datos económicos como el desempleo y las tasas de inflación- que indicarían cuándo el banco central probablemente comenzará a subir las tasas de interés desde casi cero.

    El presidente de la Fed de Minneapolis, Narayana Kocherlakota, el presidente de la Fed de Boston, Eric Rosengren, y la influyente vicepresidenta de la Fed, Janet Yellen, han expresado apoyo a la idea.

    En Berlín, Fisher también intervino en el debate.

    "Una opción que creo que podríamos seguir es tener una definición de nuestro objetivo de desempleo, así como nuestro objetivo a largo plazo la inflación", dijo, haciendo notar que esto sería difícil, y que el establecimiento de un límite global de compras de activos era preferible.

  • In the Media | November 2012

    ¿Qué esperan los mercados para el 28 de noviembre?


    Pide Fisher de Fed fijar límites a la compra de activos
    El Financiero, November 28, 2012. © 2012 Copyright Grupo Multimedia Lauman, SAPI de CV.

    El presidente de la Reserva de Dallas, Richard Fisher, subrayó que no estaba preocupado por la inflación en Estados Unidos, sino por el desempleo, al tiempo que el Banco Central debería considerar fijar un límite para el total de activos que está dispuesto a comprar.

    "Las tasas de interés son las más bajas en la historia de Estados Unidos, la pregunta es qué va a estimular a las empresas y poner a nuestra gente de vuelta en el trabajo", dijo Fisher, un crítico de la política de alivio de la Fed, en declaraciones en una conferencia organizada por el Levy Economics Institute de Berlín.

    "Es momento de que aclaremos cuáles son nuestros objetivos y nuestros límites", subrayó Fisher, un crítico de la política expansiva de la Fed, quien se describe a sí mismo como ortodoxo frente a la inflación.

    "Una opción es tener una definición de nuestra meta del empleo, además de nuestra meta de inflación de largo plazo. Será difícil de hacer, pero es una opción", resaltó.

    La segunda opción sería anunciar "más pronto que tarde" cuánto está dispuesta a comprar la Fed.

    El Banco Central estadunidense anunció una tercera ronda de compras de activos en septiembre, de final abierto, que según dice continuará hasta que haya una mejora sustancial en el mercado laboral.

    A la espera de la Fed

    En Estados Unidos se conocerá el informe económico conocido como Beige Book, esperando encontrar pistas sobre los próximos pasos a seguir por parte de la Reserva Federal y de su percepción en torno al problema fiscal.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Evans de la Fed desea más alivio, Fisher quiere límites


    Por Andrea Hopkins y Sarah Marsh

    TORONTO / BERLIN (Reuters) — Las profundas divisiones de la Reserva Federal quedaron expuestas el martes, apenas dos semanas antes de la siguiente reunión de política monetaria del banco central de Estados Unidos, con un funcionario de la Fed impulsando un mayor alivio y otro defendiendo la fijación de límites.

    La brecha pone de relieve los obstáculos que enfrenta el presidente de la Fed, Ben Bernanke, en su intento de alcanzar un consenso entre sus compañeros sobre los esfuerzos políticos a veces polémicos del banco central por reducir la elevada tasa de desempleo del país, que registró un 7,9 por ciento el mes pasado.

    Charles Evans, presidente de la Reserva Federal de Chicago y uno de los moderados de la Fed, dijo que las tasas de interés deberían permanecer cerca de cero hasta que la tasa de desempleo caiga a menos del 6,5 por ciento. Tal política acarrearía "sólo riesgos mínimos de inflación", y podría impulsar el crecimiento más rápido que en otro caso, dijo.

    Evans, que pasará a ocupar en enero un asiento con derecho a voto en el panel de fijación de política de la Fed, también dijo que la Fed debería intensificar su programa de alivio cuantitativo en el nuevo año para mantener su nivel global de compras de activos en 85.000 millones de dólares al mes por la mayor parte, si no todo, el 2013.

    Pero el presidente de la Fed de Dallas, Richard Fisher, un duro que se inclina por el rigor fiscal, dijo que el banco central de Estados Unidos podría meterse en problemas si no se establece un límite a la cantidad de activos que está dispuesto a comprar.

    "No se puede expandir de manera ilimitada sin consecuencias terribles", dijo a periodistas en el marco de la conferencia organizada por el Levy Economics Institute de Berlín. "No hay un infinito en la política monetaria, sabemos eso a partir de la experiencia alemana", agregó.

    En septiembre, la Fed lanzó un abierto programa de compra de activos, partiendo con 40.000 millones de dólares en valores respaldados por hipotecas y prometiendo continuar o reforzar el programa a menos que las perspectivas del mercado laboral mejoren sustancialmente.

    Esas compras se suman a los 45.000 millones de dólares en bonos del Tesoro a largo plazo que la Fed está comprando cada mes bajo la Operación Twist, compras que se financian con la venta de una cantidad igual de bonos del Tesoro a corto plazo.

    "Es importante mantener el nivel general de compra de activos en 85.000 millones de dólares, al menos por un tiempo hasta que podamos ver si lo estamos haciendo mejor o no, o si las cosas van más lento, podemos ajustarlo, dependiendo de esa evaluación", dijo a los periodistas que asistían a una conferencia en el Instituto CD Howe en Toronto.

    "Creo que debemos tener una discusión sobre qué es una 'mejoría sustancial'. ¿lo hemos visto? En mi opinión, no lo hemos hecho", agregó.

    Evans dijo que juzgaría que el mercado laboral ha mejorado sustancialmente una vez que vea ganancias mensuales de al menos 200.000 puestos de trabajo durante unos seis meses, así como sobre una tendencia de crecimiento del Producto Interno Bruto que conduzca a la disminución del desempleo.

    "Estaría muy sorprendido si pudiéramos alcanzar eso antes de que hayan pasado seis meses, y no me sorprendería si tarda hasta fines del 2013", declaró.

    Evans dijo que la Fed debería mantener las tasas bajas mucho más allá de esa fecha, hasta que la tasa de desempleo llegue al 6,5 por ciento, siempre y cuando las perspectivas de inflación para los próximos dos o tres años se mantengan por debajo del 2,5 por ciento. El objetivo de inflación de la Fed es del 2 por ciento. Evans durante el último año había pedido tasas bajas hasta que la tasa de desempleo caiga al 7 por ciento, mientras la inflación no amenace con superar la barrera del 3 por ciento.

    El martes Evans dijo que ahora considera que un umbral de desempleo de un 7 por ciento es "demasiado conservador". El también dijo que ahora cree que una garantía de que la inflación no supere el 2,5 por ciento es apropiada, dado que un umbral mayor "pone a muchas personas ansiosas", y no es necesario para que la política funcione.

    "Es mucho más probable que alcancemos el umbral de un 6,5 por ciento de desempleo antes de que la inflación comience incluso a acercarse a un número modesto como un 2,5 por ciento", afirmó.

    La Fed han estado aumentando las discusiones sobre los llamados umbrales -puntos específicos de datos económicos como el desempleo y las tasas de inflación- que indicarían cuándo el banco central probablemente comenzará a subir las tasas de interés desde casi cero.

    El presidente de la Fed de Minneapolis, Narayana Kocherlakota, el presidente de la Fed de Boston, Eric Rosengren, y la influyente vicepresidenta de la Fed, Janet Yellen, han expresado apoyo a la idea.

    En Berlín, Fisher también intervino en el debate.

    "Una opción que creo que podríamos seguir es tener una definición de nuestro objetivo de desempleo, así como nuestro objetivo a largo plazo la inflación", dijo, haciendo notar que esto sería difícil, y que el establecimiento de un límite global de compras de activos era preferible.

    (Reporte de Sarah Marsh y Reinhard Becker en Berlín, Andrea Hopkins y Jeffrey Hodgson en Toronto; Escrito por Ann Saphir. Editado en español por Carlos Aliaga)
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Chicago Federal Reserve Wants More Easing, Dallas Seeks Limits


    The China Post, November 29, 2012. Copyright © 1999–2012 The China Post.

    TORONTO/BERLIN—Deep divisions at the Federal Reserve were on display on Tuesday, just two weeks before the U.S. central bank's next policy-setting meeting, with one top Fed official pushing for more easing, and another advocating limits. The divide underscores the hurdles Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke faces as he tries to win consensus among his fellow policymakers on the central bank's sometimes controversial efforts to bring down the nation's lofty unemployment rate, which registered 7.9 percent last month.

    Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank and one of the Fed's most outspoken doves, said interest rates should stay near zero until the jobless rate falls to at least 6.5 percent. Such a policy would carry “only minimal inflation risks,” and could boost growth faster than otherwise, he said. Evans, who rotates into a voting seat on the Fed's policy-setting panel in January, also said the Fed should step up its program of quantitative easing in the new year to keep its overall level of asset purchases at US$85 billion a month for most, if not all, of 2013.

    But Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, a self-identified inflation hawk, said the U.S. central bank could get into trouble if it does not set a limit on the amount of assets it is willing to buy.

    “You cannot expand without limits without horrific consequences,” he told reporters on the sidelines of the conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute in Berlin. “There is no infinity in monetary policy, we know that from the German experience.”

    In September the Fed launched an open-ended asset-purchase program, kicking it off with a monthly US$40 billion in mortgage-backed securities and promising to continue or ramp up the program unless the outlook for the labor market improves substantially.

    Those purchases come on top of the US$45 billion in long-term Treasurys the Fed is buying each month under Operation Twist, purchases that are funded with sales of a like amount of short-term Treasuries.

    “It's important to maintain the overall level of asset purchases at US$85 billion, at least for a time until we can see whether or not we are doing better or things are going more slowly, and we can adjust, depending on that assessment,” Evans told reporters attending a speech at the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto.

    “I think we have to have discussion about what is 'substantial improvement.' Have we seen it? In my opinion, we have not,” he said.

    Evans said he would judge the labor market as substantially improved once he sees monthly job gains of a least 200,000 for about six months, as well as above-trend growth in gross domestic product that would lead to declines in unemployment.

    “I would be very surprised if we could achieve that before six months have passed, and I would not be surprised if it takes until the end of 2013,” he said.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Atlanta Fed CEO Addresses Cyber Attacks and Pensions in Berlin


    By Phil Bolton
    Global Atlanta, November 27, 2012. All content © 1993- GlobalAtlanta.com, All Rights Reserved.

    The president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Dennis Lockhart, spoke at an economic conference in Berlin Nov 27 about the potential harm that cyber attacks on U.S. banks could do to the global payments system.
      Mr. Lockhart called the attacks “a real financial concern” that the Atlanta Fed is studying. He cited attacks in recent months on U.S. banks that flooded bank web servers with junk data, allowing the hackers to target certain web applications and disrupt online services.
      “The increasing incidence and heightened magnitude of attacks suggests to me the need to update our thinking,” he told attendees at the Hyman P. Minsky Conference organized by the Levy Economic Institute of Bard College. Dr. Minsky was an American economist who researched the characteristics of financial crises.
      The two-day conference is being supported by the Ford Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Deutsche Bank AG to address challenged to global growth affected by the eurozone debt crisis; the impact of the credit crunch on economic and financial markets; the larger implications of government deficits and the debt crisis for U.S., European and Asian economic policy and central bank independence and financial reform.
      Mr. Lockhart is one of many speakers including Philip D. Murphy, the U.S. ambassador to Germany; Klaus Gunter Deutsch, director of Deutsche Bank Research; and Peter Praet, chief economist and executive board member of the European Central Bank.
    Mr. Lockhart qualified his concerns saying that he didn’t think cyber attacks on payment systems was as critical as fiscal crises or bank runs. But he suggested that resilience measures of the sort banks have to maintain operations in a natural disaster such as multiple back-up sites and redundant computer systems would be appropriate.
      Mr. Lockhart also said that the Atlanta Fed is investigating the current state of public pensions as a possible source of financial instability and called it “the other debt problem” that the U.S. faces.
      If public funds can attain an 8 percent average annual return on their portfolios, he said that public state and municipal pension funds in the U.S would still have an $800 billion funding gap to fill.
      Using more realistic return assumptions, such as the longer-term rate on U.S. Treasuries, the gap could reach as high as $3 trillion to $4 trillion, he added.
    He cited three strategies fund managers can apply: increase contributions, decrease promised future benefit or assume more investment risk.
      “As a financial stability consideration, the problem of pension underfunding is not likely to be the source of any immediate shock or trigger a broader systemic crisis,” he said.
      “However, the situation needs to be monitored, as public finance does contribute to financial and economic stability more broadly.”
  • In the Media | November 2012

    WRAPUP 1—Fed's Evans wants more easing, Fisher wants limits


    By Andrea Hopkins and Sarah Marsh
    Yahoo! News, November 27, 2012. (c) Copyright Thomson Reuters 2012.

    TORONTO/BERLIN Nov 27 (Reuters) — Deep divisions at the Federal Reserve were on display on Tuesday, just two weeks before the U.S. central bank's next policy-setting meeting, with one top Fed official pushing for more easing, and another advocating limits.

    The divide underscores the hurdles Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke faces as he tries to win consensus among his fellow policymakers on the central bank's sometimes controversial efforts to bring down the nation's lofty unemployment rate, which registered 7.9 percent last month.

    Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank and one of the Fed's most outspoken doves, said interest rates should stay near zero until the jobless rate falls to at least 6.5 percent. Such a policy would carry "only minimal inflation risks," and could boost growth faster than otherwise, he said.

    Evans, who rotates into a voting seat on the Fed's policy-setting panel in January, also said the Fed should step up its program of quantitative easing in the new year to keep its overall level of asset purchases at $85 billion a month for most, if not all, of 2013.

    But Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, a self-identified inflation hawk, said the U.S. central bank could get into trouble if it does not set a limit on the amount of assets it is willing to buy.

    "You cannot expand without limits without horrific consequences," he told reporters on the sidelines of the conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute in Berlin. "There is no infinity in monetary policy, we know that from the German experience."

    In September the Fed launched an open-ended asset-purchase program, kicking it off with a monthly $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities and promising to continue or ramp up the program unless the outlook for the labor market improves substantially.

    Those purchases come on top of the $45 billion in long-term Treasuries the Fed is buying each month under Operation Twist, purchases that are funded with sales of a like amount of short-term Treasuries.

    "It's important to maintain the overall level of asset purchases at $85 billion, at least for a time until we can see whether or not we are doing better or things are going more slowly, and we can adjust, depending on that assessment," Evans told reporters attending a speech at the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto.

    "I think we have to have discussion about what is 'substantial improvement.' Have we seen it? In my opinion, we have not," he said.

    Evans said he would judge the labor market as substantially improved once he sees monthly job gains of a least 200,000 for about six months, as well as above-trend growth in gross domestic product that would lead to declines in unemployment.

    "I would be very surprised if we could achieve that before six months have passed, and I would not be surprised if it takes until the end of 2013," he said.

    Evans said the Fed should keep rates low well beyond that date, until the jobless rate hits at least 6.5 percent, as long as the inflation outlook for the next two to three years remains below 2.5 percent. The Fed's inflation target is 2 percent.

    Evans for the past year had called for low rates until the jobless rate falls to 7 percent, as long as inflation does not threaten to breach 3 percent.

    On Tuesday Evans said he now views a 7 percent unemployment threshold as "too conservative," and sees a 2.5 percent inflation safeguard as appropriate, given that a higher threshold makes some people "apoplectic" and is not needed in order for the policy to work.

    "We're much more likely to reach the 6.5 percent unemployment threshold before inflation begins to approach even a modest number like 2.5 percent," he said.

    Fed policymakers have been ramping up discussions on so-called thresholds—economic data points such as specific unemployment and inflation rates - that would signal when the central bank is likely to begin raising benchmark interest rates from near zero.

    Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren and the Fed's influential vice chair, Janet Yellen, have all expressed support for the idea.

    In Berlin, Fisher also chimed into the debate. "One option I believe we might pursue is to have a definition of our unemployment target as well as our long-term inflation target," he said, noting it would be difficult, however, and setting an overall limit on asset purchases was preferable.

    Fed Chairman Bernanke said last week that adopting numerical thresholds for unemployment and inflation could be a "very promising" step to develop the Fed's communication strategy, but stressed that it was still under discussion.

    On at least one issue, Fisher and Evans agreed: lack of jobs, not high inflation, is the biggest problem for the U.S. economy.

    "I am not worried about inflation right now, I am worried about an underemployed workforce in America," said Fisher.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Fed’s Fisher Warns Temporary Fiscal Cliff Fix Could Be Destructive


    By Brian Blackstone and Harriet Torry
    The Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2012. Copyright ©2012 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    A temporary fix to the “horrific” US federal budget deficit that fails to give businesses any clarity on tax and regulatory policy could have destructive effects on the US economy, a Federal Reserve official warned Tuesday.

    US businesses are in a “defensive crouch,” Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher said in a speech to a conference sponsored by the Levy Institute. If US leaders provide only a temporary solution to the looming deadline of combined tax hikes and spending cuts, known as the fiscal cliff, “that fix may well have an effect” on the economy, Mr. Fisher said.

    US tax and regulatory policies are “stuck in a pre-globalization time warp” and must be “completely rebooted,” Mr. Fisher said.

    The Fed’s policy rate is near zero and in recent years officials have introduced a series of asset-purchase measures to keep long-term interest rates low, pushing the central bank’s balance sheet past $3 trillion. Mr. Fisher said inflation remains under control in the US, with underemployment and unemployment remaining a top economic concern.

    “I do not believe that inflation will be the inevitable consequence” of the rapid rise of the Fed’s balance sheet, Mr. Fisher said.

    Still, “we’re going to need to soon decide and signal to the markets when…the punchbowl (of ultra-accomodative monetary policy) first will be ended and then when it will be withdrawn,” he said.

    The US economy has seen an uneven recovery since exiting recession in 2009 with unemployment near 8%, far above the rates associated with vibrant activity. “I’m worried about an underemployed workforce, a dispirited workforce,” Mr. Fisher said.

    He noted, however, that business balance sheets are in their best shape in many years. “American businesses are ready to roll, and we want them to roll,” he said.

    Mr. Fisher outlined two ways that US bond yields may rise. If inflation expectations rise, yields would increase, Mr. Fisher said, adding the Fed is guarding “ferociously” against this scenario.

    The “happy” outcome, he said, is if the economy recovers and the money currently parked at the Fed is put to work in the economy. This is the scenario the Fed hopes for, he said, even if it means a loss on its holdings of debt securities.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Fed’s Lockhart Sees Risk from Cybercrime at Banks


    By Steve Matthews and Stefan Riecher
    Bloomberg Businessweek, November 27, 2012. ©2012 Bloomberg L.P. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Dennis Lockhart said financial regulators need to be vigilant in identifying risks, including cybercrime at banks and the underfunding of public pensions.

    “At a global level, the span of vigilance needs to be extremely broad,” Lockhart said today in remarks prepared for a speech in Berlin. “The events of 2007 and 2008 brought many surprises,” he said. “Markets that some thought too small to cause much trouble ultimately posed systemic-scale problems.”

    U.S. regulators are grappling with how to identify threats to financial stability more than four years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. The Dodd-Frank Act tightening post-crisis supervision created a council of regulators to monitor sources of instability.

    Lockhart didn’t comment on the U.S. economic outlook or monetary policy in his prepared remarks.

    One concern is “the potential for malicious disruptions to the payments system in the form of broadly targeted cyber-attacks,” Lockhart said at the Levy Economics Institute’s Hyman P. Minsky Conference on Financial Stability.

    “Banks and other participants in the payments system will need to reevaluate defense strategies” in light of increasing attacks by “sophisticated, well-organized hacking groups,” he said.

    Funding Shortfalls U.S. states and municipalities face pension funding shortfalls of as much as $3 trillion or $4 trillion, when conservative investment returns are assumed, Lockhart said. While pensions may not trigger a financial crisis, the health of state and local governments contributes to economic stability, he said.

    “The situation needs to be monitored,” Lockhart said. “The public pension funding problem, as it grows, has the potential to sap the resilience we wish for to withstand a future spell of financial instability.”

    Lockhart, a former Georgetown University professor, has led the Atlanta Fed since 2007. The Atlanta Fed district includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and portions of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Policymaker Fisher Says Fed Should Limit Asset Buys


    Reuters, November 27, 2012. ©2012 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

    (Reuters) — Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, a top Federal Reserve official, said on Tuesday the U.S. central bank could get into trouble if it doesn’t set a limit on the amount of assets it is willing to buy.

    But Fisher, a critic of easy Fed policy, also said his main concern now was unemployment, not inflation.

    He said another option the Fed might consider to signal its aims to markets was a target for unemployment, although this would be difficult because monetary policy alone was not responsible for creating jobs. Fiscal policy was also key.

    Fisher kicked off his speech at a conference in Berlin with a reference to German policies in the 1920s that led to hyperinflation, saying that while inflation was not his main concern now, unlimited quantitative easing was risky.

    “You cannot expand without limits without horrific consequences,” he told reporters on the sidelines of the conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute. “There is no infinity in monetary policy, we know that from the German experience.”

    The Fed announced a third, open-ended round of asset purchases in September that it says will continue until there is a substantial turnaround in the labor market.

    A self-described anti-inflation hawk, Fisher said the Fed should announce “sooner rather than later” limits on the amount of assets it would purchase, preferably in December.

    Fisher said inflation need not be the inevitable consequence of quantitative easing, but the Fed must remain mindful.

    He said that while he backed the first round of the Fed’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities, he doubted it should be continued as it had not reduced interest rate differentials as he had hoped.

    He also said that he was not in favor of extending Operation Twist, under which the Fed has been selling short-term securities to buy $45 billion in longer-term debt every month to push down long-term borrowing costs.

    Over to Fiscal Policy Fisher chimed into the debate on setting specific numerical rates for unemployment and inflation as markers for when the Fed would consider lifting interest rates.

    “One option I believe we might pursue is to have a definition of our unemployment target as well as our long-term inflation target,” he said, noting it would be difficult however and setting an overall limit on asset purchases was preferable.

    Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke said last week that adopting numerical thresholds for unemployment and inflation could be a “very promising” step to develop the Fed’s communication strategy, but stressed that it was still under discussion.

    “I am not worried about inflation right now, I am worried about an underemployed workforce in America,” said Fisher.

    “American businesses are ready to roll ... they are just not doing so, and that requires the fiscal authorities to incentivize them properly, in whatever way they choose.” He also said that after dealing with its fiscal policy, the U.S. government should seek a free trade deal with Europe.

    “It is very important our government, in addition to getting its act together on fiscal policy, resist with every fiber in their body the temptation to follow a protectionist course.”

    (Reporting by Sarah Marsh and Reinhard Becker, editing by Gareth Jones/Ruth Pitchford)
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Fed Fisher: Main Problem in U.S. Is Unemployment, Not Inflation


    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, November 27, 2012.

    BERLIN (MNI) - Dallas Federal Reserve Bank President Richard Fisher said Tuesday that the main problem in the U.S. economy at the moment is unemployment, not inflation.

    “I believe inflation is under control in the United States,” Fisher said at a conference of the Levy Economics Institute here. “Our real problem is underemployment,” he said.

    Fisher said he currently saw “no evidence” of inflation risks. “I do not believe inflation need be the inevitable consequence of the Federal Reserve expanding its balance sheet,” he added.

    At the same time he cautioned that “we must be ever mindful...that a shift [in inflation expectations] comes quickly and suddenly.”

    Fisher said the Fed must define what the limits of its policies are. “We’re going to need to soon decide and signal to the market when the punchbowl will be ended and then will be withdrawn,” he said.

    “Monetary policy is necessary but not sufficient” to get the U.S. economy on track again, Fisher argued. “Now we need the fiscal side to do its job,” he said.

    Currently, worries about the so-called “fiscal cliff” in the U.S., as well as concerns about the Chinese and European economy, are holding back investments in the economy, he said
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Desempleo EEUU es preocupación principal, no inflación: Fisher de la Fed


    Terra.com, 27 de Noviembre de 2012. © Copyright 2012, Terra Networks, S.A.

    BERLIN (Reuters) — El presidente de la Fed de Dallas, Richard Fisher, un funcionario de alto rango de la Reserva Federal de Estados Unidos, dijo el martes que no estaba preocupado por la inflación en Estados Unidos, sino por el desempleo y sostuvo que la política monetaria no es suficiente para crear puestos de trabajo.

    “Las tasas de interés son las más bajas en la historia de la República Americana (...) La pregunta es qué va a estimular las empresas y poner a nuestra gente de vuelta en el trabajo”, dijo Fisher, un crítico de la política de alivio de la Fed.

    El hizo estas declaraciones en una conferencia organizada por el Levy Economics Institute de Berlín.

    (Reporte de Sarah Marsh. Editado en español por Carlos Aliaga.)
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Fed's Lockhart Warns of Instability


    By Michael S. Derby
    NASDAQ, November 27, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK—A rising wave of cyberattacks on banks and underfunded pensions represent potential threats to financial stability, a key Federal Reserve official said Tuesday.

    The central banker, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Dennis Lockhart, didn’t address monetary policy or the economic outlook in remarks prepared for delivery in Berlin before a conference held by the Levy Economics Institute. Instead, he talked about issues confronting regulators at a time where the promotion of financial stability is seen a critical task.

    Mr. Lockhart observed “at a global level, the span of vigilance needs to be extremely broad,” and that’s because “the events of 2007 and 2008 brought many surprises.” In his speech, he zeroed in on threats to the payment system, most notably the sharp rise in electronic attacks directed at banks.

    “Just in the last few months, the United States has experienced an escalating incidence of distributed denial of service attacks aimed at our largest banks,” Mr. Lockhart said, noting “the attacks came simultaneously or in rapid succession,” apparently at the hand of those who appeared to be “sophisticated” and “well organized.”

    Mr. Lockhart said the motives for the attacks are “not always clear.” He explained “the intent appears to be to disable essential systems of financial institutions and cause them financial loss and reputational damage.”

    The spate of attacks suggests that financial sector participants will need to view the situation as “a persistent threat with potential systemic implications.” And while such attacks are unlikely to bring the financial system down, they nevertheless need to be countered, he said.

    Mr. Lockhart also warned about underfunded nature of much of the public pension system. “At a systemic level, this area of concern is more likely to be manifested as a gradually accreting threat to growth than a single event shock,” the official warned.

    The central banker pointed at the large gaps between what has been promised and the money put into the funds. He said managers of these funds are often operating with unrealistic investment return goals that lead to an understating of the degree of the problem.

    “The public pension funding problem, as it grows, has the potential to sap the resilience we wish for to withstand a future spell of financial instability,” Mr. Lockhart said.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Fed’s Fisher Says No Need to Extend Operation Twist


    By Harriet Torry and Brian Blackstone
    4-Traders.com, November 27, 2012. Copyright © 2012 Surperformance. All Rights Reserved.
        BERLIN—The U.S. Federal Reserve should end its program aimed at lowering long-term interest rates, known as Operation Twist, next month, U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher said Tuesday.
     
    Under the program, the Fed buys long-term Treasury bonds and sells short-term ones. Operation Twist is due to expire at the end of the year and Mr. Fisher, who has been skeptical of the program from its beginning, said he doesn’t want it extended.
     
    “I question its efficacy,” he told reporters after a speech.
     
    Mr. Fisher, who is considered one of the Fed’s most strident anti-inflation hawks, also said he doesn’t feel the Fed needs to continue purchasing mortgage-backed securities. In September, the Fed announced it would buy $40 billion per month of mortgage-backed securities until the U.S. employment market improves.
     
    “My personal view is we don’t need to do more,” Mr. Fisher said.
     
    He also said the Fed should define the limits of monetary policy. One option, he said, is to have a target for unemployment. At the same time, the Fed should set limits on the size of its balance sheet, he added.
     
    During his speech, the veteran U.S. central-bank official said the Federal Reserve needs to think about how to harness monetary policy to spur businesses to put Americans back to work.
     
    Speaking at a conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute, Mr. Fisher said the central bank now has a duty not only to maintain price stability and maximize employment, but also to preserve financial stability. He also said he supports a free trade agreement with Europe, which he said would be “stimulative” and would strengthen ties.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Fed’s Lockhart Warns on Cyber-threat Facing Banks


    By Greg Robb
    MarketWatch, November 27, 2012. Copyright © 2012 MarketWatch, Inc. All rights reserved.   WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — The U.S. financial system and its regulators need to “update our thinking” about the threat of cyber-attacks given the spike and magnitude of recent events, said Dennis Lockhart, president of the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, on Tuesday. “What was previously classified as an unlikely but very damaging event affecting one or a few institutions should now probably be thought of as a persistent threat with potential systemic implications,” Lockhart told a conference in Berlin on financial instability, sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute. Banks have been defending themselves against such attacks for a while, but recent episodes carry up to 20 times more volume of traffic than before, he noted. Lockhart said that another financial-stability concern facing the United States that does not get headlines is the underfunding of public-pension plans. The gap might be as much as $3 trillion to $4 trillion because of losses on investment portfolios during the crisis, according to the Fed president.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    ECB's Constancio Expects Spain to Apply for OMT


    By Harriet Torry
    TradingCharts.com, November 26, 2012. © TradingCharts.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    BERLIN—European Central Bank Vice President Vitor Constancio expects Spain to apply for the ECB's new bond-buying program, known as "Outright Monetary Transactions," he said after a speech in Berlin on Tuesday.

    In his speech at a conference held by the Levy Economics Institute, he said countries can only qualify for OMT if they meet strict conditions.

    Asked about the outcome he expects from the meeting of Greece's international creditors in Brussels later Monday, Mr. Constancio said he sees no grounds for a haircut of publicly held Greek sovereign debt, although he does expect agreement on disbursing the next tranche of aid.

    He also said the ECB is ready to assume its role in the supervision of the proposed banking union, the "most urgent pillar of a stable European monetary union.

    A closer financial union would allow the ECB to exit its current exceptional measures, Mr. Constancio said.

    "For us to contemplate exit from the exceptional measures, which we will do some time in the future, depends on several aspects, not just the progress of financial integration, it also depends on the overall economic conditions that affect inflation risks," the central banker told reporters after his speech.

    "If and when the economic conditions change, that would be the moment to change also the unconventional policies," he added.

    Economic growth in the euro area has slowed, and Mr. Constancio said he doesn't see visible risks to inflation on the horizon, "so we continue with our stance on monetary policy.

    "Our policy is already very accommodative," Mr. Constancio said when asked whether interest rates could change.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Kampeter sieht gute Chancen auf Einigung bei Eurogruppe


    Andreas Kissler
    Märkische Allgemeine, 26.11.2012, 16:00

    BERLIN—Finanz-Staatssekretär Steffen Kampeter sieht “sehr gute Chancen”, dass die Euro-Finanzminister bei ihrem Treffen am Montag in Brüssel eine Einigung über Hilfen für Griechenland erreichen werden. Wie zuvor bereits Regierungssprecher Steffen Seibert machte er aber klar, dass Deutschland weiterhin keinen öffentlichen Schuldenschnitt mittragen werde.

    “Wir glauben nicht an die vertrauensbildende Wirkung eines Schuldenschnitts”, sagte Kampeter bei einer Veranstaltung des Levy Economics Institute. “Das wird sich auf absehbare Zeit auch nicht ändern.” Seibert hatte zuvor bei einer Pressekonferenz betont, ein Schuldenschnitt sei für Deutschland wie auch für andere Euro-Staaten “kein Thema”. Er begründete die Haltung unter anderem mit haushaltsrechtliche Beschränkungen in Deutschland.

    Kampeter sah 80 Prozent der erforderlichen Arbeiten für eine Einigung in Brüssel schon erfüllt. “Die (verbleibenden) 20 Prozent sind letzten Endes die schwierigsten, das setzt voraus, dass sich alle Seiten noch ein Stück weit bewegen”, sagte der Parlamentarische Staatssekretär von Finanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) zu Journalisten. “Wir haben eine ganze Reihe von anderen Instrumenten im Bereich der Zinsen, im Bereich der Zeitschiene, die wir heute diskutieren.”

    Kampeter lehnte auch einen Schuldenschnitt zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt ab, wie etwa 2015 im Gegenzug für dann erfolgte griechische Reformen. “Das Argument überzeugt mich nicht, weil es ja nicht dazu führt, dass wir 2015 mehr Vertrauen in Investitionen in Griechenland haben”, machte er klar. Die Unsicherheit über zukünftige politische Beschlüsse sei ein wesentliches Investitionshemmnis und damit auch eine wesentliche Wachstumsbremse. “Deswegen sind Spekulationen über zukünftige Maßnahmen eher wachstumsbremsend als investitionsfördernd.”
  • In the Media | November 2012

    German Deputy Fin Min: Good Chance of Eurogroup Deal But No Greek Haircut


    By Harriet Torry
    The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2012. Copyright © 2012 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    BERLIN--German Deputy Finance Minister Steffen Kampeter sees a "very good chance" of an agreement on Greece's bailout program at the meeting of international creditors in Brussels later Monday, but said his government continues to oppose a haircut on publicly held Greek sovereign debt.
      "We don't believe in the trust-creating effect of a haircut," Mr. Kampeter said Monday in Berlin. A row of other instruments, involving interest rates and granting extra time, is on the table for the meeting of Greece's international creditors later Monday, the minister said.
    His expectation is that a deal will be reached at Monday's meeting of the European Commission, euro-zone finance ministers, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which can be delivered to the German Bundestag for parliamentary approval "and in the next week we should be on track."
      Mr. Kampeter said that at the moment he doesn't view as necessary further austerity measures by Greece, other than those already agreed.
      "Greece has delivered, now it's Europe's turn to deliver," Mr. Kampeter said at a Levy Economics Institute conference in Berlin. He added that the IMF is "on board."
      Speaking about a readjustment of labor costs in the euro zone, the minister expressed concerns about rising German labor costs in the medium term.
      "We are losing competitiveness," Mr. Kampeter told the conference.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Constancio, mi aspetto che Spagna chieda attivazione Omt


    Milano Finanza, 26/11/2012. © Milano Finanza 2012. All Rights Reserved.   Il vice presidente della Banca centrale europea, Vitor Constancio, si aspetta che la Spagna chieda l’attivazione del programma di acquisti di bond sul secondario della Bce (Omt) per ridurre il costo di finanziamento sui mercati.

    Durante un discorso tenuto al Levy Economics Institute di Berlino, Constancio ha detto che i Paesi possono ottenere l’attivazione dell’Omt se rispettano le condizionalità. Riferendosi alla crisi della Grecia, il vice presidente della Bce ha affermato di non vedere spazio per un haircut del debito ellenico ma che la tranche di aiuti dovrebbe essere rilasciata.

    L’Eurotower - ha aggiunto - è pronta inoltre ad assumersi il ruolo di supervisore bancario unico per creare l’Unione bancaria, “il pilastro più urgente per un’Unione monetaria europea stabile”. Con un’Unione finanziaria, la Bce potrebbe uscire dalle misure straordinarie che ha attuato per constrastare la crisi. “Uscire dalle misure eccezionali, che continueranno ad esserci per un pò in futuro, dipende da diverse aspetti, non solo dai progressi sull’integrazione finanziaria, ma anche dalle condizioni economiche generali che impattano sui rischi di inflazione”, ha detto Constancio. A chi poi gli chiedeva se ci sarà un taglio dei tassi di interesse al meeting di dicembre, l’esponente della Bce ha dichiarato che “la nostra politica è

    gia molto accomodante”.

  • In the Media | November 2012

    Even the IMF Agrees with Europe's Anti-Austerity Protests


    By Andy Robinson
    The Nation, November 20, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    In a spectacular display of widening popular discontent, strikes and anti-austerity protests broke out across the eurozone on November 14—the first time there has been broad coordinated action in multiple countries simultaneously since the beginning of a crisis rooted in the design failures of the European Monetary Union. General strikes in Spain and Portugal closed car plants and shut down other industries, drastically curtailing mass transit from Barcelona to Lisbon. There were strikes and huge demonstrations in Greece and Italy. Even in France and Belgium, countries less immediately threatened by the creeping debt crisis, big rallies were staged. 

    In Madrid, hundreds of thousands of protesters flowed past the Prado for five hours. Many seemed newly aware of a common European struggle. Some waved blue-and-white Greek flags in solidarity with the victims of the most ruthless shock therapy pursued so far. Others held placards painted with Iceland’s national colors, suggesting that the Icelandic default might show the way for the debt-laden euro periphery, especially Greece. 

    In Portugal and Greece, as in Spain, protesters took aim at the IMF as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel. “IMF means hunger and misery,” was a slogan in Lisbon. “We are fed up to our ovaries with the IMF,” joked a feminist contingent at the Madrid demonstration. Yet the truth is that IMF leaders, themselves frustrated with austerity madness, might have grabbed a banner and joined the protest. A very public dispute has erupted between the fund and the European Union over the pace of fiscal adjustment and the need for a second restructuring of Greek debt. 

    At its semiannual meeting in Tokyo in October, the IMF announced that the austerity packages applied throughout southern Europe since 2009 have been counterproductive, undermining economic growth and increasing rather than bringing down public debt ratios. Greece provides ghastly proof of the failed logic of the euro orthodoxy. After three years of shock therapy, the Greek economy is in depression and will have shrunk by more than 22 percent at the end 2013, the IMF warns.

    Employment in Greece has fallen to 1980 levels, and Greek debt dynamics have only deteriorated. Public sector debt has soared from 144 percent of GDP in 2010 to 170 percent, and unless the official lenders agree to take a haircut in a controlled restructuring of debt—as private lenders did earlier in the year—Greece may be forced to leave the euro. “The IMF has admitted the blunder, but tell that to the Greeks,” said Zoe Lanara, international relations secretary of the Greek General Confederation of Labor at a conference organized in October by left think tank TASC in Dublin. 

    The incompetence and negligence in the management of the crisis is staggering. In 2010, the troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF had calculated a manageable impact on growth of the adjustment packages in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, with fiscal multipliers in the region of 0.5. That means for every 2 billion euros’ worth of cuts, maybe 1 billion would have been lost in GDP. But the fund now believes this is far too low: “IMF staff research suggests that fiscal cutbacks had larger-than-expected negative short-term multiplier effects on output,” says the fund’s latest Economic Outlook report. Far from 0.5, “our results indicate that multipliers have actually been in the 0.9 to 1.7 range.” This, the IMF notes, “may explain part of the growth shortfalls.” 

    In other words, overzealous fiscal adjustment cripples an economy, driving down tax revenues, forcing up welfare costs and causing more debt problems. While labor unions and sections of the European left have expressed concern at the impact of austerity on growth since the very beginning, “a year or so ago, most finance ministers didn’t even know what fiscal multipliers were,” said Terrence McDonough, a Marxist economist at the National University of Ireland.

    Despite applause from Brussels and Berlin for its steady progress in deficit reduction, Ireland holds sobering lessons. Its exports have helped it avoid outright depression, but with debt at around 140 percent of GNP, Dublin may be as close to insolvency as Athens, warn the unions. “We are in the sixth year of contraction of domestic demand, and they are still cutting spending. If the IMF is right and multipliers are 1.7, this will be devastating for Ireland,” said Michael Taft of the Irish union Unite. 

    The IMF 2013 forecast for Portugal, meanwhile, has been revised downward to a full-blown recession with a 3 percent fall in GDP. Only Latvia—recovering strongly and keen to join the eurozone after its own dose of shock treatment—remains to vindicate the EU orthodoxy’s penchant for austerity, wage cuts and internal devaluation. Yet the tiny Baltic state was close to expiring on the operating table, losing a quarter of GDP and one-seventh of its youth to emigration. Even with its current growth rates, it will take five years to get back to where it started. 

