Publications
In the Media
| January 2014
The "Problem" of Unemployment
Rania Antonopoulos
Kathimerini, January 31, 2014. All Rights Reserved.
The responses to unemployment by the last three governments [in Greece] have been characterized by sloppy proposals and an insignificant amount of funds in relation to the size of the problem. Regardless of whether there were political considerations behind it (or not), the recent announcement of the Prime Minister highlights, unfortunately, a relentless continuation of lack of understanding of reality.
The Prime Minister recently, on January 29, told us that unemployment is a "sneaky enemy" and proceeded to announce measures to tackle the problem. He also indicated that "we do not promise things we cannot do, and we say no to populism and fine words." The goal of the proposed measures, we heard, is to create 440,000 "work opportunities" of which 240,000 will target the unemployed 15–24 years of age, with no prior work experience. The announced measures totaling 1.4 billion Euro, will be financed by funds from the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), social funds from the EU, and are classified into three pillars.
Specifically, the first pillar sets a target to recruit 114,000 unemployed for the private sector, an initiative that essentially subsidizes wages and social security contributions for businesses that hire unemployed who are up to 29 years old and some who are unemployed between the ages of 30 to 60 years of age. The second pillar concerns 240,000 young persons. This program will provide work experience and training for all unemployed up to 24 years old, who have no prior work experience. These unemployed, will also go to private companies for some time, or participate in vocational training centers (VTC) to improve their skills in order to find their first job, or both. The third pillar concentrates in hiring 90,000 unemployed from households who have no employed person, who will work in community service projects in the public sector and local government.
Assuming that strict rules are in place, with dedicated control mechanisms that will guarantee nonreplacement of existing positions in the private and public sector (really, is there a sufficient number of public sector inspectors for this task?), prima facie, it all sounds positive and leads to the conclusion that at last the Prime Minister himself has publicly accepted his responsibility towards the citizens that have been left without a job. But, appearances can be deceiving.
Let's start with the obvious. If we divide the 1.4 billion euros with 440,000 job opportunities to be created in the next two years, we arrive at an average of 220,000, now unemployed, future employed per year, who will receive a total of 3,182 euros during one year. Namely, 265 euros per month. So these jobs offer underemployment, or starvation wages or both. Job opportunities? These interventions in reality provide employment for four to five months. Then what?
But, also, there was nothing new proposed. The present government, on January 10, 2013 had presented us with a National Action Plan for Youth Employment. The "Action Plan" consisted essentially of a compilation of already existing interventions, which, it should be noted, had already received miserably failing grades by ELIAMEP, through a study that they produced at the request of the National Bank of Greece. Mr. Samaras suggested the same and identical measures. If these “actions” have not worked in the past, why should we expect them to help now? This is important, because at this difficult hour it would be wise not to throw out the window EU funds. At the end, if the aim is to provide income support, let’s expand unemployment coverage, and not pretend we are creating jobs.
But the essential problem is that the proposed action plan is based on the wrong diagnosis. First, its focus is on the young unemployed, and secondly, it mistakenly identifies the causes of youth unemployment in "employability"–namely, inthe absence of knowledge, experience, and seniority.
Let's start with the second question first. The proposal carries a message that youth unemployment will fought through the acquisition and improvement of knowledge on the one hand (through VTC), and practical experience in temporary jobs in private sector companies. Success should be evaluated by the ability of participants to find a permanent job after termination of participation in these programs. Do we then expect the young graduates to find a job? how many new jobs were announced in 2013? What has changed since 2008 is demand for labor due to the tremendous reduction of GDP and not the quality of the labor supply of young people. Unemployment has sky rocketed [from 7.7 to over 27%] due to austerity, lack of liquidity SMEs face, and the rapid, albeit legal, reduction of salaries and pensions. These are more or less commonly accepted facts. 2008 employees aged 15–24 included approximately 270,300 young aged workers, when in 2013 there were only 125,300 (a 145,000 reduction). Similarly, today the total number of unemployed people aged 15–24 is approximately 178,500—in 2008 there were 72,300 (an increase of 106,200). The numbers speak for themselves.
