Research Topics

A Stock-Flow Consistent Approach to the Currency Hierarchy

Underdevelopment is often conceived as being reproduced domestically. This paper emphasizes the international forces that enable the persistence of underdevelopment. We first explore how the currency hierarchy imposes a dependency relation between developed and underdeveloped economies. We improvise and quantify the currency hierarchy using ratios from the consolidated sovereign balance sheet. Using the improvisation of the currency hierarchy, we identify that a weak currency must compensate its position by resorting to three mechanisms: changes in interest rates, changes in exchange rates, and accumulation of international reserves to improve balance sheet structure. We employ these relationships to formulate two novel, financial post-Keynesian behavioral equations: an international reserves function and a domestic interest rate function. These equations are simulated in a stock-flow consistent model. We simulate the transmission of international shocks and domestic fiscal expansion. The key findings are (1) that the intensity of economic activity in the emerging economy is reliant on the level of economic activity (and policy) i n the developed economy and (2) that any attempts to stimulate—through government spending—the emerging economy benefit primarily the developed economy while harming the emerging economy’s private sector, assuming free capital and goods mobility. This indicates the existence of a balance-of-payment constrained expansion originating from the demand for international reserves as a margin of safety. Simulations show import controls to be a solution. We find government spending complemented by import substitution to be the most appropriate response to a crisis of international origin and suggest the need for international cohesion between emerging economies to create a more conducive international financial and trade system, halting the reproduction of underdevelopment. 

Is It Worth the Premium? What Are the Alternatives?

Following an analysis of the forces behind the “global capital flows paradox” observed in the era of advancing financial globalization, this paper sets out to investigate the opportunity costs of self-insurance through precautionary reserve holdings. We reject the idea of reserves as low-cost protection against the vagaries of global finance. We also deny that arrangements giving rise to their rapid accumulation might be sustainable in the first place. Alternative policy options open to developing countries are explored, designed to limit both the risks of financial globalization and the costs of insurance-type responses. We propose comprehensive capital account management as an alternative to full capital account liberalization. The aims of a permanent regulatory regime of capital controls, with respect to both the aggregate size and the composition of capital flows, are twofold: first, to maintain sufficient macro policy space; second, to assure a good micro fit of external expertise incorporated in foreign direct investment as part of a country’s development strategy.