    Notwithstanding the discouraging evidence from the eurozone, pressure is being piled on the Obama administration to agree to a “grand bargain” of fiscal consolidation with the Republicans in Congress. Here, too, the IMF has warned that a front-loaded fiscal adjustment could abort an already weak recovery. Given that interest rates on US bonds are at rock bottom, Congress could instead be legislating public investment programs at virtually no cost. “The European monetary union has created its own constraints and needs to be overhauled, but the US should be using fiscal policy to boost growth,” says Greek economist Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Keynesian Levy Economics Institute at Bard College. 

    The IMF’s methodology, at least, is being hastily adapted to the landscape of destruction and strife across the EU periphery. Yet it is still not clear that the European leaders will change tack. In Greece, the troika ordered more than 9 billion euros’ worth of cuts and tax increases, which, if multipliers are indeed 1.7, will reduce GDP by another 8 percent. Meanwhile, as Spain prepares to request a bailout package that will activate the European Central Bank’s bond purchasing program, the troika teams in Madrid appear to be designing something similar to the disastrous Irish program. The troika had raised hopes with a promising commitment to recapitalize Spain’s banks, but it now appears that so-called legacy debt—the bad loans inherited from previous bubbles—will not be covered. This means that in Spain, just as in Ireland, the state will be left to provide the capital needed to help banks absorb the impact of a deteriorating housing market. This will feed what the IMF calls a “pernicious feedback loop” where bailouts to stricken banks undermine public sector finances.

    As Spain slides further into recession (the IMF forecasts a 1.3 percent drop in GDP next year, after a 1.5 percent contraction in 2012), concerns about debt sustainability will deepen and the bank will be forced to intervene at increasing intervals against a backdrop of mass unrest. That is a recipe for backlash in Germany that could end the eurozone once and for all.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Fiscal Cliff: Reality Show or Morality Play?


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The Huffington Post, November 6, 2012. Copyright © 2012 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    The gruesome package of spending cuts and tax increases scheduled for December 31 was dubbed the "Fiscal Cliff' by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. It's apparent why the phrase caught on. Less understandable is the urge to jump into equally dangerous policy options.

    Virtually all of Washington is unhappy with the prospect of the measures. For months there've been reports of informal meetings to create a fix. But the austerity-worshipping ethos that underlies the plan is firmly entrenched, and some version of it will be enacted. Because of the wounds that extreme austerity will inflict, the Levy Institute is predicting—and we're hardly alone—that we're headed for another recession in 2013.

    All the evidence confirms that austerity programs have been a counterproductive disaster in Europe. That hasn't persuaded fiscal conservatives to adapt their ideology to reality. They continue to point to the inevitability of a Greek or Portuguese-style meltdown in the United States unless we immediately put government on a no-calorie diet and extract higher tax payments from those least able to afford them. This is despite the understanding by economists, including the most orthodox, that our federal control of the dollar puts us in a fundamentally different position than that of countries yoked to the euro.

    What we should be watching instead is the sorry mess in the United Kingdom. It's a more relevant comparison because, like the United States, the UK controls its own money; it stuck with the pound and never adopted the euro.

    Britain's own fiscal cliff was the 2010 austerity agenda of Prime Minister David Cameron and the Conservative Party. A set of drastic measures aimed to increase growth and reduce debt, it has failed spectacularly on both fronts. The UK economy today is indisputably worse than it was when the tightening began, with a shrunken GDP and the deficit shooting up. Government spending cutbacks—integral to the plan—helped bring about this new recession. Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer David Osborne have yet to take responsibility for their policies, accusations of incompetence from the press and a slap-down from the International Monetary Fund not withstanding.

    The U.S. Congress seems determined to follow this running leap into extreme austerity. The most likely modification to the current plan is an extension of some of the Bush-era tax cuts. Yet there hasn't been any move to extend the payroll tax holiday. Workers on the low end of the pay scale need the additional take-home pay that this measure has been providing. Because these employees spend their paychecks (they save the least of any group), they've also been helping to stimulate the larger economy. To eliminate this prime tax relief issue for the working class would be a major blunder.

    Slashing federal agencies—the planned "sequestration" of Treasury Department funds when the overall budget hits a targeted figure—would be even worse. Medicare and Medicaid are exempt, but if the pressure to restore military spending succeeds, countless key economic drivers will have to be decimated instead, in order to reach the magic targeted number. With the pain spread across a wide range of departments, you might assume that the impact would be insignificant. No. The shrinkage would be, roughly, a substantial 12 to 15 percent. The cuts would lead to another recession here, in a mirror of what's happening in Great Britain.

    The trap that occurs when austerity measures are used to balance a budget is predictable and preventable. On the most simple level, spending cuts and tax increases promote a cycle of low demand (because consumers buy less), low profits, high unemployment, and slow growth. These, in turn, inevitably lead to lower tax revenues and higher government safety net payouts, which of course produce rising government deficits. Greg Hannsgen and I detail other factors that also play significant roles in a new report [Fiscal Traps and Macro Policy after the Eurozone Crisis]. The austerity cult's response to this cycle is bigger spending cuts and more tax increases, which lead to ... you get the idea.

    What's at the heart of this irrational strategy? A mistaken belief that our national economic problems stem only from a failure to control spending. The data shows that this simply is not the case. Total United States government spending has actually been falling as a percentage of GDP, while the total number of government employees has been declining. This alone clearly indicates that our deficits—like those in the UK, by the way—have more to do with meager tax revenue than with profligate spending.

    Also key to the craze is the belief that austerity measures cannot wait. Many in Washington and the media are convinced that the recovery is well underway, and if spending cuts and tax increases are delayed for even a year it will be too late to tame inflation and tighten fiscal policy on a soaring economy. The urgency rests on unfounded optimism. We still have a very long way to go before the economy is anywhere near healthy enough to heat up. The GDP is now, and has long been, far below trend.

    Our economic malaise has been consistently underestimated, and the result has been the adoption of inadequate half-measures. Swapping budget cuts at the edge of the fiscal cliff isn't a solution. A reduction in federal spending during a downturn will perpetuate the damaging cycle, no matter how judiciously the cuts are chosen.

    The sequester should be repealed outright, and it certainly should not be replaced. We need a strong stimulus that increases employment, not by wishing for it, but through public sector hiring. The Fiscal Cliff show is a morality play that celebrates puritanical righteousness and unnecessary punishment. As we've already seen on the UK stage, it's headed towards an unhappy ending.
  • In the Media | November 2012

    Top U.S. and European Policymakers to Speak at Levy Economics Institute Conference in Berlin, Nov. 26-27


    Leading European and U.S. Policymakers to Discuss Financial Instability and Its Global Economic Implications at the Levy Economics Institute's Hyman P. Minsky Conference, in Berlin, November 26-27
    BERLIN, Nov. 6, 2012 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- From November 26 to 27, the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College will gather top policymakers, economists, and analysts at the Hyman P. Minsky Conference on Financial Instability to gain a better understanding of the causes of financial instability and its implications for the global economy. The conference will address the challenge to global growth affected by the eurozone debt crisis; the impact of the credit crunch on economic and financial markets; the larger implications of government deficits and the debt crisis for U.S., European, and Asian economic policy; and central bank independence and financial reform. Organized by the Levy Economics Institute and ECLA of Bard with support from the Ford Foundation, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Deutsche Bank AG, the conference will take place Monday and Tuesday, November 26 to 27, in Frederick Hall, 4th fl., Deutsche Bank AG, Unter den Linden 13–15, Berlin.

    Participants include Philip D. Murphy, U.S. Ambassador, Federal Republic of Germany; Steffen Kampeter, parliamentary state secretary, German Ministry of Finance; Lael Brainard*, under secretary for international affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury;  Mary John Miller*, Treasury under secretary for domestic finance; Vítor Constâncio, vice president, European Central Bank; Peter Praet, chief economist and executive board member, European Central Bank; Richard Fisher, president and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; Dennis Lockhart, president and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Christine M. Cumming, first vice president, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; George Stathakis, member of the Greek Parliament (Syriza) and professor of political economy,University of Crete; Jack Ewing, European economics correspondent, International Herald TribuneBrian Blackstone, European economics correspondent, The Wall Street JournalWolfgang Münchau, associate editor, Financial TimesRobert J. Barbera, chief economist, Mount Lucas Management LP; Andrew Smithers, founder, Smithers & Co.; Frank Veneroso, president, Veneroso Associates, LLC; Michael Greenberger, professor, School of Law, and director, Center for Health and Homeland Security, The University of Maryland; Leonardo Burlamaqui, program officer, Ford Foundation; Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president, Levy Institute; Jan Kregel, senior scholar, Levy Institute, and professor, Tallinn Technical University; Dimitrios Tsomocos, reader in financial economics, Saïd Business School, and fellow, St. Edmund Hall, University of Oxford; Alexandros Vardoulakis, research economist, European Central Bank and Banque de France; Michael Pettis, professor, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, and senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Eckhard Hein, professor, Berlin School of Economics; L. Randall Wray, senior scholar, Levy Institute, and professor, University of Missouri–Kansas City; Éric Tymoigne, research associate, Levy Institute, and professor, Lewis and Clark College; and Jörg Bibow, research associate, Levy Institute, and professor, Skidmore College. *to be confirmed

    The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986 through the generous support of the late Bard College trustee Leon Levy, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public policy research organization. The Institute is independent of any political or other affiliation, and encourages diversity of opinion in the examination of economic policy issues while striving to transform ideological arguments into informed debate.
     
    ECLA of Bard is a liberal arts university offering an innovative, interdisciplinary curriculum with a global sensibility. Students come to Berlin from 30 countries in order to study with our international faculty. The curriculum focuses on value studies, in which the norms and ideals we live by, and the scholarly attention they inspire, come together in integrated programs. Small seminars and tutorials encourage lively and thoughtful dialogue. The Ford Foundation is an independent, nonprofit grant-making organization. For more than half a century it has worked with courageous people on the frontlines of social change worldwide, guided by its mission to strengthen democratic values, reduce poverty and injustice, promote international cooperation, and advance human achievement. With headquarters in New York, the foundation has offices in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

    © 2012 GlobeNewswire, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

  • In the Media | October 2012

    Scholars Oppose US Government Austerity Moves


    By James Rainey
    Los Angeles Times, October 29, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    The idea of expansive government and greater spending to prop up a still flagging economy has gotten little support this election year.

    But two economists issued a warning Monday of a renewed recession if the government continues to restrict spending — particularly with the sharp tax increases and spending cuts scheduled for early next year.

    “American austerity is precisely the wrong policy at precisely the wrong time,” Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Greg Hannsgen wrote in their paper comparing American economic strategies with those in Europe.  “Austerity policies can only make a recession worse, as government layoffs and wage cuts undermine already-weak consumer demand, investment and tax revenues.”

    Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in New York. Hannsgen is a research scholar at the institute.

    Their paper deals with conservative U.S. economic policy, in general, but specifically warns against the precipitous $500 billion in tax increases and budget cuts schedule to take effect Jan. 2. Congress and President Obama approved the actions as part of an earlier deal to raise the debt ceiling.

    Both political parties in the U.S. agreed to the austerity measures. And Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney warns against expansive spending that he says will put American on “the road to Greece.”

    The two academics disagree, saying that Greece and other European nations have exacerbated their fiscal problems by clamping down on spending when their economies had already stalled. They called those actions a “fiscal trap.”

    They described the trap as a "cycle that moves from a decline in demand to falling tax revenues, which in turn engender spending cuts and tax increases. Spending cuts and tax increases undercut the economy further, and the cycle continues.”

    President Obama has said he is confident that he and Congress will work out a deal after next week’s election — and before the new Congress is sworn in later in January — to stave off the tax increases and cuts. But the president and congressional Republicans have disagreed on how to proceed, with Obama insisting on tax increases for the wealthiest Americans and Republicans demanding only budget cuts.

    Papadimitriou and Hannsgen called for repealing the so-called budget “sequester,” without finding equivalent offsets in the federal budget. They also recommended maintaining a holiday on payroll taxes and increasing government spending “appropriately and responsibly when the economy contracts.”
  • In the Media | October 2012

    Will Bailouts Help Europe?


    Interview with Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    CNBC, October 26, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou talks to CNBC's Rick Santelli about the failure of the bailouts in Greek and Spain, and the need for a completely different approach to the "European problem," including a broad-reaching plan to aid development in Europe's southern tier, a banking union to insure deposits, and true fiscal union for the eurozone—because clearly, monetary union has not worked. Full video of the interview is available here.

  • In the Media | October 2012

    CBO's Fiscal Prediction Fails the Smell Test


    By Brianna Ehley
    Washington Post, October 23, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    The Congressional Budget Office predicted back in August that if the country went over the fiscal cliff, the economy would dip into a shallow recession and take about a year to recover. The U.S. economy would shrink about 0.5 percent over the year before bouncing back and growing at a rapid clip of 4.3 percent annually between 2014 and 2017.

    However, the Washington Post’s Brad Plumer reports that a new study by the Levy Economics Institute found problems with CBO’s estimate and claims that it is optimistic at best – without providing alternative projections for declining growth next year.

    The authors of the report argue that unless one assumes that U.S. households will start borrowing and spending at an unprecedented rate – which is not likely to happen -- the CBO’s numbers don’t work. The report notes, “households would have to carry more debt than they did at the height of the housing bubble for the CBO’s optimistic growth rates to come true.”

    The Levy Economics Institute maps out three post-cliff scenarios.:

    Scenario 1 -- There  is an unlikely boom in household borrowing and spending. 
Scenario 2 – The Bush tax cuts are extended and households increase their borrowing and consumption at a more realistic rate. Unemployment stays high.
Scenario 3 – Congress enacts a very modest fiscal stimulus. Unemployment goes down just a bit.

    The report also predicts that unemployment will remain unacceptably high for an indefinite period unless Congress and the White House agree to avert a year-end confluence of major tax increases and spending cuts. “Based on our results, we surmise that it would take a much more substantial increase in fiscal stimulus to reduce unemployment to a level that most policymakers would regard as acceptable.”
  • In the Media | October 2012

    Is the CBO Too Optimistic about the Damage from the Fiscal Cliff?


    By Brad Plumer

    The Washington Post, October 22, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    Let’s assume that the United States jumps right off the fiscal cliff next year. That means all of the Bush tax cuts expire. Those big defense and domestic spending cuts from the sequester kick in. The deficit shrivels by more than $500 billion in 2013. How much damage would that inflict on the U.S. economy?

    Back in August, the Congressional Budget Office predicted that the nation would endure some short-lived, relatively mild pain. The U.S. economy would go into a shallow recession in the first half of 2013 — shrinking about 0.5 percent over the year — before roaring back. According to CBO, the economy would then grow at a healthy clip of 4.3 percent per year between 2014 and 2017. And, as a bonus, America’s short-term deficit problem would mostly vanish.

    That doesn’t sound too apocalyptic. But is this forecast correct? After all, over in Europe, heavy austerity appears to have crippled growth in countries like Spain and Greece. What’s more, the International Monetary Fund recently released a report conceding that tax hikes and spending cuts can inflict far more damage on weak economies than previously thought. Is it possible that CBO might be understating the damage from the fiscal cliff?

    At least one group thinks so. A report (Back to Business as Usual? Or a Fiscal Boost?) earlier this year from the Levy Economics Institute called into question the CBO’s forecasts that the U.S. economy can get back to full potential by 2018 even if we go over the fiscal cliff. The authors, Dimitri Papadimitriou, Greg Hannsgen and Gennaro Zezza argue that it’s hard to make the numbers work unless you assume that U.S. households are about to go on an unprecedented borrowing binge.

    The key graph from the report is below. Households, the Levy folks note, would have to carry more debt than they did at the height of the housing bubble in order for these rapid growth casts to pan out. (That’s because budget-cutting would act as a drag on the economy and exports aren’t likely to expand enough to make up the difference.)

    As Walter Kurtz of Sober Look (who pointed out the Levy report) notes, this is an awfully unlikely scenario. All indications are that U.S. households are rushing to pay down their debts  right now. There’s little indication that Americans are preparing to go on another massive borrowing binge. That suggests the CBO might be too sanguine about economic growth in a post-fiscal-cliff world.

    So what’s the alternative? The authors of the report model three scenarios for the future course of the economy:

    In Scenario 1, there’s a surge in household borrowing and spending. This is fairly unlikely. In Scenario 2, the Bush tax cuts are extended and households increase their borrowing and consumption at a slower, more realistic rate. Unemployment stays high for years to come. In Scenario 3, Congress extends the tax cuts and adds an extra bit of fiscal stimulus. Unemployment goes down a bit further, but still stays high for years to come.

    According to the Levy Institute’s modeling, unemployment will likely stay elevated for a long time under any realistic scenario, fiscal cliff or no. (Though it’s worth noting that this report came out before the Federal Reserve’s latest quantitative easing program, so it’s unclear how that would factor in.) “Based on our results,” the authors write, “we surmise that it would take a much more substantial increase in fiscal stimulus to reduce unemployment to a level that most policymakers would regard as acceptable.”

  • In the Media | September 2012

    Public Employee Ranks Drop, Ending Decade of Growth


    By Brian Ianieri

    Press of Atlantic City, September 24, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    The number of public workers and the amount of their wages in southern New Jersey fell in 2011, ending nearly a decade of steady increases as federal, state and local governments shed employees, recently released U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data show.

    Government jobs in Atlantic, Cape May, Cumberland and Ocean counties fell 6 percent in 2011 from the prior year, eliminating nearly 1,700 positions at all levels of government, according to the preliminary data.

    The role of government as an employer has been redefined following the recession, as budget-strapped municipalities and states deal with plummeting revenues, dropping property values and weak economies.

    Monetary savings (about $23 million less in wages) have resulted, but also higher unemployment in southern New Jersey, which has the weakest labor market in the state. Cumberland and Atlantic counties had New Jersey’s highest unemployment rates this summer.

    "I have members right now saying, ‘Can you get me a job?’ And there's no new work,” said Marcus King, president of Egg Harbor City-based Teamsters Local 331 union, which represents various public workers at local and county jobs in Cape May and Atlantic counties, including Hamilton Township, Linwood, and Egg Harbor City.

    “We did get hit hard, and I can't blame the towns because they're trying to hang in there as well, but it hurts our members,” King said. cq  “The employees we represent aren't the higher paid salaries. We represent the clerks, the public works guys that take care of the towns. ... When we lose those jobs, there's a greater impact.”

    Some economists say governments cutting back on workers is slowing the recovery, adding to unemployment when private sector job creation is too weak to compensate for it.

    Others argue growing government and soaring debt are holding the economy back.

    The public sector — which makes up nearly 8 percent of the regional work force — took a drubbing in 2011.

    The federal government reduced manpower 9 percent in Atlantic, Cape May, Cumberland and Ocean counties, while the state reduced jobs 8 percent.

    The local government work force — including municipalities, schools and counties — was reduced by 4 percent, but represented the largest number of jobs lost since it is the majority of government workers.

    Private sector jobs remained about the same during that period.

    Job losses in the region had a smaller impact on budgets, where total wages of federal, state and local workers combined dropped less than 2 percent from 2010 to 2011 and remained higher than in 2009, labor data show. With fewer workers, the average annual pay for area government workers increased from 2010 to 2011, nearly $10,000 in some areas in state and federal government.

    The size of government and pay of its workers is a hot-button topic, but employment cuts have a cost, said Heidi Shierholz, cq labor market economist at the Economic Policy Institute in Washington, D.C.

    “It’s a massive drag on the economy,” she said. “There may be an idea there’s a ton that can be cut with no pain, that there’s a huge fraud-and-abuse line you could just cut. People think there are a lot of cuts that can take place without actually harming the economy, and it’s just not true.”

    Among local government workers in Atlantic County, 5 percent of positions — or about 250 jobs — were eliminated in 2011. Cape May County workers likewise saw 5 percent of local government jobs lost, while there was a 7 percent fewer in Cumberland County and a 3 fewer cut in Ocean County.

    The public sector had been spared from more drastic cuts the two prior years in part because of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The federal stimulus helped the public sector support employment, said Gary Burtless,cq labor economist at the Brookings Institution, a Washington, D.C.-based research institute.

    When the money ran out, the impacts on public jobs became more evident.

    Burtless said the federal unemployment rate would look better had jobs in the public sector simply remained stagnant, and even lower had it grown with the population.

    “If the government industry had done as well as the construction industry — which also added no jobs, and the construction industry remains very depressed — we would have an unemployment rate 0.7 percentage points lower,” he said.

    Tad DeHaven is a budget analyst for the Cato Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based policy research organization promoting limited government.

    DeHaven said taxpayer money that funds public salaries s ultimately hinders the private sector and the economy.

    “Money that went to a government employee’s salary is money that could have gone to the baker down the street or the movie theater. You just can’t look at is as you have a loss of a government employee, the loss of a salary-paying job. You had to take money out to the economy to begin with to pay the government to begin with.”

    Public and private sector employees cannot be viewed  the same way, he said.

    "Businesses that don't make a profit go out of business, and wages and benefits are going to reflect that accordingly," he said. "When government spends too much money, they issue more debt, and they can increase taxes."

    Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in New York, disagrees. He said cutting public jobs is the wrong way to recover from a recession.

    “It’s always very easy to suggest the private sector should be the driver of economic growth,” he said, “but it will only be the driver if the prospects and expectations and forecasts of the future are more euphoric ...This is the time not to do this cutting, but actually to promote employment and in some ways to increase public-sector employment.”

    The prolonged economic slump makes this recovery much different than previous ones, said Michael Busler,cq a Richard Stockton College of New Jersey business professor and a fellow at the William J. Hughes Center for Public Policy.

    “After the 1981 recession, we were adding over 400,000 jobs per month, and there were two months we added over one million jobs. If we could get that kind of growth, the loss in the public sector would be negligible,” he said.

    “If the economy was recovering the way it traditionally does after a steep recession, the answer is yes, the private sector could compensate for that. The problem is the recovery has been so slow,” he said.

  • In the Media | September 2012

    Don't Put Faith in the Fed: Quantitative Easing Isn't Magic. We Need a Dose of Realism about What Central Banks Can Achieve


    By James K. Galbraith
    The Guardian (London), September 21, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    What should we make of the latest moves to kickstart the US economy, and to save the euro? As the late, great Harvard chaplain Peter Gomes said to my graduating class many years ago, about our degrees: "There is less there than meets the eye."

    Quantitative easing, the third tranche of which was announced in the US last week (QE3), is just a fancy phrase for buying bonds, notably mortgage-backed-securities, in which operation the Federal Reserve takes assets from the banks and gives them cash. This tends to boost stock prices—very nice for people who own stock—and it can spur mortgage refinancing, improving the cashflow of solvent homeowners.

    And the effect on the economy? Mostly indirect and quite small. People don't generally spend capital gains as windfalls. People who are already underwater on their mortgages can't refinance anyway, and are not affected.

    Meanwhile, the European Central Bank is buying the dregs of the European bond market, propping up their price. The operation is similar to QE but the help for the economy is even less. Mario Draghi, the bank chief, aims to save the euro, not the eurozone; his conditions actually prevent beneficiaries from using the money they save; in fact, to get the aid they must spend less. So long as this goes on, unemployment, budget deficits and debt will get worse. It's no surprise that sensible countries refuse the deal for as long as they can.

    Some people in high places—Tim Geithner, the US treasury secretary, for example—profess that restarting bank lending is the key to economic recovery, and increasing bank reserves will spur them to lend. (What else are banks really good for?) But if anyone believes that reserves are key to lending, they deeply misunderstand what banks do.

    As Hyman Minsky used to say: banks are not moneylenders! Banks don't lend reserves, and they don't need reserves in order to lend. Banks create money by lending. They need a client willing to borrow, a project worth lending to, and collateral to protect against risk. If these are lacking, no amount of reserves will turn the trick. And especially not when the government is willing to pay interest on their reserves: the truest form of welfare, income for doing nothing.

    Among the deluded in this matter are Republican members of Congress who rushed to attack QE3 for overstimulating, and urge laws constraining the Federal Reserve to a single price stability objective, in the manner of the European Central Bank. Obviously if the policy won't work—and it won't—they have nothing to fear on inflation. But a "price stability only" mandate for the Fed would destroy the honest accountability of the central bank to Congress.

    The Fed today operates under a "dual mandate"—full employment and price stability. The law, originally known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, is one for which I drafted the monetary sections. It states a range of economic objectives and was deliberately kept general; the purpose was not to dictate economic theory but to foster an honest dialogue between the Fed and Congress over what monetary policy is and does.

    Changing to a price-stability objective would oblige Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, to claim, as ECB officials do, that he is motivated solely by his charter, even if obviously doing something else. And Congress, having imposed the price-stability straitjacket, would not be able to complain about unemployment, foreclosures or anything else. The Fed-Congress dialogue would be reduced to a tissue of ritual incantation and lies.

    What we need is a candid review of what central banks cannot do. Yes, they can usually forestall panic. Yes, they can keep zombie banks alive. No, they cannot bring on economic recovery or solve any of our deeper economic problems, from unemployment and foreclosures in America to unemployment and economic collapse in Greece. The sooner we stop thinking of central bankers as wizards and magicians, the better.

    James K. Galbraith teaches at the University of Texas at Austin. His new book is Inequality and Instability, a Study of the World Economy Just Before the Great Crisis.

  • In the Media | September 2012

    GDP Targeting: The Real Message from Jackson Hole?


    By Rosalyn Retkwa
    Institutional Investor, September 5, 2012. © 2012 Institutional Investor, Inc. All material subject to strictly enforced copyright laws.

    To Federal Reserve watchers, “Jackson Hole”—shorthand for the annual summit of central bankers hosted by the Kansas City Fed in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in late August—is widely anticipated for the speaker who kicks off the proceedings, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke.

    This year, Bernanke’s speech didn’t contain any market-moving surprises.

    But another paper, delivered by Michael Woodford, a professor of political economy at Columbia University, caused a stir. In a 97-page study, Woodford maintained that with interest rates near zero, the time had come for the Fed to take a fresh approach in its efforts to stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment by targeting growth in nominal gross domestic product (GDP) as its key indicator of when it should reverse course and start raising interest rates. The Fed has already promised to keep rates low through 2014, but if it were to switch gears, it would instead promise to keep rates low indefinitely, until nominal GDP, or GDP adjusted for inflation, was showing clear signs of a recovery.
     
    “The thing that the central bank should wish to signal is not a commitment to keep interest rates low for a fixed calendar period, but rather a commitment to maintain policy accommodation until the nominal GDP target path is reached,” Woodford said.
     
    It’s not a new concept. Last October Goldman Sachs published a paper titled: “The Case for a Nominal GDP Level Target,” and right before Jackson Hole, Goldman said that moving to that target would be one of the ways in which the Fed could “open the door to ‘unconventional unconventional’ easing . . . until the economy has regained a bigger share of the lost output and/or employment.” (The Fed’s balance sheet/asset purchase policies are already considered unconventional.) But the fact that a paper of that heft from a monetary policy expert like Woodford was delivered in a forum like Jackson Hole may indicate that the concept is starting to gain ground.

    It’s not without its problems, notes Roberto Perli, managing director and partner, policy research, at the International Strategy and Investment Group (ISI) of Washington, D.C.

    Perli, who worked on monetary policy in different capacities for the Fed for eight years before joining ISI in 2010, says that targeting nominal GDP “is an attractive idea from an academic perspective,” but in practice, has a few issues. “For example,” he says, “targeting a nominal GDP level would essentially mean creating inflation if real output growth remained stubbornly low as it is today. In that case, can policymakers be sure that inflation expectations would remain as stable as they remain in academic models?”

    There’s another set of obvious questions, he says. “What exactly is an appropriate nominal GDP target—4 percent, 5 percent, 6 percent? How would the Fed pick one? How much inflation would a central bank be willing to tolerate to achieve that? Nobody knows,” he says, but he notes that inflation “is already close to the Fed’s 2 percent target,” the level it sees as being “compatible with the dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability.”

    Perli believes the Fed could move in that direction “without actually going there,” by promising “not to tighten policy even after the economy has begun its recovery.” He believes the Fed has already done that “in a sort of timid fashion.” In the minutes of the last Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, the Fed said its guidance about it not raising rates until late 2014 “could be extended,” and that, combined with other language in the minutes to the effect that “a highly accommodative stance” was “likely to be maintained even as the recovery progressed,” suggests that the Fed “is likely to move somewhat in the direction suggested by Woodford at Jackson Hole, but in a cautious way that would leave many outs should inflation become a concern,” Perli says.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou, the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York, is also wondering how the Fed would put a strategy of targeting nominal GDP into practice. “How do you do this?” he asks. “There is no reliable transmission channel from monetary policy to GDP. The evidence is clear about that,” he says. Still, Papadimitriou says, “Woodford’s long paper is interesting, and he is right about the ineffectiveness of monetary policy at zero-bound interest rates.”

    Tearing apart the Fed’s current policies is a big part of Woodford’s 97 pages, but it looks to be a sure thing that the Fed is going to go for more quantitative easing, either at its next FOMC meeting in September, and if not then, by its last meeting of the year, in December.

    “Nothing in chairman Bernanke’s published remarks at Jackson Hole altered our view that the FOMC is poised to announce a new balance-sheet program on September 13,” says Lou Crandall, the chief economist at Wrightson ICAP in Jersey City, New Jersey, adding that “we don’t think this is a particularly close call,” though there’s still a chance that stronger-than-expected economic indicators “could delay the announcement,” he said.

    “The FOMC policy statement on August 1 indicated that the decision on further easing was being fast-tracked, and the minutes of that meeting two weeks later warned that additional action would be called for unless incoming information pointed to ‘a substantial and sustainable strengthening’ in economic activity,” he said, in his post-Jackson Hole report.

    But Crandall also believes “the Fed’s next bond-buying program will be its last.” Noting that the Fed has itself acknowledged the “risk of diminishing returns” from each additional round of buying long-dated bonds to bring down interest rates, known as LSAP, or Large-Scale Asset Purchases, Crandall says: “There will be no ‘QE4,’” or fourth round of quantitative easing. “A skeptical public will increasingly ask whether the Fed is throwing good money after bad,” he said.

    He does believe, though, that “the Fed may embrace the idea of switching to an open-ended format for its asset purchases,” and “is likely to alter the format of its forward policy guidance to lessen the reliance on specific calendar references.”

    In his speech at Jackson Hole, towards the end of his remarks, Bernanke said: “The stagnation of the labor market in particular is a grave concern not only because of the enormous suffering and waste of human talent it entails, but also because persistently high levels of unemployment will wreak structural damage on our economy that could last for many years.”

    Given Bernanke’s “grave concern” about unemployment, all of the economists seem to be sure Bernanke will press forward with more easing, even if some members of the FOMC are opposed.

    “He will, I think, proceed with another bond-purchasing program, if there is no improvement in GDP growth and decrease in unemployment,” says Papadimitriou, noting that monetary policy won’t solve the unemployment problem. “It is only fiscal policy that is potent to improve economic conditions,” he says. But Bernanke, “being a student of the Great Depression,” doesn’t want to be blamed for not doing everything he could possibly do to lower unemployment, he says.
  • In the Media | August 2012

    Banks Are Too Big to Be Effectively Regulated


    Interview with Jan Kregel

    Money Radio, August 27, 2012. © 2012 CRC Broadcasting Company. All Rights Reserved.

    Senior Scholar Jan Kregel talks about the LIBOR scandal and the impracticality of regulating banks that are “too big to fail” in this radio interview. Full audio is available here.

    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
  • In the Media | August 2012

    That Rumbling in Your Portfolio? It's Real


    By Chris Gay

    U.S. News and World Report, August 27, 2012. Copyright © 2012 U.S. News & World Report LP. All rights reserved.

    Until about 25 years ago, when elders spoke in solemn tones about “the Great Crash,” there was never any doubt about which crash they meant. For nearly six decades, there was only one Great Crash worthy of the name, and its memory forever blemishes 1929, not to mention a certain Mr. Hoover.

    Then came Black Monday, 1987. Suddenly, if you were of certain age, ahem, you took pains to distinguish which crash you were talking about.

    Things got even more complicated with the Asian contagion of 1997, and the Long-Term Capital Management scare of 1998, and the dot-com plunge of 2000, and the near-death experience of 2008. And how can we forget the Flash Crash of 2010? Wasn’t that some ride?

    But wait. This sort of blood-curdling free-fall is supposed to be a once-in-a-lifetime event, like the transit of Venus or a federal budget surplus. How is it that someone who was in high school when Justin Bieber was in Pampers has already experienced half a dozen of them? Either we need to redefine “crash” or someone owes you some lifetimes.

    If you’re starting to suspect that something’s amiss, Hyman Minsky is way ahead of you. Alas, he’s also dead, but while alive (1919–96) and teaching economics at Washington University in St. Louis, among other venues, he developed a theory about how financial panics happen. His Financial Instability Hypothesis describes a process by which the normal, profit-maximizing behavior of borrowers and lenders leads inevitably to crisis. (If you’re interested, the New Yorker’s John Cassidy does a wonderful job of explaining Minsky on his blog and in his superb book, How Markets Fail.)

    The panic is usually preceded by what has come to be known as a “Minsky moment”—the point when a critical mass of investors realizes that the overleveraged party is about to end, so they flee for the door—ensuring, of course, that the party ends. Market outcomes are often self-fulfilling.

    But what’s really interesting—and most important—is how the party gets going in the first place. Minsky held that what appear to be periods of stability are actually just lulls between storms. All the while stock prices are rising at some modest, sustainable-looking pace, and interest rates are hovering around some reasonable long-term average, the Masters of the Universe are back in the kitchen cooking up the next crisis.

    Not because they are evil, but because they are rational, in an Adam Smith sort of way. In a period of modest returns, investors look for higher yield, which they’re more likely to get the more they can leverage (i.e., borrow). Creditors, happily obliging, scramble to outcompete each other by lowering lending standards or inventing exotic new realms of financial risk (think “synthetic CDOs”). That fuels more buying, turning a normal economy into a bubble economy through a self-reinforcing dynamic that leads inevitably to the Minsky Moment.

    “The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable,” wrote Minsky in a 1992 paper. “The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.”

    In short, says Minsky, financial systems do not tend, like some immutable law of physics, toward equilibrium. They tend toward instability. If so, expecting financial markets to self-moderate without the occasional meltdown is a bit like handing your 16-year-old a six-pack and the keys to the car. He might come home just fine, but it’s not a prudent expectation.

    To be sure, Minsky has his detractors. While many economists have discovered or grown more interested in Minsky following the subprime disaster, others dismiss him. “You have to understand that to really take Minsky’s ideas on board, you have to be willing to surrender some of the precepts of equilibrium economics, which is the sine qua non of most mainstream approaches,” says Gary Dymski, a professor of economics at the University of California–Riverside. “And this, most economists still are not prepared to do. Minsky is still a bridge too far for most.”

    A critical difference between Minsky and other scholars of market extremes is that Minsky is not primarily concerned with market manias. “In Minsky, everything that’s being done can be completely rational,” says L. Randall Wray, a University of Missouri–Kansas City professor who studied under Minsky in the 1980s. “Everyone is profit-maximizing, innovating, working to get around regulations and supervision.”

    What’s more, Minsky contended, extremes in financial markets are not just occasional and incidental; they are inevitable. “That’s what economics has persistently and consistently gotten wrong,” says Wray. “Their belief is that market forces are stabilizing, and Minsky’s argument is that market forces are destabilizing because normal profit-seeking behavior is what leads to this fragile position.”

    That financial markets are inherently destabilizing is worrying enough. Mix in a political culture that says the best regulation is no regulation, and the 16-year-old doesn’t even need a license. In the United States, many argue, the abdication of regulatory authority and the “financialization” of the economy in recent decades explains the frequency of market extremes in the past generation.

    One telling metric: The financial industry accounted for about 3 percent of GDP in 1960, but about 8 percent in 2008. For the lurid details of getting to 8 percent from 3 percent, Cooper Union professor Jeff Madrick’s Age of Greed is a good place to start.

    Meantime, unless Congress decides to reign in the financial industry like it did in the 1930s, there’s no reason not to expect more portfolio chills and thrills during your investing lifetime than your grandparents expected in theirs.

    To put it another way: You, Dodd-Frank, are no Glass-Steagall.

  • In the Media | August 2012

    A Run on the Euro as Europe Runs Out of Time


    Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Background Briefing, August 23, 2012. Copyright © 2012 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou joins Ian Masters to discuss the accelerating run on the euro, as poorer nations move their money to Germany. Full audio of the interview is available here.

  • In the Media | August 2012

    The Takeaway from LIBOR: Break Up the Big Banks, Study Finds


    By Jonathan Camhi

    Bank Systems Technology, August 23, 2012. Copyright © 2012 UBM TechWeb. All Rights Reserved.

    The LIBOR scandal clearly indicates that banks have grown too large to effectively regulate, a new study by Bard College’s Levy Economics Institute claims. The report emphasizes the need for structural changes to the banks and rejects the idea that a failure by Bank of England officials and regulators to respond to alerts of LIBOR’s manipulation are at fault for the scandal, a statement from the institute said.

    The Levy Institute’s Senior Scholar Jan Kregel, who authored the report, titled “The LIBOR Scandal: The Fix Is In—The Bank of England Did It,” compared the scandal with JPMorgan’s trading losses fiasco earlier this year. Kregel said that in both cases the response has been to point the finger at individuals involved instead of looking at any institutional changes that need to be made to the big banks. “The rotten apples have been removed without anyone noticing that it is the barrel that is the cause of the problem,” Kregel wrote.

  • In the Media | August 2012

    Europe's Highway to Hell


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    The Nation, August 21, 2012. Copyright © 2012 The Nation. All Rights Reserved.

    U.S. News and World Report, August 27, 2012. Copyright © U.S. News & World Report LP. All Rights Reserved.

    European policymakers are still enjoying their famously long, languorous summer holiday. The vacations will end in the coming days, with Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel scheduled for a series of meetings with leaders from France, Greece and Italy this month. Meanwhile, at a more rapid pace, Europe is in the midst of a massive run on bank deposits in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland. While the last out-of-office auto-responses zip across the continent in multiple languages, the bank runs continue to accelerate.

    How did we get here? What can we expect next? And, most important, what is the way out?

    Europe’s trip down the highway to hell began with an original sin. At the birth of the euro, nations that adopted it and formed the European Monetary Union (EMU) gave up their national currencies. They could no longer “print” money to pay for expenses (despite the longtime use of keystrokes for this purpose, the image of stacked, crisp bills somehow hangs on). The European Central Bank, comparable to the US Federal Reserve, could increase the supply of euros, but individual nations could not.

    Like each of the US states, each nation in the EMU became a user, rather than an issuer, of money. But each country kept control of taxing and spending through its own treasury. The design flaw—think major miscalculation here—was the absence of a unifying body that could move resources from country to country in the event of local trouble, as the US government does between states.

    The single currency was intended to insure that capital could flow easily across borders. For banks, this meant the ability to buy assets and make loans wherever the euro was used. And did they ever. The Basel Accords, initially set up in 1988 to establish international standards of capital adequacy, ended up allowing banks to self-determine the weight of risky assets on their balance sheets, leaving them without any supervision or regulation in their calculation and pricing. This added more opportunities to take on Wall Street–like risks.