Measures of "improving knowledge" will not do, not when our well-educated graduates migrate abroad massively. These "solutions" are of European origin and are ineffective because the main problem we face is that the private sector has shrunk and this has produced a plummeting of demand of the existing workforce due to the depth and duration of the recession—the problem is not lack of quality and skills of the labor force.
Let us now consider the first issue, the problem of youth unemployment. Indeed, the unemployment rate is very high among the youth and especially for 15–24 years, from 22.1% in 2008 to 57.2% today. But among the 1.3 billion unemployed (average of the first three quarter of 2013) the 1,186,000 are over 25 years old. According to the Hellenic Statistical Authority, all unemployed aged 15–24 amounted to 178,500. Recall that the second pillar consists of 240,000 unemployed young people aged up to 24 years! All the newcomers put together, among the 15–24 years of age, are less than 130.00. Even if we include new entrants ages 25–29, we reach 225,000 persons. The numbers are not consistent, at least not for the youth category of 15–24. Unless the same young person who participates one month in a training program and is then engaged in the private sector represents two “jobs.”
The age targeted measures are ill conceived, as is the focus on employability. Most tragic of all is that long-term unemployed by now hits approximately 900,000 unemployed, of which 844,000 are not in the category of “youth.” Among them, 224,100 have been out of paid work for more than 48 months (4 years) and an additional 317.00 unemployed, for 24–47 months. For all these long-term unemployed, including those who have exhausted their resources and cannot pay even their electricity bill, for the 777, 000 unemployed who have a high school education level or lower, the announcement of Mr. Samaras highlights that there will be some lucky 200,000 young and more mature workers (440,000 minus 240, 000 people) that will be offered an “employment opportunity” for a few months out of a year in the private or public sector, receiving the meager earnings mentioned earlier.
What must be urgently understood is that although the economy is now approaching the area of balancing the internal and external balance of payments and the pressure on further depressing the economy gradually slows down, this does not automatically lead to recovery. The economy can remain at frighteningly low production levels, high unemployment and income inequality of catastrophic dimensions. Recovery needs high and sustained private and public investment rates, and certainly gradual relief from the austerity measures. But let us remember that the decade before the crisis, with on average GDP growth about 4%, the economy created each year, on average, 55–60 thousand new jobs. Even if the growth rate returns to precrisis levels, at 4%, generating even 50–60 thousand new jobs per year, to reach the employment levels of 1998 to 2008 will be impossible in the near future; the figures for unemployment are so high, that the next decade will be 'lost', including for people sent to educational training centers.
It is reasonable to ask, What can the poor government do when it has to deal with the Troika "requirements" of the one hand and the NSRF European Unon funds on the other, which are focused on these specific "actions"? Negotiate hard and convince their "partners" that the yardstick for introducing or maintaining conditionality measures, structural and otherwise, at this time is whether they increase unemployed or not; and point out to other partners that these "actions" against unemployment are incompatible with the Greek reality—that the "Youth Guarantee" and the rest should be channeled to other types of interventions.
The time has come to stop recycling the same distorted views. This crisis requires urgently a custom tailored Greek New Deal, which should last for at least the next three years. That is, the extension of a radically reorganized job guarantee program*, a community-based program of "koinofelis ergasia" not for five months but for 11 months per year, not for the 50,000–90,000 jobs for the unemployed but 440,000 real year-round jobs. As for what it will cost and where will we find the money, I reserve the right to provide relevant information next month through a study of the Levy Institute in cooperation with INE / GSEE [General Confederation of Trade Unions]. There is a solution, but it requires getting rid of current obsessions and to not follow the beaten track. Whether the political will of the current government to do so exists, is another matter.
*The Levy Institute was instrumental in proposing a Job Guarantee policy for Greece, which was adopted by the Ministry of Labor in 2011, as a pilot program for 55,000 unemployed. It was rolled out in 2012 and was run through the NGO sector in collaboration with local and community governing bodies. For a background document that includes guidance notes on how best to design and implement such an initiative see http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=1458.