    Yet individual nations remained responsible for their own banks. Private “banks without borders” could, and did, run up fabulous debts that were easily several orders of magnitude greater than their host country’s total government spending or taxing. When the winning streak ended, the public had to pick up the tab. To visualize this debacle, picture a US state, any state, having to find the funds to settle a run on Bank of America because it happened to be headquartered there.

    Covering the bank losses ballooned national deficits and debt to previously unheard of levels. This is what happened in Ireland, for example, and it is emerging now in Spain, where during the first five months of this year about 163 billion euros left the Spanish banks.

    Finally, and key to the current cash exodus, depositors could shift their euros without cost from one bank to another throughout Euroland. Anyone with euros in, for example, a Spanish bank, can simply transfer them to a German bank.

    The killer is that once the shift has been made, Spain, through its central bank, has to back up the money with reserve funds, which then accumulate in Germany’s Bundesbank. Where would Spain find those funds? Its central bank would need to borrow—deeply—from the European Central Bank.

    This precise scenario is now playing out across Europe, as depositors in its poorer nations understandably move their money to relative safety in Germany. The cross-border mechanism is called TARGET2, for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer. The inelegant name is the least of its problems; it’s a system destined to crash and burn.

    The flight of capital from the south had already begun in slo-mo by 2010. Then, this past May, as millions of euros a day were pulled from Greece and a major Spanish bank tottered, the world braced itself. Nationalization of the troubled Spanish bank and some largely insignificant measures on the part of European leadership followed, in what was widely reported as a definitive step back from the brink.

    By this summer, optimism was replaced by increasingly frantic predictions of doom. When European Central Bank president Mario Draghi issued one in a string of we’ll-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-the-euro statements in late July, the wheel turned again. Inaction followed, and the wheel lost traction.

    The migration of money into Germany is quickening. And under TARGET 2, the trillions of euros that the ECB has loaned out to finance this race will be uncollectable.

    How to counteract a disaster of these proportions? Unlimited deposit insurance for all euros in EMU banks, backed by the creation of a strong European federal treasury, would end the bank runs, just as deposit insurance in the United States has prevented them here ever since the Great Depression. The insurance liability would be on Europe’s central bank, which would become insolvent if Spain or Italy abandoned the euro. Since, unlike the United States, the ECB doesn’t have a unified European treasury to backstop it, Germany would presumably get the bill for a default.

    As Randall Wray and I predict in a new Levy Institute policy paper [“Euroland’s Original Sin], “That’s a bill Germany will not accept, hence, probably no deposit insurance.” And no future for the euro.

    Auto-response message to Europe’s banks: See you in September?

  • In the Media | July 2012

    Who Warned About the Euro First?


    By Martin Essex

    The Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2012. Copyright © 2012 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    As the world’s financial markets begin to price in a total collapse of the euro project, there’s no shortage of economists and other experts saying they always knew it was doomed to failure. So who warned first?

    Well, only last week, a senior International Monetary Fund economist resigned and wrote a scathing letter to the board blaming management for suppressing staff warnings about the 2008 global financial crisis and for an alleged pro-European bias that he says exacerbated the euro-zone’s debt turmoil.

    But long before the 2008 crisis, many economists were warning there were structural problems in the euro set up. And now the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College has issued a policy note, provocatively headed “Euroland’s Original Sin,” which names five of them.

    There’s Stephanie Bell, writing as long ago as 2002, who warned that “the prospects for stabilization in the euro zone appear grim.”

    And the year before that, back in 2001, Warren Mosler wrote that history and logic dictate that the credit sensitive euro-12 national governments and banking system will be tested.

    “The market’s arrows will inflict an initially narrow liquidity crisis, which will immediately infect and rapidly arrest the entire euro payments system,” he said. “Only the inevitable, currently prohibited, direct intervention of the ECB will be capable of performing the resurrection, and from the ashes of that fallen flaming star an immortal sovereign currency will no doubt emerge.”

    But two years before that Mathew Forstater was highlighting the problem that “market forces can demand pro-cyclical fiscal policy during a recession, compounding recessionary influences.”

    Even earlier, in 1998, L. Randall Wray was concerned that the euro zone would be much like a U.S. operating with a Fed, but with only individual state treasuries. It will be as if each member country were to attempt to operate fiscal policy in a foreign currency; deficit spending will require borrowing in that foreign currency according to the dictates of private markets, he said.

    And the winner? According to the Levy Institute, that was Wynne Godley, as far back as 1997, who wrote: “The danger … is that the budgetary restraint to which governments are individually committed will impart a disinflationary bias that locks Europe as a whole into a depression it is powerless to lift.”

    Mind you, there were plenty of others not named by the Levy Institute. According to Public Service Europe, in the late 1990s, eminent economists queued up to explain the flaws in the euro project. Chief among them was Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman, who in 1999—the year the euro was born—predicted that “sooner or later, when the global economy hits a real bump, Europe’s internal contradictions will tear it apart.”

    With Spanish bond yields surging while the euro and European stock prices tumble as the euro system creaks under austerity programs that have been imposed on governments that seem unable to cope with them, the words of Godley, Friedman and the rest echo through the years.

    But were they the first economists to issue warnings? You may know better.

  • In the Media | July 2012

    Dodd-Frank: Fossil of the Future?


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Huffington Post Business, July 22, 2012. © 2012 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. "The Huffington Post” is a registered trademark of TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All rights reserved.

    There's a sad truth about the fate of financial regulation: It's almost certain to be outmoded by the time it's introduced. This was as true of Glass-Steagall in 1933 as it is of Dodd-Frank today.

    This month we begin the third year since the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform act passed, with the struggle over its shape ongoing. It's a still-unmolded toddler, and already on the fast track to fossilization. Does the most ambitious finance legislation in decades carry the DNA to successfully cope with the next crisis? In a word, no.

    The take-away from this challenge doesn't have to be cynicism, inaction, or laissez-faire tirades. To be ready for the next shock rather than the last one, though, we need to reset our thinking.

    Dodd-Frank is based on the idea that financial markets are normally stable, with the exception of the occasional alarming "event." The New Deal's Glass-Steagall Act and the Clinton-era Gramm-Leach-Bliley "Modernization" shared those assumptions. All of these efforts were conceived as system-wide overhauls. In reality, though, they were designed only to remedy random, ad hoc crises; shocks like the 2008 meltdown, sometimes called "Minsky Moments."

    Ironically, the late economist Hyman Minsky actually believed that these "moments" were anything but. At the Levy Institute, we share his view that instability is central to the genome of modern finance.

    In other words, it's normal for the boat to keep rocking. The increasingly risky practices that fuel danger and instability are still being rewarded, and the absence of penalties for losses continues. The shocks will keep coming.

    And each new threat to stability is destined to be different than the last. Dodd-Frank aims to identify the most vulnerable institutions and practices. That approach is too brittle to contain the disastrous effects of risks that are always morphing. Even constructive aspects of the Act could have perverse consequences, unless the rules are subject to sophisticated re-examination as the finance world develops.

    Banks carry an urge -- maybe it's a genetic imperative? -- to evolve in a way that maximizes revenue. We're always witnessing how quickly markets create newer, riskier, and more profitable instruments. Credit default swaps aren't the only example, of course; look at the whole range of off-balance-sheet special purpose vehicles. It's the very nature of modern finance to transform its structure in response to the prevailing regulation, and to evade it successfully.

    Under Dodd-Frank, banks will function more-or-less as they did in the past.

    Their enormous size and multi-function operations -- the business model that underlies the latest crisis -- will be subject only to a series of cosmetic changes. The act's most significant measure, the Volcker Rule, continues to be diluted, and many of its other regulations are tied up in delays.

    Instead of fundamental changes that would cushion our fragile system from shocks, Dodd-Frank's centerpiece is a limit on the use of public funds to rescue failing banks. By enabling rapid dissolutions, it aims to avoid a repeat of 2008, when the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy virtually froze capital markets. It's also an understandable response to TARP, which recapitalized insolvent financial institutions at a great cost, while allowing failing households to fall into foreclosure.

    But limiting taxpayer exposure to the next bank breakdown is not the same as preventing a system-wide collapse. Tweaks to Dodd-Frank aren't a solution. Glass-Steagall contained features worth preserving, but reviving the law -- outdated then; infeasible now -- won't help. Neither will blaming Gramm-Leach-Bliley which, profound as it was, merely reflected the new status quo of its day. It institutionalized the changes that had already emerged in the markets.

    We need banks that can earn competitive rates of return while they focus not on big risks, but on financing capital development. Reforms that promote enterprise and industry over speculation will have to be as innovative, flexible, opportunistic and plastic as the markets they aim to improve.

    Regulators could begin by breaking banks down into smaller units. A bank holding company structure with numerous types of subsidiaries, each one subject to strict limitations on the type of permitted activities, would be a valuable deterrent to risky behavior. Restrictions on size and function would allow a reasonable shot at understanding esoteric subsidiaries, and a chance to react quickly to mutations.

    As Dodd-Frank reaches its second anniversary, it faces both the limitations of its scope and the disheartening obstacles to its implementation. Will we really wait for the next, inevitable crisis before we start to develop adaptable reforms? In a word, probably.

  • In the Media | July 2012

    Συνεργασία του IΝΕ-ΓΣΕΕ με το Levy Economics Institute


    Express.gr, July 3, 2012. © All Rights Reserved.

    ΣΤΗΝ υπογραφή συμφωνητικού συνεργασίας αναμένεται να προχωρήσουν το Παρατηρητήριο Οικονομικών και Κοινωνικών Εξελίξεων του Ινστιτούτου Εργασίας της ΓΣΕΕ—ΑΔΕΔΥ με το Levy Economics Institute του Bard College της Νέας Υόρκης. Συγκεκριμένα, αύριο Τετάρτη, στις 12 το μεσημέρι, στα γραφεία της Συνομοσπονδίας θα πραγματοποιηθεί συνάντηση του προέδρου της ΓΣΕΕ και του ΙΝΕ-ΓΣΕΕ Γιάννη Παναγόπουλου με το διευθυντή του Levy Economics Institute Δημήτρη Παπαδημητρίου. Σημειώνεται ότι η εφημερίδα ΕΞΠΡΕΣ συνεργάζεται με το Ινστιτούτο Levy και προχωρεί κάθε Κυριακή στη δημοσίευση άρθρων επιστημονικών συνεργατών και στελεχών του.

    Αντικείμενο της συνεργασίας αποτελεί η υλοποίηση ερευνητικών προγραμμάτων που στοχεύουν στην ανάδειξη προτάσεων πολιτικής προς όφελος του κόσμου της εργασίας. Στόχος είναι η διάχυση των ερευνητικών αποτελεσμάτων στο ευρύτερο κοινό, επιτρέποντας με αυτό τον τρόπο την ουσιαστική παρέμβαση στο δημόσιο διάλογο.

    Τα πρώτα αποτελέσματα της ερευνητικής συνεργασίας θα δημοσιοποιηθούν μέσα στους επόμενους μήνες και αφορούν, μεταξύ άλλων, την επεξεργασία προτάσεων για την άμεση δημιουργία θέσεων εργασίας στην Ελλάδα, καθώς επίσης την ανάπτυξη ενός μακροοικονομετρικού υποδείγματος για την ελληνική οικονομία, το οποίο θα αποτελέσει τη βάση για μια ρεαλιστική αξιολόγηση εναλλακτικών πολιτικών για την καταπολέμηση της κρίσης στη χώρα μας.

    Τα επόμενα χρόνια η ερευνητική συνεργασία θα επεκταθεί και σε άλλα πεδία που αφορούν την οικονομική πολιτική και την πολιτική απασχόλησης στην Ελλάδα και την ΕΕ. Στο πλαίσιο της διάδοσης των ερευνητικών ευρημάτων αλλά και της προώθησης του διαλόγου για τις οικονομικές και κοινωνικές εξελίξεις στην Ελλάδα και την ΕΕ τα δύο ινστιτούτα στοχεύουν στην από κοινού διοργάνωση επιστημονικών συναντήσεων, διαλέξεων, ημερίδων και συνεδρίων.

     Το Levy Economics Institute αποτελεί ένα διεθνούς κύρους ινστιτούτο που από το 1986 παράγει έρευνα στο πεδίο των δημόσιων πολιτικών. Βασική επιδίωξη του ινστιτούτου είναι να προσφέρει επιστημονικά τεκμηριωμένες αναλύσεις, οι οποίες βοηθούν τους φορείς χάραξης πολιτικής στην αντιμετώπιση των οικονομικών και κοινωνικών προβλημάτων στις ΗΠΑ και παγκοσμίως.

    Μέσα από τη συνεργασία του με το Levy Economics Institute, το Ινστιτούτο Εργασίας της ΓΣΕΕ επιδιώκει να αναβαθμίσει την ερευνητική του δραστηριότητα και να εμπλουτίσει το περιεχόμενο των προτάσεών του για την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης στην Ελλάδα.
  • In the Media | June 2012

    Euro : Intransigência Alemã vai Prevalecer


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Valor Econômico, June 22, 12. All rights reserved.

    Durou pouco o alívio do mercado financeiro com o resultado da eleição grega de domingo, que resultou na formação de um governo favorável ao pacote de resgate das finanças públicas do país. Não há dúvida de que a crise da dívida prossegue na Europa, atacando diretamente a Espanha—cujos bancos foram resgatados no início do mês—e talvez, em seguida, Itália e Portugal. O euro, moeda comum do continente, não desapareceu no começo da semana, mas ainda está fortemente ameaçado.

    O plano de resgate da Grécia não tem condições de funcionar, porque a austeridade que se exige é impossível. Antonis Samaras venceu as eleições com base na promessa de renegociação. O mercado tem a expectativa de soluções de longo prazo na reunião de cúpula da próxima semana, um plano coerente para resolver a crise da dívida. Mas a intransigência alemã vai prevalecer e não virá solução. A resposta dos mercados vai ser ainda mais dura e os líderes da França e da Itália vão pressionar a Alemanha por uma mudança de curso. Isso vai levar muito tempo até se chegar a algum resultado concreto.

    O presidente francês François Hollande quer mudar o curso da austeridade e incorporar uma política de crescimento. Estou otimista: com o tempo, acredito que mudanças virão. Mas temo que vão chegar um pouco tarde demais. Os eurobônus são necessários, assim como um fundo garantidor de depósitos que englobe todos os bancos de países da zona do euro. Minha expectativa é de que os problemas incontornáveis do sistema financeiro espanhol e, em seguida, possivelmente, também do italiano, podem ser os catalizadores do estabelecimento de um programa de títulos de dívida europeus.

     

    O sistema financeiro europeu é frágil. Só com união fiscal o sistema de pagamentos estará a salvo. É o único jeito de evitar corridas bancárias quando eventuais crises aparecerem. É tempo de que o BCE exerça o papel de um verdadeiro banco central e seja o emprestador de último recurso.

    Todas as tentativas de salvar o euro só valem a pena se conseguirmos chegar à união fiscal. Atualmente, o euro é um projeto incompleto e sua dissolução é uma possibilidade concreta. A única solução para o euro é uma união fiscal como a que chamamos de Estados Unidos da América. Se não, temo que o euro esteja em seus estertores.

    A Europa jamais deveria ter formado uma união monetária com países de estrutura econômica tão diversa. Para que a Alemanha tenha superávit comercial, os demais países precisam ter déficit. Os desequilíbrios vão continuar, porque uma união só monetária não pode lidar com eles. A Alemanha foi e continua sendo de longe a maior beneficiária do euro, porque conseguiu, graças a um sistema de baixos salários, ser mais produtiva e competitiva. Para a Alemanha, o euro é uma moeda subvalorizada, enquanto para os outros países, é uma moeda sobrevalorizada.

  • In the Media | June 2012

    Economists Find Another Good Moment to Consider Minsky


    American Banker, June 1, 2012. © 2012 American Banker and SourceMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    Hyman Minsky was a maverick economist in his day. He theorized about the inherent instability of financial markets, and viewed the Federal Reserve as the author of both the permission slip and the prescription for economic crises.

    None of it sounds very far-fetched now, of course. The Great Recession pulled Minsky’s ideas in from the fringes of the economics mainstream, and turned the late economist’s work into a touchstone for many who have tried making sense of the latest financial crisis. Accordingly, the annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference, where academics, policymakers and assorted market philosophers gather to apply Minsky’s lens to contemporary issues in finance, has taken on special significance since the events of 2008.

    This year, the forum focused mainly on the financial reforms underway in the United States, and on the continuing crisis in Europe.

    The upshot was that the US banking agencies are making decent, and in some cases helpful, progress in carrying out new duties assigned to them under the Dodd-Frank Act, while the European economy is, and likely will be for the next five to 10 years, a total basket case.

    Translation: Minsky was right to eschew the deregulation arguments that most of his contemporaries were making in the 1970s and 1980s, and if it hasn’t been proven yet that markets are inherently unstable, it can at least be agreed upon that they are frequently unstable-and not just on this side of the pond.

    But how should that instability be handled?

    Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize–winning economist from Columbia University, argued for fiscal solutions to the persistent US economic malaise, saying, “Monetary policy can’t help now.”

    But as Financial Times commentator Martin Wolf reminded the audience the next day, fiscal strength failed to ward off the crisis in Spain and Ireland, which were in excellent fiscal shape right up until their economic booms ended.

    Wolf wasn’t responding directly to Stiglitz, but juxtaposing the remarks by the two men, an important question is raised: if monetary policy can only go so far, and fiscal strength can only last so long, what other solution for stability is there?

    Better regulation, perhaps. Minsky put more stock in financial regulation than many of his contemporaries did. But even he acknowledged that regulators are poorly positioned to keep up with financial sector innovations-a point driven home whenever the conference discussion turned to the topic of derivatives regulation.

    Frank Partnoy, a University of San Diego School of Law professor who used to structure derivatives on Wall Street, was largely critical of the Dodd-Frank Act’s attempts to regulate derivatives, particularly its mandating of centralized clearing for swaps. He said a migration to clearing would have happened with or without the legislation, and that it wouldn’t do much to stabilize the financial system in any case, especially with exemptions being carved out for so many big pieces of the derivatives market. Partnoy readily acknowledged the paradox in his critique, admitting, “It’s sort of like Woody Allen’s complaining that the food is terrible and the portions are too small.”

    The challenge of chasing innovation also was addressed by J. Nellie Liang, the director of the Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research at the Federal Reserve Board. In her impressively succinct (and refreshingly apolitical) explanation of what Dodd-Frank does and does not do, she noted the act makes no attempt to control financial innovations, thus ensuring a healthy level of activities in the shadows for some time.

    Liang pointed out that most of Dodd-Frank’s accomplishments are of the pre-emptive variety-like prescribing higher capital requirements, establishing a Financial Stability Oversight Council and creating a resolution regime for the largest institutions. Such measures can’t prevent future crises (“Shocks are hard to predict,” Liang noted) but what they can dois “tell you how many people need to be in the room to solve the problem she said.

    Christine Cumming, first vice president of the New York Fed, provided some color on one of the most curious pre-emptive measures of all: end-of-life planning for the biggest institutions. She said discussions between regulators and bankers on living wills have been productive, if not easy conversations to have (though certainly easier than they would have been pre-2008, she pointed out).

    The living wills required by Dodd-Frank “will not be meet-me-at-the-bridge-at-5-o’clock kinds of plans, but they will be menus of options” for handling a wind-down, Cumming said.

    With the worst of the crisis slowly receding into rear view, the atmosphere at the conference was less combative than in past years, when the panels and audiences seemed to contain more, or at least more vocal, critics of banks and bank regulators.

    One of the more memorable moments of last year’s Minsky Conference came in a speech by Phil Angelides, who chaired the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. He was outraged that former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan had been in the press that spring criticizing Dodd-Frank. It was Greenspan, Angelides said, who “had his foot on the gas pedal as we drove over the cliff, and now he wants to give the nation driving lessons once again.”

    Greenspan’s driving abilities were considered again this year, this time by Bruce Greenwald of Columbia University, who had a much more detached view of the whole situation.

    “Alan Greenspan is not a hero. Alan Greenspan is not a villain. Alan Greenspan is irrelevant,” Greenwald said, arguing that by the time Greenspan got “into the driver’s seat,” the steering column already “had been disconnected from the wheels.”

    Did this reflect a fundamental difference of opinion, or just an extra year’s worth of hindsight and contemplation as we move farther away from the most acute stages of the crisis?

    Maybe both. Dmitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, which sponsors the annual Minsky gathering, explained the softening in tone thusly: “When you are having a crisis and you don’t see a ready solution to it, you want to put your views forward. There are real problems we haven’t come to a solution to yet ... But there is a lot more agreement now.”

  • In the Media | June 2012

    Jan Kregel: Banche, deregulation, et le regole del mercato


    In audio clips from a forthcoming interview, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel argues that, to address the current crisis, there is a need for regulations that place limits on the activities of financial institutions. The market does not adjust by itself, says Kregel—it needs rules to function efficiently. Radio Audizioni Italiane. Clip 1. Clip 2.

    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
  • In the Media | May 2012

    Greece May Remain in the Euro Zone with a New Rescue Plan


    Interview with Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Capital.gr, May 18, 2012. © All Rights Reserved.

    In an interview with Helen Artopoulou (DailyFX.gr/FXCM) that was posted on Capital.gr, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute, discusses the failed policy of austerity that the European Union opted to enforce on Greece, and what it may take for Greece to overcome its current crisis.

    Q. The political impasse in Greece, largely the outcome of the recent elections, had led to some reconsideration of the austerity policy measures being currently implemented in the indebted countries of the Eurozone. In fact, it seems that a number of public officials have shifted their position, calling now for a growth-oriented economic policy. Given the reality of Greece, how easy is to stir economic growth, and why didn’t the EU follow the growth path to economic recovery in the first place but relied instead on fiscal consolidation and draconian austerity measures?

    Economic growth is dependent on public policy aiming at deploying the resources available, that is, labor and capital. Presently, in Greece, there is an abundance of labor, but no capital from either the private or public sectors. It will be some time before the economy becomes friendlier to private investment, markets offering increasing liquidity, and for the private sector to gain confidence in the country’s economic stability. The time horizon for these things to happen will be long so, the responsibility falls on the public sector to do the investing in the key sectors of the Greek economy. But the public sector is on the brink or bankrupt, and in effect restricted by the EU, ECB and IMF in investing for growth. When they call for a growth-oriented economic policy in response to the overwhelming election results in favor of the anti-austerity platform, they simultaneously insist on the implementation of the imposed austerity. This joint policy prescription, that growth and austerity can coexist, is the new “austerian” economics—a new frontier of economic nonsense. North European leaders believe that all member states in the Eurozone can be similar to Germany’s competitive export-led growth economy. But Germany’s competitive advantages that yield intra Eurozone better trade balances are dependent on other Eurozone’s countries worse balances.

    Austerity programs were imposed, first, to discipline the eurozone’s profligate citizens and, second and most importantly to calm the financial markets, both of which have failed miserably. The medicine of austerity has worsened the patient’s condition and markets, as has been observed time and time again, have a mind of their own.

    Q. Greece is facing once again the prospect of a forceful exit from the eurozone. How likely is this frightening scenario and is it manageable? Also, would it be as disastrous for the country as most people fear it would be?

    I don’t believe thus far, all options have been explored. Greece can remain in the Eurozone with a reworked out bail out plan. Reasonable people can be convinced, if serious alternatives are presented. Everyone in the EU recognizes the harshness of the austerity measures and their most disproportional burden to the Greek people. Many proposals has been suggested from very serious economists, but have not made their way to the negotiating table. So there may be still time to avoid doing the unthinkable.

    At the end, when all other options are exhausted then, the possibility of Greece exiting the euro remains the only options. This maybe a frightening scenario but it will have to be manageable, the inexorable difficulties notwithstanding. Exiting the euro will be accompanied with very serious challenges. We should expect to witness the workings of a dysfunctional economy and society characterized with bank runs, resulting in banks being nationalized, rapid devaluation of the domestic currency, immediate repudiation of all public debt and lender retaliation, closed financial markets for many years to come, and strong inflationary pressures. An economy with an under developed industrial base, like Greece, would be hard-hit on import prices, especially oil, natural gas, machinery and other necessary imports.

    On the positive side, having its own currency the government can embark on large emergency employment programs, as those presently in place for public service works, and others used by other countries, i.e., the US New Deal-type programs, South Korea’s programs during the Asian crisis as well as those implemented in some countries in Latin America. More importantly, there can be public investment and promotion toward exporting agricultural goods, technical services to non-European countries, etc. And, there maybe still structural funds available from the EU. What is absolutely critical, however, for the country to ultimately find its way to growth and prosperity is spectacular and visionary leadership.

    Q. The ECB has managed through different means to avoid a European credit crisis and to restore somewhat investors’ confidence in sovereign bond markets. Still, a lot of peripheral banks are on very shaky ground, with Spanish Bankia being the most recent case. What’s your assessment of the efforts undertaken so far by the ECB towards solving the eurozone crisis?

    The ECB has done a lot less that it could have to calm the markets. For it is unfortunate that its charter—a version of the German Bundesbank—limits its functions as a central bank. Central banks have the ability to use tools at their disposal at times of financial crises, one of which is functioning as lenders of last resort (LOLR). The ECB is prohibited in doing so even though, its LTRO program is nothing more than a timid attempt to function as a LOLR, too little and too late to significantly calm the financial markets. The spreads for Spain and Italy continue to be under assault and the urgings from the Bundesbank to exit from the program earlier than its original time horizon worsen matters. European policymakers are well aware that the European financial institutions are severely undercapitalized and shaky, but hope that their intended private recapitalization will be a satisfactory solution. But as it has become obvious by now the method of solving Europe’s problems is to get each country’s fiscal house and banking sector in order by applying a band aid that helps kick the can down the road and somehow grow its way out of trouble. But even if the omens are clear, the willingness to deal with them effectively is not.

    Q. It seems that the crisis in the European periphery is widening and deepening. Spain is set to be the next victim, but the bailout funds are hardly adequate given its size. Moreover, Germany continues to insist on the fiscal pact treaty as the only way out of the crisis. Is the European Union facing a dead-end? And is the current crisis essentially a structural crisis?

    The euro project is an incomplete project. It is impossible to have a monetary union of countries with very different fiscal structures and earnings potential that are yoked to the same currency without a fiscal union. Germany’s insistence on a fiscal pact treaty is simply thoughtless and will sooner rather than later lead to euro’s dissolution. Aside from Greece, Portugal and Ireland—Chancellor Merkel’s poster children are not meeting their deficit targets and both Spain and Italy, two very large economies are in recession and their citizens are refusing to take the austerity medicine. Consequently, the end of the euro may be near and it will be a blow not just to European pride but, to the whole idea of Europe.

    Q. During the last months the markets (including the US equity market) are showing signs that they are not in tune with the real economic conditions, which is to say that their performance does not seem to reflect what’s going in the global economy. Why is this happening, and have we faced a similar situation in the past?

    As I indicated earlier, markets have a mind of their own. As the late Paul Samuelson once quipped, financial markets forecasted five of the last three recessions. Financial markets are globally interconnected and what happens in Europe affects the US markets and in their turn the Asian markets irrespective of the prevailing economic conditions. For example, the recent run-up in the US equity markets was due to some marginal improvement in the US economy, and more importantly, the sizable increase in corporate profits. This and last weeks volatility is attributed to the results of the Greek elections and the chorus proclaiming the country’s impending exit from the euro and the possible contagion to the rest of the Eurozone with spillover effects to the US economy.

  • In the Media | May 2012

    Greece and the Euro: What’s Next?


    By Chris Isidore

    CNNMoney, May 14, 2012. © 2012 Cable News Network. A Time Warner Company. All Rights Reserved.

    Investors are getting increasingly worried about whether Greece will remain in the eurozone. And they should.

    There are a series of upcoming events that could spell the end of a deal, put in place nearly three months ago, to restructure Greee’s debt under strict terms dictated by the European Union, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank, known as the troika.

    “The threat from Greece remains real, and Greece exiting the euro area would likely have contagion effects that cannot easily be addressed in the current set-up,” said Bank of America Merrill Lynch analysts in a note Monday. “The next weeks are crucial.”

    Greece has been struggling under a mountain of debt, as it tries to push through unpopular austerity measures and get its economy on solid footing. Without a cohesive government, that battle just got tougher.

    Here’s what next in the Greek political drama, and what it could mean for the rest of Europe and the global economy.

    Where do things stand after last week’s national elections? There is still no party that has been able to form a new government. The two parties from the previous ruling coalition that supported austerity and the debt deal, New Democracy and Pasok, only have 149 seats between them and 151 are needed.

    So far, none of the other parties are willing to join them, given Greek voters’ anger over the harsh austerity measures.

    If Greek President Karolos Papoulias is not able to bring together a new ruling coalition by Thursday, he is expected to call for another round of voting, likely in mid-June.

    What is likely to happen if new elections are held in June? Recent polls and various experts seem to agree that the Coalition of the Radical Left, also known as Syriza, would be the top vote getter in the next round. Syriza has gained solid support since finishing second in last week’s round of voting.

    If it can form a majority coalition with other anti-austerity parties, that would leave Greece with a government opposed to the earlier deals made with the EU, IMF and ECB, which has to approve funds for Greece that would allow the government to pay its bills and make its bond payments.

    Whether the June election result would lead to a disorderly default and a Greek exit from the euro is far less clear.

    “Even Syriza is not really interested in getting out of the euro. Their primary focus is to renegotiate the bailout package,” said Dimitri Papadimitriou, economics professor and expert on Greece from Bard College.

    But without financial support from the so-called troika, it will be tough for Greece to meet its financial obligations.

    Can Greece stop paying its bills and still stay in the eurozone? That is the biggest unknown, and probably the biggest worry for markets.

    Elisabeth Afseth, fixed income analyst for Investec Bank in London, said if Greece stops paying its bills, that will mean the end of the funding it so desperately needs. If that happens, it won’t have much choice but to start issuing its own currency to pay its ongoing bills.

    How Greece can stay in the eurozone

    But Papadimitriou said that other European leaders are also loath to have Greece exit the euro, due to the shock it might cause for the continent’s already-fragile financial system. Therefore, he said, it is possible, albeit unlikely, that there could be yet another new deal even if Greece stops paying what it owes.

    “I would expect the European finance ministers’ meeting to have intense discussions this week,” he said. “The best case for keeping Greece within the euro would be for the rest of Europe to be proactive in trying to come up with a renegotiated deal suitable for all parties. But I’m not optimistic.”

    What’s the best case scenario for Greece leaving the euro? In the best case, the ECB steps in and contains the so-called contagion effect.

    While the central bank’s drumbeat has been to not be the lender of last resort, it has also made it clear that it would do everything in its power to keep the crisis from spreading.

    Greek euro exit won’t mean tragedy

    A dozen European countries are already in recession thanks to Germany’s surprise growht, the entire EU and eurozone managed to stave off recession in the first quarter.

    Even in this best case scenario, one in which measures to prop up the non-Greek sovereign debt work, the austerity measures needed to pay for them would send the remaining countries of the eurozone and EU into an even deeper, more prolonged downturn.

    Yields could soar on government debt for Portugal and Ireland, let alone much larger economies like Spain and Italy, vastly increasing the costs for the remaining European governments that are paying for various bailouts.

    That would also weigh on the already slowing growth in both the United States and Asia.

    How bad could things get? Things could be worse than that—far worse.

    “I don’t think anyone at the present time can quantify the contagion effect of a disorderly exit of Greece from the eurozone,” said Papadimitriou. “No one can predict the markets. They have a mind of their own.

    In a worst-case scenario, the Greek exit prompts other countries to leave the euro, as voters there follow Greek voters’ lead and rebel against austerity measures.

    “As it stands now, there’s no precedence for leaving,” said Afseth. “If Greece leaves, all of sudden there is precedent.”

    If larger countries follow Greece out of eurozone, it could cause a meltdown in the European banking sector, which holds billions of euros of sovereign debt of the other troubled economies, as well as private sector loans to consumers.

    In turn, businesses in those countries would be unable to pay given their suddenly devalued currency.

    While U.S. authorities have said U.S. banks have relatively limited exposure to European sovereign debt, the major banks here do have exposure to the European banking system, so a meltdown in European markets would be felt in the United States and around the globe.

  • In the Media | May 2012

    Will the Eurozone Unravel before the Elections?


    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    With Greece teetering and increasing doubts about the solvency of Spanish banks, Masters and Papadimitriou discuss the growing likelihood of a cascading crisis in the eurozone and its potential impact on US elections in November. Full audio of the interview is available here.

  • In the Media | May 2012

    Greece Will Muddle Through


    By Ben Rooney

    CNNMoney, May 10, 2012. © 2012 Cable News Network. A Time Warner Company. All Rights Reserved.

    The political stalemate in Greece has raised concerns that the nation is more likely than ever to leave the euro currency union.

    But it may be too soon to say that the Greek government—once there is one—will decide that abandoning the euro is in the national interest.

    Greece has been thrust into political chaos after last weekend’s elections failed to give any party a clear majority in Parliament.

    The main concern is that the lack of leadership in Athens could jeopardize the nation’s bailout agreement with the European Union and International Monetary Fund. That could lead to a disorderly default by Greece, which would force the nation out of the eurozone.

    As it stands, none of the main parties appear able to form a coalition government, which means the Greek president will have an opportunity to broker a deal. He too is expected to fail. That means Greece will likely hold a second election next month.

    Paul Christopher, chief international strategist at Wells Fargo Advisors, does not expect the current political turmoil to result in Greece leaving the eurozone. He said the mainstream parties in Greece, which were punished by voters for supporting the bailout, might do better the second time around.

    Coalition deal eludes Greek politicians—CNN

    “If the election fails to produce a coalition government, then the public fear of chaos may benefit larger, pro-European parties in a fresh election,” said Christopher. In any event, pro-euro parties control 67% of the Greek Parliament, he added.

    Other euro area leaders have been ousted by voters frustrated with austerity—the policy of cutting spending and raising taxes to reduce public debts. But in many cases, the new governments have stayed the course.

    “Spanish, Irish and Italian voters have already voted out governments that offered austerity, only to see the successor administrations offer more of the same,” said Christopher.

    Meanwhile, the stakes are potentially huge for the rest of the eurozone.

    There is still the danger that a default by Greece will drag down other troubled euro area governments, such as Spain and Portugal, despite beefed up crisis resources. In addition, the eurozone economy is fragile and any financial shock could plunge the region into a deep recession.

    Given these risks, many analysts say EU authorities might be wiling to cut Greece some slack, although an outright renegotiation of the bailout program seems unlikely.

    What’s more, EU nations and the IMF have already lent Greece over €100 billion and the European Central Bank owns some €40 billion worth of Greek bonds. In other words, Greece’s so-called official creditors have a significant financial interest in seeing the political drama resolved and a default avoided.

    “There are many signals coming from European leaders attempting to keep Greece in the eurozone,” said Dimitri Papadimitriou, a professor of economics at Bard College. “I expect there will be some flexibility in meeting the targets for budget deficits.”

    Much depends on how the newly-elected president of France, François Hollande, will interact with his German counterpart, Angela Merkel.

    A long-time Socialist Party leader, Hollande campaigned against too much austerity and has promised to push through measures to boost economic growth. Hollande is expected to meet with Merkel, the most outspoken supporter of fiscal discipline in the eurozone, shortly after he is sworn in later this month.

    “We first need to see how the dust settles in Athens and what Merkel and Hollande agree to before jumping to conclusions,” said Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg Bank.

    Spanish bond yields cross 6% again

    Gillian Edgeworth, an economist at Italy’s UniCredit, thinks EU leaders could allow Greece an extra year to push through fiscal reforms.

    In a note to clients, Edgeworth said Greece is expected to build up a cash buffer of €5.2 billion, which could be used to cover budget shortfalls this year. In addition, the program assumes that Greece will pay down €9 billion in short-term debt this year and next, a portion of which could be delayed, she said.

    “Though not huge, there is some scope for maneuver,” said Edgeworth.

    On Wednesday, the directors of Europe’s bailout fund confirmed that Greece will receive an installment of €4.2 billion on Thursday. The European Financial Stability Facility also said it will disburse €5.2 billion from the first installment of Greece’s new bailout program by the end of June.

    Officials from the EU, IMF and ECB—known as the troika—are expected to being their latest review of Greece’s bailout program next month. Greece is scheduled to receive its next installment of bailout money in August.

     

  • In the Media | May 2012

    Markets Could Stumble after France, Greece Votes


    By Daniel Wagner
    The Associated Press, May 6, 2012. Copyright 2012 Bloomberg L.P. All Rights Reserved.

    Financial markets will likely stumble this week after elections in Greece and France cast a pall of uncertainty over Europe's efforts to solve its debt crisis.

    Greek voters on Sunday voted mostly for two parties that want to change the nation's international bailout terms or even overturn the rescue deal, according to early projections of the election results. Greece won't have a government until parties with divergent worldviews can form a governing coalition.

    Greek voters are reacting against spending cuts imposed on the recession-weary nation by the international lenders whose bailouts are keeping it afloat.

    French President Nicolas Sarkozy lost in a runoff election to Socialist candidate Francois Hollande. Hollande has criticized France's austerity program and wants to encourage growth by boosting government spending.

    Sunday's votes raise serious doubts about whether voters will swallow the current plan of international bailouts coupled with severe cost-cutting, economists said.

    Many experts believe the austerity program is necessary to keep bond investors from panicking about the possibility that more European nations will default or require bailouts.

    But a growing number say the cuts have been too much, too fast. They say the region's economy can't return to growth unless governments stop tightening the fiscal noose and start spending again to create demand.

    Much depends on the reaction of investors in debt issued by European nations, said Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College. If they fear that the crisis response is losing momentum, they will likely demand higher interest rates -- not just from Greece, but from other nations seen as carrying too much debt.

    The result would be rising borrowing costs for Greece as well as countries that haven't received bailouts, like Italy and Spain. Rising borrowing costs sent global stock markets diving last year. Uncertainty about the path forward in Europe may mean a return to extreme market volatility after several months of relative calm.
  • In the Media | April 2012

    Could Germany Leave the Eurozone?


    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    As stocks continue to plunge in Europe and on Wall Street, Masters and Papadimitriou revisit the malaise in the eurozone, where the cost of Spanish debt has reached unsustainable levels, austerity has proven to be disastrous, and there is no money for stimulus. Full audio of the interview is available here.
  • In the Media | April 2012

    Productivity, the Miracle of Compound Interest, and Poverty


    By Michael Hudson
    Naked Capitalism, April 22, 2012. Copyright © 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 Aurora Advisors Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.

    Research Associate Michael Hudson looks at the disconnect between the enormous productivity gains in the postwar era and the failed promise of a leisure economy. The full post is available here.
  • In the Media | April 2012

    A Quick Boost for the Economy—a $12 Minimum Wage


    James K. Galbraith

    The Real News Network, April 5, 2012. All original content copyright © The Real News Network.

    In an interview with TRNN’s Paul Jay, Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith offers a solution to boosting demand: raise the minimum wage. Full video and a transcript of the interview are available here.

  • In the Media | March 2012

    Greece: “Trapped in a Dark Endless Tunnel”


    By David Berman

    The Globe and Mail, March 26, 2012. © Copyright 2012 The Globe and Mail Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    Remember Greece? The financial crisis there might be dimming in the minds of many investors ever since the euro zone found the necessary money to bail out the country and creditors agreed to a debt restructuring. However, not everyone believes that everything is well.

    Take C. J. Polychroniou, a research associate and policy fellow at Levy Economics Institute of Bard College: He argues in a new policy paper [One-Pager No. 28] that Greece is about to become a “zombie debtor” and, in a “doomsday scenario,” will be forced to leave the euro zone. In other words, everyone’s greatest fears are about to be revisited.

    “The bond swap is a temporary fix and will not pull Greece out of its debt spiral,” he said in a one-page release. Part of the problem is that the latest bailout by the euro zone comes with harsh austerity measures, and these measures are going to undermine Greece’s economic growth and its ability to meet debt payments.

    “The most optimistic projections suggest that Greece will return to a budget surplus by 2015,” Mr. Polychroniou said.

    “However, even then, the predicted primary surplus of €20-billion won’t cover more than 30 per cent of the cost of carrying its debt. . . . In sum, Greece is not only bankrupt but also remains trapped in a dark, endless tunnel.”

    If he's right, global stock markets could be in for a round of turbulence. Europe's sovereign-debt crisis has weighed heavily on stocks, off and on, over the past two years. Most recently, the crisis helped drag the S&P 500 down nearly 19 per cent from last July to the end of September.

    Since then, a combination of European action in holding off a messy Greek default and upbeat U.S. economic news have driven stocks to four-year highs.
  • In the Media | March 2012

    2,181 Italians Pack a Sports Arena to Learn Modern Monetary Theory—The Economy Doesn’t Need to Suffer Neoliberal Austerity


    By Michael Hudson
    Naked Capitalism, February 28, 2012. Copyright © 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 Aurora Advisors Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.

    I have just returned from Rimini, Italy, where I experienced one of the most amazing spectacles of my academic life. Four of us associated with the University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) were invited to lecture for three days on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and explain why Europe is in such monetary trouble today—and to show that there is an alternative, that the enforced austerity for the 99% and vast wealth grab by the 1% is not a force of nature.

    Stephanie Kelton (incoming UMKC Economics Dept. chair and editor of its economic blog, New Economic Perspectives), criminologist and law professor Bill Black, investment banker Marshall Auerback and me (along with a French economist, Alain Parquez) stepped into the basketball auditorium on Friday night. We walked down, and down, and further down the central aisle, past a packed audience reported as over 2,100. It was like entering the Oscars as People called out our first names. Some told us they had read all of our economics blogs. Stephanie joked that now she knew how The Beatles felt. There was prolonged applause—all for an intellectual rather than a physical sporting event.

    With one difference, of course: Our adversaries were not there. There was much press, but the prevailing Euro-technocrats (the bank lobbyists who determine European economic policy) hoped that the less discussion of possible alternatives to austerity, the easier it would be to force their brutal financial grab through.

    All the audience members had contributed to raise the funds to fly us over from the United States (and from France for Alain), and treat us to Federico Fellini’s Grand Hotel on the Rimini beach. The conference was organized by reporter Paolo Barnard, who had studied MMT with Randall Wray and realized that there was plenty of demand in Italian mass culture for a discussion of what actually was determining the living conditions of Europe—and the emerging financial elite that hopes to use this crisis as an opportunity to become the new financial lords carving out fiefdoms by privatizing the public domain being sold off by governments that have no central bank to finance their deficits, and are tragically beholden to bondholders and to Eurocrats drawn from the neoliberal camp.

    Paolo and his enormous support staff of translators and interns provided an opportunity to hear an approach to monetary and tax theory and policy that until recently was almost unheard of in the United States. Just one week earlier the Washington Post published a review of MMT, followed by a long discussion in the Financial Times. But the theory remains grounded primarily at the UMKC’s economics department and the Levy Institute at Bard College, with which most of us are associated.

    The basic thrust of our argument is that just as commercial banks create credit electronically on their computer keyboards (creating a bank account credit for borrowers in exchange for their signing an IOU at interest), governments can create money. There is no need to borrow from banks, as computer keyboards provide nearly free credit creation to finance spending.

    The difference, of course, is that governments spend money (at least in principle) to promote long-term growth and employment, to invest in public infrastructure, research and development, provide health care and other basic economic functions. Banks have a more short-term time frame. They lend credit against collateral in place. Some 80% of bank loans are mortgages against real estate. Other loans are made to finance leveraged buyouts and corporate takeovers. But most new fixed capital investment by corporations is financed out of retained earnings.

    Unfortunately, the flow of earnings is now being diverted increasingly to the financial sector—not only to pay interest and penalties to banks, but for stock buybacks intended to support stock prices and hence the value of stock options that managers of today’s financialized companies give themselves. As for the stock market—which textbook diagrams still depict as raising money for new capital investment—it has been turned into a vehicle to buy out companies on credit (e.g., with high interest junk bonds) and replace equity with debt. Inasmuch as interest payments are tax-deductible, as if they were a necessary cost of doing business, corporate income-tax payments lowered. And what the tax collector relinquishes is available to be paid out to the bankers and bondholders who get rich by loading the economy down with debt.

    Welcome to the post-industrial economy, financialized style. Industrial capitalism has passed into a series of stages of finance capitalism, from the Bubble Economy to the Negative Equity stage, foreclosure time, debt deflation, austerity—and what looks like debt peonage in Europe, above all for the PIIGS: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. (The Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania already have been plunged so deeply into debt that their populations are emigrating to find work and flee debt-burdened real estate. The same has plagued Iceland since its bank rip-offs collapsed in 2008.)

    Why aren’t economists describing this phenomenon? The answer is a combination of political ideology and analytic blinders. As soon as the Rimini conference ended on Sunday evening, for instance, Paul Krugman’s Monday, February 27 New York Times column, “What Ails Europe?” blamed the euro’s problems simply on the inability of countries to devalue their currencies. He rightly criticized the Republican party line that blames European welfare spending for the Eurozone’s problems, and also criticizing putting the blame on budget deficits.

    But he left out of account the straitjacket of the European Central Bank (ECB) unable to monetize the deficits, as a result of junk economics written into the EU constitution.

    If the peripheral nations still had their own currencies, they could and would use devaluation to quickly restore competitiveness. But they don’t, which means that they are in for a long period of mass unemployment and slow, grinding deflation. Their debt crises are mainly a byproduct of this sad prospect, because depressed economies lead to budget deficits and deflation magnifies the burden of debt.

    Depreciation would lower the price of labor while raising the price of imports. The burden of debts denominated in foreign currencies would increase in keeping with the devaluation, thereby creating problems unless the government passed a law re-denominating all debts in domestic currency. This would satisfy the Prime Directive of international financing: always denominated debts in your own currency, as the United States does.

    In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt nullified the Gold Clause in U.S. loan contracts, enabling banks and other creditors to be paid in the equivalent gold value. But in his usual neoclassical fashion, Mr. Krugman ignores the debt issue:

    The afflicted nations, in particular, have nothing but bad choices: either they suffer the pains of deflation or they take the drastic step of leaving the euro, which won’t be politically feasible until or unless all else fails (a point Greece seems to be approaching). Germany could help by reversing its own austerity policies and accepting higher inflation, but it won’t.

    But leaving the euro is not sufficient to avert austerity, foreclosure and debt deflation if the nation that withdraws retains the neoliberal policy that plagues the euro. Suppose the post-euro economy has a central bank that still refuses to finance public budget deficits, forcing the government to borrow from commercial banks and bondholders? Suppose the government believes that it should balance the budget rather than provide the economy with spending power to increase its growth?

    Suppose the government slashes public welfare spending, or bails out banks for their losses, or takes losing bank gambles onto the public balance sheet, as Ireland has done? Or for that matter, what if the governments do not write down real estate mortgages and other debts to the debtors’ ability to pay, as Iceland has failed to do? The result will still be debt deflation, forfeiture of property, unemployment—and a rising tide of emigration as the domestic economy and employment opportunities shrink.

    So what then is the key? It is to have a central bank that does what central banks were founded to do: monetize government budget deficits so as to spend money into the economy, in a way best intended to promote economic growth and full employment.

    This was the MMT message that the five of us were invited to explain to the audience in Rimini. Some attendees came up and explained that they had come all the way from Spain, others from France and cities across Italy. And although we did many press, radio and TV interviews, we were told that the major media were directed to ignore us as not politically correct.

    Such is the censorial spirit of neoliberal monetary austerity. Its motto is TINA: There Is No Alternative, and it wants to keep matters this way. As long as it can suppress discussion of how many better alternatives there are, the hope is that the public will remain acquiescent as their living standards shrink and wealth is sucked up to the top of the economic pyramid to the 1%.

    The audience requested above all more theory from Stephanie Kelton, who gave the clearest lecture on economics I had ever heard—a Euclidean presentation of MMT logic. For a visual of the magnitude, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XP60tpwu5cs. At the end, we felt like concert performers.

    The size of the audience filling the sports stadium to hear our economic explanation of how a real central bank should operate to avoid austerity and promote rather than discourage employment showed that the government’s attempt to brainwash the population was not working. It was not working any better than Harvard’s Economics 101 class, from which students walked out in protest against the unrealistic parallel universe thinking whose only appeal is to Aspergers Syndrome sufferers who are selected as useful idiots to train to draw pictures of the economy that exclude analysis of the debt overhead, rentier free lunches and financial parasitism.
  • In the Media | February 2012

    New Deal cercasi


    Di Federica Bianchi e Paola Pilati
    L'Espresso, February 23, 2012

    L’austerità imposta dall’Europa alla Grecia non funziona. Ma esistono ricette alternative che puntano allo sviluppo. A base di eurobond e di distretti industriali.

  • In the Media | February 2012

    You Know the Deficit Hawks. Now Meet the Deficit Owls.


    By Dylan Matthews
    The Washington Post, February 19, 2012. © 1996–2012 The Washington Post

    About 11 years ago, James K. “Jamie” Galbraith recalls, hundreds of his fellow economists laughed at him. To his face. In the White House.

    A discounted poster presenting US dollars bills in circulation is seen in the visitor center of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in Washington on August 09, 2011. It was April 2000, and Galbraith had been invited by President Bill Clinton to speak on a panel about the budget surplus. Galbraith was a logical choice. A public policy professor at the University of Texas and former head economist for the Joint Economic Committee, he wrote frequently for the press and testified before Congress.

    What’s more, his father, John Kenneth Galbraith, was the most famous economist of his generation: a Harvard professor, best-selling author and confidante of the Kennedy family. Jamie has embraced a role as protector and promoter of the elder’s legacy.

    But if Galbraith stood out on the panel, it was because of his offbeat message. Most viewed the budget surplus as opportune: a chance to pay down the national debt, cut taxes, shore up entitlements or pursue new spending programs.

    He viewed it as a danger: If the government is running a surplus, money is accruing in government coffers rather than in the hands of ordinary people and companies, where it might be spent and help the economy.

    “I said economists used to understand that the running of a surplus was fiscal (economic) drag,” he said, “and with 250 economists, they giggled.”

    Galbraith says the 2001 recession—which followed a few years of surpluses—proves he was right.

    A decade later, as the soaring federal budget deficit has sharpened political and economic differences in Washington, Galbraith is mostly concerned about the dangers of keeping it too small. He’s a key figure in a core debate among economists about whether deficits are important and in what way. The issue has divided the nation’s best-known economists and inspired pockets of passion in academic circles. Any embrace by policymakers of one view or the other could affect everything from employment to the price of goods to the tax code.

    In contrast to “deficit hawks” who want spending cuts and revenue increases now in order to temper the deficit, and “deficit doves” who want to hold off on austerity measures until the economy has recovered, Galbraith is a deficit owl. Owls certainly don’t think we need to balance the budget soon. Indeed, they don’t concede we need to balance it at all. Owls see government spending that leads to deficits as integral to economic growth, even in good times.

    The term isn’t Galbraith’s. It was coined by Stephanie Kelton, a professor at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, who with Galbraith is part of a small group of economists who have concluded that everyone—members of Congress, think tank denizens, the entire mainstream of the economics profession—has misunderstood how the government interacts with the economy. If their theory—dubbed “Modern Monetary Theory” or MMT—is right, then everything we thought we knew about the budget, taxes and the Federal Reserve is wrong.

    Keynesian roots
    “Modern Monetary Theory” was coined by Bill Mitchell, an Australian economist and prominent proponent, but its roots are much older. The term is a reference to John Maynard Keynes, the founder of modern macroeconomics. In “A Treatise on Money,” Keynes asserted that “all modern States” have had the ability to decide what is money and what is not for at least 4,000 years.

    This claim, that money is a “creature of the state,” is central to the theory. In a “fiat money” system like the one in place in the United States, all money is ultimately created by the government, which prints it and puts it into circulation. Consequently, the thinking goes, the government can never run out of money. It can always make more.

    This doesn’t mean that taxes are unnecessary. Taxes, in fact, are key to making the whole system work. The need to pay taxes compels people to use the currency printed by the government. Taxes are also sometimes necessary to prevent the economy from overheating. If consumer demand outpaces the supply of available goods, prices will jump, resulting in inflation (where prices rise even as buying power falls). In this case, taxes can tamp down spending and keep prices low.

    But if the theory is correct, there is no reason the amount of money the government takes in needs to match up with the amount it spends. Indeed, its followers call for massive tax cuts and deficit spending during recessions.

    Warren Mosler, a hedge fund manager who lives in Saint Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands—in part because of the tax benefits—is one proponent. He’s perhaps better know for his sports car company and his frequent gadfly political campaigns (he earned a little less than one percent of the vote as an independent in Connecticut’s 2010 Senate race). He supports suspending the payroll tax that finances the Social Security trust fund and providing an $8 an hour government job to anyone who wants one to combat the current downturn.

    The theory’s followers come mainly from a couple of institutions: the University of Missouri-Kansas City’s economics department and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, both of which have received money from Mosler. But the movement is gaining followers quickly, largely through an explosion of economics blogs. Naked Capitalism, an irreverent and passionately written blog on finance and economics with nearly a million monthly readers, features proponents such as Kelton, fellow Missouri professor L. Randall Wray and Wartberg College professor Scott Fullwiler. So does New Deal 2.0, a wonky economics blog based at the liberal Roosevelt Institute think tank.

    Their followers have taken to the theory with great enthusiasm and pile into the comment sections of mainstream economics bloggers when they take on the theory. Wray’s work has been picked up by Firedoglake, a major liberal blog, and the New York Times op-ed page. “The crisis helped, but the thing that did it was the blogosphere,” Wray says. “Because, for one thing, we could get it published. It’s very hard to publish anything that sounds outside the mainstream in the journals.”

    Most notably, Galbraith has spread the message everywhere from the Daily Beast to Congress. He advised lawmakers including then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) when the financial crisis hit in 2008. Last summer he consulted with a group of House members on the debt ceiling negotiations. He was one of the handful of economists consulted by the Obama administration as it was designing the stimulus package. “I think Jamie has the most to lose by taking this position,” Kelton says. “It was, I think, a really brave thing to do, because he has such a big name, and he’s so well-respected.”

    Wray and others say they, too, have consulted with policymakers, and there is a definite sense among the group that the theory’s time is now. “Our Web presence, every few months or so it goes up another notch,” Fullwiler says.

    A divisive theory
    The idea that deficit spending can help to bring an economy out of recession is an old one. It was a key point in Keynes’s “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.” It was the chief rationale for the 2009 stimulus package, and many self-identified Keynesians, such as former White House adviser Christina Romer and economist Paul Krugman, have argued that more is in order. There are, of course, detractors.

    A key split among Keynesians dates to the 1930s. One set of economists, including the Nobel laureates John Hicks and Paul Samuelson, sought to incorporate Keynes’s insights into classical economics. Hicks built a mathematical model summarizing Keynes’s theory, and Samuelson sought to wed Keynesian macroeconomics (which studies the behavior of the economy as a whole) to conventional microeconomics (which looks at how people and businesses allocate resources). This set the stage for most macroeconomic theory since. Even today, “New Keynesians,” such as Greg Mankiw, a Harvard economist who served as chief economic adviser to George W. Bush, and Romer’s husband, David, are seeking ways to ground Keynesian macroeconomic theory in the micro-level behavior of businesses and consumers.

    Modern Monetary theorists hold fast to the tradition established by “post-Keynesians” such as Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor and Hyman Minsky, who insisted Samuelson’s theory failed because its models acted as if, in Galbraith’s words, “the banking sector doesn’t exist.”

    The connections are personal as well. Wray’s doctoral dissertation was advised by Minsky, and Galbraith studied with Robinson and Kaldor at the University of Cambridge. He argues that the theory is part of an “alternative tradition, which runs through Keynes and my father and Minsky.”

    And while Modern Monetary Theory’s proponents take Keynes as their starting point and advocate aggressive deficit spending during recessions, they’re not that type of Keynesians. Even mainstream economists who argue for more deficit spending are reluctant to accept the central tenets of Modern Monetary Theory. Take Krugman, who regularly engages economists across the spectrum in spirited debate. He has argued that pursuing large budget deficits during boom times can lead to hyperinflation. Mankiw concedes the theory’s point that the government can never run out of money but doesn’t think this means what its proponents think it does.

    Technically it’s true, he says, that the government could print streams of money and never default. The risk is that it could trigger a very high rate of inflation. This would “bankrupt much of the banking system,” he says. “Default, painful as it would be, might be a better option.”

    Mankiw’s critique goes to the heart of the debate about Modern Monetary Theory—and about how, when and even whether to eliminate our current deficits.

    When the government deficit spends, it issues bonds to be bought on the open market. If its debt load grows too large, mainstream economists say, bond purchasers will demand higher interest rates, and the government will have to pay more in interest payments, which in turn adds to the debt load.

    To get out of this cycle, the Fed—which manages the nation’s money supply and credit and sits at the center of its financial system—could buy the bonds at lower rates, bypassing the private market. The Fed is prohibited from buying bonds directly from the Treasury—a legal rather than economic constraint. But the Fed would buy the bonds with money it prints, which means the money supply would increase. With it, inflation would rise, and so would the prospects of hyperinflation.

    “You can’t just fund any level of government that you want from spending money, because you’ll get runaway inflation and eventually the rate of inflation will increase faster than the rate that you’re extracting resources from the economy,” says Karl Smith, an economist at the University of North Carolina. “This is the classic hyperinflation problem that happened in Zimbabwe and the Weimar Republic.”

    The risk of inflation keeps most mainstream economists and policymakers on the same page about deficits: In the medium term—all else being equal—it’s critical to keep them small.

    Economists in the Modern Monetary camp concede that deficits can sometimes lead to inflation. But they argue that this can only happen when the economy is at full employment—when all who are able and willing to work are employed and no resources (labor, capital, etc.) are idle. No modern example of this problem comes to mind, Galbraith says.

    “The last time we had what could be plausibly called a demand-driven, serious inflation problem was probably World War I,” Galbraith says. “It’s been a long time since this hypothetical possibility has actually been observed, and it was observed only under conditions that will never be repeated.”

    Critics’ rebuttals
    According to Galbraith and the others, monetary policy as currently conducted by the Fed does not work. The Fed generally uses one of two levers to increase growth and employment. It can lower short-term interest rates by buying up short-term government bonds on the open market. If short-term rates are near-zero, as they are now, the Fed can try “quantitative easing,” or large-scale purchases of assets (such as bonds) from the private sector including longer-term Treasuries using money the Fed creates. This is what the Fed did in 2008 and 2010, in an emergency effort to boost the economy.

    According to Modern Monetary Theory, the Fed buying up Treasuries is just, in Galbraith’s words, a “bookkeeping operation” that does not add income to American households and thus cannot be inflationary.

    “It seemed clear to me that . . . flooding the economy with money by buying up government bonds . . . is not going to change anybody’s behavior,” Galbraith says. “They would just end up with cash reserves which would sit idle in the banking system, and that is exactly what in fact happened.”

    The theorists just “have no idea how quantitative easing works,” says Joe Gagnon, an economist at the Peterson Institute who managed the Fed’s first round of quantitative easing in 2008. Even if the money the Fed uses to buy bonds stays in bank reserves—or money that’s held in reserve—increasing those reserves should still lead to increased borrowing and ripple throughout the system.

    Mainstreamers are equally baffled by another claim of the theory: that budget surpluses in and of themselves are bad for the economy. According to Modern Monetary Theory, when the government runs a surplus, it is a net saver, which means that the private sector is a net debtor. The government is, in effect, “taking money from private pockets and forcing them to make that up by going deeper into debt,” Galbraith says, reiterating his White House comments.

    The mainstream crowd finds this argument as funny now as they did when Galbraith presented it to Clinton. “I have two words to answer that: Australia and Canada,” Gagnon says. “If Jamie Galbraith would look them up, he would see immediate proof he’s wrong. Australia has had a long-running budget surplus now, they actually have no national debt whatsoever, they’re the fastest-growing, healthiest economy in the world.” Canada, similarly, has run consistent surpluses while achieving high growth.

    To even care about such questions, Galbraith says, marked him as “a considerable eccentric” when he arrived from Cambridge to get a PhD at Yale, which had a more conventionally Keynesian economics department. Galbraith credits Samuelson and his allies’ success to a “mass-marketing of economic doctrine, of which Samuelson was the great master . . . which is something the Cambridge school could never have done.”

    The mainstream economists are loath to give up any ground, even in cases such as the so-called “Cambridge capital controversy” of the 1960s. Samuelson debated post-Keynesians and, by his own admission, lost. Such matters have been, in Galbraith’s words, “airbrushed, like Trotsky” from the history of economics.

    But MMT’s own relationship to real-world cases can be a little hit-or-miss. Mosler, the hedge fund manager, credits his role in the movement to an epiphany in the early 1990s, when markets grew concerned that Italy was about to default. Mosler figured that Italy, which at that time still issued its own currency, the lira, could not default as long as it had the ability to print more liras. He bet accordingly, and when Italy did not default, he made a tidy sum. “There was an enormous amount of money to be made if you could bring yourself around to the idea that they couldn’t default,” he says.

    Later that decade, he learned there was also a lot of money to be lost. When similar fears surfaced about Russia, he again bet against default. Despite having its own currency, Russia defaulted, forcing Mosler to liquidate one of his funds and wiping out much of his $850 million in investments in the country. Mosler credits this to Russia’s fixed exchange rate policy of the time and insists that if it had only acted like a country with its own currency, default could have been avoided.

    But the case could also prove what critics insist: Default, while technically always avoidable, is sometimes the best available option.  
  • In the Media | February 2012

    Why Is Greece Cutting Private-sector Wages?


    By Uri Friedman
    Foreign Policy, February 13, 2012. © 2012 The Foreign Policy Group, LLC. All Rights Reserved.

    There’s something puzzling about the austerity bill embraced by the Greek parliament overnight. The package includes measures such as government layoffs that seem logical for a country flirting with default. But news reports are also discussing private-sector wage cuts. How is the government able to slash salaries in the private sector, and why would it imperil much-needed tax revenue by reducing people’s incomes and embarking on what Reuters is calling “among the most radical steps backwards inflicted in peacetime in modern Europe?”

    For starters, the Greek government isn’t strongarming companies into cutting salaries; it’s modifying labor law by lowering the minimum wage by 22 percent to €586 a month (around $780)—roughly on par with Portugal’s—with a 32 percent cut for workers under age 25. Greece’s foreign lenders—the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund—have long demanded the cuts in exchange for a second bailout, and over the weekend Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos publicly endorsed the measure, which had nearly torn his governing coalition asunder only days earlier. The austerity program may be a bitter pill to swallow, Papademos allowed, but it will stave off bankruptcy and “restore the fiscal stability and global competitiveness of the economy.”

    Platon Tinios, an economist at the University of Piraeus in Greece, explains that the cuts championed by international financial organizations are intended to structurally revamp economies and make them more competitive. “Greece has a very rigid labor market, which has translated in the past 10 years into what essentially was jobless growth,” he explains. “The point is to intervene in the labor market so as to increase the probability of jobs being created faster when the recovery comes.”

    Or, as the New York Times put it earlier this month, the goal of reducing Greece’s minimum wage is to “make Greek workers, who are generally less productive than workers elsewhere in Europe, able to compete more effectively inside the eurozone, where countries share a common currency that does not allow devaluations to help even out differences in labor costs.”

    Indeed, the EU and IMF forced a similar reduction in living standards in Latvia—through a process known as “internal devaluation”—though there is heated debate about whether it worked and whether the Latvian model can be applied to Greece.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou, an economics professor at Bard College and the president of the Levy Economics Institute, is highly skeptical of the IMF’s “neoliberal policy.” He says it hasn’t worked in Latin America or Portugal and won’t work in Greece, which doesn’t have an export-driven economy like Germany does.

    Labor demand cannot be stoked simply by lowering the cost of production on the supply side, Papadimitriou argues. “If you had a good industrial base ... you could produce a lot more [by lowering wages] because the demand is there either from abroad or domestically,” he explains. “But in the absence of that, interference with private-sector labor is not something that will solve the problem.” Papadimitriou adds that reducing wages could put a dent in tax revenues and pension contributions.

    Tinios, meanwhile, is less concerned about those possibilities. “In the medium term, what’s more important is to create more jobs, and reducing the minimum wage doesn’t mean that hundreds of thousands of Greeks will be paid less tomorrow; it will mean that new job offers will be made at the lower minimum wage,” he notes, though he concedes that struggling firms may be more likely to slash existing salaries if the minimum wage is reduced.

    There’s also the question of whether, in cutting wages, Greece is chasing the wrong demon. “If our political system had, over the years and especially the last two years, addressed the essential problems of competitiveness in our economy—the excessive number of laws and bureaucracy, the corruption, the bloated and wasteful state, the closed markets, the antibusiness environment—then we wouldn’t be forced to discuss wage costs today,” Federation of Greek Industries President Dimitris Daskalopoulos declared earlier this month.

    The ultimate lesson, of course, is that Greece is choosing from a menu of awful options. As the Associated Press noted over the weekend, “ Greece is trapped in a lose-lose predicament: It must deepen an austerity plan begun in 2010 that will throw many more people out of work. Or it must default on its debts, abandon Europe’s single currency, and see its banking system implode.”

    For now, Greek leaders appear to have averted their eyes, held their noses, and chosen the former. 
  • In the Media | February 2012

    Greece's Grim Choice: Deep Budget Cuts or Default


    By Christina Rexrode
    AP, February 12, 2012. Copyright © 2012 The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (AP) — Why would Greece accept more pain when unemployment is at 21 percent, the economy is enduring its fifth year of recession and rioters are hurling gasoline bombs in the streets of Athens?

    Because the alternative might be worse.

    Greek leaders are gritting their teeth as they move forward with a plan to further slash spending in return for a bailout of about $172 billion (€130 billion) from other countries in Europe and around the world. The Greek Parliament is scheduled to vote on the plan Sunday.

    Greece is trapped in a lose-lose predicament: It must deepen an austerity plan begun in 2010 that will throw many more people out of work. Or it must default on its debts, abandon Europe’s single currency and see its banking system implode.

    “The choice we face is one of sacrifice or even greater sacrifice—on a scale that cannot be compared,” Greek Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos said.

    Here is a closer look at Greece’s two bleak options:

    —Impose deep spending cuts in exchange for the bailout.

    The pros:

    Greece needs the bailout to make a $19.1 billion (€14.5 billion) bond payment due March 20. Prime Minister Lucas Papademos warned that “a disorderly default would cast our country into a catastrophic adventure.”

    Papademos said the plan would help lift Greece out of recession next year.

    In addition to the $172 billion bailout, Greece is negotiating a deal that would reduce the roughly $264 billion in debt it owes private creditors. Under that arrangement, about $132 billion would be shaved off the national debt and Greece would get more favorable repayment terms.

    Selling government-owned companies, exposing professionals like architects and pharmacists to more competition and imposing other reforms is designed to make the economy more efficient in the long run.

    Even with the austerity plan in place, the International Monetary Fund estimates it will be 2020 by the time Greece can shrink its debt load to a sustainable level.

    The cons:

    Such austerity can be counterproductive because it can slow the economy and reduce tax revenue.

    The government acknowledges that the austerity plan would cause Greece’s economy to shrink 4 percent to 5 percent this year. Without it, the government would expect the economy to contract just 2.8 percent. The plan includes lowering the minimum wage by 22 percent and laying off 15,000 government workers this year.

    So far, austerity has done nothing to reduce Greece’s debt burden. Government debt as a percentage of the economy actually grew after it began imposing austerity—to nearly 160 percent in the July-September quarter of 2011 from 139 percent a year earlier.

    “The whole plan was a losing proposition,” says Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute and professor at Bard College.

    Austerity is causing widespread hardship and inflaming social tensions. Papdimitriou worries that Greek society is “disintegrating” under the strain: “Poverty has been increasing, homeless rates have been increasing.”

    So have crime and suicides.

    —Default and drop the euro.

    The pros:

    Defaulting on its debt would ease the immediate strain on Greece’s finances and probably cause it to abandon the euro, the currency used by 17 countries.

    Dropping the euro would leave Greece with a much cheaper currency, its own drachma. That would juice Greece’s economy by making Greek products less expensive around the world. This would give Greek exporters a competitive edge.

    In the 1990s, Canada used a weak currency to expand exports and grow its way out of high government debts, says Simon Tilford, chief economist at the Centre for European Reform in London. As long as it’s shackled to the euro, Greece lacks that option.

    Bernard Baumohl, chief global economist at the Economic Outlook Group, thinks economic and financial pressure will eventually drive Greece to drop the euro.

    And he thinks that would be for the best.

    “What is worse for Europe—to have this matter linger on and on, with European citizens having to continue to bail out Greece and Portugal? Or to face the reality that these countries should not have joined the euro in the first place?” Baumohl asks.

    The cons:

    Exiting the euro would throw Greece’s banking system into chaos. Lenders would panic over the prospect of being repaid not in euros but in drachmas of dubious value.

    Adopting a suddenly much weaker currency could also ignite Greek inflation because prices of imported goods would soar.

    International investors would be reluctant to lend to Greece’s government, its companies or its banks. The freeze-up in credit could cause a depression, worse than what Greece is suffering now. Economists at UBS estimate that Greece’s economy would shrink by up to 50 percent if it left the eurozone.

    The pain would also likely spread as European banks absorbed losses on their loans to Greece. The worst-case scenario: A disaster akin to what followed Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008. Banks grew too fearful to lend to each other. Credit froze worldwide.

     Some economists would like to see European governments produce a rescue package that pairs government cuts and reforms with economic aid designed to spur growth in Greece.

    “When you have over 20 percent unemployment, you need to do something,” Papadimitriou says.

    He wants European countries to propose something like the U.S. aid plan that rescued an impoverished Europe after World War II.

    “You need something similar to the Marshall Plan,” Papadimitriou says.


    Rexrode reported from New York. Associated Press Writer Derek Gatopoulos contributed to this report from Athens.

  • In the Media | February 2012

    Papadimitriou Discusses the Latest on Greece


    Bloomberg Radio, February 10, 2012. © 2012 Bloomberg L.P. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, discusses whether or not Greece will hold together. Papadimitriou talks with Kathleen Hays and Vonnie Quinn on Bloomberg Radio's “The Hays Advantage.” Full audio of the interview is available here.

  • In the Media | February 2012

    Greece's Groundhog Day


    By Bob Moon
    Marketplace, February 10, 2012. © Marketplace from American Public Media

    As riots in Athens grew violent today, Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos took a “take it or leave it” stance with his cabinet ministers. Either get behind the new austerity measures or quit. Six of them chose to leave.   On Sunday the Greek parliament votes on whether or not to accept another round of deep cuts lashed out in an hard-fought agreement reached yesterday.   For Wall Street, it’s a scene right out of Groundhog Day, the movie where the lead character wakes up day after day, only to play out the same scene over and over. News of an agreement—markets go up. Next-day second thoughts and fears—markets go down. Meanwhile, the world economy is waiting.   While it looks to some like Greece just won’t take its bitter medicine, others say more austerity is essentially political theater.   Dimitiri Papadimitriou is the head of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. He says the parties that negotiated the new austerity measures—the European Central Bank, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund—cannot realistically expect them to be implemented.   It’s a case of more austerity without a plan for growth, says Papandimitriou. And that’s a bitter pill for a country with no real manufacturing or industry to rely on. Even industries that could flourish in Greece—solar and wind energy or drilling for oil in the Ionian Sea—will be impossible if Greece is back to the drachma.   Still, Papadimitriou says he’s much less optimistic today about whether Greece can pull off this tightrope act of saying yes to austerity but not crushing the will of its people. He says, “I’m afraid that Greece might throw in the towel and leave the Euro.”
  • In the Media | February 2012

    Greece: How to Slow the Nosedive


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    The Huffington Post, February 9, 2012. Copyright © 2012 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All rights reserved.

    The latest negotiations between Greece and its lenders have ended, at least momentarily. Athens has agreed to endure ever-more painful pension, spending, and wage cuts, with monthly minimum salaries dropping 20 percent. The powerful leaders of ”the troika”—the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the European Central Bank—have charted the direction of Greek public policy for years to come: substantial austerity measures, including the lay-offs of thousands of workers.

    Within those confines, how can Greek competitiveness be rebuilt? The overwhelming, key, and most urgent imperative should be to raise employment levels. Here's why:

    • The long-term effects of extreme unemployment on an economy have been well documented. The loss of output is permanent. Workers' skills deteriorate and become outdated, making the labor pool unattractive to potential employers.
       
    • “Informal” work—the “shadow” sector—swells at the expense of the nation's formal economy, and in Greece, the grey-market is not just a statistical ding. It's widely estimated to compose (as is also the case in Italy) more than one quarter of the GNP.
       
    • Inequality increases. In Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain the recent rise is estimated to be as much as 10 percent. Dangerous ideological shifts accelerate, too.
       
    • Social cohesion disintegrates rapidly. Poverty, homelessness, and crime go up, along with poor health, depression, suicide rates and countless personal tragedies.

    Greece now stands directly in the path of this onrushing apocalypse express. Between spring 2009 and mid 2011, its unemployment rose a heart-stopping 91.8 percent. The overall unemployment rate is now 20 percent; among youths, it's close to 40 percent, and expected to keep climbing. The damaged lives include 20,000 homeless, living in makeshift shelters during a miserably severe European winter, and an upswing in suicides and poverty.

    As joblessness continues to snowball—and if the odds-makers in the credit markets are right, expect an avalanche—the unemployed themselves can involuntarily become a powerful force that prevents economic growth.

    Until now, the Greek government has responded with small interventions to preserve jobs in the private sector. The emphasis has been on shortening the workweek (with the thought that more people would share the available work), and on employment subsidies.

    But in places where reduced workweeks have been tried—Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Australia and Japan—they have failed to generate jobs. Employment subsidies have also been unsuccessful; they've tended to distort market mechanisms by interfering with employer decisions, and current workers end up being traded for newly subsidized ones.

    Now, finally, in addition to those policies, a better option is being tried on a small scale: A labor department direct public service job creation program with an initial target of 55,000 jobs. Participants are entitled to up to five months of work per year, in projects—implemented by non-governmental organizations—that benefit their communities. A similar, streamlined, Interior department program, this one without NGO participation, will generate up to 120,000 openings.

    This approach is the Greek government's best shot at slowing the nosedive in employment, and at circumventing further catastrophe. The plans have been designed to specifically address and avoid the nepotism, corruption, and favoritism that plague poorly conceived "workfare" schemes. With proper targeting, monitoring, and evaluation as the projects move along, the outcomes should be impressive.

    The alternative to an active government labor policy is to rely on the private sector to provide enough work to derail astronomical unemployment. What is the realistic likelihood for this in a nation where jobs are already scarce, and where the public sector, now being dismantled, has composed 40 percent of the economy? It's hard to be optimistic.

    A privately fueled reboot of Greece would require colossal input from start-ups, large ventures, and foreign capital. Historically, these investors have found Greece unattractive. Its competitiveness is likely to erode further as the engineered recession advances beyond the first phase of austerity. The massive unemployment fallout will seriously degrade the climate that's desirable to the same private sector sources being counted on to make Greece more competitive.

    Greece's economy is also characterized by a high percentage of self-employment and small businesses, totaling about 35 percent of all workers. The destabilizing events that accompany high unemployment include a downward push on retail sales and other consumption; global demand shock is amplifying the problem. As the economy contracts, how will these enterprises survive without intervention?

    Before the crisis, Greece drove its growth with public spending and jobs. Now that the government is shrinking, the range of employment policies needs to grow. Public service job creation programs are the government's best prospect. During the coming years of austerity, thousands of Greek workers will remain idle because policymakers believe that this makes economic sense. It simply does not.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, which, with underwriting from Greece's Labour Institute, has been instrumental in the design and implementation of a social works program of direct job creation throughout Greece. He recently co-authored a report (see Direct Job Creation for Turbulent Times in Greece) on Greek labor trends.

  • In the Media | February 2012

    My Big Fat Greek Speculative Rally


    By Paul La Monica
    CNN Money, February 8, 2012. © 2012 Cable News Network. A Time Warner Company. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (CNNMoney)—Stop me if you’ve heard this before. Greece is close to getting another bailout from the European Union, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank, the so-called troika.

    Greece may also be close to a deal with creditors that will cut its Cyclops-sized debt load.

    By the time I finish writing this column, an agreement with bondholders and a new aid package from the troika may finally be reached. Or there could be 17 conflicting news reports about the status of the various talks.

    Either way, one thing is certain. Even if Greece is able to wind up avoiding a disorderly, chaotic default, the recent market rally related to Greece might be a bit excessive.

    The U.S.-listed shares off National Bank of Greece (NBG) have more than doubled so far this year. A new Greek stock exchange-traded fund that launched last December, the Global X FTSE Greece 20 ETF (GREK), is up nearly 40% in 2012.

    National Bank of Greece is the largest holding in the fund, but it also includes the Athens-listed shares of companies such as bottler Coca-Cola Hellenic and Greek gambling firm OPAP.

    Of course, the rally in Greek stocks comes off a highly depressed base. The Athens Stock Exchange tumbled more than 50% in 2011. As long as Greece can avoid default, Greek stocks, and for that matter other European stocks, should rebound a little.

    Greece facing “dramatic dilemma”

    The ECB has helped matters by giving banks cheap three-year loans that some banks appear to have used to buy up the sovereign debt of some of the most problematic European nations. Credit contagion fears have diminished somewhat as a result.

    “Despite the day to day noise on Europe, the market believes policies are in place to put a fence around the sovereign debt problems,” said Doug Cote, chief market strategist for ING Investment Management in New York.

    That may be true. The austerity measures that need to be put into place in Greece and other eurozone nations may cut debt in the long-term. But it will come at the expense of economic growth in the short-term.

    The global economy is still in a fragile state. In fact, a key (albeit admittedly wonky) measure that tracks international shipping prices for various commodities known as the Baltic Dry Index is hovering near a 25-year low.

    Shipping is an extremely important part of the Greek economy. Shares of several Greek freight companies, such as DryShips (DRYS), Navios Maritime Holdings (NM), Diana Shipping (DSX) and Paragon Shipping (PRGN), have started to bounce back this year after a disastrous 2011 on hopes of a global economic rebound.

    But if the BDI, which rose on Tuesday for the first time in more than a month, continues to remain near multi-decade lows, then that could be more troubling news for the shippers and the Greek economy.

    “Greece is highly dependent on shipping from an employment perspective. It’s hard to be confident,” said Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y. “Greece and the rest of Europe should have just anemic economic growth. After a while, the markets may not view that as substantial progress.”

    What’s next for Europe?