The responses to unemployment by the last three governments [in Greece] have been characterized by sloppy proposals and an insignificant amount of funds in relation to the size of the problem. Regardless of whether there were political considerations behind it (or not), the recent announcement of the Prime Minister highlights, unfortunately, a relentless continuation of lack of understanding of reality.
The Prime Minister recently, on January 29, told us that unemployment is a "sneaky enemy" and proceeded to announce measures to tackle the problem. He also indicated that "we do not promise things we cannot do, and we say no to populism and fine words." The goal of the proposed measures, we heard, is to create 440,000 "work opportunities" of which 240,000 will target the unemployed 15–24 years of age, with no prior work experience. The announced measures totaling 1.4 billion Euro, will be financed by funds from the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), social funds from the EU, and are classified into three pillars.
Specifically, the first pillar sets a target to recruit 114,000 unemployed for the private sector, an initiative that essentially subsidizes wages and social security contributions for businesses that hire unemployed who are up to 29 years old and some who are unemployed between the ages of 30 to 60 years of age. The second pillar concerns 240,000 young persons. This program will provide work experience and training for all unemployed up to 24 years old, who have no prior work experience. These unemployed, will also go to private companies for some time, or participate in vocational training centers (VTC) to improve their skills in order to find their first job, or both. The third pillar concentrates in hiring 90,000 unemployed from households who have no employed person, who will work in community service projects in the public sector and local government.
Assuming that strict rules are in place, with dedicated control mechanisms that will guarantee nonreplacement of existing positions in the private and public sector (really, is there a sufficient number of public sector inspectors for this task?), prima facie, it all sounds positive and leads to the conclusion that at last the Prime Minister himself has publicly accepted his responsibility towards the citizens that have been left without a job. But, appearances can be deceiving.
Let's start with the obvious. If we divide the 1.4 billion euros with 440,000 job opportunities to be created in the next two years, we arrive at an average of 220,000, now unemployed, future employed per year, who will receive a total of 3,182 euros during one year. Namely, 265 euros per month. So these jobs offer underemployment, or starvation wages or both. Job opportunities? These interventions in reality provide employment for four to five months. Then what?
But, also, there was nothing new proposed. The present government, on January 10, 2013 had presented us with a National Action Plan for Youth Employment. The "Action Plan" consisted essentially of a compilation of already existing interventions, which, it should be noted, had already received miserably failing grades by ELIAMEP, through a study that they produced at the request of the National Bank of Greece. Mr. Samaras suggested the same and identical measures. If these “actions” have not worked in the past, why should we expect them to help now? This is important, because at this difficult hour it would be wise not to throw out the window EU funds. At the end, if the aim is to provide income support, let’s expand unemployment coverage, and not pretend we are creating jobs.
But the essential problem is that the proposed action plan is based on the wrong diagnosis. First, its focus is on the young unemployed, and secondly, it mistakenly identifies the causes of youth unemployment in "employability"–namely, inthe absence of knowledge, experience, and seniority.
Let's start with the second question first. The proposal carries a message that youth unemployment will fought through the acquisition and improvement of knowledge on the one hand (through VTC), and practical experience in temporary jobs in private sector companies. Success should be evaluated by the ability of participants to find a permanent job after termination of participation in these programs. Do we then expect the young graduates to find a job? how many new jobs were announced in 2013? What has changed since 2008 is demand for labor due to the tremendous reduction of GDP and not the quality of the labor supply of young people. Unemployment has sky rocketed [from 7.7 to over 27%] due to austerity, lack of liquidity SMEs face, and the rapid, albeit legal, reduction of salaries and pensions. These are more or less commonly accepted facts. 2008 employees aged 15–24 included approximately 270,300 young aged workers, when in 2013 there were only 125,300 (a 145,000 reduction). Similarly, today the total number of unemployed people aged 15–24 is approximately 178,500—in 2008 there were 72,300 (an increase of 106,200). The numbers speak for themselves.