    Greece can’t afford any more bad breaks right now. The worst may be over. But that doesn’t mean it’s time to sound the all-clear signal for Greece.

    “The reason there is optimism about Greece is that leaders are moving towards solving something,” said Michael Bapis, managing director and partner at the Bapis Group of HighTower Advisors, a financial services firm in New York.

    “But this is just the beginning of fixing the problem,” he added. “A lot of work has to be done.”

    And it’s also important to note that any deal with the troika could be met with resistance in Greece, particularly if even stricter government spending cuts are proposed.

    “It’s a cautious euphoria because investors are only looking at the short-term. Of course, there should be an agreement between the troika and the Greek government,” Papadimitriou said. “But you can’t assume that a Parliament that is in disarray will approve more austerity measures.”

    In other words, let’s not bust out a celebratory shot of ouzo just yet.
  • In the Media | February 2012

    Canada Income Inequality: Study Shows Government Policies Growing Less Effective at Narrowing Gap


    By Rachel Mendleson

    Huffington Post Canada, February 3, 2012. Copyright © 2012 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All rights reserved.

    As debate about income inequality mounts, a new study [see Working Paper No. 703] underscores how important public investment in social programs like education and health care is in narrowing the rich-poor divide.

    At a time when Ottawa prepares to beat back the deficit with public spending cuts, the findings also show that the effect of Canada’s social safety net on narrowing the income gap waned in the early 2000s.

    “There seems to be a decline in the role of transfers on inequality in Canada,” says Andrew Sharpe, director of the Centre for the Study of Living Standards in Ottawa, and co-author of the study by the New York–based Levy Institute of Bard College.

    Efforts to quantify the rich-poor divide often focus on basic income—namely, how much households earn in a given year. But in their comparison of income inequality in the U.S. and Canada, the authors of the working paper, released in January, endeavour to take a more comprehensive approach.

    According to Sharpe, the aim is to “go beyond standard measures of income” to include other factors that play a role in household wealth: taxes and transfers; government expenditures on goods and services, such as housing, education and health care; time spent on household tasks; and the value of major assets.

    Including these other elements when calculating income inequality tends to have a narrowing effect, he explains, “because everybody gets government services and everybody does household work.”

    The vast amount of data required to make such comparisons limited the scope of the study somewhat—to 1999 and 2005 in Canada, and 2000 and 2004 in the U.S.—but the snapshots give some indication of how much these other factors have been affecting inequality in recent years.

    The authors calculated inequality using two different measures. The first, dubbed Money Income (MI), only takes into account gross income and government transfers. However, the second, called the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being (LIMEW), also includes the effect of the other factors outlined by Sharpe, many of which are related to the strength of public services and programs.

    On both sides of the border, the gap, measured with the Gini coefficient, the standard unit used to gauge inequality, was significantly narrowed when these other sources of wealth were taken into account.

    In Canada in 1999, for instance, when inequality was calculated using the LIMEW, the Gini coefficient was 17 per cent lower; in 2005, meanwhile, it was 13 per cent lower.

    The findings show that factors besides income (such as government spending on education and health care) do a better job at smoothing out inequality in Canada than in the U.S. But they also demonstrate that, from 1999 to 2005, this package of benefits became less effective at levelling the playing field.

    This likely came as little surprise to Sharpe, who recently advocated for greater government investment as a means of curbing income inequality.

    In a a report on reducing disparities published in November by Canada 2010—a think-tank established to “create an environment of social and economic prosperity”—Sharpe was among a group of public policy experts and economists who called on Ottawa to “analyze and consider the longer term effects of income polarization, and consider the strategic policy reforms to head off a looming problem.”

    Among other fixes, the report suggests addressing the growing gap by imposing an inheritance tax, enhancing child benefits and increasing investment in post-secondary education.

    “Public services are . . . an essential element of the redistributive effort of government,” Sharpe wrote. “Erosion of public services will thus tend to increase inequality, something that is not often at the forefront of discussion when cuts are proposed."

  • In the Media | January 2012

    Op-Ed: Need Jobs? Call On Government


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Los Angeles Times, January 5, 2012. Copyright © 2012 Los Angeles Times

    International experience shows that direct job creation by governments is one of the very few options that has succeeded at raising employment levels more than just marginally during a crisis.

    Is high unemployment as certain as death and taxes? Of course not. But if we depend on the private sector to bring rates down, joblessness could join those two certainties.

    International experience shows that direct job creation by governments is one of the very few options that has succeeded at raising employment levels more than just marginally during a crisis. Nonetheless, unfounded optimism about the power of privately fueled growth underlies the latest round of interventions in Europe. The assumption that the business sector has the ability to absorb enough labor to end the unemployment crisis remains almost unquestioned.

    And it is a crisis, despite the recent employment upsurge in much of the world. In Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, high unemployment has continued, with anemic confidence indicators and planned-purchases data in Greece, for example, showing clear evidence that businesses and consumers are bracing for a protracted recession. In economies that are improving, outrageously high unemployment rates among important groups, particularly youths, signal the start of both a threat and a tragedy. Grave labor issues are scattered around the globe.

    It's unreasonable to expect private enterprises to solve these problems. Full employment isn't an objective of businesses. Companies usually strive to keep staffing at a minimum—we've all heard the virtues of "lean and mean." There simply isn't any known automatic mechanism, in the markets or elsewhere, that creates jobs in numbers that match the pool of people willing and able to work.

    In contrast, direct public-service job creation programs by governments have a history of long-term positive results. Throughout the last century, the United States, Sweden, India, South Africa, Argentina, Ethiopia, South Korea, Peru, Bangladesh, Ghana, Cambodia and Chile, among others, have intermittently adopted policies that made them "employers of last resort"—a term coined by economist Hyman Minsky in the 1960s—when private sector demand wasn't sufficient.

    South Korea, for example, during the meltdown of 1997-'98, implemented a Master Plan for Tackling Unemployment that accounted for 10% of government expenditure. It employed workers on public projects that included cultivating forests, building small public facilities, repairing public utilities, environmental cleanup work, staffing community and welfare centers, and information/technology-related projects targeted at the young and computer-literate. The overall economy expanded and thrived in the aftermath.

    In 2005, France outlined a program in which the government paid laid-off workers their former salaries. It showed that this model could ultimately cost the nation a lower percentage of GDP than unemployment compensation or other traditional remedies.

    Of course, these ideas came long after America's Depression-era initiatives had already proved that government could successfully fulfill the role of employer without competing with the private sector. Programs such as the Public Works Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps were followed by a "golden" era in American capitalism, and now, decades later, those policies are still providing rewards. The vogue to dismiss the 1940s recovery as entirely the result of World War II reflects political positioning, not economic data.

    At the theoretical heart of job-creation programs is this fact: Only government, because it is not seeking profitability when it is hiring, can create a demand for labor that is elastic enough to keep a nation near full employment. During a downturn, when a government offers a demand for unemployed workers, it takes on a role analogous to the one that the Federal Reserve plays when it provides liquidity to banks. As in banking, setting an appropriate rate—in this case, a wage—is one key component for success, with the goal of employing those willing and able to work at or marginally below prevailing informal wages.

    And, as in any good public policy, another key is rigorous, scientific monitoring and evaluation. South Africa, in response to a projected unemployment rate of 33% by 2014, has launched a $2.5-billion initiative to create 1 million "cumulative work opportunities" over five years. Analysis by Rania Antonopoulos of the Levy Institute found that care-provisioning jobs—such as home-based workers who care for the ill, the elderly or young children—had a significantly stronger impact as an employment multiplier than infrastructure-oriented or "green" opportunities. Not all jobs are created equal.

    The benefits of direct job creation aren't just transitory. It's well documented that persistent unemployment results in a permanent loss of output and labor productivity. During a crisis, jobs combat these potential future effects. When the good times are rolling, they support those excluded from the prosperity while stimulating demand through feedback loops that increase the economy's vibrancy.

    This is the moment to expand the range of policy responses to unemployment.

    There's no evidence that work creation policies either hurt private business or break national treasuries. Incurring national debt to restore an economy through direct job creation isn't frivolous. It is logical, practical, effective and humane.

  • In the Media | November 2011

    Europe Leads the World’s Economy to the Cliff


    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Copyright © 2011 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Masters and Papadimitriou discuss the looming financial crisis in the eurozone, the possibility of contagion, and the OECD's warning of an impending recession in Europe and the UK unless the European Central Bank takes action. Full audio of the interview is available here.

  • In the Media | November 2011

    A Moment among the Minskians


    By Dan Monaco

    The Straddler, Fall 2011. All content © The Straddler

    I
    The events leading up to and following the financial crisis in 2008 led to widespread deployment of the term “Minsky Moment,” used to describe the painful termination of what Hyman Minsky called “runaway expansion.” In boom times, according to Minsky, stable profit growth resulting from speculative (debt-fueled) risk-taking leads to ever greater speculative risk-taking until the bubble finally bursts and a debt-deflation crisis ensues as investors liquidate their assets to cover their debt liabilities. The longer the “runaway expansion” lasts, the more dramatic the “Minsky Moment” is liable to be.

    In June I traveled to the Minsky Summer Seminar at the Levy Institute at Bard College. The train stop closest to Bard is Amtrak’s Rhinecliff station, and the journey to it from New York City takes you up the eastern bank of the Hudson River for about ninety minutes. It’s hard not to be struck by the beauty of the Hudson, broad and grand between its beveled cliffs, a steady, workmanlike current, simultaneously fierce and serene, operating like a paradoxically silent operatic ostinato. Pleasure cruises run between New York City and Albany, and it is not unusual to see a barge heading in this direction or that, evoking the Hudson Valley’s manufacturing history.

    Of course, the Hudson River is also infamous for its having been contaminated by toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from General Electric’s manufacturing plants in Hudson Falls and Fort Edward. The result of years of mostly legal dumping of PCBs between 1947 and 1977 led to a large stretch of the river being declared a Superfund Site in 1984. Turmoil, controversy, and legal battles ensued; cleanup dredging began in earnest in 2009.

    Knowing this as one looks out a railcar window at the river leads to an odd and occasionally eerie appreciation of the scenery. It might also inspire a thought or two on the occupation of the economist. For there is a sense in which all economists are implicitly charged with advancing recommendations on the appropriate use of an apparatus—call it the labor and money arrangements of man—which one might with only slight exaggeration describe as a sort of savage machinery. This apparatus is capable, when adequately structured, of advancing human well-being; it is capable, too, of setting well-being back, of passing over certain sections of humanity—including populations within nations, nations themselves, continents, and generations.

    But there is also a sense in which, at least to the eyes of an outsider, the codes of the profession, and the dominant modes of thought within the field, seem to put the economist who fully acknowledges the potency of the poorly secured munitions ship whose course he is seeking to influence in a bit of an odd position. If he thinks it is best to grapple with the navigation plan, he must still contend with the tendencies of the moiety of his brethren who, in spite of the field’s outsized political and cultural influence, either deny that their conclusions have anything to do with something as complex as the actual practice of seafaring, or who—hewing closely to the field’s first principles—regard an absence of captaincy as the best captaincy, the rarely manned bridge the best manned bridge.

    “Economists have lost their credibility because they do not actually deal with the real world,” Dimitri Papadimitriou, President of the Levy Institute, told me in my conversation with him. “But there were and are certainly some economists, including Hyman Minsky, who looked at the real world not as an exception case.”

    “Minsky was in some ways a pioneer. He saw that economic theory assumed that everything is known and that there is some tendency of the system to reach for equilibrium and, at times, to reach periods of ‘tranquility,’ as he preferred to call them. Of course, he never believed that stability was possible. He didn’t believe in the invisible hand. There’s a reason why it’s invisible—because it’s not there.”

    II
    It is characteristic of capitalism, according to Minsky’s John Maynard Keynes, that it fails to maintain full employment,(1) and that its most essential traits are instability and uncertainty.

    JMK appeared in 1975, just as the postwar “Golden Age” of global capitalism was coming to an end in a decade marked by oil shocks, unsustainable levels of inflation, the dismantling of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, rising rates of unemployment, and growing popular familiarity with the concepts of “stagflation” (stagnation and inflation) and the “misery index” (unemployment plus inflation).

    The 1970s were a crucial period for both economic policy and economic study; the decade’s disruptions were exhibited to impugn the effectiveness of, and ultimately abandon mainstream adherence to, Keynesian economics. As Peter Temin, an economic historian at MIT, told The Straddler in February, there were two reactions within economics to the problems of the 1970s: “One was to patch up [Keynesian] theory and extend it. The other came from people who said that Keynesian theory is terrible—it got us into this mess, we have to do something different. And that fed into this desire to use mathematics to set up elaborate models and to have everything be efficient."(2)

    It led, in other words, to the recrudescence of precisely the sort of clean neoclassical models of efficiency, equilibrium, and omniscience from which Keynes, in 1937, had broken by publishing The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.

    The return back to neoclassical economics, however, was made easier by its never having really left. The Keynesianism prevailing for a time before, and for the thirty years after, the second World War was in fact a neoclassical synthesis of old ideas and new theory.

    In Minsky’s recap of the standard telling, the process of synthesis began with J.R. Hicks’ influential 1937 article “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’,” which introduced an interpretation and a simplified model (IS-LM) by which to understand Keynes. Hicks’ interpretation was the foundation of the influential economist Alvin Hansen’s work “in hammering out the American version of standard Keynesianism."(3) As a result, American (and a great deal of international) economic policy was guided by a neoclassical synthesis called Keynesianism into the 1970s.

    Without getting into the neoclassical synthesis’ IS-LM model (which examines the relationships between interests rates and GDP), or the intricacies, such as they are, of neoclassical Quantity Theory (which essentially argues that prices are exclusively related to the amount of money in circulation), the fundamental difference between Keynesianism (whatever the version) and neoclassical theory is that the former argues that some form of government intervention into the economy is necessary to achieve full-employment stability, while the latter holds, to use Minsky’s words, that “a decentralized economy is fundamentally stable."(4)

    Johan Van Overtveldt’s history of the Chicago School provides a succinct summary of the worldview underlying neoclassical theory:

    The basic assumption of neoclassical economic theory is the proposition that in a competitive market environment, individuals and corporations pursuing their own self-interests necessarily promote the best interests of society as a whole.(5)

    Thus, neoclassical economics, whatever its modifications or adjustments, is always in essence a cry for “pure” capitalism, while Keynesianism, whatever its color, is always at heart a proffered solution (more or less “radical,” depending upon one’s interpretation) to the problems of capitalism from within capitalism.

    In JMK, Minsky writes that in the 1930s, neoclassical economics had held that events like the onset of depressions were anomalies; once they began there was nothing to do but ride them out. Coming from a different direction, orthodox Marxists “interpreted the Great Depression as confirming the validity of the view that capitalism is inherently unstable. Thus, during the depression’s worst days, the mainstream of orthodox economists and the Marxists came to the same policy conclusions: …nothing useful could be done to counteract depressions."(6)

    The General Theory was thus simultaneously a response to worldwide depression, a dramatic (if not a clean) break with neoclassical economics, and an argument that while capitalism is “inherently unstable,” policy solutions from within do exist to ensure that “business cycles, while not avoidable, [can] be controlled."(7)

    What made Keynes’ theory possible, in Minsky’s view, was a radical paradigm shift in perception that placed the “fragile” workings of the financial sector at the center of a complex modern capitalist economy:

    Whereas classical economics and the neoclassical synthesis are based upon a barter paradigm—the image is of a yeoman or a craftsman trading in a village market—Keynesian theory rests upon a speculative-financial paradigm—the image is of a banker making his deals on a [sic] Wall Street.(8)

    In this capitalist economy, full-employment equilibrium—indeed, equilibrium in general—is not possible because each stage of the business cycle contains the loose strands of its own unraveling. Actors operating in a sophisticated financial sector are engaged in “decision-making under conditions of intractable uncertainty” and as a result there are always “processes at work which will ‘disequilibriate’ the system."(9)

    Financial collapses are the most pronounced examples of these disequilibriations:

    [T]he financial system necessary for capitalist vitality and vigor…contains the potential for runaway expansion, powered by an investment boom. This runaway expansion is brought to a halt because accumulated financial changes render the financial system fragile, so that not unusual changes can trigger serious financial difficulties.… [S]tability…is destabilizing.(10)

    III
    What of Minsky’s claim that Keynes was basically misinterpreted by mainstream economics? And what of this claim in the context of capitalism’s “Golden Age?” Whether or not the neoclassical synthesis was an accurate interpretation of Keynes, the thirty years following World War II were notable in the history of capitalism for their relatively stable growth and their approximation to full employment. I put these questions to Papadimitriou.

    Papadimitriou: Minsky realized that there were some important features that prevented a full-blown crisis from occurring. There were a number of near crises, but Minsky would agree that during the “Golden Age” there was a crucial role that both big government played as well as the big bank [i.e., the Federal Reserve].

    Minsky was always interested in what is apt policy versus what particular item one should look for in a policy. Minsky’s own policy was that if you believe stability is destabilizing—that is, there is a tendency for the system to destabilize—you need to be prepared for that and do something about it to prevent it.

    Yes, you can assume that private markets can be self-regulating as a result of profit seeking—you don’t want anything bad to happen. But on the other hand, we know that avarice and greed become a lot more important than self-restraint and self-regulation. So my suspicion is that Minsky would have said that you have to be able to rely on something other than policies emanating from traditional economic theory, like the neoclassical synthesis. As, for example, in the same way as Schumpeter had said that there will always be technological innovation, and therefore you will have creative destruction, Minsky was cognizant of financial innovation. And, there is a need, then, for sophisticated instruments of regulation that are required to keep up with financial innovation, especially if you believe that a sophisticated economy as ours is more or less a finance-guided economy. Look what has happened especially now, where the free-market mantra took hold beginning with the Reagan Presidency. Look at the results.

    Had Minsky been alive today, he would have said that government doesn’t only have to play a role in expenditures [to generate adequate aggregate demand], but also, a role in industrial policy. And that has been absent. The American economy is superior to other economies in terms of high technology, aerospace, and probably agriculture. But you cannot sustain growth to provide for 300 million people [on these industries alone].

    In addition to emphasizing that “there is no final solution to the problems of organizing economic life,"(11) Minsky argued that policies based on a correct interpretation of Keynes would direct government expenditures towards more socially and individually productive ends, and would also promote a more equitable distribution of income. Writing as the neoclassical synthesis was on the verge of giving way, he lamented the military spending and empty consumption of capital-intensive goods that had marked its heyday.

    As Keynes summarized The General Theory, he avowed that there were two lessons to be learned from the argument. The first was the obvious lesson that policy can establish a closer approximation to full employment than had, on average, been achieved. The second, more subtle, lesson was that policy can establish a closer approximation to a more logical and equitable distribution of income than had been achieved.

    To date [i.e., 1975] the first lesson has been learned, albeit in a manner that makes an approximation to full employment heavily dependent upon government spending in the form of defense production and private investment that sacrifices present plenty for questionable benefits in the future. … [T]he second lesson has been forgotten; the need for policy aimed to achieve justice and equity in income distribution has not only been ignored but it has been so to speak turned on its head.(12)

    Raising questions of income distribution and inequality in America tends to lead, in both elite and barroom discourse, to cries of “class warfare” or worse, so I asked Papadimitriou to elaborate a bit on Minsky’s idea of equality in the context of the reality of default American economic ideology.

    Papadimitriou: Minsky was very concerned about poverty. He thought the government should approach the poor from the perspective of, “why are they poor?” and seek to restructure the view about what government should do. He was against the idea of government transfers to alleviate poverty. He would have been intolerant of the government’s failure to do now what was done during the Great Depression through employment programs such as the Works Progress Administration and other programs of the New Deal, because he thought that by giving the poor these transfers the government changed their behavior as opposed to providing them with a job—giving them a goal and, to some extent, the capacity to enjoy a standard of living and social inclusion.

    Minsky was realistic that the sort of equality connotated by the word “equality” is not achievable—it wasn’t achieved under socialism; it wasn’t achieved under communism. But, nevertheless, the question is, is it appropriate for one-tenth of the population to control that gigantic percentage of wealth, and to command that kind of income, relative to the bottom half, which basically does not have a chance to realize the prosperity that can be achieved in this country.

    You can put it in a different way. The government plays the role of a redistributive vehicle. As an example, Minsky and others would be appalled at the Bush tax cuts being continued. They don’t do anything for aggregate demand, they don’t do anything in terms of increasing employment, and they don’t do anything in setting the economy on a path for growth. Therefore, Minsky would have insisted that these tax cuts cause the wrong kind of debt for the government to incur. He would have suggested other policies—for example, promulgating a tax structure that is progressive and not, like the payroll tax, regressive—that could bring about better outcomes. That would not lead to the same maldistribution of wealth we are experiencing currently.

    But what about the perception of this maldistribution of wealth? There seems to be an odd phenomenon, arguably not limited to American society, by which the reality of discontent with income and wealth maldistribution is held in check by ambivalent feelings about to what degree it is actually malevolent. Back in April, former U.S. Senator Phil Gramm authored an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in which he argued that Barack Obama’s presidency had brought about “higher taxes on the most productive members of American society."(13) This is a familiar stance on the right that is not wholly rejected by the population at large: the wealthy may create abundant riches for themselves, but they are the job creators who provide us with employment, and so anything we do to hurt their bottom line just ends up hurting our own. Or, even if that’s a bit hard to take, in any case, any remedy the government would come up with to address maldistribution would be worse than the malady itself.

    And this ambivalence has an additional, aspirational contour. There is a famous quote, attributed to John Steinbeck, that runs, “Socialism never took root in America because the poor see themselves not as an exploited proletariat but as temporarily embarrassed millionaires.” I asked Papadimitriou if, putting the question of socialism aside, he thought the attitude towards the rich by the poor was in some ways informed by their seeing themselves not as the poor, “but as temporarily embarrassed millionaires.”

    Papadimitriou: The majority of the population has that perspective, and that comes out clearly in the surveys that are run on individuals who are surviving on welfare checks and yet are against taxation because they believe there could be a time that they will be hurt. There is this longing, to go back to Steinbeck’s words, to become a millionaire.

    On the other hand, there is another group of the population that is totally disenfranchised, and I doubt that these people have any notion that they will ever actually find a ticket out of their misery. You can see that in the inner cities, and in the increase of homelessness. IV
    With respect to creating a culture that is receptive to the idea that there is a role for the government in promoting a more equitable society, the challenge faced by people like the Minskians is fourfold. First, a significant portion of the population at large must agree that the so-called “American Dream” is not alive and well. As Papadimitriou told me, “the ‘American Dream’ is fulfilled only for a segment of the population. Maybe the one percent in the income distribution ladder.”

    Second, this same portion of the population must accept that the receding of the “American Dream” is not a result of government malfeasance but has its roots in the present structure of the system in which private actors operate.

    Third, there must be widespread willingness to accept that government has a place in bringing about better economic outcomes and more equitable distributions of income.

    Fourth, people must be willing to act on these beliefs to press the government to take action. (For all its myriad failings and inefficiencies, the government possesses a quality unique among powerful entities in that it is subject to some form of democratic accountability.)

    Just how challenging the current ideological climate makes all of this was well encapsulated in an exchange that took place in July between Paul Krugman and George Will. Just after word emerged of a pending agreement between the House, Senate, and President to raise the ceiling on federal debt in exchange for spending cuts and budgetary reductions, both Will and Krugman appeared on the “roundtable” segment of ABC’s This Week:

    Krugman: We used to talk about the Japanese and their lost decade. We’re going to look to them as a role model. They did better than we’re doing. This is going to go on—I have nobody I know who thinks the unemployment rate is going to be below eight percent at the end of next year. With these spending cuts it might well be above nine percent at the end of next year. There is no light at the end of this tunnel. We’re having a debate in Washington which is all about, “Gee, we’re going to make this economy worse, but are we going to make it worse on ninety percent of the Republicans’ terms or a hundred percent of the Republicans’ terms?” And the answer is a hundred percent.

    Will: Paul’s right, we are a third of the way to a lost decade. But we’re a third of the way after TARP, the stimulus, Cash for Clunkers, dollars for dishwashers, cash for caulkers, the entire range of stimulus—the Keynesian approach which, by its own evidence, simply hasn’t worked. Now, Paul would double down—

    Krugman: In advance—one important point to make is that people like me said, in advance, this wasn’t remotely big enough. It’s not an after the fact—

    Will: That’s true.

    Krugman: —it’s not coming back afterwards. Right from the beginning, I looked at the numbers—people like me looked at the numbers and said, we’re going to have cutbacks at the state and local level, you’ve got a federal increase which is going to be barely enough to limit those cutbacks. There’s going to be no net fiscal stimulus if you look at government as a whole, which is what happened. So here we are.

    Will: It would be good to go to the electorate and have a Krugman election this time, saying, “Resolved, the government is too frugal. Let’s vote."(14)

    And so, even in the face and fallout of a disastrous economic collapse brought about by a financial crisis that occurred in the maw of an era of pronounced deregulation and government rollback, the burden of proof remains on anyone who would argue that properly calibrated government intervention into the economy is not only necessary, but is also capable of producing more positive outcomes. (It is, of course, worth noting that many forms of government expenditure—defense and less visible subsidies and tax incentives for large businesses and wealthy individuals being obvious examples—are somehow exempted from categorization as government intervention into the economy.)

    Thus, Will, who is somewhat rare among contemporary conservative commentators in broadcast media in that his is the professorial posture of a man who likes to take his arguments on the plane of ideas, was quite comfortable responding to Krugman’s points with nothing more than an arched rhetorical eyebrow, confident (not without cause) that such a response was all that was necessary to refute the most modest and elementary recommendations derived from Keynesianism.

    In responding to a crisis which they agree calls for a basic Keynesian response, then, left-of-(rather conservative)-center political actors and analysts (Larry Summers, for example—a hedge-fund liberal and the most prominent embodiment of the “New Keynesian” heirs to the neoclassical synthesis, who was instrumental in developing the partially effective stimulus bill of 2009, and who was also an ardent supporter of financial deregulation in the 1990s—called for additional stimulus in 2011) find themselves in a circular process by which they are:

    constrained by politics and ideology which → limits the force of the response which → leads to outcomes that partially attenuate but do not end the crisis which → allows opponents who have helped build constraints on a potential Keynesian response to claim to demonstrate that Keynesianism does not work which → builds even more confining constraints on its application.

    And, if, returning to Minsky, he is correct that Keynes has been misinterpreted, the process above is, in some ways, the same process that Keynesianism itself underwent during, and immediately following, the reign of the neoclassical synthesis.

    V
    Why should Keynes’ theory have “triggered an aborted, or incomplete, revolution in economic thought?” Minsky offers a number of reasons. He suggests, for example, that The General Theory is a “clumsy statement” (“a great deal of the new [theory] is imprecisely stated and poorly explained”); that Keynes’ didn’t have a chance to participate in the interpretative debate following its publication (he was sidelined by a heart attack and then went to work in the war effort); and that it is not possible to perform controlled experiments in the social sciences (a familiar lament).(15) But two of Minsky’s explanations in particular stand out.

    1) According to Minsky, “the older standard theory, after assimilating a few Keynesian phrases and relations, made what was taken to be real scientific advances.”

    Even though economists had often argued as if the laissez-faire proposition, about the common good being served as if by an invisible hand by a regime of free competitive markets, were firmly established, it is only since World War II that mathematical economists have been able to achieve elegant formal proofs of the validity of this proposition for a market economy—albeit under such highly restrictive assumptions that the practical relevance of the theory is suspect.(16)

    Keynes was therefore “made to ride piggy-back on mathematical general-equilibrium theory.”

    As an outsider, it is hard not to see in this assimilation a manifestation of a broader tendency in mainstream economics to reach for an equilibrium of another kind. The au fond assumption away from which the field, generally speaking, seems to resist being pulled, and towards which it inevitably claws its way back, is precisely the neoclassical proposition Van Overtreldt describes in the citation above.

    Of all of the social sciences, famously incomplete in their ability to comprehend human affairs, economics seems to be the least capable of acknowledging its limitations—or perhaps it is simply the most skilled at cagily hedging those limitations. After all, it seems reasonable to assume that the economic affairs of man are a complex affair, full of inconsistencies, contradictions, and odd behavior. Messy, in other words. And yet, it appears that theories within mainstream economics seeking to account for this mess—or seeking to counter the deleterious consequences of this mess—are at best partially assimilated, and at worst, wholly rejected in favor of models and modes of thought that don’t just envision and promote the benefits of the competitive workings of free and unfettered markets, but that also create an ideal out of them.(17) Further, any deviation is met with a redoubled effort to reinforce and/or retrofit the ideal. As Peter Temin told The Straddler, “The kind of models that many people use—general equilibrium models—start from assumptions of perfect competition, omniscient consumers, and various like things which give rise to an efficient economy. As far as I know, there has never been an economy that actually looked like that—it’s an intellectual construct."(18)

    James Kenneth Galbraith’s words to The Straddler back in March of 2010 are of a similar flavor—and go further towards hinting at an explanation of why this might be:

    [W]hen we encounter a doctrine of harmonization, of the smoothly functioning realization of the interests of all, the great and the small, which is textbook market economics, people should recognize that this is sand being thrown in their faces—that this cannot possibly be a realistic representation of the world in which we actually live. Take it as an analytic principle that one has to look at the behavior of the great with a cold eye.(19)

    There is a famous and oft-cited quote of Keynes from The General Theory which runs:

    The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.

    Minsky agrees and disagrees, proposing that this quote “needs to be amended to allow the political process to select for influence those ideas which are attuned to the interests of the rich and powerful.” That is, ideas are important, but those ideas best suited to the advance and further entrenchment of the “vested interests” are often selected as the most important.

    Perhaps it is this process, beyond the limitations of the field qua investigative social science, that accounts for mainstream economics’ radical idealism with respect to the functioning of capitalism.

    2) But there is a further point to be made, using the final potential reason Minsky lists for the failure of full-throated Keynesianism to take hold as a point of departure:

    [T]he Keynesian Revolution may have been aborted because the standard neoclassical interpretation led to a policy posture that was adequate for the time. Given the close memory of the Great Depression in the immediate post-World War II era, all that economic policy really had to promise was that the Great Depression would not recur. … Questions as to whether the success of standard policy could be sustained and questions of “for whom” and “what kind” and about the nature of full employment were not raised. The Keynesian Revolution may have been aborted because the lessons drawn from the standard interpretation not only did not require any radical reformulation of the society but also were sufficient for the rather undemanding performance criteria that were ruling.(20)

    One wonders—in an age of florid and ever-increasing income inequality, stagnating wages for the majority of Americans, the recent development of high and persistent unemployment, and the pronounced deterioration in the quality of experience for the citizen as laborer (not only has job security disappeared, but the erosion of benefits for members of the workforce has increased as a structural adjustment of the meaning of employment continues apace) and for the citizen as consumer (interactions with providers of goods and services leave the consumer not infrequently in a netherworld between simultaneously complex, shoddy, and quickly obsolete products and poor, generally unresponsive support service)—if the implementation of an effective method to remedy the recent trajectory of economic citizenry would now require a radical reformulation of society. Or, what is more likely, if a change in society’s structure that, while not particularly radical, would be perceived as radical by those who have benefitted most from its current arrangements. Perhaps this is why Barack Obama’s speech on September 19th, in which he issued recommendations for tax increases on high-end incomes, and which contained a knowing and preemptive rhetorical strike against those who would call it class warfare, was greeted with cries of class warfare. (Class warfare, incidentally, is a concept with notable and defining instances in the actions of mankind. Examples in modern history include the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, and America’s nineteenth-century labor battles. None of these events or movements seem to have had at its vanguard a battering ram in the shape of a modest tax increase.)

    While a small sector of the society has been well served by the workings of America’s economic system, the vast majority of the population has reason for discontent. One suspects that this might become even more the case as the future unfolds. Under these circumstances, if you’re interested in defending the status quo, better to fight on the plane upon which you are strongest by wrapping yourself in the rhetorical trappings of American economic ideology and the reassuring tropes of American self-identity than to join the battle on the plane of real-world outcomes and conditions.

    And better, too, if you are an economist with a stake in the game—a little too cozy, perhaps, with those who foot the bills, but by no means operating outside of the ethics of the field in which you ply your trade—to retreat to models demonstrating the fundamental correctness of your position, even if these models, in the end, have a dubious relationship to the actual world.

    VI
    It should be noted that in some ways, Minsky’s pessimism about the possibilities for stability within capitalism, may prove—subsequent to the 2008 “Minsky Moment”—too optimistic for present circumstances.

    Speaking extemporaneously on a panel at the Levy Institute in June, the Washington University economist Steven Fazzari pointed up the potential for a cycle to get stuck at a particular stage:

    What’s the converse of “stability is destabilizing?” Instability is stabilizing. I don’t know that Hy[man Minksy] would have ever said that, but the theory does imply this to some extent because it is a theory of indefinite cycles. So you get the boom, you hit the peak, you get the crisis, the crisis is cleansing—it may be extremely painful, but you wipe out the weaker units and you reestablish the conditions for growth again when the balance sheets are in some sense repaired. I think that’s the basic theory, the basic story.

    So in that context, if you want to tie my question—what will be the aggregate demand generating process going forward—to a Minsky perspective, you have to ask how long will it take for balance sheets to be repaired? How long will it be until more robust conditions in the financial system are established?

    A necessary condition for a more robust recovery is the improvement of the household balance sheet—leading to a restoration of better consumption, given that consumption is such a big part of demand. But I’m actually not fully convinced that this is sufficient. It’s necessary, but I’m not sure it’s sufficient.

    Income distribution is a fundamental structural problem that goes beyond finance. The growth model in the US over the past three decades was one of relatively stagnant income growth across much of the income distribution, plugging the hole in demand with more consumer borrowing. So balance sheet improvement can help but it doesn’t seem to me that it deals with the additional issue of the income distribution. And there’s nothing on the table from a policy perspective or a structural perspective that would change this.

    In other words, absent some significant event or dramatic change in policy, the fuse may have blown on the washing machine, leaving us stuck on soak.

    Paul Davidson, editor of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, made a similar argument in his remarks at the Institute:

    From the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II, the unemployment rate in the UK was double digits, except for one year when it was 9.7. That doesn’t sound like a cyclical problem to me, and it didn’t sound like it to Keynes, who basically argued that the economy had settled down at a long-run, stable unemployment rate which was very high. Just look at Japan in the 1990s and 2000s—and, I’m afraid to say, maybe a decade or two in the United States, beginning in 2007. So it’s not the ups and downs of a roller coaster—the capitalist system can be stable at less than full employment.

    No one can know what will happen as the avenues to affluence and the economic expectations (be they grand or modest) that people have for their lives are more and more ostentatiously occluded for more and more members of the population. It’s not likely to be pleasant, as grievances tend to manifest themselves in all sorts of odd and often irrational ways (the Tea Party being Exhibit A in our own times). But it’s also always possible, of course, that the worm will turn and those who benefit least will fix their attention on those who benefit most. Perhaps this is American capitalism’s fundamental anxiety—indeed, perhaps it always has been. But in the aftermath—and in the midst—of its greatest crisis in eighty years, a heightened unease may help account for its pronounced defensiveness,(21) and the rigidity of its scholarly underpinnings.

    VII
    There remain broader questions. Though we are in a tough spot today partially because consumers are less able to play their accustomed role in demand generation, Minsky’s speculation that “[t]he joylessness of American affluence may be due to the lack of a goal, the acceptance of a standard in which ‘more’ is really not worth the effort"(22) rings no less true in these circumstances.

    As of 1975, according to Minsky, “[t]he combination of investment that leads to no, or minimal net increment to useful capital, perennial war preparation, and consumption fads [had] succeeded in maintaining employment.” But though the period of the “Golden Age” had been remarkable in purely quantitative economic terms, in America it had “put all—the affluent, the poor, and those in between—on a fruitless inflationary treadmill, accompanied by…deterioration in the biological and social environment."(23)

    And so, even if we accept that an economy should be geared towards full-employment with stable growth, a reasonably equitable distribution of income, and the potential to enjoy prosperity and affluence as goals, what form will this growth take? What do we mean by prosperity and affluence? And what are qualitative contours by which to gauge the well-being of members of our society?

    At a time where a move back to some contemporary approximation of the moderate principles underlying the neoclassical synthesis would be regarded as radical, perhaps it is worth putting these larger, qualitative questions on the table as well.

    Perhaps, too, it is time to urge the field of economics to wrestle with the complexity of a system whose limitations it is best not to elide in simplified models that have a Panglossian sanguinity at their core. And perhaps too it would be well to investigate the complexities that are actually produced by the limits of the capabilities of field.

    For, as Minsky writes as he closes JMK, if, like Keynes, we think it best to live under an economic system “that sustains the basic properties of capitalism,” it should not be “because of the virtues of unfettered capitalism but in spite of its defects, which, though great, can in principle be controlled. ...[I]f capitalism is to be controlled so that the basic triad of efficiency, justice, and liberty is achieved, then the design of the controls will have to be enlightened by an awareness of what was obvious to Keynes—that with regard to both the stability of employment and the distribution of income, capitalism is flawed."(24)

    Notes

    1. “Full employment” is generally understood to mean a situation in which every person of working age who wants to work has a job, which is of course different than saying every person of working age has a job. In practical terms, unemployment rates below three, four, or even five percent—like those seen in the 50s and 60s, and again in the 90s—have typically been considered reasonably close approximations to full employment, not least because of the perceived relationship between low unemployment rates and the danger of an “overheating” economy leading to high rates of inflation. Indeed, there is a not uncontroversial concept in economics, the NAIRU (Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment), which argues that there is a rate of unemployment (sometimes infelicitously termed the “natural” rate of unemployment) below which an economy ought not go lest it risk unsustainable rates of inflation. It is a subject of some debate precisely what this rate is, or if it is the same rate at all times, or if it is even a useful concept, but it’s typically claimed to be in the neighborhood of five percent.

    It is also worth noting, of course, that the official rate of unemployment is always lower than the actual rate of unemployment because official measurements fail to include significant portions of the nonworking population. For example, in September of 2011, the unemployment rate in the United States stood at 9.1 percent, or 14 million, according to the Department of Labor. But there were an additional 2.5 million, or 1.6 percent, who were officially not counted (how many were unofficially not counted is another matter):

    “In September, about 2.5 million persons were marginally attached to the labor force, about the same as a year earlier.… These individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey.…

    “Among the marginally attached, there were 1.0 million discouraged workers in September…. Discouraged workers are persons not currently looking for work because they believe no jobs are available for them.”* (*United States Department of Labor. Employment Situation—September 2001. Washington D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf [bold type in original].)

    The so-called “underemployed,” people who would like to work full time but are working in part-time jobs, are also not included in official measures of unemployment.

    2. “What’s Natural? Peter Temin in Conversation with The Straddler.” The Straddler, springsummer2011. http://www.thestraddler.com/20117/piece5.php

    3. Minsky, Hyman P. John Maynard Keynes. New York: McGraw Hill, 2008. 32.

    4. Ibid. 2.

    5. Overtveldt, Johan van. The Chicago School. Evanston, IL: Agate B2, 2007. 52.

    6. Minsky. Op. cit. 6

    7. Ibid. 7.

    8. Ibid. 55.

    9. Ibid. 11, 59.

    10. Ibid. 11.

    11. Ibid. 166.

    12. Ibid. 158.

    13. Gramm, Phil. “The Obama Growth Discount.” Wall Street Journal. 15 Apr 2011.
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703983104576262763594126624.html [my emphasis].

    14. “Roundtable.” This Week with Christiane Amanpour. ABC: 31 Jul 2011.
    http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/roundtable-part-budget-endgame-14198610.

    15. Minsky. Op. cit. 11-15.

    16. Ibid. 15. Minsky continues:

    “It turns out that the accomplishments of pure theory during the 1950s and 1960s are more apparent than real, when the problems of a financially sophisticated capitalist economy are under consideration.… Thus the purely intellectual pursuit of consistency between what was taken to be an elegant and scientifically valid microeconomics and a presumably crude macroeconomics has turned [o]ut to have been a false pursuit; microeconomics is at least as crude as macroeconomics.”

    17. As one of The Straddler’s contributing editors, Gary Peatling, observes:

    “I’m wondering if this unreality of neoclassical economics is itself a defense mechanism. Since a really unregulated economy is impossible (and is not even desired by the richest and most powerful vested corporate interests), any failure can be blamed on residual regulation. Hence the tenets are always irrefutable, in the manner of what Karl Popper termed a ‘bad science’ (although Popper might not have identified this). Also I’m reminded of John Ruskin’s comment that political economy was like science of gymnastics devised on the assumption that humans have no skeletons.” (Peatling, Gary. Personal communication. October 25, 2011)

    18. Temin. Op. cit.

    19. “The Predators’ Boneyard: A Conversation with James Kenneth Galbraith.” The Straddler, springsummer2010. http://www.thestraddler.com/20105/piece2.php

    20. Minsky. Op. Cit. 16.

    21. A comparatively mild articulation of this defensiveness was on display in a sympathetic 2010 New York Times Magazine profile of “lifelong Democrat” Jamie Dimon, CEO of Chase Bank:

    “The executive I encountered was on a mission to reclaim a respected place for his industry, even as he admits that it committed serious mistakes. He was adamant that government officials—he seemed to include President Obama—have been unfairly tarring all bankers indiscriminately. ‘It’s harmful, it’s unfair and it leads to bad policy,’ he told me again and again. It’s a subject that makes him boil, because Dimon’s career has been all about being discriminating—about weighing this or that particular risk, sifting through the merits of this or that loan.” (Lowenstein, Roger. “Jamie Dimon: America’s Least-Hated Banker.” New York Times Dec. 1, 2010. www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/magazine/05Dimon-t.html)

    22. Minsky. Op Cit. 164.

    23. Ibid. 163.

    24. Ibid. 165.

  • In the Media | November 2011

    The Man Who Saw Through the Euro


    By John Cassidy

    Rational Irrationality Blog, The New Yorker, November 2, 2011. © 2012 Condé Nast Digital. All rights reserved.

    To many Americans, the European debt crisis is a bit like the Asian bird flu of a few years back: a mystery virus that appears from nowhere and threatens to destroy us. To those of us who grew up in northern Europe, and especially Britain, it is the tragic culmination of a fractious political and intellectual debate that goes back almost a quarter of a century.

    Twenty years ago, in advance of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which paved the way for a monetary union and the creation of the euro, a big dividing line in British politics was between pro-Europeans, who supported these efforts, and “Eurosceptics,” who vehemently opposed them. Most Eurosceptics were on the right, and their spiritual leader was Margaret Thatcher, who viewed Europe through the lens of small-government conservatism. “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels,” Thatcher famously commented in 1988.

    On the center and the left, most politicians and intellectuals supported further European integration, including a monetary union and common currency. But a few brave souls demurred. Some were old-school socialists and trades unionists, who viewed the European Economic Community, as it was then called, as a ghastly bosses’ plot. But one was a posh Cambridge economic forecaster called Wynne Godley. Previously, Godley had been best known for his critical stance on Mrs. Thatcher’s domestic economic policies and her embrace of monetarism. After Godley’s repeated criticisms of its policies, the Thatcher government slashed the funding to his taxpayer-financed economic institute in Cambridge.

    Assiduous readers of this blog will recall that last week I mentioned Godley, who died in 2010, in my post about Keynes. He was an interesting fellow. A professional oboe player before becoming an economist, he worked at the British Treasury department in the nineteen-fifties and sixties, and then taught at Keynes’s old home, King’s College, Cambridge. In the mid-nineties, he moved for part of each year to the Levy Institute at Bard College, a haven for heterodox thought, where he became one of the first economists to query the debt-financed prosperity of the Greenspan-Bernanke years. Today, though, I would like to draw attention to an article he wrote in October, 1992, for the London Review of Books entitled “Maastricht and All That.” (Thanks to Gavyn Davies, who now blogs regularly and informatively at the Financial Times’ Web site, for reminding me about it.)

    Unlike many Eurosceptics, Godley wasn’t anti-European or anti-government—far from it. His problem with the plan for a common currency was that it didn’t provide for enough government. The failure of the Maastricht Treaty to set up a proper fiscal policy for the entire euro zone alongside a common currency meant the entire scheme was half-baked and ultimately unworkable. He wrote,

    Although I support the move towards political integration in Europe, I think that the Maastricht proposals as they stand are seriously defective, and also that public discussion of them has been curiously impoverished…. The central idea of the Maastricht Treaty is that the EC countries should move towards an economic and monetary union, with a single currency managed by an independent central bank. But how is the rest of economic policy to be run? As the treaty proposes no new institutions other than a European bank, its sponsors must suppose that nothing more is needed. But this could only be correct if modern economies were self-adjusting systems that didn’t need any management at all.

    As a Keynesian, Godley didn’t believe in self-adjustment. He took it as axiomatic that what had prevented another Great Depression was the worldwide adoption of counter-cyclical policies. Faced with the onset of a recession, governments typically relaxed fiscal policy and devalued their currencies to make their exports more competitive, he pointed out. But inside a monetary union, policymakers wouldn’t have either option available, and the outcome could well be disastrous. Godley ended his essay with these prophetic words:

    If a country or region has no power to devalue, and if it is not the beneficiary of a system of fiscal equalisation, then there is nothing to stop it suffering a process of cumulative and terminal decline leading, in the end, to emigration as the only alternative to poverty or starvation. I sympathise with the position of those (like Margaret Thatcher) who, faced with the loss of sovereignty, wish to get off the EMU train altogether. I also sympathise with those who seek integration under the jurisdiction of some kind of federal constitution with a federal budget very much larger than that of the Community budget. What I find totally baffling is the position of those who are aiming for economic and monetary union without the creation of new political institutions (apart from a new central bank), and who raise their hands in horror at the words “federal” or “federalism.” This is the position currently adopted by the Government and by most of those who take part in the public discussion.
  • In the Media | October 2011

    The Eurozone Punts as the Crisis Deepens


    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    October 23, 2011. Copyright © 2011 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Pacific Radio host Ian Masters interviews President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou about the looming crisis in the eurozone, the inadequacy of current proposals to resolve it, and the real possibility of contagion on this side of the pond. Full audio of the interview is available here.

  • In the Media | October 2011

    Taxing the Wealthy Will Not Kill Jobs


    By Thomas Masterson

    Multiplier Effect, October 21, 2011

    I study the distribution of wealth and income here at the Levy Institute, so I read the first five hundred words of Robert Samuelson’s Washington Post column on inequality (“The Backlash against the Rich,” October 9th) with interest and approval. But I knew it couldn’t last. Once Samuelson gets beyond description and attempts explanation and analysis, he is clearly out of his depth.

    Samuelson turns his gaze to the proposal to raise income taxes on those with incomes above a million dollars, whom he refers to as “job creators”—a Republican Party talking point that Samuelson repeats uncritically. He makes two mistakes in citing a paper [Working Paper No. 589], written by my colleague Ed Wolff, in which the distribution of assets for the top 1% of households by wealth (total assets minus total debt) is compared to the distribution for the bottom 80%. First, Samuelson seems to assume that those people who own privately held businesses are small business owners. Second, not all of the people in the top 1% of household wealth are households making more than $1 million a year in income.

    In Ed Wolff’s paper we see that the wealthiest 1% of U.S. households in 2007 held more than half of their net worth in “unincorporated business equity and other real estate,” and only 26% in financial assets such as stocks, mutual funds, bonds, etc. It is clear that Samuelson is translating the former category as “small and medium-sized companies.” This could be an honest mistake. But it is a mistake. There is no evidence in Ed Wolff’s paper that the top 1% contains all (or no) “small business owners.” Just that they hold twice as much wealth in privately held businesses as in publicly traded businesses. And as Kevin Drum of Mother Jones put it, “[w]e’re talking about people who earn upwards of a million dollars a year, after all. You don’t get that from taking a minority stake in your brother-in-law’s auto shop.”

    If we actually look at those U.S. households receiving $1 million or more in income (using the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, as Ed Wolff does), we are talking about 0.37% of households. In terms of the composition of their assets, the picture is pretty much the same for them as for the wealthiest 1% of U.S. households. But only 24% of the top 1% of household wealth are in the million-dollar income club. If you look at the bottom 99.6% or the bottom 80%, the picture is very different. While the average net worth for the millionaires is $23.5 million, the rest of us have just under $445,000, and the bottom 80% have less than half that.

    Even if you assume that all those people making a million or more in income are small business owners (stop laughing now, I’m trying to make a point), where is the evidence that raising income taxes on the wealthy will prevent them from creating jobs? There is no evidence. Here are the facts: Clinton raised the top rate to 39.6% and employment expanded by more than 20% during his presidency, while Bush the Younger lowered top rates and saw only a 2.3% increase in employment during his eight years. This is correlation, not causation, of course, but certainly no evidence for the claim that raising top rates is a job-killer.

    Samuelson might appeal to logic, perhaps. But logic must deny the appeal. There is no valid logical argument, merely this: (1) raise taxes; (2) ???; (3) fewer jobs. There is, however, a case to be made in support of raising taxes on those with high incomes. Raising income taxes will increase the incentive to use profits to invest in the business (thereby increasing business-owners’ wealth) rather than as income. Which one of those options creates more jobs?

    More importantly, Samuelson misses the elephant in the room in his discussion of the possible reasons for the increase in inequality over the last 30 years: public policy. Beginning with Ronald Reagan and continuing through Bush the Elder, Clinton, Bush the Younger, and right through to Obama, public policy has shifted more and more toward the benefit of the wealthy. In just about every sphere of public policy that impacts the economy, there has been an almost unilateral shift from policies that help workers to policies that help employers. From agricultural subsidies and embargoes that favor agribusinesses, to free trade policies that help manufacturers to move their plants to the location of the lowest bidder, and labor policies that have enabled the rollback of union power almost everywhere except the public sector itself, the policy landscape has looked ever more appealing to the wealthy and ever more bleak to the worker.

    Author(s):
  • In the Media | October 2011

    Marshall Auerback: Gold and Silver Opportunities in Turbulent Times


    The Gold Report

    Business Insider, October 19, 2011. Copyright © 2011 Business Insider, Inc. All rights reserved.

    The Gold Report: Many of the resource companies in Pinetree Capital’s investment portfolio are gold companies. Gold went from above $1,900/ounce (oz.) in early September to around $1,600/oz. currently. Now, European central banks have sold 1.1 million metric tons of gold into the market to drive the price lower. Pinetree’s share price has followed gold lower and your exposure to gold remains high. What’s Pinetree’s pitch to investors right now?

    Marshall Auerback: We had a very significant run up in the gold price, so some correction is understandable. But the conditions that created the run-up to $1,900/oz. have not dissipated. If anything, they’ve become more pronounced, notably in the Eurozone, where investors must begin to seriously consider the possibility of a break-up of the European monetary union and the implications that has for gold. And if you look at the monetary overhangs in places like China and Japan, it’s hard to find stores of value there either. So we have had some significant spec liquidation, some central bank sales—a plus, as central bankers are usually a great contrary indicator—and yet the price appears to have stabilized around $1,600/oz. Gold stocks, in contrast, still reflect valuations that are substantially lower than the current gold price. It is also important to note that the capital markets, in contrast to late 2008, have not shut down. Good quality mining projects can still obtain funding, especially for projects with robust economics, which a number of our holdings possess.

    Pinetree has a unique structure. We raise money from the markets, which means that our longer-term funding requirements are, to some degree, shaped by market perceptions and market enthusiasm for resource stocks. But it also means we are not subject to monthly, daily or quarterly redemption pressures, so we can hold on to some smaller names that now offer the most compelling value they have offered in years.

    TGR: A few years ago, Pinetree went from being focused on technology and biotechnology stocks to resource-based equities.

    MA: Yes, the fundamental thesis has not changed. The developing world is likely to remain the dominant social, political and economic theme for at least the next few generations. Commodity prices have soared because the depletion of readily available resources is now finally outstripping the ingenuity of mankind to extract these resources. That is not just our view. Jeremy Grantham of GMO believes that this has changed the fundamental trend in real commodity prices, though the explosive nature of these prices in recent years has no doubt been amplified by speculation and historically unprecedented and ultimately unsustainable fixed investment in China. So you will get periodic corrections, especially during periods of global economic slowdown, but we don’t think this changes the long-term thesis. The portfolio composition has changed somewhat to reflect a changed economic environment of less base metals, more precious metals, but that is a tactical, as opposed to strategic, decision.

    TGR: Did that one-month, $300-dollar drop in the gold price ruin gold’s reputation as a safe-haven investment?

    MA: Not really. The price rise was, like other commodities, undoubtedly amplified by the actions of trend-following speculators. These are generally weak holders, and they tend to get shaken out when there are market gyrations of the sort that we have experienced over the past few months. But the fundamental reasons for holding gold have, if anything, grown stronger over the past few months.

    TGR: Is the fear-trade gone? Is gold now trading strictly on supply and demand fundamentals?

    MA: Given the way that markets have traded toward the end of the quarter, where you get maximum incentive to “paint the tape” in an upward direction, we think it is way too premature to suggest that the fear trade is over. Ultimately, though, gold is a supply/demand story. The market has been in fundamental deficit for decades and only the sales and leasing of gold by the central banks have prevented an even more acute price explosion.

    TGR: The market is always about timing, but timing is even more important now given the rampant volatility in the markets. Fearing an economic collapse, many investors exited the junior sector once the volatility started in August. Many of those same investors remain on the sidelines today and some probably want to get back in. Is there something they should wait for—like a bottoming of the gold price—or is now the time to return?

    MA: We think the time when you get maximum valuation is during these periods of turbulence and fear, when the baby gets thrown out with the bathwater. The good stuff is thrown out along with the bad as redemption pressures mount. Since we are in a comfortable position vis-à-vis our cash positions, we are in a good position to capitalize. Especially as Pinetree, for reasons explained before, doesn’t face comparable redemption pressures.

    TGR: Our readers are primarily retail investors who like the high-risk, high-reward nature of the precious metals juniors. Pinetree is essentially a retail investor with lots of cash and a crack research team. How is Pinetree playing the current market? Have you been adding to your positions on the market dips? Have you sold off? Have you held tight? Give us the scoop.

    MA: We try to “feed the ducks while they’re quacking,” in the sense that we recognize that many of these holdings are small and illiquid, and we tend to take large, strategic stakes. When our assessments are largely validated by market action, then we find that it is a good time to reduce, particularly because with these smaller, less liquid names, we are almost always going to be a bit early because we have to trim when there is good demand. This is especially the case when the company’s development has largely tracked what our analysts forecasted and with that comes the growing popularity of the shares with the broader market. Selling in those kinds of situations gives us the flexibility to take on new deals or, as is the case today, to buy from distressed sellers.

    TGR: What are your favorite five gold plays in the Pinetree Capital portfolio?

    MA: Gold Canyon Resources Inc. (GCU:TSX.V) is one. We are big believers in this deposit. The initial resource should be out by the end of this year and is promising to be several million ounces with grades exceeding most other bulk tonnage deposits in Canada. Looking at the dimensions of the deposit, specifically the new extension to the southeast, the potential here continues to grow far beyond what the company’s initial resource will give it credit for.

    Queenston Mining Inc. (QMI:TSX) is the consolidation of key past producing mines in the prolific Kirkland Lake mining camp. There is an Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. (AEM:TSX; AEM:NYSE) take-out potential. Extensive drilling on the Upper Beaver and the South Mine complex joint venture with Kirkland Lake Gold Inc. (KGI:TSX) continues to add ounces.

    RoxGold Inc. (ROG: TSX.V) is operating in Burkina Faso and has just raised the money needed to acquire 100% of its flagship asset. High-grade deposits are very hard to come by and the results it has consistently seen show potential for just that. With mid-major companies operating in the region, as RoxGold continues to add size, it becomes more and more likely to be an attractive candidate for a take-out.

    Continental Gold Ltd. (CNL:TSX) recently reported a very large high-grade resource on its Buritica gold/silver/base metals deposit in Colombia. If you look around right now there aren’t too many deposits that hold size and grade like this one and, with 250 kilometers of assays to come since the resource was calculated, there is still a lot of upside from here.

    Mawson Resources Ltd. (MAW:TSX; MWSNF:OTCPK; MRY:Fkft) is exploring at Rompas in Finland, a new discovery with bonanza gold where samples up to 22,723 grams per ton (g/t) gold and 43.6% uranium have been identified. The weighted average of all channel samples from the 2010 program is 0.59m at 203.66 g/t of gold and 0.73% uranium within a sampling footprint of 6.0 km. strike and 200–250m width. More than 300 discovery sites have now been identified within the mineralized footprint. At this very early stage of exploration, Rompas has to be considered as one of the most exciting global gold discoveries (with a uranium credit) to emerge into the marketplace, in terms of its high grades and hundreds of surface showing over a large area.

    TGR: What are three gold plays Pinetree has positions in that few have ever heard of?

    MA: Redstar Gold Corp. (RGC:TSX.V) is exploring in Alaska where properties have limited historical drilling. However, the company has seen very high grades. Currently, it is drilling up there and with the recent addition of the International Tower Hill Mines Ltd. CEO to their board, there is reason for interest. The company also has a joint venture with Confederation Minerals Ltd. (CFM:TSX.V) up in Red Lake. Thus far, Redstar has seen very high grades over 200 g/t over narrow widths stretching over a potentially several kilometer-long strike length. This kind of project requires lots of drilling; however, thus far, there has been some good continuity of success and with any sort of thicker intervals, this would be a project well worth the interest.

    Prosperity Goldfields Corp.’s (PPG:TSX.V) exploration is headed up by Quinton Hennigh, who is also on the board of Gold Canyon and is heading up its exploration program. Stock had a large run-up prior to results, which the market clearly saw as disappointing. Despite this, we think these results show great promise given that Prosperity was the first in the area and the potential size of this deposit is very large. This project is in Nunavut; however, a winter camp has been set up and, relative to the region, the infrastructure is better than most.

    Terreno Resources Corp. (TNO:TSX.V) is focused on a few different resources in South America. The company just raised $2.8 million and so it is cashed up to move forward on the initial exploration of both precious/base metal projects in Argentina as well as their phosphate/potash exploration in Brazil. It has had some solid trench results thus far down in Argentina, which is promising. The phosphate/potash market seems to be one of the few places where most analysts agree there will be a lift in pricing in the future so we are excited to see the exploration results.

    TGR: Let’s switch gears to silver. Does Pinetree believe silver is a better near-term investment than gold?

    MA: No, we think gold is likely to be the better performer if a global recession becomes the predominant concern, as opposed to systemic issues. That said, there have been some fairly violent moves to the downside over the last few weeks. The bear talk on China has really been overdone. Remember, China has over $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, so it has ample firepower to combat the forces of recession. In the very short term, we could get these massively oversold conditions worked off if it looked like the world was not coming to an end and silver could have a nice pop. Look at the U.S. data recently:

    • Since late August, the U.S. economic data has surprised somewhat to the upside.
    • Initial unemployment claims rose less than expected; September chain store sales look stronger than expected; Ford Motor Company’s sales for September were up 9%.
    • It looks as though GDP growth may come in better than 2% annually in both the third and fourth quarters, surpassing recent pessimistic expectations.

    As far as China itself goes, suddenly all the analysts, economists and portfolio managers that were all bulled up on China two years ago, a year ago and even six months ago have become all beared up on China. We are hearing about an imminent hard landing in China from everyone. So why the sudden bearishness about China?

    It is claimed that China’s informal credit market is out of control. Property developers and businesses are starved for credit; business investment and real estate will fall. A hard landing is at hand. Let’s put this informal credit market into perspective.

    This informal credit market is estimated at 3–4 trillion yuan RMB. The Chinese economy is now estimated at something north of 40 trillion yuan. According to Fitch, the formal credit market plus the shadow banking system totals about 70 trillion yuan.

    When one looks at these numbers one can see that the growth of informal lending and the extremely high interest rates on informal lending represent a problem in China. But it does not impact a significant share of aggregate expenditures.

    The real problem lies with the banking system and the shadow banking system.

    TGR: Is this important credit market now poised to take Chinese aggregate demand down?

    MA: We doubt it. Interest rates in the banking system are negative in real terms. The banking system is still expanding at a double-digit annual rate. Interest rates in the shadow banking system are much higher; they are no doubt positive in real terms, but it appears they are not usurious. In any case, this credit is still being allowed to expand at a very rapid rate. Will the authorities be able to deal with problems in the banking system or shadow banking systems, which are the credit markets that matter?

    The answer is probably yes. The biggest credit excesses and the biggest white elephant fixed investments in this cycle lie with the local authorities. The Chinese government in one fell swoop removed half a trillion dollars of such loans off the backs of these local authorities. A half a trillion dollars! That is as large as the entire alleged informal credit market that everyone is getting so beared up about.

    Longer term, the Chinese economy is an out-of-control Ponzi economy. Labor force growth will go negative. Surplus labor in agriculture is depleting. Fixed investment is impossibly high relative to a falling warranted rate of growth. Very bad things will eventually happen. However, the Chinese economy is also an extreme command economy. Extraordinary measures will be taken to avert these very negative outcomes.

    The Chinese economy is highly indebted. The Chinese central government is not. Before the proverbial you-know-what hits the fan, the Chinese government will use its balance sheet to keep the white-elephant over-investment juggernaut going. Do not underestimate the fiscal capacity of the Chinese government and its willingness to use it. We do not think the excesses today in the Chinese informal credit market are a reason to get very beared up on China all of a sudden. The Chinese bear story will unfold progressively over a long time.

    The real threat in China is inflation. China’s fixed investment has become increasingly credit dependent. To keep the fixed-investment juggernaut going and avert a hard landing, there must be sustained rapid money and credit expansion. There is already a large monetary overhang. The combination of these flow and stock dynamics threaten a very high inflation down the road. Which again makes the long-term case for gold very bullish.

    TGR: Where is Pinetree getting its exposure to silver?

    MA: Apogee Silver Ltd. (APE:TSX.V). The company’s primary focus is the Pulacayo-Paca Property located in southwestern Bolivia. The property includes the historic Pulacayo mine, which was the second largest silver mine in Bolivia’s history with historical production exceeding 600 million ounces of silver. Although there is obviously some risk with dealing in Bolivia, there are still many operating mines and we feel the deposit warrants the risk.

    Southern Silver Exploration Corp. (SSV:TSX.V; SEG:Fkft) recently acquired the Cerro Las Minitas property in Durango, Mexico. There is a history of production right in the middle of the property and thus far, the company’s initial holes have been promising. This is a very early stage project and there is a lot more definition needed before a resource can be laid out; however, Southern Silver is in a good region and we feel the property certainly has potential.

    TGR: What are some investment themes that you expect to play out in the coming months?

    MA: We think that the markets could surprise again to the upside as we have apparently discounted a double dip recession, whereas a slowdown might be more accurate. This period might end up being closer to 1998 than 2008.

    The trouble with the view that we are heading for another 2008 is that all crises are different. But they do share one common element: the inability of markets to perceive that when a market discontinuity is fresh in the minds of investors (e.g., 2008); it seldom repeats until that institutional memory is dissipated. Now, I believe that European banks are insolvent conditional upon the PIIGS collectively being insolvent. Clearly, this is the case for Greece (although the European Central Bank (ECB) could easily forestall this if it keeps buying Greek debt), but for the others, this is unclear—and, particularly in the case of Spain and Italy, a function of the rates at which they can borrow. So while the ECB provides a liquidity backstop, they have the room to adjust. Of course, the missing ingredient is growth. Europe already looks as though it has slid into recession. I would argue that recession, as opposed to systemic risk and bank runs, is already priced into European stock markets. But nothing is certain.

    While the current crisis in Europe is worse than the 1998 crisis with LTCM and Russia, in 1998 it was thought that the entire system would collapse. Remember in 1998 Fed funds were 5%, not zero; 10-year notes, above 4%, not 2%+; 2-year notes were 5%; SPX was 30x earnings, not 15x. We had not gone through a 1974-style liquidation in reverse parabola terms except for the one day 1987 sell-off, as we did in 2008–2009. Real estate (houses) was not selling for prices yielding 10%–15% on lower-end real estate, but that is where the focus of foreclosures is felt. The story will be told in the next eight trading days.

    TGR: Thank you for your insights.

    As Pinetree Capital’s corporate spokesperson, Marshall Auerback is a member of Pinetree’s board of directors and has some 28 years of global experience in financial markets worldwide. He plays a key role in the formulation and articulation of Pinetree’s investment strategy. Auerback is a research associate for the Levy Institute and a fellow for the Economists for Peace and Security.

  • In the Media | October 2011

    Looking Overseas for Job-creation Inspiration


    By Catherine Hollander

    National Journal, October 11, 2011. Copyright © 2011 by National Journal Group Inc.

    The U.S. job market has shown lackluster growth recently, to put it mildly.

    The September employment report, released on Friday, revealed that nonfarm payrolls added just 103,000 jobs last month—not horrific, but still under the threshold economists say they need to cross in order to dent unemployment. The Senate is likely to vote on the job-creation proposals in President Obama’s $447 billion American Jobs Act this week, but the bill’s passage is a long shot.

    As they consider the legislation, lawmakers may want to reflect on their counterparts across the Atlantic.

    While each economy faces unique obstacles to growth, fellow developed countries like Germany, Denmark, and France have implemented programs analogous to some found in Obama’s jobs bill with success. These include job-search programs accompanying unemployment benefits and stepped-up apprenticeship programs.

    Other countries have developed programs not found in the president’s legislation, such as mechanisms to certify workers who have gained skills on the job rather than in the classroom.

    Unemployment insurance programs vary widely from country to country. As of 2007, the most recent year for which data was available, the U.S. paid employees 13.6 percent of their previous earnings on average, compared with 24.7 percent in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as a whole, which counts the U.S. and 33 other wealthy countries as members.

    The U.S. also has short-lasting unemployment benefits compared with most of the other OECD members. By itself, this provides a “powerful incentive” for the unemployed to look for their next job, according to Gary Burtless, an economist at the Brookings Institution.

    But other OECD countries have deployed different incentives to get recipients of unemployment benefits back to work. Many low-paying jobs in the U.S. pay around the same as the benefits. Other countries have ensured work earnings are higher than unemployment benefits, incentivizing recipients to look for a job, according to Stefano Scarpetta, the OECD’s Deputy Director for Employment, Labour, and Social Affairs. 

    Some OECD countries have bolstered their programs to help the recipients of unemployment insurance re-enter the workforce. France and others have made unemployment benefits conditional on searching for a job and participating in re-employment programs. The U.S. has paid less attention to investing in such labor market institutions, Scarpetta said.

    He recommended focusing on “training, apprenticeship, and skills” to boost unemployment among the most vulnerable sectors of the population -- the young and long-term unemployed. Countries such as Germany and Denmark stepped up their traditional apprenticeship programs in response to the economic downturn. The pumped-up programs have a strong track record of landing apprentices with jobs, Scarpetta said.

    The American Jobs Act proposes to do this through new training for the recipients of unemployment insurance -- so-called “bridge to work” programs modeled after efforts in Georgia and North Carolina. These programs allow long-term unemployed workers to continue receiving unemployment benefits while they pursue work-based training.

    Such training could have secondary benefits, eliminating unwanted social trends such as crime and depression that are associated with high unemployment levels, according to Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of Bard College’s Levy Economics Institute. He called the training programs a “very good idea.”

    But Papadimitriou cautioned that without a more general economic recovery, simply training unemployed workers doesn’t guarantee jobs. Others fear it will be difficult to find employers willing to bring in unpaid trainees. They like to maintain control over the hiring process, Brookings’s Burtless said.

    It would be more fruitful in the long run to reform the way the U.S. thinks about employment training, he said.

    Several OECD countries, including Portugal, have created mechanisms by which workers who drop out of school but gain skills on the job can have those skills certified, making them more attractive to potential employers.

    The U.S. places too much emphasis on formal educational credentials and not enough on skills acquisition, Burtless said. A European-style certification program could make on-the-job training more valuable by providing workers with proof that they have a transferable skill.

    Such a program runs the risk of locking workers into too-rigid skill certifications, which could harm their ability to appear flexible in a changing workforce, according to Randall Eberts, president of the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. It would not provide immediate unemployment relief, and it would take time for employers and workers to recognize the value of the certificate, but it could provide a huge help in the long run to a large portion of workers who complete their training on the job, Burtless said.

    Some economists were hesitant to make comparisons between the U.S. and the smaller European countries, whose economies operate in a different political environment. And it will ultimately take strong overall economic growth to turn around the labor market. Supply-side changes will have a limited impact without an accompanying improvement in demand, Papadimitriou argued.

    But in the end, the point is not that other developed countries have it all figured out—it’s that no one does, and looking at programs that have been implemented abroad can be a useful jumping-off point for discussions of job-creation measures in the U.S.

  • In the Media | September 2011

    The Die-Hard Recession Heads Off the Charts


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Truthout, September 9, 2011. Copyright © 2011 Truthout. All Rights Reserved.

    “By 1970, the governments of the wealthy countries began to take it for granted that they had truly discovered the secret of cornucopia. Politicians of left and right alike believed that modern economic policy was able to keep economies expanding very fast—and endlessly. That left only the congenial question of dividing up the new wealth that was being steadily generated.”

    Those words, from a Washington Post editorial more than twenty-five years ago, echoed the beliefs not only of politicians and the press, but of mainstream economics professionals resistant to the idea that growth in a market economy would ever stagnate over a protracted period.

    And some of the data did fit nicely. Through several recessions and recoveries, inflation-adjusted GDP rose almost in tandem with a line of predicted growth expectations. But in November 2007, something changed. Real GDP dropped down from what was expected by more than 11 percent, and, as this summer’s data has shown, it hasn’t returned to its pre-recession trend.

    The unusual slump has provoked a stream of commentary that attempts to define the problem, but it hardly matters whether the downturn is identified as the second dip of a “double-dip” recession, a continuation of the “Great Recession,” a fast-moving slowdown, a slow nosedive, a long-term stall-out, or a confirmation that the economy has entered a Japanese-style “lost decade.” Growth during the 21st century is following a different trend line than it did in the 20th, and employment is also responding in new, different ways from earlier post–World War II recessions.

    A range of additional data also indicates that what we’re hearing is not the regular breathing of an economy as it contracts and expands. Annual growth rates and quarterly moving averages—when examined starting in the mid 1970s, as Greg Hannsgen and I did at the Levy Economics Institute [see One-Pager No. 12]—show a steady decline beginning in 2000.

    And the employment numbers make the case yet again. Look at the graph below, with separate lines for the past six recessions. It traces employment-to-population ratios, beginning with the first month of each recession. These ratios are used to measure, among other things, how well a nation utilizes its workforce—a kind of labor drop-out rate.

    You can see at a glance that the pink line indicating the current recession—yes, that one down near the bottom of the chart—is an outlier in the group. It shows that by the 43rd month of the downturn, the ratio stood at just over 58 percent, meaning that 58 percent of the population was employed. That figure is 4.6 percent less than at the recession’s start, when more than 62 percent were working. And it means that this employment decline is steeper, deeper, and longer than in any of the previous five recessions by a long shot.

    Even in the two worst recoveries during the past forty years, this ratio never before declined by more than three percent. By the time the five recessions were this far along, employment had returned either to pre-recession levels, or to a distance from the recession’s start that was, at worst, two percent, compared to the current more than four percent.

    Together, this data makes the case that we’re in a prolonged slump that’s highly unusual, and requires action that’s far more aggressive than the usual responses. Job creation should be the government’s urgent, first priority. The nation needs to recognize just how perilous the employment disaster is—and what a marked departure this recession is from any we’ve seen in the modern era.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is President of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and Executive Vice President and Jerome Levy Professor of Economics at Bard College.

  • In the Media | September 2011

    At Issue with Ben Merens


    Interview with Pavlina R. Tcherneva

    September 8, 2011. © 2011 by Wisconsin Public Radio

    As Obama tours the East promoting his jobs bill, and jobs forums spring up across Wisconsin, Research Associate Tcherneva and host Ben Merens talk about what should be done now to address unemployment. Full audio of the interview is available here.

  • In the Media | September 2011

    Job Creation: Obama, Government Can Do Much More, Economists Say


    By Peter S. Goodman

    The Huffington Post, September 1, 2011. Copyright © 2011 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. | “The Huffington Post” is a registered trademark of TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All rights reserved.

    As President Obama puts the finish on a much-touted program aimed at promoting job creation, public expectations appear low, owing to national dismay over a deep unemployment crisis and the partisan division ruling Washington.

    But put aside the limitations of political possibility—granted, a bit like ignoring gravity—and many economists assert there is much the government could do to put large numbers of Americans back to work.

    At the top of many to-do lists is government spending into the tens of billions of dollars to finance large-scale public works projects, a strategy that could address a gaping mismatch: Nearly 14 million Americans are officially out of work, yet a great deal of work needs to be done, from repairing dilapidated roads and bridges, to retrofitting government office buildings with energy-efficient infrastructure.

    “If the government spends the money directly on government-funded projects, that puts people on payrolls,” said Gary Burtless, a former Labor Department economist and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. He added that the bulk of hiring and spending is likely to be confined to the domestic economy. “You can’t get Brazilian workers to pave a road here in the United States, and lots of capital goods that go into infrastructure would also be produced in the United States,” he said.

    Critics of infrastructure spending as a proposed fix for unemployment have argued that it can be inefficient: A surge of money let loose through federal and state bureaucracies invites waste and abuse. To which proponents ask, compared to what?

    “The other waste that we should keep front and center in our minds is having nine percent of the workforce unemployed,” Burtless said. “If some of the money is wasted because it is spent too quickly, you’ve got to put that in context of the complete waste of the talents and abilities of the 11 million Americans who would be working if we were at full employment today.”

    Infrastructure spending is particularly promising, say proponents, because it is likely to generate jobs in the very areas of the economy that have been hardest hit as the housing boom has gone bust—construction and manufacturing.

    “We still have mass layoffs in those sectors,” said Pavlina R. Tcherneva, an economist at Franklin & Marshall College. “It seems very obvious that we can absorb large numbers of workers in those sectors for the public good.”

    One proposal that has gained favor among some economists in recent months—among them, Jared Bernstein, previously chief economic adviser to Vice President Biden and now a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities—would direct $50 billion toward repairing aging schools, with a particular focus on making buildings more energy efficient. Proponents say this spending would be financed over a decade by closing $46 billion worth of tax loopholes that now favor the traditional oil and gas industry.

    According to an outline of the Fix America’s Schools Today proposal, the nation’s roughly 100,000 public schools confront a backlog of deferred maintenance projects that reaches $270 billion, meaning this money could quickly be absorbed and put to use.

    “This is labor-intensive work,” Bernstein told the Huffington Post. “And that’s a good thing. That means more jobs.”

    Bernstein helped craft the nearly $800 billion in stimulus spending measures delivered by the Obama administration in early 2009—a package that has since become a symbol of disappointment across the ideological spectrum. Those favoring more aggressive government intervention, led by the economists and Nobel laureates Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, derided it as too small and poorly targeted to reinvigorate economic growth. Conservatives such as John Taylor, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers in the George H.W. Bush administration, and now a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, pronounced it a wholesale waste of money that did not create jobs.

    But Bernstein and many other economists maintain that the package prevented the unemployment rate from climbing even higher, and he would favor unleashing a new dose of one of its key components: aid for distressed state and local governments, whose budget troubles have prompted deep and sustained layoffs. This is now the dominant force exacerbating joblessness.

    “It’s as simple as two plus two,” Bernstein said. “You have states that have to balance their budgets and they are still cutting deeply and they either raise taxes or reduce service, and they have been doing more of the latter, leading to layoffs. State and local fiscal relief would be a great way to get much needed, fast-acting medicine into the system.”

    But as Bernstein acknowledges, such proposals are not on the agenda among the decision-makers in Washington, who have instead been consumed with debate over how to reduce the federal budget deficit.

    “I don’t see it on anyone’s to do list,” Bernstein said. “It’s very much a should. I’m not sure if it’s a could.”

    Among job creation initiatives that experts say could emerge from Washington—albeit, not without considerable congressional wrangling—are the continuation of a temporary reduction on payroll taxes, and the extension of emergency unemployment benefits for people who have been out of work for six months or longer. Both of these temporary programs are set to expire at the end of the year, absent congressional action.

    Collectively, they are pumping between $150 billion and $170 billion annually into the economy, Bernstein said.

    Beyond the Beltway considerations constraining the scope of policy, some economists advocate more sweeping efforts to generate new jobs by the million.

    Tcherneva, the Franklin & Marshall economist, says we need a modern version of the Works Progress Administration, one of the most ambitious undertakings of the New Deal, the federal government’s response to the alarming joblessness of the Great Depression. Then, the government directly employed millions of people, aiming them at building out public works projects of enduring value—dams, highways, parks and firehouses. This time, the federal government could channel funds to state and local government that could then employ private sector firms to build and revamp the needed infrastructure of today, adding light rail to reduce traffic congestion in major cities, upgrading parks and improving access to public education.

    “There is such a wide need out there,” Tcherneva said. “The private sector is not creating enough jobs. We need an explicit government commitment to put the jobless to work.”

    Some economists argue that infrastructure spending, while a potentially useful way to generate jobs, is not the most potent channel. A paper published last year by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College concludes that so-called social care—meaning early childhood education and home health care for the elderly—could generate even more jobs per federal dollar spent than infrastructure projects.

    “It gives you about twice as many jobs per buck as infrastructure,” said Thomas Masterson, an economist at the Levy Institute and one of the paper’s authors. “And it’s more targeted for women who tend to be disadvantaged.”

    The paper calls for $50 billion in annual government spending to hire early childhood educators who would provide child care for young children whose parents cannot afford it. The money would also provide home health care aides for the elderly.

    Both of these areas of the economy provide large numbers of jobs to people lacking college degrees—a group now struggling with particularly severe unemployment. Among high school graduates 25 years and older who did not complete college, less than 55 percent are now employed, according to the Department of Labor. That is down from 60 percent four years ago.

    Beyond the direct employment benefits, such a program would enable parents now unable to pay for child care to earn income outside their homes, while boosting the skills of children receiving care, Masterson said. Many states are now slashing support for subsidized childcare programs, while also cutting cash assistance programs for poor single mothers.

    Other economists assert that the key to job creation is a focus on the people who should be cutting the paychecks, generating fresh incentives for employers to hire.

    Two years ago, when the economy was still shedding hundreds of thousands of jobs each month, Aaron Edlin, an economist at the University of California at Berkeley and Edmund Phelps, an economist and Nobel laureate at Columbia University, delivered a paper calling for targeted tax credits for employers who hire low-wage workers.