Measures of "improving knowledge" will not do, not when our well-educated graduates migrate abroad massively. These "solutions" are of European origin and are ineffective because the main problem we face is that the private sector has shrunk and this has produced a plummeting of demand of the existing workforce due to the depth and duration of the recession—the problem is not lack of quality and skills of the labor force.
Let us now consider the first issue, the problem of youth unemployment. Indeed, the unemployment rate is very high among the youth and especially for 15–24 years, from 22.1% in 2008 to 57.2% today. But among the 1.3 billion unemployed (average of the first three quarter of 2013) the 1,186,000 are over 25 years old. According to the Hellenic Statistical Authority, all unemployed aged 15–24 amounted to 178,500. Recall that the second pillar consists of 240,000 unemployed young people aged up to 24 years! All the newcomers put together, among the 15–24 years of age, are less than 130.00. Even if we include new entrants ages 25–29, we reach 225,000 persons. The numbers are not consistent, at least not for the youth category of 15–24. Unless the same young person who participates one month in a training program and is then engaged in the private sector represents two “jobs.”
The age targeted measures are ill conceived, as is the focus on employability. Most tragic of all is that long-term unemployed by now hits approximately 900,000 unemployed, of which 844,000 are not in the category of “youth.” Among them, 224,100 have been out of paid work for more than 48 months (4 years) and an additional 317.00 unemployed, for 24–47 months. For all these long-term unemployed, including those who have exhausted their resources and cannot pay even their electricity bill, for the 777, 000 unemployed who have a high school education level or lower, the announcement of Mr. Samaras highlights that there will be some lucky 200,000 young and more mature workers (440,000 minus 240, 000 people) that will be offered an “employment opportunity” for a few months out of a year in the private or public sector, receiving the meager earnings mentioned earlier.
What must be urgently understood is that although the economy is now approaching the area of balancing the internal and external balance of payments and the pressure on further depressing the economy gradually slows down, this does not automatically lead to recovery. The economy can remain at frighteningly low production levels, high unemployment and income inequality of catastrophic dimensions. Recovery needs high and sustained private and public investment rates, and certainly gradual relief from the austerity measures. But let us remember that the decade before the crisis, with on average GDP growth about 4%, the economy created each year, on average, 55–60 thousand new jobs. Even if the growth rate returns to precrisis levels, at 4%, generating even 50–60 thousand new jobs per year, to reach the employment levels of 1998 to 2008 will be impossible in the near future; the figures for unemployment are so high, that the next decade will be 'lost', including for people sent to educational training centers.
It is reasonable to ask, What can the poor government do when it has to deal with the Troika "requirements" of the one hand and the NSRF European Unon funds on the other, which are focused on these specific "actions"? Negotiate hard and convince their "partners" that the yardstick for introducing or maintaining conditionality measures, structural and otherwise, at this time is whether they increase unemployed or not; and point out to other partners that these "actions" against unemployment are incompatible with the Greek reality—that the "Youth Guarantee" and the rest should be channeled to other types of interventions.
The time has come to stop recycling the same distorted views. This crisis requires urgently a custom tailored Greek New Deal, which should last for at least the next three years. That is, the extension of a radically reorganized job guarantee program*, a community-based program of "koinofelis ergasia" not for five months but for 11 months per year, not for the 50,000–90,000 jobs for the unemployed but 440,000 real year-round jobs. As for what it will cost and where will we find the money, I reserve the right to provide relevant information next month through a study of the Levy Institute in cooperation with INE / GSEE [General Confederation of Trade Unions]. There is a solution, but it requires getting rid of current obsessions and to not follow the beaten track. Whether the political will of the current government to do so exists, is another matter.
*The Levy Institute was instrumental in proposing a Job Guarantee policy for Greece, which was adopted by the Ministry of Labor in 2011, as a pilot program for 55,000 unemployed. It was rolled out in 2012 and was run through the NGO sector in collaboration with local and community governing bodies. For a background document that includes guidance notes on how best to design and implement such an initiative see http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=1458.
Associated Program(s):
Author(s):
Publication Highlight
Quick Search