    “The credits would quickly boost the number of low-wage people that businesses employ,” the scholars asserted in their paper. “As the market for low-wage people tightened, the competition for them would pull up low-end pay rates.”

    Edlin told HuffPost that this approach is now more urgently needed than ever.

    “We have a serious risk of a double-dip recession,” he said. “If one is willing to ignore the political constraints, the best way to get large numbers of people back to work is to give tax credits or subsidies to employers for employing people, and particularly the people who have suffered the most, and that’s low wage people.”

    Debate centers on whether such programs would produce sufficient benefits in an economy now painfully short of demand for goods and services, as consumers battered by years of diminishing fortunes pull back on spending.

    Masterson, the Levy Institute economist, said that most employers are too worried about weak sales prospects to respond to an incentive to hire.

    “If they can’t sell the stuff that they can make now, then why are they going to hire more people?” he said.

    But in an economy the size of the United States’, some companies are always expanding. The tax incentives might coax those employers to hire more people than they would have otherwise. And once those workers have extra wages, they would distribute them at other businesses, thus creating more jobs—a virtuous cycle. This is the theory, at least.

    “If workers are temporaily on sale,” said Brookings’ Burtless, “that will give employers a reason to add to their payrolls sooner rather than later.”

  • In the Media | August 2011

    Historically GDP Growth Is Off by 11.9% and Labor Markets Should’ve Already Bounced


    By Agostino Fontevecchia

    Forbes, August 30, 2011. © 2011 Forbes.com LLC™. All Rights Reserved.

    “[This] recession has turned into a prolonged and very unusual slump in growth, preventing a labor-market recovery,” explained Dimitri Papadimitriou, head of the Levy Economics Institute, in a recent paper called Not Your Father’s Recession. The economist makes the argument that post-crisis GDP growth rates are about 11.9% off of historical standards, which, along with the employment-to-population ratio, suggest the current macroeconomic environment is a lot more challenging than in other recessions and will need the intervention of government to recover.

    “Considering the already severe slump in job creation, it hardly matters whether such a downturn would constitute the second dip of a ‘double-dip’ recession, a continuation of the ‘Great Recession,’ or a confirmation that the economy has entered a Japanese-style ‘lost decade,’” wrote Papadimitriou, adding that a labor-market recovery appears unlikely without help from the government, and the data proves it.

    Economics hasn’t come to terms with the possibility of a market economy stagnating over a protracted period because its models are based on constant growth. The reality is that market economies have grown relentlessly during the XX century.

    Papadimitriou illustrates it with a chart overlaying an exponential growth line to an inflation adjusted-GDP series from 1967 to today. The match is almost exact all the way to 2007; today, real GDP is “11.9 per cent less than one would have expected based on earlier data.”

    It’s no surprise that a depressed U.S. economy has kept output at multi-year lows. Recent revisions show Q2 GDP growing at a meager 1%, suggesting post-recession growth came from now-exhausted stimulus packages. Papadimitriou takes it one step further, arguing that average GDP, as illustrated by 12-quater, 20-quarter, and 28-quarter moving averages, has been declining since 2000.

    One of the most worrying signs of the U.S.’ generalized economic weakness is the state of labor markets, particularly when compared with other post-recession recoveries.

    Employment-to-population ratios bottom out 18 to 37 months after the onset of the recession in each of the previous six cases of output contraction. This time around, 43 months after the beginning of the recession, the trend continues to be negative, with the ratio down 4.6% to 58.1% in what has been almost four years of negligible recovery in labor markets.

    With Chairman Ben Bernanke choosing to stay on the sidelines and the private sector immersed in a cycle of deleveraging, Papadimitriou points the finger at government, noting “the [federal] government has barely begun the task of creating the new jobs needed to deal with this disaster.”

    Further stimulus will face staunch opposition in Congress, with Tea Party candidates taking the reins of the Republican Party on a cut spending-platform. The White House has leaked, though, an announcement that President Obama will unveil a new jobs plan, which is expected to be some sort of stimulus, in September.

    It remains to be seen whether the situation in Europe will worsen, or if a moderate improvement in economic conditions in the second half of the year, coupled with Obama’s coming plan, will help push the economy out of the gutter.

  • In the Media | August 2011

    Fed’s $1.2 Trillion in Financial Sector Loans “A Classic Case of Moral Hazard”


    By Alexander Eichler

    Huffington Post, August 22, 2011. Copyright © 2011 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. | “The Huffington Post” is a registered trademark of TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All rights reserved.

    During the 2008 financial crisis, when the nation’s banking system seemed on the verge of collapse, President George W. Bush authorized a $700 billion bailout of the financial industry. The U.S. Treasury implemented that program, known as TARP, in an effort to stave off economic catastrophe.

    At the same time, and in the years that followed, the Federal Reserve was undertaking its own rescue operation, in the form of private, previously undisclosed loans to banks and other institutions—lending as much as $1.2 trillion, nearly twice the amount of the Treasury bailout, according to a data analysis performed by Bloomberg News and published on Monday.

    The scope of the Fed’s private lending had previously only been guessed at, but figures obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Bloomberg News show that the nation’s central banker issued loans to more than 300 institutions between August 2007 and April 2010, including over 100 loans of $1 billion or more.

    While the Fed’s loans likely helped to prevent a complete implosion of the global banking system, analysts say they fear the loans may have contributed to an atmosphere of complacency on Wall Street. Banks that received emergency cash infusions during the crisis may now believe the Fed will always be there to bail them out of trouble, the thinking goes.

    “It is a classic case of moral hazard,” Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, told The Huffington Post.

    The Federal Reserve itself had argued that the details of its emergency loans should be kept out of the public eye, claiming that the reputations of the firms involved could suffer if they were seen to be taking money from the government in order to stay afloat. Many of the banks that borrowed from the Fed had previously appealed to the Supreme Court to keep those records secret.

    However, an invocation of the Freedom of Information Act forced the Fed to release more than 29,000 pages of documents, revealing the extent to which the financial sector relied on Federal Reserve dollars during the worst days of the crisis.

    Given the extraordinary size of the loans, the public has a right to know what happened, said David Jones, an executive professor at the Lutgert College of Business at Florida Gulf Coast University.

    “It’s completely valid at some point to say, ‘Who did the borrowing?’“ Jones told The Huffington Post. “It was appropriate, under this special set of circumstances, to divulge the information.”

    Among the largest borrowers were Bank of America, which borrowed $91.4 billion; Goldman Sachs, which was in debt for $69 billion; JPMorgan Chase, which borrowed $68.6 billion; Citigroup, which borrowed $99.5 billion and Morgan Stanley, the biggest borrower of all, to which the Fed loaned $107 billion.

    In addition, the Fed issued sizable loans to a number of foreign banks, including the Royal Bank of Scotland, which borrowed $84.5 billion; Credit Suisse Group, which borrowed $60.8 billion and Germany’s Deutsche Bank, to which the Fed lent $66 billion. Nearly half of the 30 largest borrowers were European firms, according to Bloomberg News.

    While the amount of lending that took place is remarkable, some argue that the Fed’s error was not in issuing the loans, but rather in doing so without setting stronger policy reform conditions for the money.

    Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, told The Huffington Post that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke could have attached a “quid pro quo” to the emergency loans—stipulating, for example, that the money would only come through if the banks agreed to do business in a less risky way going forward.

    “This is the moment all the banks were on their backs,” Baker said. “The Fed ran to the rescue and got nothing in return.”

    A previous disclosure in December found that the Fed issued $9 trillion in low-interest overnight loans to banks and other Wall Street companies during the crisis. The $1.2 trillion figure represents the peak amount of outstanding loans, which occurred on December 5, 2008, according to Bloomberg News.

    Some critics contend that while the Fed was right to support the financial sector, the government didn’t do enough to help ordinary citizens who were also seeing their wealth evaporate during the crisis.

    Papadimitriou told The Huffington Post that the Fed issued many of its biggest loans during the Bush administration, and that “they didn’t appear to have any difficulty supporting the financial sector, but very much difficulty supporting the real sector, households.”

    Consumer spending suffered and unemployment spiked in the wake of the financial crisis, and the economy remains weak today. Output is low, consumer confidence is down and millions are still out of work—factors that have some economists worried about the possibility of a double-dip recession.

    The TARP bailout, led by the Treasury, was the subject of much popular ire when it occurred, since it was seen as a case of the government throwing money at the financial sector at the expense of everyday Americans. Similarly, the Fed’s $1.2 trillion in emergency loans were primarily aimed at keeping major financial institutions on their feet.

    “One would assume banks are too interconnected, you have to help all of them,” Papadimitriou said. “But if you take households in total, they are also all interconnected. They are also too big to fail.”

  • In the Media | August 2011

    L. Randall Wray Interviewed by Ian Masters on KPFK FM 90.7 – Los Angeles


    New Economic Perspectives, August 13, 2011. Copyright © 2010 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Senior Scholar Wray joins Masters for a macroeconomic analysis of adverse economic trends at home and abroad amid dire predictions of a double-dip recession in the United States and defaults in Europe, connecting the dots to see if we are indeed at a Smoot-Hawley moment where the Congress, instead of reversing economic decline, has accelerated it. Full audio of the interview is available here.

  • In the Media | May 2011

    Diagnosing New Inflation Symptoms


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    May 26, 2011. Copyright © 2011 New Geography

    It's been more than three years since the Great Recession began, and it's no longer debatable that the federal spending in its wake did not provoke inflation. Years of forecasts by fiscal conservatives about the result of government expenditures have proved to be wrong. After three fiscal stimulus packages, core inflation—which excludes the volatile prices of oil and commodities—remains very much in check. The core rate is the most reliable guide to future inflation, and it has not trended upward.

    Headline inflation, however, the rate that does include these two, has increased. Is the recent uptick in gas and food prices a game-changer on inflation? Does it mean that predictions of an inflation tsunami were well-founded? And what's the best course to follow now?

    Many commodity prices have made double and triple digit gains over the past year. The changes are more than a blip—cotton futures, for example, have risen 162 percent—even if the cost of oil continues to decline. These prices are notoriously subject to rapid change for reasons that don't reflect the structure of the U.S. economy. Factors can include Middle East politics, weather, activity in the developing world, and, most significantly today, speculative profiteering.

    Gold and other commodities have become a hot destination for players—money managers—as these markets have become the rare opportunity for high returns. In the absence of federal regulation and supervision, the low interest rates that are so crucial to business growth and to the vast majority of Americans have been allowed to feed into the permissive speculative superstructure.

    The run-up has clearly impacted the poor and the hungry in the undeveloped world. In academic and policy circles, there's a high level confidence that commodities account for only a small share of GDP in wealthy countries, and so aren't of concern as long as core inflation is under control. At the Levy Institute, in contrast, our research shows that even in the developed world expensive food, energy, and materials can crowd out other household purchases. Consumer budgets can be hurt even before serious headline inflation appears.

    If commodity prices were to continue to climb broadly and sharply, the Federal Reserve could face the prospect of a serious episode of cost-push inflation, similar to what we saw in the 1970s and '80s. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke might find himself occupying the chair of Paul Volcker in more ways than one.

    This kind of inflation is caused neither by the effects of low interest rates on the broader economy, nor by government spending. And, as with any symptom of ill health, the cause dictates the appropriate treatment. So if Bernanke's response was to raise interest rates dramatically in the hope of abating inflation to some arbitrarily low target, it would be a risky mistake. An interest rate rise would be a serious danger to growth and job creation. Business and labor are far too fragile to deal with a double whammy from rising gas and food prices coupled with monetary policy tightening.

    A better response would be "watchful waiting," a phrase seen in the December 1996 minutes of the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) meeting. A commodity price inflation could remain at least somewhat isolated.

    Higher commodity prices will be used as an excuse to charge that the Fed's supposedly lax policy has unleashed an inflationary flood of cash throughout the economy. But the Fed's so-called "easy money" is parked at the Fed itself, as bank reserves, since banks are not lending. This can't cause inflation either. Logic hasn't stopped newly re-branded Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich, who recently admonished that "The Bernanke policy of printing money is setting the stage for mass inflation."

    Those who purchase securities for long-term investment evidently disagree. Bond traders aren't anticipating an inflationary surge. Just look at the yield spread between inflation-indexed and non-indexed Treasury securities of the same maturity. It has remained almost constant over the past year. In other words, buyers who want their returns insulated from inflation are paying only slightly more for protection than they were last year. That flatness—the unwillingness to pay a premium for inflation insurance—indicates that long-term bond buyers haven't revised their inflation forecasts.

    Also unlikely to revise their predictions: inflation doom-drummers, even as energy prices level, and wages, another inflation indicator, are by no means jumping. Like eons of "the-end-is-nigh" prognosticators, they don't exactly have a great track record. Back in spring 2008, a frenzied Glenn Beck urged Fox viewers to "Buy that coat and shoes for next year now." Some of his Washington cohorts are coy about inflation's estimated time of arrival. Republican House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, for example, tells us that "fears" of "future" inflation are "hanging over the marketplace." Others, like former Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum, say it's already arrived (Obama brought it). The accusations continue despite a lengthy stretch of the lowest inflation rates in modern US history, even with the current commodities rise.

    Paul Ryan (R-WI) has been hailed as both a truth sayer and a soothsayer on the economy. He recommends that the Federal Reserve raise interest rates now to head off inflation "before the cow is out of the barn," ignoring the pain this would cause families and businesses. Here's my recommendation: Don't trust predictions about the future from those who've misread the present, and been very wrong in the past.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou is President of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, and Executive Vice President and Jerome Levy Professor of Economics at Bard College.

  • In the Media | May 2011

    Op-Ed: To Restore Jobs, US Has to Ramp Up Exports


    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    May 13, 2011. Copyright © 2011, Los Angeles Times

    For 20 years, U.S. exports have trailed imports. Addressing the imbalance could hugely boost the job market.

    One school of thought about the so-called jobless recovery of the American economy blames high unemployment on the federal deficit. But that’s blaming the wrong deficit.

    To achieve an authentic recovery that includes new jobs, the deficit we need to cut is in trade.

    For 20 years, America’s exports have been surpassed by its imports, with a big bite of that trade deficit composed of oil imports. Addressing the imbalance could have a huge effect on the job market, but only if it goes beyond reducing imports. We need to actively strengthen exports as well.

    Even if the economic recovery continues, as is likely, joblessness will remain a colossal disaster. The unemployment rate is hovering at about 9%, and for some groups it is far higher. Nearly 16% of African Americans are unemployed, with young people and Latinos not far behind. The United States is about 19 million jobs behind the curve if employment is to return to its pre-recession levels. Among the world’s most developed nations, the G-7, we have the highest unemployment. Here at the Levy Economics Institute, even in our best-case growth scenario, we see unemployment dropping only to about 7%—way above healthy levels—by 2015. We’re not alone in that pessimism: The figures vary, but the prevailing outlook, including from the Federal Reserve is that job-seekers face years of pain.

    Exports are key to meeting the urgent need for new jobs. The White House estimates that every $1 billion in exports creates 5,000 jobs. This makes it crucial for companies to find more customers in the rest of the world.

    In addition to aircraft and other transport vehicles, U.S. industrial equipment, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, semiconductors and agricultural products—raw and processed—have a track record of success in the global marketplace, along with millions of goods from medium-size and small companies.

    There are things that could be done to help American exporters. A devaluation of the dollar beyond the current downward creep would be a start. A weaker dollar would reduce the cost of our exports in foreign markets, in turn generating demand from buyers abroad. It would also encourage American consumers to buy domestic products because our goods would have a price advantage over imported ones. And the resulting rise in exports would have a side benefit: reducing the national budget deficit, because GDP growth and lower unemployment would mean larger government revenues and less spending on safety-net programs.

    Devaluation does have some downsides, of course. Over the long haul, it can cause inflation, but that is not an immediate danger because core inflation is currently at or near record lows. Still, consumers would probably be paying more in the short term for oil and other imports.

    In the long term, international monetary reforms would certainly be a preferable route to devaluing the dollar. Global imbalances are on the G-20 radar screen, but a serious policy response has yet to be floated. One helpful monetary reform would be to expand Special Drawing Rights—artificial, blended currency units governed by the International Monetary Fund—as supplemental currency reserves. This could only be done by an accord among the G-20 countries. International agreements take time—the World Trade Organization’s Doha talks will soon celebrate their 10th anniversary—so moving the dollar’s exchange rate is a better short-term solution.

    Even then, ramping up American exports will be difficult. The White House has set a goal of doubling exports over five years, but the current mania for spending cuts may work against that ambition. In the House of Representatives, the Small Business Committee has advocated rescinding $30 million in Small Business Administration grants to states for promoting exports and sharply cutting the SBA’s Office of International Trade. These savings would be counterproductive and would work against the nation’s best interests.

    It’s true that our trade account balance has recently improved. The better figures, though, aren’t a sign of healthy growth or an upcoming job surge. They reflect more a drop in imports rather than a growth in exports, and the drop has come because of less demand for goods in the recession’s shadow and amid ongoing financial fears.

    Exports are starting to rise. But making sure that the upward curve continues will be crucial to addressing our still-worrisome unemployment rate.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and a professor of economics there. He is a former vice chairman of Congress’ Trade Deficit Review Commission

  • In the Media | May 2011

    China Will Not Demand Its Money Back: Why the Doomsday Predictions on the Debt Ceiling Are Wrong


    Pema Levy Interviews James K. Galbraith

    The American Prospect, May 5, 2011. © 2011 by The American Prospect, Inc.

    A deal is taking shape between Congress and the administration on the debt-ceiling vote, and it will likely include some spending cuts in exchange for increasing the amount the government can borrow.

    As these negotiations play out, we’re constantly warned that the debt-ceiling fight has high stakes. Refusing to raise the ceiling will prevent us from paying debts and will destroy the faith our bondholders—that is, China—have in us. Or will it? The Prospect talked with James K. Galbraith, the Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations at the University of Texas at Austin, about just how accurate the doomsday predictions really are.

    Everyone says that if we don’t raise the debt ceiling soon, we’ll have a financial disaster on our hands. How accurate are these catastrophic predictions?

    Failure to raise the debt limit would be, for sure, a bad idea. Whether it would produce a fiscal and bond market Armageddon, I think, is really doubtful.

    This is a group of politicians saying, give me cuts or I will shoot the economy. So that’s the political problem that we face. And one way I think to handle that problem is to point out that what the hostage-takers have in their hands may well not be a nuclear grenade; it might be something much less cataclysmic.

    A few weeks ago, the ratings agency Standard & Poor’s warned that the United States could lose its AAA rating on U.S. debt (securities, bonds, etc.), which could have serious repercussions for the economy. How do you gauge the chances of a downgrade?

    One can’t judge what Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s will do, because they’ve gotten most everything else wrong in the last decade. These are firms that graded vast mounds of worthless mortgage-backed paper as AAA because of the crafty ways it was securitized. These are firms that never to my knowledge downgraded a major corporate fraud—Enron and so forth—more than a few days in advance of its collapse. And they routinely give cities lower ratings than they should based upon the default rates on those instruments. They have no particular competence in Europe, either. So, it’s a little bit unpredictable what a corporation with that track record is going to do.

    Is there a danger we’ll default?

    If you read the 14th Amendment, Section 4, it says that the [validity of the] debt of the United States authorized by law—including pensions, by the way, so including Social Security—shall not be questioned. So long as we are run by the Constitution, we’re going to pay the debt.

    One fear is that not raising the ceiling will cause a global panic or at least a ripple effect if the U.S. fails to pay its foreign creditors. What will foreign creditors do if we default on our bonds?

    Let’s suppose that the Treasury actually says to the People’s Bank of China, sorry, we can’t write a check to you right now. Well, in the case of the People’s Bank of China, the bond that they hold would become a defaulted bond, but it would still be there. And the Treasury would still recognize its obligation on that bond and would presumably be willing to pay accrued interest on it. The Treasury would probably say, it’s going to be a few days while we resolve this, and the People’s Bank of China would, in my view, probably do nothing.

    If I were sitting in the position of a foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities in that situation, the last thing I would want would be a panic. I would want this problem to go away.

    And if there is a panic?

    I think the right analogy to that would be the failure of Congress to pass the [Troubled Asset Relief Program] on the first round. The stock market went down by 800 points. That sent a very powerful political wake-up call, and suddenly people changed their positions. The most likely thing if we actually go to this stage where there is real turmoil would be that Congress—the hostage-takers—would drop their guns.

    So the question I would have then is: Does it make sense to give the hostage-takers what they want? Which are massive cuts. And I think it does not make sense by any stretch of the imagination to agree that the debt ceiling shall be the point of leverage for coming to a decision, which is what the Republicans want and unfortunately what some Democrats like Kent Conrad want.

    This would be an act of just gross negotiating folly to set the precedent that the debt-ceiling negotiations become the way in which the extremists get what they want.

    This Q&A has been edited for length and clarity.

  • In the Media | May 2011

    Conversations with Great Minds: Economist James K. Galbraith


    The Big Picture with Thom Hartmann, May 2, 2011

    In a two-part interview, Senior Scholar Galbraith discusses the “vast raid” on the home equity of the middle class by financial predators, “green” investment as a basis for economic growth, the importance of government regulation in establishing and maintaining markets, and how the substance of domestic policy has moved away from fostering “the common good.”

  • In the Media | June 2010

    An economist’s economist


    Copyright 2010 The Economist; Letters, June 10, 2010

    Sir,

    Your obituary of Wynne Godley (May 29th) did an injustice to his considerable intellectual achievements in macroeconomics and his courage in going against the orthodoxy that has ruled the economics profession for the past three decades. That very orthodoxy is now under attack all across the world, its otiose theoretical constructions having been exposed to the harsh light of actual economic events. Godley’s contributions to macroeconomics include his 1978 work on pricing with Kenneth Coutts and William Nordhaus, the textbook written in 1983 with Francis Cripps that inspired the “New Cambridge” group, and his 2006 book on monetary economics, written with Marc Lavoie.

    His often-cited success as a macroeconomic forecaster came about precisely because he developed a systematic framework for analysing the impact of potential developments, applied first to the British economy at Cambridge and subsequently to America’s economy at the Levy Economics Institute.

    Instead of taking the trouble to address these contributions, your piece settled for personal gossip, ending with a snide comment that “against a background like this, a little waywardness in the world of macroeconomics seems entirely forgivable.”

    Anwar Shaikh
    Professor of Economics
    New School for Social Research
    New York

    Gennaro Zezza
    Associate Professor of Economics
    University of Cassino
    Cassino, Italy

    Dimitri Papadimitriou
    President
    Levy Economics Institute
    Bard College
    Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

    Author(s):
  • In the Media | May 2010

    Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production, and Wealth


    Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie
    The work of Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie offers a novel approach, based on a consistent accounting methodology relating stocks and flows, and making use of Post-Keynesian behavioural assumptions that tie the analysis to a monetary economics perspective. The authors’ objective is to provide an analytical framework that could provide an alternative to the standard approach, by taking into account comprehensively the interrelations between real and financial variables.
    Download:
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Célia Firmin

  • In the Media | February 2010

    Holiday from the eurozone would bankrupt Greece


    Friday, February 19, 2010 02:00. Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010.

    From Mr Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Sir, Martin Feldstein (February 17) argues in favour of Greece taking a holiday from the eurozone. While his very thoughtful comment makes sense on the face of it, if implemented I believe it will bankrupt Greece absolutely.

    Under his plan, once the new drachma is devalued there would be a very strong demand for wages and prices to rise in tandem with the devaluation, so that parity is maintained with the euro. The result would be high inflation rates and even bigger budget deficits. The country’s holiday from the eurozone would likely become permanent, and prime minister George Papandreou’s valiant efforts to change the culture of a country’s expanding and wasteful public sector, rife with tax avoidance and evasion, will be forever lost.

    The plethora of articles in your pages and others, some arguing in favour and others against a bail-out, contribute to market confusion and drive the country’s financing costs to record levels. It is not yet clear that a bail-out is even needed, but this market confusion is rendering the government’s ability to achieve its deficit goals ever more difficult.

    Since the architects of economic and monetary union are neither about to change the system, nor to provide a sympathetic ear and a helping hand, what Greece really needs now is a holiday from further market confusion being created by contradictory, alarmist public commentary.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    President
    Levy Economics Institute
    Annandale, NY, US
  • In the Media | January 2010

    Who Are These Economists, Anyway?


    By James K. Galbraith

    By James K. Galbraith, Thought and Action, The NEA Higher Education Journal, Fall 2009.

    This article is partly a response to Paul Krugman’s piece in the Sunday New York Times of September 6, 2009, on the failures of the economists in the face of the crisis. Here, Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith takes up the challenge of identifying some of those economists—the “nobodies” of the profession—who did see it coming, and who have not gotten the credit they deserve. He also points out the urgent need to expand the academic space and the public visibility of ongoing work that is of actual value when faced with the many deep problems of economic life in our time—an imperative for university administrators, for funding agencies, for foundations, and for students.

  • In the Media | September 2009

    Why capitalism fails; the man who saw the meltdown coming had another troubling insight: it will happen again


    By Stephen Mihm

    Since the global financial system started unraveling in dramatic fashion two years ago, distinguished economists have suffered a crisis of their own. Ivy League professors who had trumpeted the dawn of a new era of stability have scrambled to explain how, exactly, the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression had ambushed their entire profession.

    Amid the hand-wringing and the self-flagellation, a few more cerebral commentators started to speak about the arrival of a “Minsky moment,” and a growing number of insiders began to warn of a coming “Minsky meltdown.”

    “Minsky” was shorthand for Hyman Minsky, a hitherto obscure macroeconomist who died over a decade ago. Many economists had never heard of him when the crisis struck, and he remains a shadowy figure in the profession. But lately he has begun emerging as perhaps the most prescient big-picture thinker about what, exactly, we are going through. A contrarian amid the conformity of postwar America, an expert in the then-unfashionable subfields of finance and crisis, Minsky was one economist who saw what was coming. He predicted, decades ago, almost exactly the kind of meltdown that recently hammered the global economy.

    In recent months Minsky’s star has only risen. Nobel Prize–winning economists talk about incorporating his insights, and copies of his books are back in print and selling well. He’s gone from being a nearly forgotten figure to a key player in the debate over how to fix the financial system.

    But if Minsky was as right as he seems to have been, the news is not exactly encouraging. He believed in capitalism, but also believed it had almost a genetic weakness. Modern finance, he argued, was far from the stabilizing force that mainstream economics portrayed; rather, it was a system that created the illusion of stability while simultaneously creating the conditions for an inevitable and dramatic collapse.

    In other words, the one person who foresaw the crisis also believed that our whole financial system contains the seeds of its own destruction. “Instability,” he wrote, “is an inherent and inescapable flaw of capitalism.”

    Minsky’s vision might have been dark, but he was not a fatalist; he believed it was possible to craft policies that could blunt the collateral damage caused by financial crises. But with a growing number of economists eager to declare the recession over, and the crisis itself apparently behind us, these policies may prove as discomforting as the theories that prompted them in the first place. Indeed, as economists re-embrace Minsky’s prophetic insights, it is far from clear that they’re ready to reckon with the full implications of what he saw.

    In an ideal world, a profession dedicated to the study of capitalism would be as freewheeling and innovative as its ostensible subject. But economics has often been subject to powerful orthodoxies, and never more so than when Minsky arrived on the scene.

    That orthodoxy, born in the years after World War II, was known as the neoclassical synthesis. The older belief in a self-regulating, self-stabilizing free market had selectively absorbed a few insights from John Maynard Keynes, the great economist of the 1930s who wrote extensively of the ways that capitalism might fail to maintain full employment. Most economists still believed that free-market capitalism was a fundamentally stable basis for an economy, though thanks to Keynes, some now acknowledged that government might under certain circumstances play a role in keeping the economy—and employment—on an even keel.

    Economists like Paul Samuelson became the public face of the new establishment; he and others at a handful of top universities became deeply influential in Washington. In theory, Minsky could have been an academic star in this new establishment: like Samuelson, he earned his doctorate in economics at Harvard University, where he studied with legendary Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, as well as future Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief.

    But Minsky was cut from different cloth than many of the other big names. The descendent of immigrants from Minsk, in modern-day Belarus, Minsky was a red-diaper baby, the son of Menshevik socialists. While most economists spent the 1950s and 1960s toiling over mathematical models, Minsky pursued research on poverty, hardly the hottest subfield of economics. With long, wild, white hair, Minsky was closer to the counterculture than to mainstream economics. He was, recalls the economist L. Randall Wray, a former student, a “character.”

    So while his colleagues from graduate school went on to win Nobel prizes and rise to the top of academia, Minsky languished. He drifted from Brown to Berkeley and eventually to Washington University. Indeed, many economists weren’t even aware of his work. One assessment of Minsky published in 1997 simply noted that his “work has not had a major influence in the macroeconomic discussions of the last thirty years.”

    Yet he was busy. In addition to poverty, Minsky began to delve into the field of finance, which despite its seeming importance had no place in the theories formulated by Samuelson and others. He also began to ask a simple, if disturbing question: “Can �it’ happen again?”—where “it” was, like Harry Potter's nemesis Voldemort, the thing that could not be named: the Great Depression.

    In his writings, Minsky looked to his intellectual hero, Keynes, arguably the greatest economist of the 20th century. But where most economists drew a single, simplistic lesson from Keynes—that government could step in and micromanage the economy, smooth out the business cycle, and keep things on an even keel—Minsky had no interest in what he and a handful of other dissident economists came to call “bastard Keynesianism.”

    Instead, Minsky drew his own, far darker, lessons from Keynes’s landmark writings, which dealt not only with the problem of unemployment, but with money and banking. Although Keynes had never stated this explicitly, Minsky argued that Keynes’s collective work amounted to a powerful argument that capitalism was by its very nature unstable and prone to collapse. Far from trending toward some magical state of equilibrium, capitalism would inevitably do the opposite. It would lurch over a cliff.

    This insight bore the stamp of his advisor Joseph Schumpeter, the noted Austrian economist now famous for documenting capitalism's ceaseless process of “creative destruction.” But Minsky spent more time thinking about destruction than creation. In doing so, he formulated an intriguing theory: not only was capitalism prone to collapse, he argued, it was precisely its periods of economic stability that would set the stage for monumental crises.

    Minsky called his idea the “Financial Instability Hypothesis.” In the wake of a depression, he noted, financial institutions are extraordinarily conservative, as are businesses. With the borrowers and the lenders who fuel the economy all steering clear of high-risk deals, things go smoothly: loans are almost always paid on time, businesses generally succeed, and everyone does well. That success, however, inevitably encourages borrowers and lenders to take on more risk in the reasonable hope of making more money. As Minsky observed, “Success breeds a disregard of the possibility of failure.”

    As people forget that failure is a possibility, a “euphoric economy” eventually develops, fueled by the rise of far riskier borrowers—what he called speculative borrowers, those whose income would cover interest payments but not the principal; and those he called “Ponzi borrowers,” those whose income could cover neither, and could only pay their bills by borrowing still further. As these latter categories grew, the overall economy would shift from a conservative but profitable environment to a much more freewheeling system dominated by players whose survival depended not on sound business plans, but on borrowed money and freely available credit.

    Once that kind of economy had developed, any panic could wreck the market. The failure of a single firm, for example, or the revelation of a staggering fraud could trigger fear and a sudden, economy-wide attempt to shed debt. This watershed moment—what was later dubbed the “Minsky moment”—would create an environment deeply inhospitable to all borrowers. The speculators and Ponzi borrowers would collapse first, as they lost access to the credit they needed to survive. Even the more stable players might find themselves unable to pay their debt without selling off assets; their forced sales would send asset prices spiraling downward, and inevitably, the entire rickety financial edifice would start to collapse. Businesses would falter, and the crisis would spill over to the “real” economy that depended on the now-collapsing financial system.

    From the 1960s onward, Minsky elaborated on this hypothesis. At the time he believed that this shift was already underway: postwar stability, financial innovation, and the receding memory of the Great Depression were gradually setting the stage for a crisis of epic proportions. Most of what he had to say fell on deaf ears. The 1960s were an era of solid growth, and although the economic stagnation of the 1970s was a blow to mainstream neo-Keynesian economics, it did not send policymakers scurrying to Minsky. Instead, a new free market fundamentalism took root: government was the problem, not the solution.

    Moreover, the new dogma coincided with a remarkable era of stability. The period from the late 1980s onward has been dubbed the “Great Moderation,” a time of shallow recessions and great resilience among most major industrial economies. Things had never been more stable. The likelihood that “it” could happen again now seemed laughable.

    Yet throughout this period, the financial system—not the economy, but finance as an industry—was growing by leaps and bounds. Minsky spent the last years of his life, in the early 1990s, warning of the dangers of securitization and other forms of financial innovation, but few economists listened. Nor did they pay attention to consumers’ and companies’ growing dependence on debt, and the growing use of leverage within the financial system.

    By the end of the 20th century, the financial system that Minsky had warned about had materialized, complete with speculative borrowers, Ponzi borrowers, and precious few of the conservative borrowers who were the bedrock of a truly stable economy. Over decades, we really had forgotten the meaning of risk. When storied financial firms started to fall, sending shockwaves through the ”real” economy, his predictions started to look a lot like a road map.

    “This wasn’t a Minsky moment,'' explains Randall Wray. “It was a Minsky half-century.”

    Minsky is now all the rage. A year ago, an influential Financial Times columnist confided to readers that rereading Minsky's 1986 “masterpiece”—“Stabilizing an Unstable Economy”—“helped clear my mind on this crisis.” Others joined the chorus. Earlier this year, two economic heavyweights—Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong—both tipped their hats to him in public forums. Indeed, the Nobel Prize–winning Krugman titled one of the Robbins lectures at the London School of Economics “The Night They Re-read Minsky.”

    Today most economists, it’s safe to say, are probably reading Minsky for the first time, trying to fit his unconventional insights into the theoretical scaffolding of their profession. If Minsky were alive today, he would no doubt applaud this belated acknowledgment, even if it has come at a terrible cost. As he once wryly observed, “There is nothing wrong with macroeconomics that another depression [won't] cure.”

    But does Minsky’s work offer us any practical help? If capitalism is inherently self-destructive and unstable—never mind that it produces inequality and unemployment, as Keynes had observed—now what?

    After spending his life warning of the perils of the complacency that comes with stability—and having it fall on deaf ears—Minsky was understandably pessimistic about the ability to short-circuit the tragic cycle of boom and bust. But he did believe that much could be done to ameliorate the damage.

    To prevent the Minsky moment from becoming a national calamity, part of his solution (which was shared with other economists) was to have the Federal Reserve—what he liked to call the “Big Bank”—step into the breach and act as a lender of last resort to firms under siege. By throwing lines of liquidity to foundering firms, the Federal Reserve could break the cycle and stabilize the financial system. It failed to do so during the Great Depression, when it stood by and let a banking crisis spiral out of control. This time, under the leadership of Ben Bernanke—like Minsky, a scholar of the Depression—it took a very different approach, becoming a lender of last resort to everything from hedge funds to investment banks to money market funds.

    Minsky’s other solution, however, was considerably more radical and less palatable politically. The preferred mainstream tactic for pulling the economy out of a crisis was—and is—based on the Keynesian notion of “priming the pump” by sending money that will employ lots of high-skilled, unionized labor—by building a new high-speed train line, for example.

    Minsky, however, argued for a “bubble-up” approach, sending money to the poor and unskilled first. The government—or what he liked to call “Big Government”—should become the “employer of last resort,” he said, offering a job to anyone who wanted one at a set minimum wage. It would be paid to workers who would supply child care, clean streets, and provide services that would give taxpayers a visible return on their dollars. In being available to everyone, it would be even more ambitious than the New Deal, sharply reducing the welfare rolls by guaranteeing a job for anyone who was able to work. Such a program would not only help the poor and unskilled, he believed, but would put a floor beneath everyone else's wages too, preventing salaries of more skilled workers from falling too precipitously, and sending benefits up the socioeconomic ladder.

    While economists may be acknowledging some of Minsky’s points on financial instability, it's safe to say that even liberal policymakers are still a long way from thinking about such an expanded role for the American government. If nothing else, an expensive full-employment program would veer far too close to socialism for the comfort of politicians. For his part, Wray thinks that the critics are apt to misunderstand Minsky. “He saw these ideas as perfectly consistent with capitalism,” says Wray. “They would make capitalism better.”

    But not perfect. Indeed, if there's anything to be drawn from Minsky’s collected work, it's that perfection, like stability and equilibrium, are mirages. Minsky did not share his profession's quaint belief that everything could be reduced to a tidy model, or a pat theory. His was a kind of existential economics: capitalism, like life itself, is difficult, even tragic. “There is no simple answer to the problems of our capitalism,” wrote Minsky. “There is no solution that can be transformed into a catchy phrase and carried on banners.”

    It's a sentiment that may limit the extent to which Minsky becomes part of any new orthodoxy. But that’s probably how he would have preferred it, believes liberal economist James Galbraith. “I think he would resist being domesticated,” says Galbraith. “He spent his career in professional isolation.”

    Stephen Mihm is a history professor at the University of Georgia and author of “A Nation of Counterfeiters” (Harvard, 2007).

  • In the Media | September 2009

    Why some economists could see the crisis coming


    By Dirk Bezemer

    September 7, 2009. Copyright 2009 The Financial Times Limited.

    From the beginning of the credit crisis and ensuing recession, it has become conventional wisdom that “no one saw this coming.” Anatole Kaletsky wrote in The Times of “those who failed to foresee the gravity of this crisis”—a group that included “almost every leading economist and financier in the world.” Glenn Stevens, governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, said: “I do not know anyone who predicted this course of events. But it has occurred, it has implications, and so we must reflect on it.” We must indeed.

    Because, in fact, many had seen it coming for years. They were ignored by an establishment that, as the former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan professed in his October 2008 testimony to Congress, watched with “shocked disbelief” as its “whole intellectual edifice collapsed in the summer [of 2007].” Official models missed the crisis not because the conditions were so unusual, as we are often told. They missed it by design. It is impossible to warn against a debt deflation recession in a model world where debt does not exist. This is the world our policymakers have been living in. They urgently need to change habitat.

    I undertook a study of the models used by those who did see it coming.* They include Kurt Richebächer, an investment newsletter writer, who wrote in 2001 that “the new housing bubble—together with the bond and stock bubbles—will [inevitably] implode in the foreseeable future, plunging the US economy into a protracted, deep recession”; and in 2006, when the housing market turned, that “all remaining questions pertain solely to [the] speed, depth and duration of the economy’s downturn.” Wynne Godley of the Levy Economics Institute wrote in 2006 that “the small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels are rising resulting from the house price decline, will immediately lead to a sustained growth recession before 2010.” Michael Hudson of the University of Missouri wrote in 2006 that “debt deflation will shrink the ‘real’ economy, drive down real wages, and push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style stagnation or worse.” Importantly, these and other analysts not only foresaw and timed the end of the credit boom, but also perceived this would inevitably produce recession in the US. How did they do it?

    Central to the contrarians’ thinking is an accounting of financial flows (of credit, interest, profit and wages) and stocks (debt and wealth) in the economy, as well as a sharp distinction between the real economy and the financial sector (including property). In these “flow-of-funds” models, liquidity generated in the financial sector flows to companies, households and the government as they borrow. This may facilitate fixed-capital investment, production and consumption, but also asset-price inflation and debt growth. Liquidity returns to the financial sector as investment or in debt service and fees.

    It follows that there is a trade-off in the use of credit, so that financial investment may crowd out the financing of production. A second key insight is that, since the economy’s assets and liabilities must balance, growing financial asset markets find their counterpart in a growing debt burden. They also swell payment flows of debt service and financial fees. Flow-of-funds models quantify the sustainability of the debt burden and the financial sector’s drain on the real economy. This allows their users to foresee when finance’s relation to the real economy turns from supportive to extractive, and when a breaking point will be reached.

    Such calculations are conspicuous by their absence in official forecasters’ models in the US, the UK and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In line with mainstream economic theory, balance sheet variables are assumed to adapt automatically to changes in the real economy, and can thus be safely omitted. This practice ignores the fact that in most advanced economies, financial sector turnover is many times larger than total gross domestic product; or that growth in the US and UK has been finance-driven since the turn of the millennium.

    Perhaps because of this omission, the OECD commented in August 2007 that “the current economic situation is in many ways better than what we have experienced in years. . . . Our central forecast remains indeed quite benign: a soft landing in the United States [and] a strong and sustained recovery in Europe.” Official US forecasters could tell Reuters as late as September 2007 that the recession in the US was “not a dominant risk.” This was well after the Levy Economics Institute, for example, predicted in April of that year that output growth would slow “almost to zero sometime between now and 2008.”

    Policymakers have resisted inclusion of balance sheets and the flow of funds in their models by arguing that bubbles cannot be easily identified, nor their effects reliably anticipated. The above analysts have shown that this is, in fact, feasible, and indeed essential if we are to “see it coming” next time. The financial sector is just as real as the real economy. Our policymakers, and the analysts they rely on, ignore balance sheets and the flow of funds at their peril—and ours.

    *No One Saw This Coming”: Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models, MPRA

    The writer is a fellow at the economics and business department of the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

  • In the Media | October 2008

    Asia's revenge


    By Martin Wolf

    October 8, 2008. Copyright 2008 The Financial Times Limited. “FT” and “Financial Times” are trademarks of the Financial Times.

    “Things that can’t go on forever, don’t.” —Herbert Stein, former chairman of the US presidential Council of Economic Advisers

    What confronts the world can be seen as the latest in a succession of financial crises that have struck periodically over the last 30 years. The current financial turmoil in the US and Europe affects economies that account for at least half of world output, making this upheaval more significant than all the others. Yet it is also depressingly similar, both in its origins and its results, to earlier shocks.

    To trace the parallels—and help in understanding how the present pressing problems can be addressed—one needs to look back to the late 1970s. Petrodollars, the foreign exchange earned by oil exporting countries amid sharp jumps in the crude price, were recycled via western banks to less wealthy emerging economies, principally in Latin America.

    This resulted in the first of the big crises of modern times, when Mexico’s 1982 announcement of its inability to service its debt brought the money-centre banks of New York and London to their knees.

    Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University identify the similarities in a paper published earlier this year.* They focus on previous crises in high-income countries. But they also note characteristics that are shared with financial crises that have occurred in emerging economies.

    This time, most emerging economies have been running huge current account surpluses. So a “large chunk of money has effectively been recycled to a developing economy that exists within the United States’ own borders,” they point out. “Over a trillion dollars was channelled into the subprime mortgage market, which is comprised of the poorest and least creditworthy borrowers within the US. The final claimaint is different, but in many ways the mechanism is the same.”

    The links between the financial fragility in the US and previous emerging market crises mean that the current banking and economic traumas should not be seen as just the product of risky monetary policy, lax regulation and irresponsible finance, important though these were. They have roots in the way the global economy has worked in the era of financial deregulation. Any country that receives a huge and sustained inflow of foreign lending runs the risk of a subsequent financial crisis, because external and domestic financial fragility will grow. Precisely such a crisis is now happening to the US and a number of other high-income countries including the UK.

    These latest crises are also related to those that preceded them—particularly the Asian crisis of 1997–98. Only after this shock did emerging economies become massive capital exporters. This pattern was reinforced by China’s choice of an export-oriented development path, partly influenced by fear of what had happened to its neighbours during the Asian crisis. It was further entrenched by the recent jumps in the oil price and the consequent explosion in the current account surpluses of oil exporting countries.

    The big global macroeconomic story of this decade was, then, the offsetting emergence of the US and a number of other high-income countries as spenders and borrowers of last resort. Debt-fuelled US households went on an unparalleled spending binge by dipping into their housing “piggy banks.”

    In explaining what had happened, Ben Bernanke, when still a governor of the Federal Reserve rather than chairman, referred to the emergence of a “savings glut.” The description was accurate. After the turn of the millennium, one of the striking features became the low level of long-term nominal and real interest rates at a time of rapid global economic growth. Cheap money encouraged an orgy of financial innovation, borrowing and spending.

    That was also one of the initial causes of the surge in house prices across a large part of the high-income world, particularly in the US, the UK and Spain.

    What lay behind the savings glut? The first development was the shift of emerging economies into a large surplus of savings over investment. Within the emerging economies, the big shifts were in Asia and in the oil exporting countries (see chart). By 2007, according to the International Monetary Fund, the aggregate savings surpluses of these two groups of countries had reached around 2 per cent of world output.

    figures

    Despite being a huge oil importer, China emerged as the world’s biggest surplus country: its current account surplus was $372bn (£215bn, €272bn) in 2007, which was not only more than 11 per cent of its gross domestic product, but almost as big as the combined surpluses of Japan ($213bn) and Germany ($185bn), the two largest high-income capital exporters.

    Last year, the aggregate surpluses of the world’s surplus countries reached $1,680bn, according to the IMF. The top 10 (China, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Switzerland, Norway, Kuwait, the Netherlands and the United Arab Emirates) generated more than 70 per cent of this total. The surpluses of the top 10 countries represented at least 8 per cent of their aggregate GDP and about one-quarter of their aggregate gross savings.

    Meanwhile, the huge US deficit absorbed 44 per cent of this total. The US, UK, Spain and Australia—four countries with housing bubbles—absorbed 63 per cent of the world’s current account surpluses.

    That represented a vast shift of capital—but unlike in the 1970s and early 1980s, it went to some of the world’s richest countries. Moreover, the emergence of the surpluses was the result of deliberate policies—shown in the accumulation of official foreign currency reserves and the expansion of the sovereign wealth funds over this period.

    Quite reasonably, the energy exporters were transforming one asset—oil—into another—claims on foreigners. Others were recycling current account surpluses and private capital inflows into official capital outflows, keeping exchange rates down and competitiveness up. Some described this new system, of which China was the most important proponent, as “Bretton Woods II,” after the pegged adjustable exchange rates set-up that collapsed in the early 1970s. Others called it “export-led growth” or depicted it as a system of self-insurance.

    Yet the justification is less important than the consequences. Between January 2000 and April 2007, the stock of global foreign currency reserves rose by $5,200bn. Thus three-quarters of all the foreign currency reserves accumulated since the beginning of time have been piled up in this decade. Inevitably, a high proportion—probably close to two-thirds—of these sums were placed in dollars, thereby supporting the US currency and financing US external deficits.

    The savings glut had another dimension, related to a second financial shock—the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000. One consequence was the move of the corporate sectors of most high-income countries into financial surplus. In other words, their retained earnings came to exceed their investments. Instead of borrowing from banks and other suppliers of capital, non-financial corporations became providers of finance.

    In this world of massive savings surpluses in a range of important countries and weak demand for capital from non-financial corporations, central banks ran easy monetary policies. They did so because they feared the possibility of a shift into deflation. The Fed, in particular, found itself having to offset the contractionary effects of the vast flow of private and, above all, public capital into the US.

    A simple way of thinking about what has happened to the global economy in the 2000s is that high-income countries with elastic credit systems and households willing to take on rising debt levels offset the massive surplus savings in the rest of the world. The lax monetary policies facilitated this excess spending, while the housing bubble was the vehicle through which it worked.

    The charts show what happened, as a result, to “financial balances”—the difference between expenditure and income inside the US economy. If one looks at three sectors—foreign, government and private—it is evident that the first has had a huge surplus this decade—offset, as it has to be, by deficits in the other two.

    In the early 2000s, the US fiscal deficit was the main offset. In the middle years of the decade, the private sector ran a large deficit while the government’s shrank. Now that the recession-hit private sector is moving back into balance at enormous speed, the government deficit is exploding once again.

    Looking at what happened inside the private sector, a striking contrast can be seen between the corporate and household realms. Households moved into a huge financial deficit, which peaked at just under 4 per cent of GDP in the second quarter of 2005. Then, as the housing bubble burst, housebuilding collapsed and households started saving more. With remarkable speed, the household financial deficit disappeared. Today’s explosion in the fiscal deficit is the offset.

    Inevitably, huge household financial deficits also mean huge accumulations of household debt. This was strikingly true in the US and UK. In the process, the financial sector accumulated an ever greater stock of claims not just on other sectors but on itself. This frightening complexity, which lies at the root of many of the current difficulties, was facilitated by the environment of easy borrowing and search for high returns in an environment of low real rates of interest. These linked dangers between external and internal imbalances, domestic debt accumulations and financial fragility were foretold by a number of analysts. Foremost among them was Wynne Godley of Cambridge University in his prescient work for the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, which has laid particular stress on the work of the late Hyman Minsky.**

    So what might—and should—happen now? The big danger, evidently, is of a financial collapse. The principal offset, in the short run, to the inevitable cuts in spending in the private sector of the crisis-afflicted economies will also be vastly bigger fiscal deficits.

    Fortunately, the US and the other afflicted high-income countries have one advantage over the emerging economies: they borrow in their own currencies and have creditworthy governments. Unlike emerging economies, they can therefore slash interest rates and increase fiscal deficits.

    Yet the huge fiscal boosts and associated government recapitalisation of shattered financial systems are only a temporary solution. There can be no return to business as usual. It is, above all, neither desirable nor sustainable for global macroeconomic balance to be achieved by recycling huge savings surpluses into the excess consumption of the world’s richest consumers. The former point is self-evident, while the latter has been demonstrated by the recent financial collapse.

    So among the most important tasks ahead is to create a system of global finance that allows a more balanced world economy, with excess savings being turned into either high-return investment or consumption by the world’s poor, including in capital-exporting countries such as China. A part of the answer will be the development of local-currency finance in emerging economies, which would make it easier for them to run current account deficits than proved to be the case in the past three decades.

    It is essential in any case for countries in a position to do so to expand domestic demand vigorously. Only in this way can the recessionary impulse coming from the corrections in the debt-laden countries be offset.

    Yet there is a still bigger challenge ahead. The crisis demonstrates that the world has been unable to combine liberalised capital markets with a reasonable degree of financial stability. A particular problem has been the tendency for large net capital flows and associated current account and domestic financial balances to generate huge crises. This is the biggest of them all.

    Lessons must be learnt. But those should not just be about the regulation of the financial sector. Nor should they be only about monetary policy. They must be about how liberalised finance can be made to support the global economy rather than destabilise it.

    This is no little local difficulty. It raises the deepest questions about the way forward for our integrated world economy. The learning must start now.

    *“Is the 2007 US subprime financial crisis so different? An international historical comparison.” Working paper 13761, www.nber.org

    **The US economy: Is there a way out of the woods? November 2007, www.levyinstitute.org

    The writer is the FT’s chief economics commentator and author of Fixing Global Finance, published in the US this month by Johns Hopkins University Press and forthcoming in the UK through Yale University Press.

  • In the Media | September 2007

    Prepare for the credit crisis to spread


    By Wolfgang Münchau

    FT.com, September 3, 2007. Copyright 2007 The Financial Times Limited. “FT” and “Financial Times” are trademarks of the Financial Times

    “Financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation. What is recurrently so described and celebrated is, without exception, a small variation on an established design. . . . The world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version.” —John Kenneth Galbraith, A Short History of Financial Euphoria

    The late John Kenneth Galbraith would have enjoyed this summer. He was no expert on modern credit markets but his analysis of historic bubbles fits our most recent boom and bust episode with uncanny precision.

    All historic bubbles were accompanied by a sharp rise in leverage. A salient feature of modern bubbles is the emergence of innovative financial products. No matter whether we are talking about junk bonds or modern collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), as Galbraith has pointed out, such products boil down to variants of debt secured on a real asset.

    By historic standards, our credit bubble is probably one of the largest ever, given the sheer size of the market itself and the degree of euphoria that was characteristic in the final stages of the boom. While the fallout was initially concentrated in the financial sector itself, it would be surprising if the ongoing problems did not trickle down into the real economy. The availability of credit affects house prices and numerous studies have demonstrated the interlinkages between US house prices and US economic growth.

    So what should central banks do? I suspect that central banks are not going to be the main actors in any rescue operation, but rather governments. Central banks' room for manoeuvre to cut interest rates is more constrained this time than during the most recent recession. But more important, this is not the kind of crisis that can easily be stopped by a few hasty rate cuts or bank bail-outs. If your subprime mortgage exceeds the value of your house by 10 per cent, and if the monthly payments exceed your income, no positive interest rate could bail you out. Your only hope is some serious debt relief.

    The economists Dimitri Papadimitriou, Greg Hannsgen and Gennaro Zezza last week published a study* in which they demonstrated the danger to US economic growth posed by the present real estate crisis. Their policy recommendations go significantly beyond the usual bail-out calls. They argue that it is almost impossible for policymakers to stop the decline in real estate prices, but “if the Fed and Congress can work to stop any incipient recession, they will prevent job losses, which are one of the main contributors to foreclosures. An effective job-creation method could be some form of employer-of-last-resort programme that offers government jobs to all workers who ask for them”.

    We should remember that the subprime market is not the only unstable subsection of the credit market. Once US consumption slows, we should prepare for a crisis in credit card and car finance CDOs. And once corporate bankruptcies start to rise again as the cycle turns down, both in the US and in Europe, we will probably hear about problems with collateralised loan obligations. The credit market is very deep and offers significant potential for contagion.

    In this sense, the debate about whether this is a liquidity or a solvency crisis is beside the point. Banks may look at their CDO investments as a source of temporary illiquidity, but may sooner or later realise that they are sitting on a pile of junk. The fiscal and monetary authorities should therefore assume that they are confronted with a solvency crisis. Bailing out the odd bank, as the Germans did last month, is not going to be sufficient and perhaps not even necessary.

    Instead, the monetary and fiscal authorities should stand ready to support the economy if and when needed. Lower interest rates will probably be part of any such deal, but a large part of the help will invariably come from fiscal policy. The US Federal Reserve will probably cut interest rates soon and the European Central Bank will almost certainly postpone the rate rise it unwisely preannounced only a few weeks ago. I am convinced the next interest rate movement both in the US and the eurozone will be downwards.

    One of the problems the monetary authorities have to deal with is moral hazard. This is not a theoretical issue, as some suggest, but a far more immediate concern. Moral hazard is the result of asymmetric expectations, as markets expect the central bank to bail out the financial sector during a time of crisis. The problem of moral hazard is to some extent related to the monetary policy strategy of central banks, with their mechanistic focus on a single consumer price index. Such strategies often have no space for asset prices, but markets know fully well that central banks must invariably take account of asset prices during sharp downturns. One way out of this asymmetry is for central banks to include asset prices into their policy frameworks in some form or other.

    This said, a bail-out of the financial system will probably become unavoidable, but it should be accompanied with structural policy changes. Tighter financial regulation is probable. The role of the ratings agencies is bound to change too. And central banks should reconsider their monetary policy frameworks. They are part of the problem.

    *Cracks in the Foundations of Growth, Levy Institute, www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/ppb_90.pdf

  • In the Media | August 2007

    In time of tumult, obscure economist gains currency


    Mr. Minsky long argued markets were crisis prone; his “moment” has arrived

    By Justin Lahart. The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2007, Page A1
    Copyright 2007 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

    The recent market turmoil is rocking investors around the globe. But it is raising the stock of one person: a little-known economist whose views have suddenly become very popular.

    Hyman Minsky, who died more than a decade ago, spent much of his career advancing the idea that financial systems are inherently susceptible to bouts of speculation that, if they last long enough, end in crises. At a time when many economists were coming to believe in the efficiency of markets, Mr. Minsky was considered somewhat of a radical for his stress on their tendency toward excess and upheaval.

    Today, his views are reverberating from New York to Hong Kong as economists and traders try to understand what’s happening in the markets. The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, where Mr. Minsky worked for the last six years of his life, is planning to reprint two books by the economist—one on John Maynard Keynes, the other on unstable economies. The latter book was being offered on the Internet for thousands of dollars.

    Christopher Wood, a widely read Hong Kong-based analyst for CLSA Group, told his clients that recent cash injections by central banks designed “to prevent, or at least delay, a ’Minsky moment,’ is evidence of market failure.”

    Indeed, the Minsky moment has become a fashionable catch phrase on Wall Street. It refers to the time when over-indebted investors are forced to sell even their solid investments to make good on their loans, sparking sharp declines in financial markets and demand for cash that can force central bankers to lend a hand.

    Mr. Minsky, who died in 1996 at the age of 77, was a tall man with unruly hair who wore unpressed suits. He approached the world as “one big research tank,” says Diana Minsky, his daughter, an art history professor at Bard. “Economics was an integrated part of his life. It wasn’t isolated. There wasn’t a sense that work was something he did at the office.”

    She recalls how, on a trip to a village in Italy to meet friends, Mr. Minsky ended up interviewing workers at a glove maker to understand how small-scale capitalism worked in the local economy.

    Although he was born in Chicago, Mr. Minsky didn’t have many fans in the “Chicago School” of economists, who believed that markets were efficient. A follower of the economist John Maynard Keynes, he died just before a decade of financial crises in Asia, Russia, tech stocks, corporate credit and now mortgage debt, began to lend credence to his ideas.

    Following those periods of tumult, more investors turned to the investment classic “Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises,” by Charles Kindleberger, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who leaned heavily on Mr. Minsky’s work.

    Mr. Kindleberger showed that financial crises unfolded the way that Mr. Minsky said they would. Though a loyal follower, Mr. Kindleberger described Mr. Minsky as “a man with a reputation among monetary theorists for being particularly pessimistic, even lugubrious, in his emphasis on the fragility of the monetary system and its propensity to disaster.”

    At its core, the Minsky view was straightforward: When times are good, investors take on risk; the longer times stay good, the more risk they take on, until they’ve taken on too much. Eventually, they reach a point where the cash generated by their assets no longer is sufficient to pay off the mountains of debt they took on to acquire them. Losses on such speculative assets prompt lenders to call in their loans. “This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values,” Mr. Minsky wrote.

    When investors are forced to sell even their less-speculative positions to make good on their loans, markets spiral lower and create a severe demand for cash. At that point, the Minsky moment has arrived.

    “We are in the midst of a Minsky moment, bordering on a Minsky meltdown,” says Paul McCulley, an economist and fund manager at Pacific Investment Management Co., the world’s largest bond-fund manager, in an email exchange.

    The housing market is a case in point, says Investment Technology Group Inc. economist Robert Barbera, who first met Mr. Minsky in the late 1980s. When home buyers were expected to have a down payment of 10% or 20% to qualify for a mortgage, and to provide income documentation that showed they’d be able to make payments, there was minimal risk. But as home prices rose, and speculators entered the market, lenders relaxed their guard and began offering loans with no money down and little or no documentation.

    Once home prices stalled and, in many of the more-speculative markets, fell, there was a big problem.

    “If you’re lending to home buyers with 20% down and house prices fall by 2%, so what?” Mr. Barbera says. If most of a lender’s portfolio is tied up in loans to buyers who “don’t put anything down and house prices fall by 2%, you’re bankrupt,” he says.

    Several money managers are laying claim to spotting the Minsky moment first. “I featured him about 18 months ago,” says Jeremy Grantham, chairman of GMO LLC, which manages $150 billion in assets. He pointed to a note in early 2006 when he wrote that investors had become too comfortable that financial markets were safe, and consequently were taking on too much risk, just as Mr. Minsky predicted. “Guinea pigs of the world unite. We have nothing to lose but our shirts,” he concluded.

    It was Mr. McCulley at Pacific Investment, though, who coined the phrase “Minsky moment” during the Russian debt crisis in 1998.

    Laurence Meyer, who served on the faculty with Mr. Minsky at Washington University in St. Louis, was a Federal Reserve Governor during those turbulent times. Mr. Meyer says that when he was an academic, Mr. Minsky’s work didn’t interest him very much, but that changed when he went into the real world. He says he grew to appreciate it even more when he was at the Fed watching financial crises unfold.

    “Had Minsky been there, he probably would have been calling me and alerting me along the ride. And that would have been a good thing,” Mr. Meyer says. “Every year that goes by, I appreciate him more. I hear myself sometimes and I think, oh my gosh, I sound like Hy Minsky.“

    Steven Fazzari, an economics professor at Washington University, says that Mr. Minsky would have supported the Federal Reserve’s recent move to provide cash and cut the rate it charges banks on loans from its discount window to try to avert a financial crisis that could spill over to the economy. But he would probably be worried, too, that the moves might be bailing out investors who would all too soon be speculating again.

    Having seen recent events unfold in the way his friend and former colleague predicted, Mr. Fazzari says, “I hope he’s someplace saying, ‘Aha, I told you so!’”

    —Jon E. Hilsenrath contributed to this article.

  • In the Media | June 2007

    Greek Treasury gaining at expense of pension funds


    Copyright 2007 The Financial Times Limited
    Financial Times (London, England)
    June 22, 2007 Friday; Asia Edition 1; Letters to the Editor

    Sir, Kerin Hope is right to report on the seriousness of the bond deal in Greece, which “sparks calls for early Greek poll” (report, June 19). It is paramount, though, for the Greek government, before it concludes on a possible early poll, to investigate who the actual bearer of these structured bonds is.

    If a large proportion were to be held by international investors, then there may be an argument that structured bonds may save the taxpayer some of the cost of servicing that debt. But, if a large proportion of these structured bonds ends up in the portfolios of the Greek pension funds, as it seems to be the case, the government may be accused of taking advantage of the unsophisticated boards of the pension funds to minimise its tax liabilities. The Greek Treasury is gaining at the expense of the pension funds. This is not just an ethical issue; it is a clear responsibility of the government itself, as it is the one that sets up the legal structure of the pension funds. This suggests that the whole structure requires overhauling and the government should proceed with extreme care and responsibility.

    Some general guidelines on the overhauling process may be useful. The management of the portfolios of the pension funds should be placed with the private sector that has the requisite skills and expertise. The asset management companies that would run the portfolios would be directly accountable to the boards of the pension funds. The boards, on the other hand, should not be appointed by the government, but they should be elected by their members, to whom they should be accountable. The responsibility of the boards should be to set up the decision-making process of the portfolio management and not be responsible for the investment decisions, as it happens now. The government should avoid the finance of the budget deficit through private placements as this undermines transparency. The normal practice of issuing ordinary fixed income government bonds through auctions that involve primary dealers is the only way to ensure that the burden to the tax-payer is kept to a minimum. In such an auction the government would fetch the market price on the issue of its bonds, which incorporates the risk that the market attaches to such bonds.

    Philip Arestis,
    University Director of Research,
    Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy,
    University of Cambridge, UK

    Elias Karakitsos,
    Chairman, Global Economic Research,
    Associate Member, Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy,
    University of Cambridge, UK

    Author(s):
    Philip Arestis Elias Karakitsos
  • In the Media | May 2006

    US economy and the deficit predicament


    Copyright 2006 The Financial Times Limited (London, England)
    Wednesday, May 30, 2006; Financial Times; USA Edition; Letters to the Editor

    Sir, Martin Feldstein (“The falling dollar sets a test for Asia and Europe”, May 26) provides a good account of the problems caused by global imbalances [which closely resembles, in its structure, the analysis contained in many reports published by the Levy Institute during the last seven years]. However, his statement that following devaluation in the mid 1980s there was a 40 per cent fall in the trade deficit is very misleading because, when expressed as a proportion of gross domestic product, the fall was only 1.5 per cent.

    The US trade deficit peaked at about 3 per cent of GDP in 1986 and fell (by 50 per cent!) to 1.5 per cent at the end of 1989. There was a small further fall after the end of 1989, but this was surely caused by the sharp economic slowdown, and ultimately recession, which occurred in 1990.

    A 1.5 per cent improvement in the deficit, which has reached 67 per cent of GDP, would hardly sustain the US economy if there were now the large rise in saving Prof. Feldstein expects. I conclude the strategic predicament, with its disinflationary possibilities for the US and the rest of the world, is more intractable than he suggests. Published by:
    The Financial Times

    Author(s):
  • In the Media | February 2006

    The balance of trade, not payments, is true measure of a deficit's effects


    Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited (London, England)
    Wednesday, February 15, 2006; Financial Times; USA Edition; Letters to the Editor

    Sir, Balance of payments deficits often cause concern because they may result in financing difficulties and, possibly, a disorderly depreciation of the currency.

    The U.K. payments deficit would seem to be too small, at present, to worry about. But it is the balance of trade, not payments, that measures the direct effect of a deficit on the demand for domestically produced goods and services.

    The trade deficit of the US is now about 6.5 per cent of gross domestic product while that of the U.K. is about 4.5 per cent. In both countries domestic demand in total has so far been held up by budget deficits as well as by personal expenditure (on consumption and investment combined) far in excess of disposable income, and this has perforce been financed by unusually high borrowing leading to rapidly rising personal indebtedness.

    In other words, the growing subtractions from demand caused by trade deficits, which now seem to be structural, have so far been made good by injections of demand which are essentially temporary.

    The unusual size of the deficits, both in the US and in the U.K., has introduced a novel element into economic prospects viewed strategically because if (or when) personal borrowing and expenditure slows down, neither government has any obvious politically feasible policy instrument to avert a prolonged deficiency in total demand.

    Cuts in interest rates might conceivably reignite the housing booms for a time but could not provide permanent motors for growth.

    Published by:
    The Financial Times
  • In the Media | September 2005

    Fed can handle reserves to keep US rates on target


    Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited (London, England)
    Wednesday, September 21, 2005; Financial Times; USA Edition; Letters to the Editor

    Sir, In his article, “Only leadership can defuse America's fiscal time-bomb” (September 15), Jagadeesh Gokhale claims that US fiscal deficits will force the Fed to face a “surfeit of Treasuries,” leading it to put too many dollars in circulation as it buys excess bonds; and that the fiscal deficits will lead to slow productivity growth and high unemployment by “eroding the capital stock.”

    With respect to the first claim, Mr. Gokhale misunderstands reserve accounting. Budget deficits lead ceteris paribus to net credits to banking system reserves that are drained through bond sales—either open market sales by the central bank or new issues by the Treasury.

     

    The central bank would only buy Treasuries if banks were short of reserves—an unlikely event in the current situation with annual budget deficits of at least $330bn.

    In any case, central bank interventions are automatic, triggered by excess or deficient reserve positions of banks that cause the overnight interest rate to move away from target.

    There is no plausible circumstance in which the Fed would not be able to provide or withdraw reserves to keep rates on target.

    Mr. Gokhale's second claim appears to be based on the “crowding-out” argument—that a budget deficit absorbs private sector saving, leaving less to finance private investment. He is ignoring the fact that the current account deficit, now 6.3 per cent of gross domestic product, makes the large budget deficit necessary if aggregate demand is to be sustained. If the government were now to cut its deficit without increasing net export demand, it would only succeed in reducing output, thereby reducing saving and investment as well.

    Whether or not the current fiscal stance is the correct one, it is not creating any operational difficulties for the central bank, nor is it reducing the private capital stock by absorbing saving.

    Published by:
    The Financial Times
  • In the Media | March 2004

    If US grows to potential it would stimulate eurozone recovery


    Copyright 1992 The Financial Times Limited (London, England)
    Tuesday, March 2, 2004; Financial Times USA Edition 2; Letters to the Editor; Pg. 12

    Sir, Nicholas Garganas may be right to suggest that European Central Bank monetary policy is appropriate (“ECB official gives blunt rebuff to rate cut call,” February 27). Your editorial in the same issue (“Currencies cause Schroder pain”) may also be right to suggest that although one may sympathise with the German chancellor’s plea for an interest rate cut, “the ECB in Frankfurt has to take account of conditions in the euro area as a whole.” The argument, however, is more complex.

    The buoyancy of the US economy since the end of the Iraq war and the spectacular recovery of exports in the US, and that of the euro area and Japan to a lesser extent, have raised hopes of a US-led world recovery. However, the euro area has suffered significant losses in competitiveness because of the strong appreciation of the euro in the past three years and its slow adjustment of competitiveness to changes in the nominal exchange rate. These developments in (G-3) competitiveness augur well for a rise in US and Japan exports from a world recovery, but they cast doubts on whether the euro area can benefit from it.

    Despite these concerns we would suggest that if the US economy were to grow as fast as potential output in the next two years, then the world economy would recover. Such growth would be sufficient to offset previous. losses in competitiveness and allow the euro area to enjoy an export-led recovery. But, a rate cut by the ECB would not have the desired effect of restraining the euro rise, as its business cycle is synchronised with that of the US Since the burst of the bubble in 2000 both players are struggling to recover and a weak currency is desirable by both.

    In the absence of intervention the only stable outcome is the one that favours dollar weakness and this is the one that markets impose. Investors, in trying to protect the value of their portfolios, usually enforce a stable outcome, because it would lead to a US-led world recovery. Whereas a dollar rise (and consequently a euro fall) would not help the rest of the world and, perhaps, not even the euro area itself.

    In this respect, the experience of France in the early 1980s is pertinent. Similarly, in the period between the end of the Asian-Russian crisis (1998) and the burst of the equity bubble (2000) the ECB, and before it the Bundesbank, was again unable to stem the euro plight, in spite of tight monetary policy because its business cycle was again synchronised with that of the US

    By contrast, whenever the US business cycle is not synchronised with that of the euro area, the resulting equilibrium is stable, simply because there is no conflict—one player’s interest dictates a strong currency, while the other’s dictates a weak currency. This was the case between 1994 and 1998, when the US was overheated but the euro area was operating with spare capacity.

    George Garganas and your editorial may be right in their conclusions but the justification of the argument is far deeper and more complex.

    Published by:
    The Financial Times
    Author(s):
    Philip Arestis Elias Karakitsos
  • In the Media | September 2003

    US teenager’s budgeting analogy is misleading and helps divert attention from the real issues


    Copyright 2003 The Financial Times Limited (London, England)
    Thursday, September 11, 2003; Financial Times; USA Edition; Letters to the Editor

    Sir, Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters (“Americar’s budget bookkeeping scandal,“ September 9) present a highly misleading analogy to highlight US budget accounting.

    In their analogy, they present US with an 18-year old who earns $2,000 a month, spends $1,800 on necessities, and has $200 left over. But this 18-year-old is also building up $500 a month in credit card debt for a net deficit of $300 a month. And they have him/her planning to do this every month into the future.

    What their analogy does not do is reflect reality. In the future, our 18-year-old average worker can expect to earn more money per month and will very likely marry someone who also earns a pay cheque.

    Eventually, the 18-year-old and his/her family will earn enough to pay for necessities, cover their credit card debt (even if it grows somewhat) and perhaps save a little.

    While Mr. Gokhale and Mr. Smetters are correct that the US budget accounting does not reflect future pension and healthcare liabilities accumulating in the current pay-as-you-go system (their so-called government "credit card" debt), they ignore the fact that the US economy (total earnings in the analogy) also will be larger in the future.

    By focsing on the non-existent crisis of faulty US bookkeeping (with entitlement reform as the solution), they draw attention away from a true crisis: the US health care system (public but especially private), which is in dire need of reform.

    Published by:
    The Financial Times
    Author(s):
    Thomas L. Hungerford
  • In the Media | September 2003

    Wrong policies pulling eurozone economies apart


    Copyright 2003 The Financial Times Limited (London, England)
    Monday, September 8, 2003; Financial Times; USA Edition; Letters to the Editor

    Sir, Ed Crooks and Tony Major (Comment & Analysis, September 1) are right to question the ability of the eurozone economy to catch up with the US economy. Indeed, they are right to argue that the eurozone economy “will struggle to improve potential growth,” and thereby “will leave the world on course for an unbalanced and potentially unstable recovery.”

    It is, however, regrettable that they have not taken the argument further. For it is important to ask why this may be the case.

    We suggest that the answer to this question is not difficult to gauge. It is the implementation of the wrong set of policies introduced since the inauguration of the euro in January 1999, after general deflationary policies in the preceding years.

    The stability and growth pact constrains national governments in the application of their fiscal policies, while monetary policy has not been expansionary, despite recent reductions in the “repo” rate, the official European Central Bank rate of interest. Furthermore, both policies have produced serious “divergence” among the member states of the economic and monetary union in view of the “one-size-fits-all” nature of both policies.

    It is, thus, the case that the institutional arrangements that govern economic policy within the eurozone economy cannot deliver higher growth (it is expected to be negative in the second quarter of 2003) and lower unemployment (at 8.9 per cent currently, as compared to a 6.2 per cent US rate, not to mention the lower 5 per cent in the U.K.).

    What is more disturbing is the highly unequal growth rates in the eurozone: the periphery enjoying rather “healthy” growth rates while the “core” economies, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, are now in recession, having experienced two consecutive quarters of negative growth rates, and France’s second quarter of 2003 having contracted.

    An interesting, and related issue, is that productivity in some eurozone countries is about the same level as in the US, once it is measured on a “per hour” basis: the evidence corroborates the view that Americans work longer hours than many Europeans.

    Inflexible labour markets cannot be the reason for the poor eurozone economic performance. Germany in the past, for example during the 1950s and 1960s, despite labour markets even more “inflexible” than currently, managed to deliver healthier growth rates than the US “The US” had “much more flexible markets” then and could “lay off workers” just as easily then as now. Germany did deliver a great deal more than the US, then! More recently, and as the authors also readily acknowledge, eurozone business investment in the second half of the 1990s rose more steeply than in the US Surely the eurozone was not more flexible then.

    The eurozone can catch up with America, but sensible economic policies are desperately needed to enable it to do so. The authors recognise this in the case of the US. Why not for the eurozone economy as well? Such a combination will produce more long-lasting growth and high employment, not merely for the two countries but also for the world as a whole.

    Published by:
    The Financial Times
  • In the Media | August 2003

    Only fiscal activism has the power to counter recession, because central banks are impotent


    Copyright 2003 The Financial Times Limited (London, England)
    Friday, August 29, 2003; Financial Times; USA Edition; Letters to the Editor

    Sir, Martin Feldstein (“Fiscal activism would speed a recovery,” August 26) is clearly correct to argue that fiscal activism should be used under current economic circumstances. He is, though, incorrect to suggest that monetary policy will be more effective as an economic stabiliser in the near future.

    Fiscal policy, used prudently to manipulate aggregate demand to achieve high levels of employment, is very much in order. Monetary policy, on the other hand, is impotent when interest rates are rapidly approaching their floor of zero and inflation is practically non-existent.

    The Americans, the Japanese and the eurozone economies are the primary examples of the ineffectiveness of central bank actions. Only fiscal policy can rescue economies that are either in recession, or growth recession, as the case may be.

    The eurozone countries are experiencing unacceptable unemployment rates of 8.9 per cent, growth recession and inflation generally above the 2 per cent target of the European Central Bank. The European Commission now warns of further stagnation in the third quarter of 2003. This unenviable performance is the result of the stability and growth pact and its nature—along with that of monetary policy—of “one-size-fits-all,” an argument that has been well rehearsed in the Financial Times.

    Fiscal policy has been severely constrained by the pact and it has not been allowed to support monetary policy, itself having become destabilising and contributing to the current eurozone recession.

    France and Germany must be right when they justify their violation of the fiscal rules by saying the pact has brought “too much stability and not enough growth.”

    Japan is emerging with some growth because of government commitment to fiscal deficit (currently at 7.5 per cent of gross domestic product—much higher than the pact’s 3 per cent). The US’s budget deficit will increase in the order of 6–7 per cent of GDP well into the future; it will not stabilise at the 2 per cent level as Mr. Feldstein argues. Indeed, the world is looking to the US with its changed fiscal stance, and not to the actions of the Federal Reserve, to become the motor of the global economy

    Published by:
    The Financial Times
  • In the Media | August 2003

    Europe's imposed stability, now it has to create growth


    The slowdown in economic growth and rising unemployment in the euro area, with major economies slipping into recession, have revealed serious faultlines in the stability and growth pact governing the euro area's macroeconomic policies. The pact dictates that budget deficits must not exceed 3% of GDP, with a requirement budgets are in balance or surplus on average. Countries that do not adhere to these limits are threatened with fines. It should come as no surprise that slowdown pushes up deficits and has taken some countries over the 3% limit, notably in Germany and France.

    For now, penalties for countries exceeding the limit have not been imposed and countries are given up to four years to meet the budget deficit requirements. Although there has been some bending of them, the rules remain in place. Indeed, the European Central Bank and members of the commission are demanding strict adherence to the rules of the pact in future. They are supported by the small countries of the eurozone, which complain that it is unfair for them to have to adhere to the pact while its main architects, Germany and France, do not.

    The ECB and some governments view the zone's slowdown as the result of structural factors—labour market rigidities above all—and the failure to tackle burgeoning budget deficits. The rigidities, though, have been around for a long time: during the 50s and 60s, when many European economies were booming, especially Germany's "economic miracle" of the 70s. It is adherence to the pact's rules to limit budget deficits, which thereby can require tax rises and expenditure cuts in the face of recession, that has promoted the present slowdown.

    This has not been helped by the ECB's inability to take action to stimulate the zone's economies. The recession has raised severe questions about the appropriateness of the institutional and policy arrangements governing the single currency and their ability to deal with unemployment, recession and inflation.

    The limit on budget deficits and the overall balanced budget requirement are severe, running counter to the experience of the past six decades, not allowing public capital investment to be funded by borrowing and more severe than necessary to maintain the 60% public debt to GDP ratio.

    Seeking to enforce the requirements of the pact imposes a substantial deflationary thrust and calls for flexibility in the pact's terms do not deal with the underlying problem. It is often argued the budget position of each country has to be restrained because of externalities, or spillover effects. These sometimes take the form of a government's spending putting upward pressure on interest rates and raising the cost of borrowing for others. This may then spill over into other countries and may cause the ECB to raise rates to dampen inflation.

    Without accepting that expenditure would necessarily have these effects, we would say the expansion of private sector spending could be expected to have similar effects to those resulting from public spending. Fluctuations in the overall level of expenditure come into play mostly because of fluctuations in private expenditure. The logic of imposing limits on public expenditure would also apply to the private sector. Perhaps there should be limits on private sector deficit or on the trade account.

    The pact threatens to become an "instability and no growth pact", with the thrust of fiscal and monetary policies pushing the eurozone economies in a deflationary direction, with Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands now in recession.

    No wonder the EC president, Romano Prodi, complains that current pact arrangements are "rigid" and "stupid", and it would not be an exaggeration to suggest they have also become a standing joke.

    France and Germany's justification for violating the fiscal rules is that the pact has delivered too much stability and not enough growth. Changes at this juncture in global economic development are very pressing. The falling dollar provides an opportunity for expansion. For, without strong growth outside the US, the economic imbalances may undermine the rest of the world's prospects.

    The euro countries should take a lead. What is needed is a fundamental change so a truly effective pact emerges. Coordination of monetary and fiscal policies is paramount but requires monetary authorities to enter into agreements with fiscal authorities and a removal of limits on national deficits. And those deficits should be used to ensure high levels of activity within the euro area.

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Phone: 845-758-7412
Fax: 845-758-7411
E-mail: [email protected]

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